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One can sign away one’s constitutional rights by contract, though histori-
cally that has been allowed only when there were plenty of other options. 
One could choose, for example, to sign a contract forbidding engaging in 
public political speech, even on one’s personal time, in order to work for a 
telephone company concerned about being welcome in every home in the 
community— in the past, though, under conditions in which if that were 
not acceptable there were plenty of other jobs available on a par in terms 
of skills required, pay, a visible career path, and so on. You had a choice.
In contrast, already by the turn of the century, comparative analysis of 
the terms of service and acceptable use agreements, the contracts we sign 
with Internet service providers (ISPs) and platforms by clicking through on 
them, found the terms of these contracts across providers were converging. 
And they were doing so in ways destructive of the human rights that are 
core to most constitutions and constitution- like foundations of national 
law in protections for civil liberties (see “Advantage ISP”). US constitutional 
law, for example, forbids the use of language in laws or regulations that is 
vague (reasonable adults may not agree on its meaning) or overbroad (cov-
ering far more activity and types of communication than is the intended 
target of a particular law or regulation). Both types of language are not only 
rife in, but characteristic of, terms of service agreements. This convergence 
of the provisions of terms of service means that, on the Internet, there has 
been nowhere else, effectively, to go, if offered a contract you considered 
abusive of human rights. The subject addressed by this book, on threats to 
human rights from private sector entities in the online environment, could 
not be more important.
Series Editor’s Introduction
Sandra Braman
viii Series Editor’s Introduction
Theories of free speech typically focus on one problem: how to maximize 
the possibilities for rich and diverse public discourse about shared matters 
of public concern under conditions in which there may be threats to those 
rights from governments. As Edwin C. Baker and others have pointed out, 
though, with the commercial broadcasting that has dominated the globe 
ever since the liberalization waves of the late twentieth century, a second 
problem has to be solved at the same time: in economists’ terms, a sec-
ond market had to be served— advertisers. Thinking about free speech in 
a two- sided market rather than an environment conceived to serve only 
one “market,” comprised of the needs of citizens and citizenship, makes 
analyses more complex. And, importantly, it inverts the relationship of the 
problem to policy making. Historically, thinking and practice with respect 
to protecting free speech have been focused on preventing the government 
from inappropriately affecting the speech environment in what we might 
think of as a single market problem. When the problem involves a two- 
sided market, though, the question becomes how the government can best 
intervene, using laws and policy, to support the public speech environment 
and help it thrive.
What we have now, as is pointed out in Human Rights in the Age of Plat-
forms, is a third class of problem— those created by multisided market 
markets. With this, the challenge for policy makers of all types (whether 
public sector or private, organizational or individual) is that the problem 
becomes yet more complex again by another order of magnitude. There 
is a second challenge to human rights in cyberspace when framed in eco-
nomic terms, as well. The information economy in which we now live is, 
so to speak, an expanding universe. The economic domain is itself grow-
ing by commodifying types of information and informational interactions 
that had not previously been treated as something that can be bought 
and sold. This way of conceptualizing the information economy was intro-
duced by political economists in the 1970s as the second of the four ways 
of conceptualizing “the information economy” that have appeared since 
the 1960s, all simultaneously in use today theoretically, rhetorically, and 
operationally. (The first to appear was an approach that understood the 
information economy as one in which everything operates as it always 
had, but industries in the information sector had become proportionately 
more important than those in other economic sectors. Later, approaches 
appeared that focused on transformations in the nature of economic 
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processes themselves— emphasizing cooperation and coordination for 
long- term economic success in addition to competition—[often referred to 
as the network economy] and, in the twenty- first century, appreciation of the 
ways in which representation has replaced empirical data as the founda-
tion of economic decision- making [an approach in which the information 
economy is called a representational economy].)
By the 1990s, there were consulting firms and business schools with 
advice about just how to take advantage of informational opportunities to 
make profit from this expansion of the economic universe. The intellectual 
capital movement of that era developed alternative accounting schemes 
for these new forms of value, and the industrial classification codes so fun-
damental to the accounting systems of importance for regulation as well 
as financial purposes were revised in that era as well for the same reasons; 
in the US this meant replacing the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
codes with the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), 
while internationally these were transformations that took place within 
the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) code system. This 
same insight into what makes the information economy different from the 
industrial economy was also a driving force behind the formation of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) and the development of associated trea-
ties, such as the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), which for 
the first time incorporated trade in services into international trade agree-
ments. (The prize for the best definition of “services” for this purpose still 
goes to The Economist, which defined it in 1984 as “anything that can be 
bought and sold that cannot be dropped on your foot.”)
What all of this means for human rights is that the proportion of our 
lifeworlds, of what we all do on a daily basis with our friends, colleagues, 
neighbors, allies, and fellow citizens, for which human rights abuses pres-
ents threats, is growing. The emphasis here is not on the egregious exam-
ples of extraordinary situations, but on the “normal,” whether that is the 
normal as we are coming to accept it or the normal as we would prefer it 
to be. We live, that is, in an expanding universe of possible human rights 
issues that might arise in association with our ordinary use of digital tech-
nologies or because these technologies are embedded in our habitual or 
expected contexts.
Spending several days at a meeting of the Internet Engineering Task 
Force in November 2017 was humbling in this regard. A growing number 
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of those involved in this group, which is responsible for the always ongoing 
effort of Internet design, are working on the problem of inserting explicit 
attention to human rights issues formally into the processes through which 
a proposed protocol for the Internet becomes the official protocol. Spend-
ing several days in sessions under the guidance of members of this group 
who were sophisticated both regarding the technologies involved and the 
processes of the organization made clear that the problem of privacy was 
a whack- a- mole problem, appearing in a high percentage of conversations, 
each devoted to a specific technical issue, each within its own working 
group and topical problem track. With every new technological devel-
opment, new privacy problems appear. From the human rights side, the 
problem may be a lack of comprehension of the technical possibilities and 
constraints of the systems to which critiques and demands for protection 
are being addressed.
Human Rights in the Age of Platforms can serve as a primer for all of us. In 
the gifted intellectual and editorial hands of Rikke Frank Jørgensen, these 
authors make visible the human rights problems specific to those environ-
ments controlled by the private sector (essentially all of them) rather than 
in the geopolitical and legal terms that have dominated the human rights 
discourses of the past. The book provides, in essence, an environmental 
approach in that the cases addressed range across the various facets of our 
lives. They bring to bear theories and insights from multiple disciplines and, 
for many, life experience working on human rights issues on the ground.
It is not an encouraging time to be thinking about human rights, 
whether in the offline or online environment. But it is encouraging to have 
such thoughtful scholars, thinkers, and practitioners to help us understand 
the fundamental human rights issues of our era as we seek to develop the 
means to address them offered by this foundational work.
Foreword
David Kaye
UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression
On the shelf beside my desk rest a number of recent and already dog- eared 
books about the digital age: Consent of the Networked by Rebecca MacK-
innon, The Attention Merchants by Tim Wu, China’s Contested Internet by 
Guobin Yang, Twitter and Tear Gas by Zeynep Tufekci, The Net Delusion by 
Evgeny Morozov, Weapons of Math Destruction by Cathy O’Neill, and Drag-
net Nation by Julia Angwin. Stacked nearby are countless nongovernmental 
organization reports and academic studies about the ways in which the 
Internet is affecting the enjoyment of human rights, with titles like Tainted 
Leaks (Citizen Lab), Online and on All Fronts (Human Rights Watch), Let the 
Mob Do the Job (Association for Progressive Communications), Troops, Trolls 
and Troublemakers (Oxford Internet Institute), and ¿Quién defiende tus datos? 
(Derechos Digitales).
What connects these disparate publications? Apart from all having a 
focus on the individual’s experience in the digital age, not a single one tells 
a hopeful story about personal autonomy, freedom of expression, security, 
or privacy online. Not one of these publications highlights the ways in 
which the Internet has opened broad avenues of communication among 
cultures, permitted the sharing of information and ideas across borders, 
and offered vast expanses of knowledge that can be traversed from link to 
link and thread to thread online. Some of them focus on the repression of 
governments that criminalize expression online or conduct surveillance of 
their citizens and others. Some drill down into the ways in which private 
companies govern quasi- public space, share information with governments 
seeking access to their networks, or simply give the false impression of pri-
vacy or security in the shadow of what Peter Swire has called “The Golden 
Age of Surveillance.”
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Are there stories about private actors expanding or simply protecting 
human rights? Of course, they do exist. Indeed, the story that dominated 
about twenty years of public discourse, from about 1990 to 2010, was the 
story of private innovation breaking through old barriers of distance to 
develop technologies that have created and then forever altered the “infor-
mation society.” Those stories are still told, ones about atheists in religious 
societies using the Internet for connection, sexual minorities going online 
to gain knowledge about health and well- being, and critics and dissenters 
using the tools of social media to share information and organize for protest.
The truth is, the books on my shelf and the publications in my in- box 
reflect changes in the way most stakeholders now think about the Internet. 
According to an increasingly dominant narrative, the Internet is a place 
of darkness, danger, propaganda, misogyny, harassment, and incitement, 
which private actors are doing little to ameliorate. (Where do you read 
these complaints? On the Internet!) Worldwide, people are worried, legisla-
tors are energized, and the gears of regulation have been engaged. An era of 
Internet laissez- faire is over or at least coming to a close. To be sure, repres-
sive governments have been imposing costs on private actors in digital 
space for many years, especially those actors— such as telecommunications 
and Internet service providers— subject to licensing rules as a condition 
of participation in a local market. Many perform a kind of regulation by 
denying entry into markets; blocking, filtering, or throttling digital traffic; 
providing beneficial network access to friends and limiting that access to 
critics; and performing other tricks of the digital censor.
But the regulatory buzz is not limited to the repressive. Some rules— such 
as those pertaining to intellectual property, like the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act in the United States— have been in place for decades, giv-
ing some private actors the power to shape in often very problematic ways 
the nature of expression and creation online. Recent years have shown 
deepening interest in regulation, as governments are eager to gain some 
measure of control over Internet space in an era of digital distress. Euro-
pean institutions are in the lead, developing regulatory models that may 
be replicated worldwide. The European Court of Justice has taken on per-
sonal reputational control with the right to be forgotten (or the right to 
erasure), outsourcing its implementation to Google. The European Court 
of Human Rights has danced around the possibility of intermediary liabil-
ity for third- party expression. The United States and Europe have been in 
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deep negotiations over the future of privacy ever since the collapse of the 
Safe Harbour standards in the treatment of personal data of Europeans. The 
European Union has imposed a code of conduct for social media companies 
and search engines to follow in the context of extremist and terrorist con-
tent, and it seems poised at the time of this writing to enter into the fraught 
space of disinformation and propaganda, so- called “fake” or “junk” news.
Amid the calls for regulation in democratic societies and the acts of 
government repression elsewhere, there is one undeniable fact about the 
digital age: at the center is the private company. Whether it’s the telco pro-
viding digital access, or the social media company providing space for con-
versation, or one of any number of other actors in sibling industries, private 
companies in the digital age exercise enormous control. They connect users 
and providers of information and ideas. They sell user data and user atten-
tion. They moderate (or regulate) user speech. They cooperate with or resist 
government demands. In short, they often are either the governors of space 
visited by billions or the mediators between the individual and the gov-
ernment. This is a massive role and, depending on how you see it, a vital 
responsibility. Just whose responsibility is subject to debate.
This volume, a collection of studies by some of the leading thinkers at 
the nexus of private action and public regulation in the digital age, intro-
duces the most difficult legal and policy questions of the digital age. It 
presents theoretical insights about the transformations brought about by 
private actors. It offers specific examples of private power that implicates 
the rights of individual users. It provides legal frameworks for all stake-
holders to think through the problems of human rights protection in an 
environment so dominated by private companies. All of this the volume 
does without either the hysteria of the moment’s particular crises or, at the 
other end of the spectrum, a jargony disconnection from the experience of 
real human beings.
The real challenge for the next generation of legislators and regulators, 
particularly those of good faith operating in democratic societies, is to 
shape new laws that meet two conditions: First, at a minimum, they must 
promote and protect everyone’s rights, such as the right to seek, receive, 
and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers and 
through any media as provided by Article 19 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights. They must be compliant with international 
human rights norms, protecting users who enjoy rights. Second, law must 
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protect users— and society as a whole— from the harms caused by the spe-
cial features of the digital age. That is easier said than done, perhaps, but 
the preservation of the original vision of the Internet should be at the top 
of all stakeholders’ agendas moving forward. This volume guides us toward 
that goal.
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This book is concerned with the human rights implications of the “social 
web.”1 Companies such as Google, Facebook, Apple, Microsoft, Twitter, 
LinkedIn, and Yahoo! play an increasingly important role as managers of 
services and platforms that effectively shape the norms and boundaries for 
how users may form and express opinions, encounter information, debate, 
disagree, mobilize, and retain a sense of privacy. The technical affordances, 
user contracts, and governing practices of these services and platforms have 
significant consequences for the level of human rights protection, both in 
terms of the opportunities they offer and the potential harm they can cause.
Whereas part of public life and discourse was also embedded in commer-
cial structures in the pre- Internet era, the current situation is different in 
scope and character. The commercial press that is often referred to as the 
backbone of the Fourth Estate was supplemented by a broad range of civic 
activities and deliberations (Elkin- Koren and Weinstock Netanel 2002, vii). 
Moreover, in contrast to today’s technology giants, the commercial press 
was guided by media law and relatively clear expectations as to the role of 
the press in society, meaning an explicit and regulated (although imperfect 
on many counts) role in relation to public deliberation and participation.
In contrast to this, the platforms and services that make up the social 
web are based on the double logic of public participation and commercial 
interest (Gillespie 2010). Arguably, over the past twenty years, these com-
panies have facilitated a revolution in access to information and commu-
nication and have had a transformative impact on individuals’ ability to 
express, assemble, mobilize, inform, learn, educate, and so on around the 
globe. At the same time, the ability of states to compel action by the com-
panies has put the human rights implications of their practices increasingly 
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high on the international agenda (Sullivan 2016, 7). Most recently, con-
cern has been raised as to the democratic implications of having a group 
of relatively few and powerful companies moderate and govern what is 
effectively the “the greatest expansion of access to information in history” 
(Kaye 2016). Despite the civic- minded narratives used to describe their ser-
vices (Jørgensen 2017b; Moore 2016), the companies ultimately answer to 
shareholders rather than the public interest, and especially Google’s and 
Facebook’s business practices have increasingly been under scrutiny in the 
public debate.
The revenue model of the widely used platforms imply that the expres-
sions, discussions, queries, searches, and controversies that make up peo-
ple’s social life in the online domain form part of a personal information 
economy (Elmer 2004). Advertising is no longer simply the dominant way 
to pay for information and culture (Lewis 2016), as has long been the case 
within “old media,” but has taken on a new dimension in that an unprec-
edented amount of social interaction is used to control markets. Whereas 
data was previously “considered a byproduct” of interactions with media, 
major Internet companies have become “data firms,” deriving their wealth 
from the abilities to harvest, analyze, and use personal data rather than 
from “user activity proper” (van Dijck and Poell 2013, 9). The data mining 
of personal information is paradoxical, as there is no demand or prefer-
ence for it among consumers, yet it is accepted as a kind of cultural tax 
that allows users to avoid paying directly for the services provided (Lewis 
2016, 95). Scholars have cautioned that these current practices represent 
a largely uncontested “new expression of power” (Zuboff 2015) that has 
severe impacts on human agency and on democracy more broadly, as elab-
orated by Zuboff in this volume. As these new practices permeate our econ-
omies, social interactions, and intimate selves, there is an urgent need for 
an understanding of their relationship with human rights.
Human rights are a set of legally codified norms that apply to all human 
beings, irrespective of national borders. International human rights law lays 
down obligations of governments to act in certain ways or to refrain from 
certain acts, in order to promote and protect human rights of individuals 
or groups.2 As such, it governs the relationship between the individual and 
the state, but it does not directly govern the activities of the private sector, 
although the state has an obligation to protect individuals against human 
rights harms in the realm of private parties.
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In recent years there have been a variety of initiatives that provide guid-
ance to companies to ensure compliance with human rights, most notably 
the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, adopted by the UN 
Human Rights Council in 2011 (UNGPs; United Nations Human Rights 
Council 2011). According to these Guiding Principles, any business entity 
has a responsibility to respect human rights, and as part of this, to carry out 
human rights due diligence, which requires companies to identify, assess, 
address, and report on their human rights impacts. Moreover, the Guiding 
Principles state that businesses should be prepared to communicate how 
they address their human rights impacts externally, particularly when con-
cerns are raised by or on behalf of affected stakeholders.
The commonly stated claim that human rights apply online as they do 
offline fails to recognize that in a domain dominated by privately owned 
platforms and services, individuals’ ability to enjoy their human rights is 
closely related to whether states have decided to encode them into national 
regulation applicable to companies and/or the willingness of companies to 
undertake human rights due diligence. In Europe, for example, the former is 
the case with online privacy rights, which enjoy protection under the new 
EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) irrespective of whether the 
data processing is carried out by a public institution or a private company.3
In order to address the interdisciplinary nature, scope, and complexity 
of these questions, the book is organized into three parts. The first is a the-
oretical and conceptual part that highlights areas in which datafication4 
and the social web have implications for the protection of human rights. 
The second is a more practice- oriented part that explores examples of plat-
form governance and rulemaking, and the third is a legal part that discusses 
human rights under pressure, focusing in particular on the right to freedom 
of expression and privacy, but also addressing human rights and standards 
related to equality and nondiscrimination, participation, transparency, 
access to remedies, and the rule of law. The ultimate goal of the book is to 
contribute to a more robust system of human rights protection in a domain 
largely facilitated by corporate actors. While the cases and examples used 
are for the most part focused on a European and US context, the challenges 
this book addresses are global by nature as is most clearly illustrated in the 
chapters by Callamard and York and Zuckerman.
Before introducing the chapters in more detail, I will outline some of 
debates and literature that have served as inspiration for this book, most 
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notably discourses on the “platform society” and its democratic implica-
tions. As part of this, I will briefly introduce the broad field of “human 
rights and technology,” as well as the human rights and business frame-
work, in order to situate the specific conceptualization of this book and the 
human rights questions it is concerned with.
The Platform Society
In recent years, the notion of “platform” has become the prevailing way to 
describe the services and revenue model that make up the social web (Hel-
mond 2015, 5). The defining characteristic of these platforms is not that 
they create objects of consumption but rather that they create the world 
within which such objects can exist (Lazzarato 2004, 188). In short, the 
platforms give us our horizons, or our sense of the possible (Langlois et al. 
2009, 430). Via integrating buttons (like, tweet, etc.), the platforms expand 
beyond single services to the extent that the platform logic is visible and 
present across the entire web. The code and policies of the platform impose 
specific boundaries on social acts, and as such, the platform allows a certain 
predefined kind of social engagement (see the chapter by Flyverbom and 
Whelan in this volume). For example, you can like and have friends, but 
not a list of enemies. Further, the platforms’ economic interest in gathering 
user data implies that one cannot study a single layer but must acknowl-
edge the intimate relationship between the technical affordances and the 
underlying economic interests.
Arguably, the corporate logic, algorithms, and informational architec-
tures of major platforms now play a central role in providing the very 
material means of existence of online publics. These combined elements 
regulate the “coming into being” of a public by imposing specific possibil-
ities and limitations on user activity (Langlois et al. 2009, 417). Effectively, 
these platforms construct the conditions for public participation on the 
web. This key role prompts us to seek an understanding of their combined 
articulation of code and economic interests and how this logic defines the 
conditions and premises for online participation— in short, the paradox 
that exists between tools used to facilitate and free communication and 
the opacity and complexity of an architecture governed by the economies 
of data mining (ibid., 420). The economies of data mining redefine rela-
tions of power, not merely by selling user attention but by tapping into 
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“the everyday life” of users and refashioning it from within, guided by 
commercial norms such as the presumed value to advertisers (Langlois 
and Elmer 2013, 4). This power perspective has also been highlighted in 
recent software studies, albeit from a different perspective, focusing on the 
interests that algorithms afford and serve in their specific manifestation 
(Bucher 2012), and thus how these algorithms rule (Gillespie 2014, 168). 
Yet scholarship has only recently begun to struggle with the broader soci-
etal implications of having technology companies define the boundaries 
and conditions for online social life and a networked public sphere. In 
addition, there is an increasing awareness of the difficulty for researchers in 
studying the technical, economic, and political priorities that guide major 
platforms due to their largely inaccessible, “complex and black- boxed 
architecture” (Langlois et al. 2009, 416). While major platforms effectively 
influence whether the notion of a public sphere for democratic dialogue 
can be sustained into the future (Mansell 2015), we have limited knowl-
edge of how they operate and limited means of holding them accountable 
to fundamental rights and freedoms.
From a regulatory perspective, the companies that control the major 
platforms for information search, social networking, and public discourse 
of all kinds “squeeze themselves between traditional news companies and 
their two customer segments, the audience and the advertisers” (Latzer et 
al. 2014, 18). They benefit from substantial economies of scale and a scope 
of operation that enables them to exploit enormous information assets 
(Mansell 2015, 20), while their global character detaches them from the 
close structural coupling between the systems of law and politics that is the 
paradigm of the nation- state (Graber 2016, 22). While the companies often 
frame themselves as neutral “conduits” for traffic and hosts for content cre-
ators, they have the power to influence which ideas are easily located and 
how boundaries for public discourse are set, as elaborated by York and Zuck-
erman in this volume. The capacity of these companies to screen out desir-
able content without the user’s knowledge is as significant as their capacity 
to screen out undesirable content. “Citizens cannot choose to view what 
they are not aware of or to protest about the absence of content which they 
cannot discover” (Mansell 2015, 24). In short, the regulatory challenge does 
not concern only cases in which the companies exercise direct editorial 
control over content. At a more fundamental level, it is about whether their 
practices shape the user’s online experience in ways that are inconsistent 
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with human rights standards relating to rights of expression, public partic-
ipation, nondiscrimination, media plurality, privacy, and so forth. When 
their gatekeeping efforts diminish the quality or variety of content accessed 
by citizens, result in discriminatory treatment, or lead to unwanted 
surveillance, there is a prime facie case for policy oversight (ibid., 3). 
We shall return to this point below when addressing the human rights 
responsibilities of these companies.
Private Control, Public Values
Since Habermas’ seminal work on transformations of the public sphere, var-
ious aspects of commercialization have been raised and widely elaborated in 
relation to the increasing power of private media corporations over public 
discourse, not least concerning their economic and institutional configura-
tions (Verstraeten 2007, 78). Since public spaces relate to general principles 
of democracy as locations where “dissent and affirmation become visible” 
(Staeheli and Mitchell 2007, 1), their configurations and modalities of own-
ership, regulation, and governance greatly impact individuals’ means of 
participating in online public life. Oldenburg’s (1997) original work on The 
Great Good Place (or the “third place”), for example, considers the role of 
physical space in democratic culture and the conflict between these spaces 
and the commercial imperative that informs the contemporary design of 
cities and communities. By contrast, the commercial aspects of the online 
public sphere are a less researched topic although this has begun to change 
as scholarship increasingly examines how the political economy of online 
platforms affects social practices and public discourse, and what kind of 
public sphere may develop as a result (Gillespie 2010, 2018; Goldberg 2011; 
Mansell 2015).
Arguably, the major platforms of the social web have developed an 
incredibly successful revenue model based on collection of users’ personal 
data, preferences, and behavior. The platforms facilitate communications 
within society, while also harnessing communication in an effort to mon-
etize it (Langlois and Elmer 2013, 2). “Corporate social media platforms 
constantly enact these double articulations: while on the surface they seem 
to promote unfettered communication, they work in their back- end of data 
processing and analysis to transform and translate acts of communication 
into valuable data” (ibid., 6). Since harnessing of personal information is 
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at the core of this revenue model, it calls for reconsideration of both “per-
sonal” and “information” in order to adequately protect users’ online pri-
vacy as discussed extensively by Mai in this volume.
On a legal level, the harnessing of personal information implies “the 
organized activity of exchange, supported by the legal infrastructure of 
private- property- plus- free- contract” (Radin 2002, 4). The value of personal 
information has been debated in a series of Facebook- commissioned reports 
on how to “sustainably maximize the contribution that personal data 
makes to the economy, to society, and to individuals” (Ctrl- Shift 2015, 3). 
It is also the topic of annual PIE (Personal Information Economy) confer-
ences, held by Ctrl- Shift.5 The first report explains how mass customization 
is enabled by information about specific things and people. “Today’s prac-
tices, whether they drive the production of a coupon or a digital advertise-
ment, employ data analysts and complex computational power to analyze 
data from a multitude of devices and target ads with optimal efficiency, 
relevance and personalization” (ibid., 9). As noted in the report, the per-
sonal information economy has given rise to a number of concerns, such 
as the lack of a reasonable mechanism of consent, a sense of “creepiness,” 
fears of manipulation of algorithms, and unaccountable concentrations of 
data power (ibid., 15). At its core, the revenue model profiles users in order 
to segment customers for the purpose of targeted advertising as addressed 
in the chapters by Zuboff and Bermejo in this volume. A user’s search activ-
ities, for example, may result in referrals to content “properties” through a 
variety of intermediary sharing arrangements that support targeted market-
ing and cross- selling (Mansell 2015, 20). The “economic turn” in Internet- 
related literature is also exemplified in the work of Christian Fuchs and 
others (Fuchs 2015; Fuchs and Sandoval 2014) who interrogate the eco-
nomic logics of the social web and argue that user activity such as the pro-
duction and sharing of content is exploited labor because it contributes to 
the production of surplus value by data- mining companies.
In the legal literature, it has been emphasized that the mantra of person-
alization “blurs the distinction between citizens and consumers and swaps 
free opinion formation for free choice of commodities” (Graber 2016, 7). 
Since freedom in a democratic society presupposes the “ability to have pref-
erences formed after exposure to a sufficient amount of information” (Sun-
stein 2007, 45), personalization risks replacing a diverse, independent, and 
unpredictable public discourse with the satisfaction of private preferences, 
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based on previous choices (a similar concern is found in Zuckerman 2013). 
In addition, there are increasing concerns about the shift in decision- 
making power from humans to algorithms (Pasquale 2015) and the demo-
cratic implications of this shift as addressed by Bechmann in this volume. 
In contrast to written law, which is interpreted by authorized humans in 
order to take effect on a person, code is largely self- executing and implies 
minimal scope for interpretation (Graber 2016, 18). While this topic is 
receiving increasing attention (Council of Europe Committee of Experts on 
Internet Intermediaries 2017), there is still limited scholarship addressing 
the human rights and rule- of- law implications of having algorithms regu-
late social behavior in ways that are largely invisible and inaccessible to the 
individual affected.
In sum, while recognizing the more optimistic accounts of the net-
worked public sphere and its potential for public participation (Benkler 
2006; Benkler et al. 2015; Castells 2009), this book is inspired by literature 
that is concerned with the democratic implications of having an online 
domain governed by a relatively small group of powerful technology com-
panies and informed by the personal information economy.
Human Rights and Technology Literature
Scholarship related to human rights and technology is scattered around 
different disciplines ranging from international law and Internet gover-
nance to media and communication studies. The interlinkage between 
technology and human rights started to surface on the international policy 
agenda during the first World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) 
in 2003 and 2005 (Best, Wilson, and Maclay 2004; Jørgensen 2006). The 
WSIS brought together policy makers, activists, and scholars from a range 
of disciplines concerned with the normative foundations of the “informa-
tion society.” The interrelation between technology and human rights was 
still very new at this point, and far from obvious for anyone besides a small 
group of committed activists and scholars. However, in the fifteen years 
since WSIS a large number of books, surveys, and norm- setting documents 
have been produced, as we shall see below.
The human rights and technology literature includes a growing body 
of standard- setting literature that supports ongoing efforts to establish 
norms for human rights protection in the online domain. The Council of 
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Europe’s Committee of Ministers, for example, has since 2003 issued more 
than 50 recommendations and declarations that apply a human rights lens 
to a specific area of concern in the online domain, such as search engines, 
social media platforms, blocking and filtering, net neutrality, Internet inter-
mediaries, big data, Internet user rights, transborder flow of information, 
and so forth.6 The Council of Europe efforts in this field are elaborated 
in McGonagle’s chapter in this volume. Also, the Organization for Secu-
rity and Co- operation in Europe (OSCE) has produced a number of guide-
books, although more narrowly related to online freedom of expression, 
such as Media Freedom on the Internet: An OSCE Guidebook (Akdeniz 2016), 
and the UN Human Rights Council has since 2012 adopted a number of 
resolutions that reaffirm the protection of human rights online.7 Further, 
the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression has produced a num-
ber of important reports that have been widely used as benchmarks for 
understanding and applying freedom- of- expression standards in the online 
domain, most recently reports on freedom of expression, states, and the 
private sector in the digital age (Kaye 2016), and the regulation of user- 
generated online content (Kaye 2018).8 In 2015, the first UN Special Rap-
porteur on Privacy was appointed and contributed with work that maps out 
the normative baseline for protecting privacy in an online context (Can-
nataci 2016). Scholars and activists have also contributed to norm setting 
by serving to “translate” human right to an online context. One example 
is the Internet Rights and Principles Coalition that since 2008 has been 
active in promoting rights- based principles for Internet governance at the 
global Internet Governance Forum (IGF) as well as regional IGFs and related 
events. The coalition has produced a number of resources, including the 
Charter of Human Rights and Internet Principles for the Internet, trans-
lated into twenty- five languages. Scholarly contributions include “Towards 
Digital Constitutionalism? Mapping Attempts to Craft an Internet Bill of 
Rights” (Redeker, Gill, and Gasser 2018).
Another subdivision of literature is the vast number of empirically 
grounded studies that illustrate how technology practice and policy may 
pose threats to the protection of human rights. Much of the literature on 
rights and freedoms in the digital era has been concerned with technology- 
enabled means of state violations— for example, online censorship, repres-
sion, control, and surveillance. The United Nations Educational, Scientific, 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), for instance, has been very active and 
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contributed with dozens of reports and mappings related to the information 
society, such as the Global Survey on Internet Privacy and Freedom of Expression 
(Mendel et al. 2012), and the report on Fostering Freedom Online: The Roles, 
Challenges and Obstacles of Internet Intermediaries (MacKinnon et al. 2014).9 
Also, Consent of the Networked: The Worldwide Struggle for Internet Freedom 
uses a wide array of empirical examples to illustrate the current battle for 
freedom of expression around the globe (MacKinnon 2012). Other widely 
used examples include the edited volumes Access Controlled (Deibert et al. 
2010), Access Denied (Deibert et al. 2008), and Access Contested (Deibert et 
al. 2011) by the OpenNet Initiative, as well as the annual Global Information 
Society Watch produced by the Association of Progressive Communication 
(APC) since 2007.10 APC, especially, has broadened the discourse on human 
rights in the information society to include social, economic, and cultural 
rights, whereas the majority of works are oriented toward the right to free-
dom of expression and privacy. Especially from legal scholarship, numerous 
contributions have been made related to privacy and freedom of expres-
sion online (Agre 1994; Balkin 2014, 2018; Benedek and Kettemann 2014; 
Cohen 2013; Lessig 1999; Nissenbaum 2010; Solove 2008).
A subset of concerns raised in many of these works relates to the role of 
Internet intermediaries11 as actors that exercise considerable control over 
content and services in the online domain and therefore are encouraged or 
enlisted to self- or coregulate. The human rights and rule- of- law implica-
tions of such practices have been raised for the past fifteen years in relation 
to Internet intermediaries (Angelopoulos et al. 2016; Brown 2010; Fryd-
man and Rorive 2003; Jørgensen and Pedersen 2017; Korff 2014; Nas 2004; 
Tambini, Leonardi, and Marsden 2008), and the debate continues, while 
increasingly focusing on regulation of platforms (Belli and Zingales 2017; 
Laidlaw 2015; Wagner 2013). More recently, scholarship has started to 
interrogate the technical Internet infrastructure and standard setting from 
the perspective of human rights (Cath 2017; DeNardis 2014; Milan and ten 
Oever 2017; Rachovitsa 2017).
Taking a slightly different approach to the topic, a number of books have 
focused on technology as a tool for promoting human rights and social 
justice (Comninos 2011; Earl and Kimport 2011; Lannon and Halpin 2013; 
Tufekci 2017), including the Internet freedom agenda (Carr 2013; Moro-
zov 2011; Powers and Jablonski 2015) and more recent work on data jus-
tice (Dencik, Hintz, and Cable 2016; Pasquale 2015). Ziccardi (2013), for 
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example, in Resistance, Liberation Technology and Human Rights in the Digital 
Age, considers the role of technology in social movements and online resis-
tance, whereas the edited volume New Technologies and Human Rights: Chal-
lenges to Regulation (Cunha et al. 2013) focuses on technology and human 
rights from the perspective of power and inequality between the Global 
South and the Global North (Cunha et al. 2013). More recently, the rela-
tionship between new technologies and human rights practice is explored 
in the edited volume New Technologies for Human Rights Law and Practice by 
Land and Aronson (2018).
Also, scholars in fields such as media and communication studies, and 
information ethics, increasingly incorporate considerations of human 
rights norms into their work— for instance, privacy norms— although these 
works mostly refer to human rights in a rather general sense. Not surpris-
ingly, media and communication scholars rarely place their analysis of, for 
example, transformations in the online public sphere (Balnaves and Will-
son 2011; Papacharissi 2010), the platform society (Gillespie 2010, 2018; 
van Dijck 2013), or data capitalism (Fuchs 2015; West 2017; Zuboff 2015) 
within the framework of the human rights system of international legal 
standards, institutions, and actors as a lens on these topics. However, one 
attempt is Framing the Net— The Internet and Human Rights (Jørgensen 2013), 
which examines how different theoretical conceptions of the online domain 
(as Public Sphere, Infrastructure, New Media, and Culture) carry specific 
human rights implications. The current volume is particularly interested in 
such interdisciplinary conversations, and its contributors were deliberately 
chosen to represent both more theoretical discourses and cutting- edge legal 
scholarship related to protecting human rights within the platforms and 
services that make up the social web.
The Human Rights Responsibility of Private Actors
In recent years, several developments have placed the role of technology 
companies increasingly high on the human rights agenda. First, a num-
ber of high- profile cases such as individual and class action litigation by 
Austrian activist Max Schrems against Facebook, the debate around fake 
news in relation to the US presidential election in 2016, and the Cambridge 
Analytica scandal have led to an increasing recognition of the powers held 
by a small group of technology companies and raised concern as to the 
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way their business practices may interfere with human rights and dem-
ocratic processes. As part of this debate, some commentators have sug-
gested that the size and market share of these companies make them de 
facto monopolies,12 too powerful to serve the public interest, and called 
for regulation akin to that of public utilities13 (Moore 2016; Srniceks 2017; 
Taplin 2017a, 2017b). In response to this, economics have argued that Goo-
gle and the other technology giants do not constitute monopolies since 
they are far from supplying the entire market. Moreover, if companies 
develop into natural monopolies,14 this only causes (economic) concern if 
they are not efficient in the service they supply.15 Irrespective of whether 
these companies— in a technical sense— constitute monopolies, the debate 
points to the current difficulty in finding appropriate policy responses to 
the powers of the technology giants.
Second, there has been a general shift in the human rights and business 
discourse exemplified by the adoption of the UNGPs. The endorsement of 
the UNGPs by the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2011 estab-
lished that businesses have a “responsibility” to respect human rights. The 
Guiding Principles focus on the human rights impact of any business con-
duct and elaborate the distinction that exists between the state duty to pro-
tect human rights and the corporate responsibility to respect human rights. 
In relation to the corporate responsibility, the framework iterates that com-
panies have a responsibility to assess the way their practices, services, and 
products affect human rights and to mitigate negative impact. A key ele-
ment of the human rights responsibility is the ability to know and show 
that the company is preventing and addressing any adverse human rights 
impacts that may be associated with its activities. As part of the ability 
to show, the companies are expected to communicate and provide a mea-
sure of transparency and accountability to individuals or groups who may 
be impacted and to other relevant stakeholders (United Nations Human 
Rights Council 2011, 25).
The UNGPs constitute a soft- law framework that addresses three differ-
ent elements of the state– business nexus: first, the state duty to protect 
against human rights abuses, including by business enterprises; second, the 
corporate responsibility to respect human rights, including through human 
rights due diligence; and third, access for victims of business- related human 
rights abuses to effective remedies (United Nations Human Rights Coun-
cil 2011). In terms of ensuring human rights due diligence, the UNGPs 
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invoke human rights impact assessments (HRIAs) and set expectations of 
both state and business entities with regard to HRIAs. In meeting their duty 
to protect, states should, for instance, “(a) enforce laws that are aimed at, or 
have the effect of, requiring business enterprises to respect human rights, 
and periodically to assess the adequacy of such laws and address any gaps; 
(b) ensure that other laws and policies governing the creation and ongoing 
operation of business enterprises, such as corporate law, do not constrain 
but enable business respect for human rights; (c) provide effective guidance 
to business enterprises on how to respect human rights throughout their 
operations” (ibid.). The guidelines iterate that the failure to enforce existing 
laws that directly or indirectly regulate business respect for human rights 
is often a significant legal gap in state practice— for instance, in relation 
to labor, nondiscrimination, or privacy laws. Further, it is important for 
states to review whether these laws provide the necessary coverage in light 
of evolving circumstances. The UNGPs framework has been widely praised 
by both states and companies but also criticized for its slow uptake, inef-
fectiveness, and lack of binding obligations on companies (Aaronson and 
Higham 2013; Bilchitz 2013).
In practice, identifying the human rights impact of the technology sec-
tor is complicated by a number of factors, such as the diversity of the sector. 
In relation to the focus of this book, that is, the social web, the compa-
nies’ role in facilitating rights of expression, information, and participation 
means that business activities intersect with human rights in ways that are 
different from the classical human rights and business scheme. Often, in 
the business and human rights landscape, there is a relatively clear and 
identifiable human rights violation and a relatively clear and identifiable 
violator. Some of the human rights violations in the technology sector look 
like these kinds of violations, for example, a company’s poor treatment 
of workers. There is, however, an additional layer of human rights harms 
in the technology sector compared to this classical scheme as addressed 
extensively by Land in this volume. Besides having obligations toward their 
employees and the community in which they operate, the companies may 
affect billions of users’ human rights as part of the services and platforms 
they provide. This particular feature of their services poses significant chal-
lenges when determining their human rights responsibilities. Thus, while 
the companies may be contributing to a range of human rights violations, 
including labor and community harms, their impact on users’ ability to 
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communicate, participate in public life, and retain a sense of privacy is 
unique to these companies. Effectively, their role as intermediaries and 
gatekeepers in the online ecosystem implies that the manner in which they 
collect, process, prioritize, curate, share, and remove content shapes the 
boundaries for public and private life on the Internet. As Kaye notes, it 
remains an open question how human rights concerns raised by corpo-
rate policy, design, and engineering choices should be reconciled with the 
freedom of private entities to design and customize their platforms as they 
choose (Kaye 2016, 55).
Also, it is important to recognize the distinction between human rights 
law that is focused on the relationship between the individual and the 
state, and the private law that governs the economic relations among 
individuals and business entities. While in general the separation of the 
spheres of law has been respected, the division is being demolished, not 
least in Europe (Collins 2011, 1). This is due to at least two developments 
in legal thought. First, fundamental rights and principles are increasingly 
regarded as constitutional values of an entire legal order that should infuse 
both public and private law since the legal order should be aligned with 
these fundamental principles (Barak 2001, 21– 22). Second, private law is 
perceived increasingly as another arm of the regulatory state, designed to 
secure social goals, and like other exercises of power by agencies of the 
state, subject to the constraints of human rights law (Collins 2011, 2). “It 
becomes appropriate, for instance, to ask whether a particular result in con-
tract law adequately protects the autonomy and dignity of an individual, or 
whether tort law provides sufficient protection for an individual’s right to 
privacy” (Collins 2011, 3). Irrespective of these developments, the respon-
sibilities for a business entity under human rights law is arguably a more 
blurred, soft, and unfamiliar terrain compared to private contract law, not 
least in the United States.
Another of the developments that have placed the role of technology 
companies increasingly high on the human rights agenda is the fact that 
the debate on Internet intermediaries and policy responses such as co- and 
self- regulation, while certainly not new, has taken on a new dimension 
with the concentration of services within technology giants. In practice, 
the line between co- and self- regulation is often blurred, but in general 
self- regulation refers to practices whereby a company defines, implements, 
and enforces norms without public intervention, whereas coregulation 
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refers to the voluntary delegation of all or some part of implementation 
and enforcement of norms from public authorities to a company (Frydman, 
Hennebel, and Lewkowicz 2008, 133– 134). The EU, for instance, has for the 
past two decades enlisted Internet companies in frameworks of self- and 
coregulation to assist the EU member states in preventing illegal content 
in the online domain (Frydman and Rorive 2003; Korff 2014; Schulz and 
Held 2001; Tambini, Leonardi, and Marsden 2008). While such EU poli-
cies clearly have an impact on individuals’ human rights, they have largely 
been formulated and implemented without an explicit recognition of the 
human rights issues they raise (Angelopoulos et al. 2016; Jørgensen et al. 
2016). “A growing amount of self- regulation, particularly in the European 
Union, is implemented as an alternative to traditional regulatory action. 
Some governments actively encourage or even place pressure on private 
business to self- regulate as an alternative to formal legislation or regula-
tion which is inherently less flexible and usually more blunt than private 
arrangements” (MacKinnon et al. 2014, 56). Most recently, the EU has pro-
moted self- regulation as a tool to counter hate speech on major Internet 
platforms, thereby affecting the ways in which users encounter content on 
sensitive topics, as addressed by Jørgensen and McGonagle in this volume.
Since 2016, both the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, 
and his counterpart, the UN Special Rapporteur on Privacy, have pointed to 
the human rights implications of technology companies as an increasingly 
important area of concern. “Vast social media forums for public expression 
are owned by private companies. Major platforms aggregating and indexing 
global knowledge, and designing the algorithms that influence what infor-
mation is seen online, result from private endeavor” (Kaye 2016). “This 
increasingly detailed data- map of consumer behavior has resulted in per-
sonal data becoming a commodity where access to such data or exploitation 
of such data in a variety of ways is now one of the world’s largest industries 
generating revenues calculated in hundreds of billions most usually in the 
form of targeted advertising” (Cannataci 2016). What remains a major chal-
lenge is to determine the human rights responsibilities of these companies, 
and the extent to which their business practices interfere with human rights 
law. As illustrated in the previous section, the literature on technology and 
human rights has exploded over the past twenty years; however, the human 
rights implications of the social web are still underresearched, including 
whether specific business practices invoke a positive state obligation to 
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regulate the companies. For example, will new regulatory responses such as 
the GDPR provide (European) users with effective protection of their online 
privacy rights? (See Van Hoboken’s analysis in this volume.) When does 
content moderation amount to a freedom- of- expression issue, and if/when 
it does, does this invoke a positive obligation on the state to regulate? (See 
the chapter by Land, in particular.) Further, and irrespective of state regu-
lation, what is the scope of the business responsibility to respect human 
rights law? (See Callamard’s analysis in this volume.) While there is an 
increasing attention to these issues, the assessment and mitigation of the 
companies’ human rights impact have largely been left to the companies 
to address through corporate social responsibility frameworks and industry 
initiatives such as the Global Network Initiative (Maclay 2014).16 Up until 
now, there has been limited research that critically assesses the frameworks 
governing the activities of these companies and questions whether they are 
sufficient to provide the standards and compliance mechanisms needed to 
protect and respect human rights online (Laidlaw 2015). In sum, the com-
panies that govern the social web effectively operate in a gray zone between 
human rights law and corporate social responsibility, with no authoritative 
answer as to what their human rights responsibility entails.
In the section that follows, I will briefly explain how the book has been 
organized to address these urgent questions and challenges.
Contents of the Book
The first part of the book, “Datafication,” highlights some of the societal 
shifts that are at play, focusing on the economic model of data extraction 
as a means to control human behavior, the corporate shaping of “informed 
realities,” datafication and its democratic deficits, and the (inadequate) 
understanding of what constitutes personal information in an algorith-
mic age. Drawing upon a long tale of scholarly work, the contributions 
highlight theoretical and conceptual challenges that have implications for 
how we frame, engage, and resolve questions concerning the protection of 
human rights online.
Zuboff’s chapter, “‘We Make Them Dance’: Surveillance Capitalism, the 
Rise of Instrumentarian Power, and the Threat to Human Rights,” discusses 
the giants of the social web as a new kind of power with a radical impact on 
the possibility for self- determination and autonomous action. Zuboff argues 
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that these companies represent a market project that fuses with technology 
to achieve its own unique brand of social domination. From the vantage 
point of radical indifference, the companies rely on instruments to moni-
tor, analyze, shape, and predict our actions, in pursuit of the competitive 
advantage that follows. Based on a brief overview of the framework of sur-
veillance capitalism, Zuboff unmasks the instrumentarian power that arises 
from the application of surveillance capitalism’s economic imperatives and 
contrasts this new power with the totalitarian construct with which it is 
typically confused. The development of these conditions demands new 
forms of collective action, resistance, and struggle, as contests over political 
rights are renewed, human rights are abrogated, and even the “right to have 
rights” is under siege.
Flyverbom and Whelan’s chapter on “Digital Transformations, Informed 
Realities, and Human Conduct” explores the influence of datafied forms of 
knowledge on human choice and agency. The chapter proposes the notion 
of “informed realities” to discuss how people’s ways of experiencing are gov-
erned by the different types of information they access and rely on. Nota-
bly, platforms inform people’s daily lives by constructing and controlling 
the informed realities that they live in and live with in digital spaces. The 
authors warn that the growing ubiquity of these platforms and services 
increasingly shapes the way we view the world, while constraining and 
directing our decision- making in invisible ways. In conclusion, the authors 
suggest a number of steps to keep this development in check
Bechmann next explores “Data as Humans: Representation, Account-
ability, and Equality in Big Data.” The chapter raises questions of repre-
sentation concerning the way data are treated as humans in the datafied 
society, and the democratic deficits this may lead to. Bechmann argues 
that systematic discrimination and inequality may occur through machine 
learning if we fail to take the preliminary measure of inscribing human 
rights norms in the machine learning algorithms executed by, for instance, 
social media. While problems of representation are not new, discrimina-
tion may now happen in a more systematic way, fostered by data mining 
and the closed cycles of machine learning algorithms that need to be prop-
erly governed.
Supplementing Bechmann’s concern, albeit from a different perspective, 
Mai’s chapter on “Situating Personal Information: Privacy in the Algorith-
mic Age” critically examines how we conceptualize personal information 
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and thus informational privacy in a time of big data. The chapter argues 
that the predominant conceptualization of informational privacy as the 
ability to control the flow of personal information is inadequate in an age 
of big data, algorithms, and an economy based on data profiles. Instead, 
informational privacy must be concerned with the situations and practices 
in which the construction, analysis, and interpretation of information take 
place. Mai suggests that privacy cannot be limited solely to an individual, 
liberal right but should be expanded to an expectation of moral norms and 
behavior in society.
The second part of the book, “Platforms,” brings us closer to actual plat-
form practices. It considers the evolving history of business practices for 
capturing, measuring, and managing attention; explores content modera-
tion in relation to public discourse; and illustrates the corporate storytelling 
around human rights. In short, it examines examples of how platforms and 
services operate, how they relate to human rights, and what the wider soci-
etal implications of their practices may be.
Bermejo’s chapter on “Online Advertising as a Shaper of Public Commu-
nication” traces the history of online advertising and illustrates how the 
intimate link between communication and data mining in today’s online 
public sphere is rooted in the development of the advertising model over 
the past two decades. Bermejo uses the process of capturing, measuring, 
and managing attention— the core of the advertising industry’s work in the 
mass media era— as a blueprint for understanding the way online advertis-
ing is conducted on the social web, and to examine the wider social and 
democratic implications of this model.
Moving closer toward the governance practices of platforms, York and 
Zuckerman’s chapter on “Moderating the Public Sphere” traces the history 
and character of content moderation as a widely used method of (private) 
control over public discourse. The concepts of hard and soft control are 
used as a lens to characterize platform authority over what can be published 
online versus platform authority over what users are likely to see— or not 
see if the content is deprioritized in the algorithms that govern a user’s feed. 
The practices of major platforms are examined within the larger context of 
threats to freedom of expression, including threats from state actors and 
threats from individual users acting alone or in concert. The authors argue 
that as instances of flawed content moderation reach the public, there is 
the opportunity for a strong citizen movement— one that monitors the 
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abuse of power by platforms, demands transparency, and fights for freedom 
of expression.
Jørgensen’s chapter on “Rights Talk: In the Kingdom of Online Giants” 
continues the examination of platform practices, this time from the per-
spective of staff at Google and Facebook. Based on empirical studies, the 
author presents three examples of human rights storytelling within the two 
companies. The first narrative paints the companies as safeguards against 
government overreach. The second narrative concerns their role as coreg-
ulators via codes of conduct, while the third narrative presents privacy as 
user control over personal information. While the companies take great 
pride in protecting their users’ right to freedom of expression and privacy 
from government overreach, their own business practices are not framed as 
a human rights issue nor subjected to the same type of scrutiny as govern-
ment practices.
The third part of the book, “Regulation,” considers human rights chal-
lenges raised by these developments and examples. Given the theme of 
the book, the relationship between human rights law and private actors 
is of particular significance in this part, not least the reach of interna-
tional human rights law vis- à- vis soft law such as the UNGPs. The contri-
butions explore the human rights responsibility of non-state actors, the 
Council of Europe approach to Internet intermediaries, and the disconnect 
between platform practices and users’ right to privacy and, finally, suggest a 
human- rights- based approach to regulating Internet intermediaries.
Callamard confronts one of the overarching questions of the book, 
namely, “The Human Rights Obligations of Non-state Actors.” Based on 
a wide array of examples from around the globe, the chapter discusses 
challenges to human rights protection— and freedom of expression in 
particular— in an environment shaped by global communications systems 
and powerful non-state actors. The chapter traces the obligations of non-
state actors to international treaty provisions; explores their treatment as 
international human rights law duty bearers; and discusses their role in 
influencing, if not shaping, normative development. In conclusion, Cal-
lamard explores “meaningful self- regulation” and the development of an 
international legal framework as two options for stronger human rights 
protection in the online domain.
In “The Council of Europe and Internet Intermediaries: A Case Study 
of Tentative Posturing,” McGonagle explores the efforts of the European 
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Court of Human Rights to keep apace of technological developments and 
to retain and revamp its general freedom- of- expression and rule- of- law 
principles in an online environment dominated by Internet intermediar-
ies. As part of this, the chapter considers the legal complications involved 
in bringing Internet intermediaries into the fold of a traditional, interna-
tional, and treaty- centric system, including the role of self- regulatory mea-
sures. The author concludes with a reflection on the rights, duties, and 
responsibilities of Internet intermediaries that flow from the existing sys-
tem, using the case of “hate speech” to illustrate how frictional the relation-
ship between intermediaries’ rights, duties, and responsibilities— and those 
of their users— can be in practice. 
The right to privacy faces particular pressure in an age of datafication, 
as outlined in the first part of the book. Van Hoboken’s chapter on “The 
Privacy Disconnect” responds to these challenges and explores the legal 
questions involved in the contemporary protection of online privacy. The 
chapter discusses and reviews some of the major obstacles to regulation of 
the personal data economy, including consolidation in the Internet service 
industry; the erosion of restrictions on the collection of personal informa-
tion; the tension between the different regulatory approaches in the United 
States and Europe; and the fact that privacy regulation is primarily con-
cerned with the handling of personal data rather than a broader concern 
for fair data- driven treatment, data privacy, and autonomy. Van Hoboken 
argues that current privacy laws and policies fall short in providing for the 
legitimacy of current- day pervasive data- processing practices and proposes 
that privacy law and policy discussions become more firmly connected to 
the underlying power dynamics they aim to resolve.
The book concludes with Land’s chapter on “Regulating Private Harms 
Online: Content Regulation under Human Rights Law.” Land draws upon 
and supplements the previous analysis (not least by Callamard) by devel-
oping a human rights– based approach to regulating the impact of Internet 
intermediaries, focusing on content regulation in particular. As part of this 
approach, Land addresses three challenges: first, the inadequate under-
standing of what constitutes state action in the online domain; second, the 
tendency to neglect the duties that international human rights law imposes 
directly on private actors; and third, the lack of attention toward the pos-
itive duty of the state to regulate intermediaries in order to protect rights 
online. Land proposes a set of recommendations that can be adopted by 
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human rights institutions such as the UN Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights and the UN treaty bodies, in order to strengthen human 
rights protection in online spaces.
Notes
1. “Social web” refers to online platforms and services designed and developed to 
support and foster social interaction.
2. There is large body of literature related to the field of human rights. For scholarly 
introductions, see, for instance, Alston and Goodman (2013) and Freeman (2014).
3. Data processing performed by national police forces and courts (for certain 
functions) is not subject to the GDPR but regulated in a separate EU Directive on 
policing and criminal justice.
4. “Datafication” refers to the practice of turning numerous aspects of life into data 
and transforming it in order to create value. The term was introduced by Cukier and 
Mayer- Schoenberger in 2013 (Cukier and Mayer- Schoenberger 2013).
5. See https://www.ctrl-shift.co.uk/personal-information-economy-2016.
6. For a full list, see https://www.coe.int/en/web/freedom-expression/committee-of 
-ministers-adopted-texts/-/asset_publisher/C10Tb8ZfKDoJ/content.
7. A/HRC/RES/34/7 (March  23, 2017), A/HRC/RES/32/13 (July  18, 2016), A/HRC/
RES/28/16 (April  1, 2015), A/HRC/RES/26/13 (July  14, 2014), A/HRC/RES/23/2 
(June  24, 2013), A/HRC/RES/20/8 (July  16, 2012), A/HRC/RES/12/16 (October  12, 
2009), A/HRC/DEC/25/117 (April 15, 2014), A/HRC/DEC/18/119 (October 17, 2011).
8. For a full list, see http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/FreedomOpinion/Pages/Annual 
.aspx.
9. For a full list of publications under UNESCO’s series of Internet Freedom, see 
https://en.unesco.org/unesco-series-on-internet-freedom.
10. For a full list, see https://www.apc.org/en/apc-wide-activities/global-information 
-society-watch.
11. “Internet intermediaries” refers to “third- party platforms that mediate between 
digital content and the humans who contribute and access this content” (DeNardis 
2014, 154).
12. “Monopoly” refers to “an organization or group that has complete control of 
something, especially an area of business, so that others have no share”; see https://
dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/monopoly.
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13. A “public utility” refers to “a business organization (such as an electric com-
pany) performing a public service and subject to special governmental regulation”; 
see https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/public%20utility.
14. A “natural monopoly” refers to “a situation in which one company is able to 
supply the whole market for a product or service more cheaply than two or more 
companies could”; see https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/natural 
-monopoly.
15. See, for instance, the response to Jonathan Taplin from Tim Worstall, April 23, 
2017: https://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2017/04/23/google-isnt-a-monopoly 
-so-dont-break-it-up-or-regulate-it-like-one/#68a5c3746ad0.
16. See, for instance, the Global Network Initiative report on the 2015/16 Assess-
ments of Facebook, Google, LinkedIn, Microsoft, and Yahoo!: http://globalnetwork 
initiative.org/sites/default/files/PAR-2015-16-Executive-Summary.pdf.
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The first part of the book highlights areas in which datafication has impli-
cations for the protection of human rights. The contributions raise critical 
questions concerning the rise of a new species of economic power (Zuboff), 
the way digital platforms inform  and constrain individuals’ choice and 
freedom (Flyverbom and Whelan), the discriminatory effect that may flow 
from big data and machine learning (Bechmann), and the need to revisit 
the idea that we can protect online privacy by controlling personal infor-
mation (Mai).

1 “We Make Them Dance”: Surveillance Capitalism,  




A 2002 review of “wireless telemedicine” stressed the value of home health 
monitoring for the elderly and the expansion of health services in remote 
areas. A diagram of the proposed digital architecture for such services fea-
tured only three parties: a closed loop that exclusively linked a person 
at home, her hospital’s servers, and her physician (Pattichis et al. 2002, 
143– 153). Digitalized information about one’s body was imagined as deeply 
“mine”: an inalienable extension of self with which one could choose to 
enrich already close relationships, such as those between a patient and 
a trusted doctor or elderly parents and their adult children. In just a few 
years, however, those 2002 schematics faded like an old daguerreotype.
Many studies of health monitoring continue to emphasize its utility for 
the elderly and other forms of remote care, but the conversation has deci-
sively moved on from its earlier state of grace. Researchers anticipate the 
fusion of “smart cities” and what’s now called “m-health” to produce “smart 
health,” defined as “the provision of health services by using the context- 
aware network and sensing infrastructure of smart cities” (Solanas et al. 
2014, 74– 81). Toward that end, there are now reliable sensors for rendering 
an increasing range of physiological processes as behavioral data, including 
body temperature, heart rate, brain activity, muscle motion, blood pres-
sure, sweat rate, energy expenditure, and body and limb motion (Intille 
et al. 2012, 24– 31; Mukhopadhyay 2015, 1321– 1330). There are sensors 
that can render audio, visual, and physiological data during postsurgical 
patient recovery and rehabilitation (Castillejo et al. 2013, 38– 49). A flexi-
ble, sensored textile patch has been developed that can render breathing, 
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hand movements, swallowing, and walking as behavioral data (Cheng et 
al. 2013, 3935– 3947). In other applications, “wearable micromachined sen-
sors” provide “accurate biomechanical analysis” as you walk or run, and 
a “body area network” records and analyzes walking and running “under 
extreme conditions” (De Rossi and Veltink 2010, 37– 43).
These rich data can no longer be imagined as cloistered within the inti-
mate closed loops of family and physician or even an application and its 
dieters or runners. By 2016, there were more than 100,000 mobile health 
apps available on the Google Android and Apple iOS platforms, double the 
number in 2014 (Addonizio 2016). A legal review of mobile health apps 
concludes that most of them “take the consumers’ private information and 
data without the consumers’ permission and . . . do not generally disclose 
to the user that this information will be sent to advertising companies” 
(Dehling et al. 2015, 1– 26). These conclusions are borne out by a long 
queue of studies.
One in- depth investigation focused on the collection, processing, and 
usage activities associated with nine prominent fitness trackers (Hilts et al. 
2016). All but two apps transmitted every logged fitness event to the com-
pany’s servers, which enabled backup and sharing with one’s friends but 
also “data analytics” and distribution to third parties. Among many dis-
turbing findings was the fact that some of the trackers transmitted device 
identification numbers; others passively and continuously transmitted the 
user’s precise longitude and latitude coordinates. These identifiers “could 
link fitness and biographical data to a single mobile phone hardware, or 
single specific fitness wearable. . . .” None of this sensitive information was 
necessary for the tracker to operate effectively, and most of the privacy pol-
icies were opaque at best and allowed data to be “sold or exchanged with 
third parties.” The researchers concluded, “We discovered severe security 
vulnerabilities, incredibly sensitive geolocation transmissions that serve no 
apparent benefit to the end user, and .  .  . policies leaving the door open 
for the sale of users’ fitness data to third parties without express consent 
of the users.”
A comprehensive study of Android- based diabetes apps published in the 
Journal of American Medicine notes that while the US Food and Drug Admin-
istration approved the prescription of a range of apps that transmit sensitive 
health data, the behind- the- scenes practices of these apps are “understud-
ied” (italics mine; Blenner et al. 2016, 1051– 1052). Researchers examined 
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211 diabetes apps and randomly sampled 65 of them for close analysis of 
data- transmission practices. In some of these apps, merely downloading the 
software automatically “authorized collection and modification of sensitive 
information.” They identified many backstage operations, including apps 
that modify or delete your information (64 percent), read your phone status 
and identity (31 percent), gather location data (27 percent), view your Wi- Fi 
connections (12 percent), and activate your camera in order to access your 
photos and videos (11 percent). Between 4 and 6 percent of the apps went 
even further: reading your contact lists, calling phone numbers found in 
your device, modifying your contacts, reading your call log, and activating 
your microphone to record your speech.
The research team concluded that privacy policies do not matter. Of the 
211 apps in the group, 81 percent did not have privacy policies, but for 
those that did, “not all of the provisions actually protected privacy.” Of 
those apps without privacy policies, 76 percent shared sensitive information 
with third parties, and of those with privacy policies, 79 percent shared your 
data while only about half admitted doing so in their published disclosures. 
Indeed, these discoveries suggest that the very notion of a “privacy pol-
icy’ has become a dangerous euphemism, when such statements are better 
understood as “surveillance policies.”
The coda here is simple: Once I was mine. Now I am theirs. In 2002, inti-
mate health and body information was assumed to be the possession of 
the experiencing subject. Now, the same information is assumed to be the 
possession of the owners of the means by which it is produced. The experi-
encing subject is transformed into a data object. This transformation reflects 
what might be thought of as a journey through the ontologies, econom-
ics, and politics of possession, alerting us to the qualities of existence and 
power that attend self- possession in contrast to dispossession. The journey 
from one to the other is not restricted to body information but rather illus-
trates a pattern that now engulfs every aspect of human experience. We 
must therefore ask, what is it that determines these states of possession? 
What happened between 2002 and 2018 to decisively transform the onto-
logical, economic, and political structures of these information flows? This 
question is aimed at the early twenty- first century, but it is clarified in a 
useful way with a quick backward glance.
“We’ve stumbled along for a while, trying to run a new civilization in 
old ways, but we’ve got to start to make this world over.” It was 1912 when 
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Thomas Edison laid out his vision for a new industrial civilization in a 
letter to Henry Ford. Edison worried that industrialism’s potential to serve 
the progress of humanity would be thwarted by the stubborn power of the 
robber barons and the monopolist economics that ruled their kingdoms. 
He decried the “wastefulness” and “cruelty” of US capitalism: “Our pro-
duction, our factory laws, our charities, our relations between capital and 
labor, our distribution—all wrong, out of gear” (Nevins 1954, 532). Both 
Edison and Ford understood that the modern industrial civilization for 
which they harbored such hope was careening toward a darkness marked 
by industrial enslavement and grinding poverty for the many and prosper-
ity for the very few.
The two quintessentially American inventors agreed that the moral life 
of industrial civilization would be shaped by the practices of capitalism that 
rose to dominance in their time and the unbridled power that such prac-
tices enjoyed, largely unimpeded by law, regulation, or jurisprudence. They 
believed that US society, and eventually the world, would have to fashion 
a new, more rational capitalism in order to avert a future of misery and 
conflict. A new century had dawned, but the evolution of capitalism, like 
the churning of civilizations, did not obey the calendar or the clock. It was 
1912, and still the nineteenth century’s Gilded Age refused to relinquish its 
claim on the twentieth.
The same can be said of our time. Once more we look to the great struc-
tural transformations of the market economy and its novel realizations of 
capitalism to define our era, and once more we see their promise occluded 
by the emergence of a new quality of economic power whose effects are 
revealed in a new kind of enslavement. What happened in the years 
between 2002 and 2018 was the emergence of a new surveillance capitalism, 
whose mechanisms and operations are only imaginable within the digital 
milieu (Zuboff 2014, 2015, 2016). Surveillance capitalism produces a new 
species of economic power that I call instrumentarianism. Together, the new 
capitalism and its unique production of power are as untamed by law as 
were the capitalism and economic power of the Gilded Age, and they are 
just as dangerous. Despite the many splendors of the digital milieu, surveil-
lance capitalism and instrumentarian power now inscribe our lives with 
their unique signature of havoc, challenging human rights in ways that we 
did not predict and could not anticipate. Many old inequalities are deep-
ened, while wholly new axes of exclusion and domination threaten every 
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unprotected dimension of human experience. Earlier contests over political 
rights are renewed, elemental human rights are abrogated, and even the 
“right to have rights” is under siege (Arendt 2004).
Indeed, when it comes to the digital future and its consequences for 
human rights, a single point demands our attention: The challenges to 
human rights that we encounter in the digital era cannot be circumscribed 
by a specific technology or company, though they may be expressed in 
technological assemblies, such as algorithms and platforms, or in the prac-
tices of a single corporation. Rather, the challenges we face originate in the 
rapid evolution of a new economic order in which wealth is largely derived 
from surveillance— specifically, the unilateral dispossession of human experi-
ence for the sake of others’ profit. As was the case in the twentieth century, 
this new economic order seeks to fashion in its likeness human personal-
ity, society, civilization, and the frameworks of human rights that bind all 
three. The sudden development of these conditions of existence means that 
if we are to claim the future for humanity, then new forms of collective 
action, resistance, and struggle are required. This chapter aims to contribute 
to such an undertaking by illuminating this triad: a novel capitalism, its 
novel form of power, and their novel challenges to elemental human rights 
that bear upon the production of autonomous action.
What Is Surveillance Capitalism?1
Framework
This effort to understand surveillance capitalism begins with the recog-
nition that we hunt the puppet master, not the puppet. A first challenge to 
comprehension is the confusion between surveillance capitalism and the 
technologies it employs. Surveillance capitalism is not technology; it is a 
logic that imbues technology and commands it into action. Surveillance 
capitalism is a market form that is unimaginable outside the digital milieu, 
but it is not the same as “the digital.” As is evident in the evolution of tele-
medicine, the digital can take many forms depending upon the social and 
economic logics that direct it into action. It is the capitalism that assigns the 
price tag of subjugation and helplessness, not the technology. In my view 
it is vital to understand that surveillance capitalism cannot be reduced to 
“platforms,” “algorithms,” “machine intelligence,” or any other technolog-
ical manifestation. While it is impossible to imagine surveillance capitalism 
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without the affordances of the digital, it is perfectly possible to imagine 
these technologies and capabilities without surveillance capitalism.
That technologies are always economic means, not ends in themselves, 
is not a new point. Max Weber called attention to this “economic orienta-
tion,” observing that economic ends are always intrinsic to technology’s 
development and deployment. “Economic action” determines objectives, 
whereas technology provides “appropriate means.” In Weber’s framing, 
“The fact that what is called the technological development of modern 
times has been so largely oriented economically to profit- making is one of 
the fundamental facts of the history of technology” (Weber 1978, 67). In a 
modern capitalist society, technology is, was, and always will be an expres-
sion of the economic objectives that direct it into action. A worthwhile 
exercise would be to delete the word “technology” from our vocabularies in 
order to see how quickly capitalism’s objectives are exposed.
The primacy of economics over technology is not new, but capitalism 
has long found it useful to conceal itself within the Trojan horse of tech-
nology in order that we might perceive its excesses as the inevitable expres-
sion of the machines it employs. Surveillance capitalists are no exception. 
For example, in 2009 the public first became aware that Google maintains 
search histories indefinitely. When questioned about these practices, the 
corporation’s former CEO Eric Schmidt explained, “. . . the reality is that 
search engines including Google do retain this information for some time” 
(Newman 2009). In truth, search engines do not retain, but surveillance 
capitalism does. Schmidt’s statement is a classic of misdirection that bewil-
ders the public by conflating commercial imperatives and technological 
necessity. It camouflages the concrete practices of surveillance capitalism 
and the specific choices that impelled Google’s brand of search into action. 
Most significantly, it makes surveillance capitalism’s practices appear to 
be inevitable, when they are actually meticulously calculated and lavishly 
funded means to self- dealing commercial ends.
Just as surveillance capitalism is not the same as technology, this new 
logic of accumulation cannot be reduced to any single corporation or group 
of corporations. Surveillance capitalism first rooted and flourished at Goo-
gle and Facebook, then quickly became the default mode for most Internet 
businesses, startups, and apps. By now surveillance capitalism can no longer 
be thought of as restricted to individual companies or even to the Internet 
sector. It has spread across a wide range of products, services, and economic 
“We Make Them Dance” 9
sectors, including insurance, retail, health care, finance, entertainment, 
education, transportation, and more, birthing whole new ecosystems of 
suppliers, producers, customers, market- makers, and market players. Nearly 
every product or service that begins with the word “smart” or “personal-
ized,” every Internet- enabled device, every “digital assistant,” operates as a 
supply- chain interface for the unobstructed flow of behavioral data.
Surveillance capitalism was invented at Google, where its logic and foun-
dational mechanisms were discovered and elaborated between 2001 and 
2004 in much the same way that General Motors invented and perfected 
managerial capitalism a century ago. Google was the pathfinder of surveil-
lance capitalism in thought and practice, the deep pocket for research and 
development, and the catalyst in experimentation and implementation. As 
the pioneer of surveillance capitalism, Google launched an unprecedented 
market operation into the unmapped spaces of the Internet where it faced 
few impediments from law or competitors, like an invasive species in a 
landscape free of natural predators. Its leaders drove the systemic coher-
ence of their businesses at a breakneck pace that neither public institutions 
nor individuals could follow. Indeed, both speed and secrecy were carefully 
crafted strategies of shock and awe essential to the company’s larger ambi-
tions of market dominance (Zuboff, 2019).
Surveillance capitalism originates in history, not in technological inev-
itability. Google’s discovery and pursuit of surveillance capitalism cannot 
be separated from the unique historical conditions that first motivated the 
urgent search for a new market form and later nurtured and sheltered its 
new mechanisms of accumulation. Specifically, the young company faced 
extreme pressure from its investors in the teeth of the 2001 financial crisis 
in Silicon Valley. Surveillance capitalism was invented as the solution to 
this financial emergency. It proved itself a rapid methodology for the trans-
lation of investment into revenue and capital. Google also benefitted from 
historical circumstance, when a national security apparatus galvanized by 
the attacks of 9/11 was inclined to nurture, mimic, shelter, and appropriate 
surveillance capitalism’s emergent capabilities for the sake of total knowl-
edge and its promise of total certainty. These dynamics comprise a political 
condition that I call surveillance exceptionalism.
The combination of financial success and the politics of surveillance 
exceptionalism transformed the new logic of accumulation into the default 
model of information capitalism. Surveillance capitalism migrated to 
10 Shoshana Zuboff
Facebook with Google- turned- Facebook executive Sheryl Sandberg and 
later took hold at Microsoft under the leadership of CEO Satya Nadella. 
Evidence suggests that Amazon has veered toward surveillance capitalism. 
The lure of surveillance revenue remains a constant challenge to Apple, 
both as an external threat and as a source of internal debate and conflict. 
Surveillance capitalism is no longer confined to the competitive dramas 
of the large Internet companies as competitive intensity eventually drove 
expansion into the offline world. Its economic imperatives and founda-
tional mechanisms now spread across every economic sector and category 
of goods and services.
“Laws of Motion”
Borrowed from Newton’s laws of inertia, force, and equal and opposite reac-
tions, “laws of motion” is a metaphor that has been used to describe the nec-
essary and predictable features of industrial capitalism (Marx 1992, 91– 92; 
Wood 2002, 76, 93, 125). While surveillance capitalism does not abandon 
established capitalist “laws” such as competitive production, profit maxi-
mization, productivity, and growth, these earlier dynamics now operate in 
the context of a new logic of accumulation that also introduces its own sui 
generis laws of motion. Surveillance capitalism is defined by new economic 
imperatives whose mechanisms and effects cannot be grasped with existing 
models and assumptions. This is not to say that the old imperatives—a 
compulsion toward profit maximization along with the intensification 
of the means of production, growth, and competition—have vanished. 
Rather, these must now operate through the novel aims and mechanisms 
of a new market form. Most people credit Google’s success to its advertising 
model. But the discoveries that led to Google’s rapid rise in revenue and 
market capitalization are only incidentally related to advertising. Google’s 
success derives from its ability to predict the future—specifically the future 
of human behavior.
The Rendition of Experience: Human– Natural Resources
From the start, Google had collected data on users’ search- related behavior 
as a by- product of query activity. Back then, these data logs were treated 
as waste, not even safely or methodically stored. Eventually, the young 
company came to understand that these logs could be used to teach and 
continuously improve its search engine. The problem was this:  Serving 
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users with effective search results “used up” all the value that users cre-
ated when they inadvertently provided behavioral data. It was a complete 
and self- contained process in which users were ends in themselves. All the 
value that users created was reinvested in their experience in the form of 
improved search, a progression that I have called the behavioral value rein-
vestment cycle. In this interaction, there was nothing “left over,” no surplus 
for Google to turn into capital. As long as the effectiveness of the search 
engine needed users’ behavioral data about as much as users needed search, 
charging a fee for service was too risky. In 2001 Google was remarkable, but 
it wasn’t yet capitalism—just one of many Internet start- ups that boasted 
“eyeballs” but no revenue.
The year 2001 brought the dot.com bust and mounting investor pres-
sures at Google. Back then, advertisers selected the search term pages for 
their displays. Google decided to try and boost ad revenue by applying its 
already substantial analytical capabilities to the challenge of increasing an 
ad’s relevance to users—and thus its value to advertisers. Operationally, this 
meant that Google would finally repurpose its growing cache of “useless” 
behavioral data. Now the data would be used to match ads with keywords, 
exploiting subtleties that only its access to behavioral data, combined with 
its analytical capabilities, could reveal.
It’s now clear that this shift in the use of behavioral data was an his-
toric turning point. Behavioral data that were once discarded or ignored 
were rediscovered as what I call behavioral surplus: data reserves that are 
more than what is required for product and service improvements. Google’s 
dramatic success in “matching” ads to pages revealed the transformational 
value of this behavioral surplus as a means of generating revenue and ulti-
mately turning investment into revenue.
Key to this formula was the fact that this new market exchange was not 
an exchange with users but rather with companies who understood how 
to make money from bets on users’ future behavior. In this new context, 
users were no longer ends in themselves. Instead, they became a means to 
profits in a new behavioral futures market in which users are neither buyers 
nor sellers nor products. Users are instead the human nature- al source of 
free raw material that feeds a new kind of manufacturing process designed 
to fabricate prediction products. These products are calculations that predict 
what individuals and groups will do now, soon, and later. The more raw 
materials that are fed into this new machine intelligence– based “means of 
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production,” the more powerful are its prediction products. While these 
processes were initially aimed at online ad targeting, they are no more 
restricted to that application than mass production was restricted to the 
manufacture of automobiles, where it was first applied at scale.
Many of the facts I describe here are well- known, but their significance 
has not been fully appreciated or adequately theorized. Google and other 
surveillance platforms are sometimes described as “two- sided” or “multi- 
sided” markets (Rochet and Tirole 2006, 645– 667), but the mechanisms of 
surveillance capitalism suggest something different. Google had discovered 
a way to translate its nonmarket interactions with users into surplus raw 
material for the fabrication of products aimed at genuine market transac-
tions with its real customers: advertisers (Strandburg 2013). The translation 
of human experience outside the market to behavioral data that circulates 
inside the market finally enabled Google to convert investment into reve-
nue. The corporation thus created out of thin air and at zero marginal cost 
an asset class of vital raw materials derived from users’ nonmarket online 
experience. At first those raw materials were simply “found,” a by- product 
of users’ search action. Later those assets were hunted aggressively, pro-
cured, and accumulated—largely through unilateral operations designed 
to evade individual awareness and thus bypass individual decision rights—
operations that are therefore best summarized as “surveillance.”
That behavioral surplus became the defining element of Google’s success 
was well understood by its leaders. Google’s former CEO Eric Schmidt cred-
its Hal Varian’s early development of the firm’s ad auctions with providing 
the eureka moment that clarified the true nature of Google’s business— “All 
of a sudden, we realized we were in the auction business”— referring to the 
automated behavioral futures markets deployed in ad targeting (Polanyi 
2001, 75– 76). Larry Page is credited with a very different and far more 
insightful answer to the question “What is Google?” Google’s first brand 
manager, Douglas Edwards, recounts a 2001 session with the founders that 
probed their answers to that precise query. It was Page who ruminated, “If 
we did have a category, it would be personal information. . . . The places 
you’ve seen. Communications.  .  .  . Sensors are really cheap.  .  .  . Storage 
is cheap. Cameras are cheap. People will generate enormous amounts of 
data. . . . Everything you’ve ever heard or seen or experienced will become 
searchable. Your whole life will be searchable” (Edwards 2011, 291).
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Page’s vision perfectly reflects the history of capitalism as a process of 
taking things that live outside the market sphere and declaring their new 
life as market commodities. In historian Karl Polanyi’s 1944 grand narra-
tive of the “great transformation” to a self- regulating market economy, he 
described the origins of this translation process in three astonishing and 
crucial mental inventions that he called “commodity fictions.” The first 
was that human life could be subordinated to market dynamics and reborn 
as “labor” to be bought and sold. The second was that nature could be trans-
lated into the market and reborn as “land” or “real estate.” The third was 
that exchange could be reborn as “money” (Polanyi 2001, 75– 76). Nearly 
eighty years earlier, Karl Marx had described the taking of lands and natural 
resources as the original “big bang” that ignited modern capital formation, 
calling it “primitive accumulation” (Marx 1992).
Page grasped that human experience would be Google’s virgin wood—
that it could be extracted at no extra cost online and at a low marginal cost 
out in the real world, where “sensors are really cheap,” thus producing a 
surplus as the basis of a wholly new class of market exchange. Surveillance 
capitalism originates in this act of digital dispossession, operationalized in 
the rendition of human experience as behavioral data. This is the lever that 
moved Google’s world and shifted it toward profit, changing the trajec-
tory of information capitalism as it claimed undefended human experience 
for a market dynamic that would encounter no impediment in the lawless 
spaces of the Internet.
The significance of behavioral surplus was lost in euphemism, both 
at Google and throughout the Internet industry, with labels like “digital 
exhaust,” “digital breadcrumbs,” and so on.2 These euphemisms for behav-
ioral surplus operate as ideological filters in exactly the same way that the 
earliest maps of the North American continent labeled whole regions with 
terms like “heathens,” “infidels,” “idolaters,” “primitives,” “vassals,” or 
“rebels.” On the strength of those labels, native peoples, their places and 
claims, were erased from the invaders’ moral and legal equations, legitimat-
ing their acts of taking and breaking in the name of Church and Monarchy.
In the case of surveillance capitalism, camouflage and other methodol-
ogies of secrecy aim to prevent interruption of critical supply- chain oper-
ations that begin with the rendition of human experience and end with 
the delivery of behavioral data to machine intelligence– based production 
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systems. These operations of secrecy by design turn us into exiles from our 
own behavior, denied access to or control over knowledge derived from our 
experience. Knowledge and power rest with surveillance capital, for which 
we are merely “human natural” resources. We are the native peoples, now, 
whose tacit claims to self- determination have vanished from the maps of 
our own lives.
To be sure, there are always sound business reasons for hiding the loca-
tion of your gold mine. In Google’s case, an explicit “hiding strategy” 
accrued to its competitive advantage, but there were other, more pressing 
reasons for concealment and obfuscation (Levy 2011, 69). Douglas Edwards 
writes compellingly about the corporation’s culture of secrecy: According to 
his account, Larry Page and Sergey Brin were “hawks,” insisting on aggres-
sive data capture and retention. “Larry opposed any path that would reveal 
our technological secrets or stir the privacy pot and endanger our ability to 
gather data.” Page wanted to avoid arousing users’ curiosity by minimizing 
their exposure to any clues about the reach of the firm’s data operations. 
He questioned the prudence of the electronic scroll in the reception lobby 
that displays a continuous stream of search queries, and he “tried to kill” 
the annual Google Zeitgeist conference that summarizes the year’s trends in 
search terms (Edwards 2011, 340– 345).
What might the response have been back then if the public were told 
that Google’s magic derived from its exclusive capabilities in unilateral 
surveillance of online behavior and methods specifically designed to over-
ride awareness and thus individual decision rights? Secrecy was required 
in order to protect operations designed to be undetectable because they 
took things from users without asking and employed those illegitimately 
claimed resources to work in the service of others’ purposes.
That Google was able to choose secrecy is itself testament to the success 
of its own claims and an illustration of the difference between “decision 
rights” and “privacy.” Decision rights confer the power to choose whether 
to keep something secret or to share it. One can choose the degree of pri-
vacy or transparency for each situation. US Supreme Court Justice William 
O. Douglas articulated this view of privacy in 1967: “Privacy involves the 
choice of the individual to disclose or to reveal what he believes, what he 
thinks, what he possesses” (Douglas 1967; Farahany 2012). Surveillance 
capitalism laid claim to these decision rights.
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The typical complaint is that privacy is eroded, but that is misleading. 
In the larger societal pattern, privacy is not eroded but redistributed, as 
decision rights over privacy are claimed for surveillance capital. Instead of 
many people having the right to decide how and what they will disclose, 
these rights are concentrated within the domain of surveillance capitalism. 
Google discovered this necessary element of the new logic of accumulation: 
it must declare its rights to take the information upon which its success 
depends. The extraordinary financial power of surveillance capitalism’s 
hidden inventions was only revealed when Google went public in 2004. 
At that time it became clear that on the strength of its secrets, the firm’s 
revenue had increased 3,590 percent in less than four years.
Today’s owners of surveillance capital have thus declared a fourth fic-
tional commodity expropriated from the experiential realities of human 
beings whose bodies, thoughts, and feelings are as blameless as nature’s 
once plentiful meadows and forests before they fell to the market dynamic. 
In this new logic, human experience is subjugated to surveillance capitalism’s 
market mechanisms and rendered as “behavior.” Behavior is reduced to data, 
ready to take their place in a numberless queue that feeds the machines for 
fabrication into predictions and eventual exchange in behavioral futures 
markets. The experiencing individual is not essential to this market action, 
except as the source of raw material.
The summary of these developments is that the behavioral surplus 
upon which Google’s fortune rests can be considered as surveillance assets. 
These assets are critical raw materials in the pursuit of surveillance customers 
for the sake of surveillance revenues and their translation into surveillance 
capital. The entire logic of this capital accumulation is most accurately 
understood as surveillance capitalism, which is the foundational framework 
of a surveillance- based economic order: a surveillance economy. The big 
pattern here is one of subordination and hierarchy, in which earlier reci-
procities between the firm and its users are subordinated to the derivative 
project of behavioral surplus captured for others’ market aims. Individual 
“users” are not the subjects of value realization. Nor are they, as some have 
insisted, “the product” in the sales process. Instead, they are the objects 
from which raw materials are extracted and expropriated for Google’s pre-
diction factories: they are the means to others’ ends. This is how in our 
lifetimes we observe capitalism shifting under our gaze: once profits from 
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products and services, then profits from financial speculation, and now 
profits from surveillance.
The Extraction Imperative: Economies of Scale
The accumulation of behavioral surplus is the master motion of surveil-
lance capitalism from which key economic imperatives can be induced. The 
quality of prediction products depends upon volume inputs to machine 
processes. Volume surplus is thus a competitive requirement. This dynamic 
establishes the extraction imperative, which expresses the necessity of econo-
mies of scale in surplus accumulation and depends upon automated systems 
that relentlessly track, hunt, and induce more behavioral surplus. These 
systems, which began in the online environment and later spread to the 
“real” world, constitute an extraction architecture that has evolved in the 
direction of ubiquity, just as Larry Page anticipated in 2001 and as the evo-
lution of digital “health” information amply demonstrates. Under the lash 
of the extraction imperative, the once simple closed loops have been trans-
formed into a global, sensate, computational, connected architecture of 
behavioral surplus capture and analysis, fulfilling computer scientist Mark 
Weiser’s 1999 vision of “ubiquitous computing” memorialized in two leg-
endary sentences: “The most profound technologies are those that disap-
pear. They weave themselves into the fabric of everyday life until they are 
indistinguishable from it” (Weiser 1999).
The Prediction Imperative: Economies of Scope
Surveillance profits awakened intense competition over the revenues that 
flow from behavioral futures markets. In this second phase of competitive 
intensity, the volume of surplus became a necessary but insufficient condi-
tion for success. Even the most sophisticated process of converting behav-
ioral surplus into products that accurately forecast the future is only as good 
as the raw material available for processing. In the race for higher degrees 
of certainty, it became clear that the best predictions would have to approx-
imate observation. The next threshold was defined by the quality, not just 
the quantity, of behavioral surplus. These pressures led to a search for new 
supplies of surplus that would more reliably foretell the future. This marks 
a critical turning point in the trial- and- error elaboration of surveillance 
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capitalism and crystallizes a second economic imperative— the prediction 
imperative— as the expression of these competitive forces. The prediction 
imperative drives the diversification of extraction architectures to accom-
modate, first, economies of scope in surplus accumulation and, later, econ-
omies of action.
The shift toward economies of scope represents a new set of aims: behav-
ioral surplus must be vast, but it must also be varied. These variations have 
been developed along two dimensions. The first is the extension of extraction 
operations from the virtual world into the “real” world of embodied human 
experience. Surveillance capitalists understood that their future wealth 
would depend upon new supply routes that extend to real life on the roads, 
among the trees, throughout the cities. Extension wants your bloodstream 
and your bed, your breakfast conversation, your commute, your run, your 
refrigerator, your parking space, your living room, your pancreas.
Economies of scope also proceed along a second depth dimension. The 
idea here is that more predictive, and therefore more lucrative, behavioral 
surplus can be plumbed from intimate patterns of the self. These supply 
operations are aimed at your personality, moods, and emotions; your lies 
and vulnerabilities. (For a detailed discussion, see Zuboff 2019, chapters 8 
and 9.) Emergent rendition techniques are trained on successive levels of 
intimacy where new supplies can be automatically captured and flattened 
into a tidal flow of data points that proceed toward manufactured certainty.
As the prediction imperative drives deeper into the self, the value of 
its surplus becomes irresistible, and the competitive pressures to corner 
lucrative sources of supply escalate. It is no longer a matter of surveillance 
capital wringing surplus from what I search, buy, and browse. Surveillance 
capital wants more than my body’s coordinates in time and space. Now it 
violates the inner sanctum, as machines and their algorithms decide the 
meaning of my sighs, blinks, and utterances; the pattern of my breathing 
and the movements of my eyes; my jaw muscles; the hitch in my voice; 
and the exclamation points in a Facebook post that I offered in innocence 
and hope.
There are many glosses that divert attention from the logic of these oper-
ations and their economic origins: “ambient computing,” “ubiquitous com-
puting,” and the “Internet of Things” are but a few examples. The labels 
differ, but they share a consistent vision: the everywhere, always- on instru-
mentation, datafication, connection, communication, and computation 
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of all things, animate and inanimate, and all processes— natural, human, 
physiological, chemical, machine, administrative, vehicular, financial . . . 
This new architecture provides the means through which human experi-
ence is continuously rendered—from phones, cars, streets, homes, shops, 
bodies, trees, buildings, airports, and cities—and translated to the digital 
realm where it finds a new market life.
The Prediction Imperative: Economies of Action
The capital requirements of these automated architectures are justified by 
the lure of surveillance revenues, continuously ratcheting up the compet-
itive intensity of the prediction imperative. Just as scale became necessary 
but insufficient for higher quality predictions, the demands of the predic-
tion imperative eventually encountered the limitations of economies of 
scope. While behavioral surplus must be vast and varied, surveillance capi-
talists gradually came to understand that the surest way to predict behavior 
is to intervene at its source and shape it. The processes invented to achieve 
this goal are what I call economies of action.
Economies of scale and scope are well- known industrial logics, but econ-
omies of action are distinct to surveillance capitalism and its digital milieu. 
In order to achieve these economies, machine processes are configured to 
intervene in the state of play in the real world among real people and things. 
These interventions are designed to augment prediction products in order 
that they approximate certainty by “tuning,” “herding,” and condition-
ing the behavior of individuals, groups, and populations. These economies 
of action apply techniques that are as varied as inserting a specific phrase 
into your Facebook news feed, timing the appearance of a BUY button on 
your phone with the rise of your endorphins at the end of a run, shutting 
down your car engine when an insurance payment is late, or employing 
population- scale behavioral microtargeting drawn from Facebook profiles. 
Indeed, the notorious manipulations of the data firm Cambridge Analytica, 
which scandalized the world in 2018, simply appropriated the means and 
methods that are now both standard and necessary operations in the sur-
veillance capitalism arsenal (Zuboff 2019, 295– 330).
As the prediction imperative gathers force, it gradually becomes clear 
that economies of scale and scope were the first phases of a more ambi-
tious project. Economies of action mean that ubiquitous machine archi-
tectures must be able to know as well as to do. What began as an extraction 
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architecture now doubles as an execution architecture through which hidden 
economic objectives are imposed upon the vast and varied field of behav-
ior. As surveillance capitalism’s imperatives and the material infrastructures 
that perform extraction and execution operations begin to function as a 
coherent whole, they produce a twenty- first- century means of behavioral 
modification to which the means of production is subordinated as merely 
one part of this larger whole.
The means of behavioral modification does not aim to compel confor-
mity to or compliance with social norms, as has been the case with earlier 
applications of the behaviorist paradigm. Rather, this new complex aims 
to produce behavior that reliably, definitively, and certainly leads to pre-
dicted commercial results for surveillance customers. The research director 
of Gartner, the respected business advisory and research firm, makes the 
point unambiguously when he observes that mastery of the “Internet of 
Things” will serve as “a key enabler in the transformation of business mod-
els from ‘guaranteed levels of performance’ to ‘guaranteed outcomes’” (italics 
mine; Pettey 2016). This is an extraordinary statement, because there can 
be no such guarantees in the absence of the power to make it so. The wider 
complex of “the means of behavioral modification” is the expression of this 
gathering power. The prospect of businesses competing on the promise of 
guaranteed outcomes enabled by a global digital architecture alerts us to 
the force of the prediction imperative, which now demands that surveil-
lance capitalists make the future for the sake of predicting it.
Surveillance capitalists’ interests have shifted from using automated 
machine processes to know about your behavior to using machine pro-
cesses to shape your behavior according to their interests. Given the con-
ditions of increasing ubiquity, it has become difficult, if not impossible, 
to escape this web. Under this regime, ubiquitous computing is not just a 
knowing machine; it is an actuating machine designed to produce more 
certainty about us and for them. The nearly two- decade trajectory since the 
collection and analysis of health data was conceived as a simple closed loop 
has taken us from automating information flows about behavior to auto-
mating behavior. Just as industrial capitalism was driven to the continuous 
intensification of the means of production, so surveillance capitalists are 
now locked in a cycle of continuous intensification of the means of behav-
ioral modification. While it is possible to imagine something like a ubiqui-
tous, connected, sensate computational architecture without surveillance 
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capitalism, the means of behavioral modification depend entirely on this 
pervasive networked architecture.
Economies of scale and scope ignored privacy norms and laws, relying 
on weak legitimation processes like “sadistic contracts” and meaningless 
mechanisms of notice and consent to accumulate decision rights in the 
surveillance capitalist domain (Bakos, et al. 2014; Becher and Zarsky 2015; 
Kar 2013; Kim 2013; Preston 2015; Radin 2012). But economies of action 
go further. These new systems and procedures take direct aim at individual 
autonomy, systematically replacing self- determined action with a range of 
hidden operations designed to shape behavior at the source. Economies 
of action are constructed through systematic experimentation that began 
with apparent banalities like the A/B testing of web- page design elements 
and eventually progressed to more complex undertakings. One example is 
the secret manipulation of social contagion demonstrated in Facebook’s 
vast experiments in shaping social behavior, about which the corporation’s 
researchers concluded, “Emotional states can be transferred to others via 
emotional contagion, leading people to experience the same emotions 
without their awareness. . . . Online messages influence our experience of 
emotions, which may affect a variety of offline behaviors” (Kramer, Guil-
lory, and Hancock 2014). Another is the population- scale social herding 
experiments popularized by the Google- incubated augmented reality appli-
cation of Niantic Labs’ Pokémon Go, in which innocent players are herded 
to eat, drink, and purchase in the restaurants, bars, fast- food joints, and 
shops that pay to play in the company’s behavioral futures markets (see the 
discussion in Zuboff 2019).
Ultimately behavioral modification capabilities are institutionalized in 
“innovative” commercial practices in which individuals fund their own 
domination. One finds digital tuning, herding, and conditioning embedded 
in such varied practices as the insurance industry’s embrace of “behavioral 
underwriting,” the gamification of retailing, the remote- control opera-
tions of automotive telematics, or the “personalized services” of so- called 
“digital assistants” such as Amazon’s “Alexa,” Google’s “Google Assistant,” 
and Microsoft’s “Cortana.” What they share is the explicit aim to produce 
planned behavioral outcomes with methods of behavioral modification 
that operate through unprecedented and proprietary digital architectures, 
while carefully circumventing the awareness of human targets.
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The conflation of economic imperatives and behavior modification at 
scale locates the surveillance capitalist project squarely in the paradigm of 
radical behaviorism associated with B. F. Skinner, which draws upon for-
mulations in early theoretical physics, especially the philosophical work of 
Max Planck (2007a, 2007b). Following Planck, radical behaviorism insists 
on the reduction of human experience to observable, measurable behavior 
purged of inwardness, thus establishing psychological science as the objec-
tive study of behaving objects comparable to the research paradigms of the 
natural sciences. Max Meyer, a student of Planck’s and the early- twentieth- 
century experimental psychologist most admired by Skinner, called this 
approach “the psychology of the Other- One” (Skinner 1991, 4– 6; see also 
Meyer 1921). Human behavior would yield to scientific inquiry only if 
psychologists learned to view humans as “others,” a “viewpoint of obser-
vation” considered an absolute requirement for an “objective science of 
human behaviour” (Meyer 1912, 371). Central to this new viewpoint was 
Meyer’s insistence that the human being should be regarded as an “organ-
ism among organisms,” distinguishable from a lettuce, a moose, or an inch-
worm only in degree of complexity (Esper 1967, 114; Meyer 1912, 1921).
Skinner embraced Meyer’s “viewpoint of observation,” which led to his 
discovery of the principles of “operant conditioning” in which a carefully 
designed “schedule of reinforcements” is imposed on the animal in order 
to shape specific behavioral patterns by amplifying some actions at the 
expense of others. While Skinner focused his work on mice and pigeons, 
the epistemology of radical behaviorism enabled easy generalizations across 
species (Blanshard 1967; Meyer 1912, 1921; Skinner 1976, 1991, 2002, 
2012; Wozniak 1997). Even the complexities of human reasoning, choice, 
problem- solving, and reflection render themselves to the viewpoint of the 
Other- One:
When a man controls himself, chooses a course of action, thinks out the solution to 
a problem, or strives toward an increase in self- knowledge, he is behaving. He con-
trols himself precisely as he would control the behavior of anyone else— through 
the manipulation of variables of which behavior is a function. His behavior in so 
doing is a proper object of analysis, and eventually it must be accounted for with 
variables lying outside the individual himself. (Skinner 2012, 228– 229)
It was Skinner who first imagined a ubiquitous “technology of behavior” 
that would enable the application of operant conditioning across entire 
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human populations. He argued that “the field of human behavior” would 
never achieve scientific status without “instruments and methods” as pow-
erful as those available to physicists and biologists (Skinner 2002, 4– 5). Such 
instruments would finally illuminate the laws of human action, enabling 
scientists to shape and predict behavior.
There would be challenges. New technologies of behavior would have 
to continually push the envelope of the public– private divide in order 
to access all the data relevant to behavioral prediction and control. Like 
today’s surveillance capitalists, Skinner was confident that the slow drip of 
technological invention would eventually push privacy to the margins of 
human experience, where it would join “freedom,” “autonomy,” and other 
troublesome illusions. All of these would be replaced by the viewpoint of 
the Other- One embodied in new instruments and methods:
The line between public and private is not fixed. The boundary shifts with every 
discovery of a technique for making private events public. Behavior which is 
of such small magnitude that it is not ordinarily observed may be amplified. 
Covert verbal behavior may be detected in slight movements of the speech appa-
ratus. . . . The problem of privacy may, therefore, eventually be solved by tech-
nical advances . . . we are still faced with events which occur at the private level 
and which are important to the organism without instrumental amplification. 
How the organism reacts to these events will remain an important question, 
even though the events may some day be made accessible to everyone. (Skinner 
2012, 282)
Skinner’s technologies of behavior have finally come to life as a market 
project. The conflation of economic orientation, the means of behavioral 
modification, and the digital architectures and devices that are its medium 
are now a taken- for- granted feature of the surveillance capitalist milieu. 
This theme and the necessity of its concealment are reiterated throughout 
the interviews that I conducted with data scientists and software engineers 
between 2012 and 2015 as one element of a larger study of surveillance 
capitalism.3 The means of behavioral modification are the subject of cre-
ative elaboration, experimentation, and application, but always outside the 
awareness of its human targets. For example, the chief data scientist for a 
national drugstore chain described how his company designs automated 
digital reinforcers to subtly tune customers’ behaviors: “You can make peo-
ple do things with this technology. Even if it’s just 5% of people, you’ve 
made 5% of people do an action they otherwise wouldn’t have done, so to 
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some extent there is an element of the user’s loss of self- control.” A soft-
ware engineer specializing in the Internet of Things explained his compa-
ny’s approach to conditioning: “The goal of everything we do is to change 
people’s actual behavior at scale  .  .  . we can capture their behaviors and 
identify good and bad. Then we develop ‘treatments’ or ‘data pellets’ that 
select good behaviors.” Another recounted the operational mechanisms of 
herding: “We can engineer the context around a particular behavior and 
force change that way. . . . We are learning how to write the music, and then we 
let the music make them dance.”
How do they get away with it? Dozens of surveys conducted since 2008 
attest to substantial majorities in the United States, the EU, and around the 
world that reject the premises and practices of surveillance capitalism, yet 
it persists, succeeds, and dominates. In other work I have detailed sixteen 
factors that enabled this new logic of accumulation to root and flourish 
(Zuboff 2019), and here I want to underscore two of these.
The first is dependency. Surveillance capitalism now controls many of 
the operations that are essential for social participation. Early on, the free 
services of Google, Facebook, and other applications appealed to the latent 
needs of second- modernity individuals seeking resources for effective 
life in an increasingly hostile institutional environment (Beck and Beck- 
Gernsheim 2002; Zuboff and Maxmin 2002). Once bitten, the apple was 
irresistible. A 2010 BBC poll found that 79 percent of people in twenty- six 
countries considered Internet access to be a fundamental human right (BBC 
2010). Six years later, in 2016, the United Nations Human Rights Council 
would adopt specific language on the importance of Internet access. In the 
United States, many people call the emergency services number, 911, on 
those rare occasions when Facebook is down (LA Times 2014). Most people 
find it difficult to withdraw from these utilities, and many ponder if it is 
even possible (Alter 2017; Andreassen et al. 2012; Casale and Fioravanti 
2015; Cheng and Li 2014; Dreifus 2017; Griffiths, Kuss, and Demetrovics 
2014; Schou Andreassen, and Pallesen 2014).
As surveillance capitalism spread across the Internet, the means of social 
participation became coextensive with the means of behavioral modifica-
tion, eroding the choice mechanisms that adhere to the private realm—
exit, voice, and loyalty. There can be no exit from processes that we cannot 
detect and upon which we must depend for the effectiveness of daily life. 
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Users are not customers and thus far lack institutionalized means of col-
lective action that would establish reliable channels for voice. Loyalty is 
an empty suit, as continued participation is better explained in terms of 
helplessness, resignation, and the foreclosure of alternatives.
Next I turn to the second key answer to the question “How do they get 
away with it?” That answer is power.
The Rise of Instrumentarian Power
The internal pressures exerted by surveillance capitalism’s economic imper-
atives produce the compulsion to “make them dance.” First, production is 
subordinated to extraction, and then the means of production is subordi-
nated to the means of behavioral modification. Finally, what is produced is 
the guarantee of outcomes, or at least the ever- improving approximation 
to such guarantees. These guarantees have value, but in the novel logic of 
surveillance capitalism, their value is a function of markets that bear no 
organic reciprocities with their populations, now repurposed as the source 
of unlimited raw material supplies. This analysis brings us to the edge of a 
new terrain, but no further. I have suggested that there can be no guarantee 
of outcomes without the power to make it so. In order to proceed, it is nec-
essary to answer the question, what is this new power to “make them dance”? 
The answer offers a glimpse into the dark heart of surveillance capitalism as 
a usurper of rights and a civilizational force.
The first key point is that there is no historical precedent for the quality 
of power that now confronts us. It is, I argue, an unprecedented species of 
power that emerges in the unprecedented digital milieu of surveillance cap-
italism and its unprecedented economic logic founded on the dispossession 
of human behavior as the new source of capital accumulation. Any encoun-
ter with the unprecedented is itself a genuine intellectual and existential 
challenge, and this fact itself merits our attention. That which is unprece-
dented is necessarily unrecognizable, tacitly interpreted through the lens of 
familiar categories. This mental operation renders invisible precisely those 
dimensions of experience for which there are no established mental sets. 
A classic example is the notion of the “horseless carriage” to which peo-
ple reverted when confronted with the unprecedented facts of the auto-
mobile. Existing lenses illuminate the familiar and obscure the original by 
turning the unprecedented into an extension of the past. The sociology of 
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the unprecedented multiplies this effect. Once the abnormal is normalized, 
habituation and psychic numbing make contest even more unlikely (Baehr 
2002; Lifton 2010; Slovic et al. 2011; van Der Kolk and Saporta 1991).
In the years during and immediately following World War II, scholars 
confronted these barriers of cognition, imagination, and language as they 
tried to name and grasp another unprecedented configuration of power, 
what would come to be known as “totalitarianism.” In the early phases of 
this effort, critics appropriated the horseless- carriage language of “imperial-
ism” as the only framework at hand with which to articulate and resist the 
new power’s murderous threats. With a few important exceptions, it was 
only after the Nazi defeat that the program of naming began in earnest.
That confrontation with the unprecedented is reflected in the mov-
ing accounts of the first scholars determined to lift the veil on their era’s 
gruesome truths. The systematic accretion of violence and complicity that 
engulfed whole populations at extreme velocity invoked a kind of bewil-
derment that ended in paralysis, even for many of the greatest minds of the 
twentieth century. Harvard political scientist Carl Friedrich was among the 
first scholars of totalitarianism to address this experience of improbability 
writing in 1954: “Virtually no one before 1914 anticipated the course of 
development which has overtaken Western civilization since then . . . none 
of the outstanding scholars in history, law, and the social sciences discerned 
what was ahead . . . which culminated in totalitarianism. To this failure to 
foresee corresponds a difficulty in comprehending” (Friedrich 1954, 1– 2).
Nearly every intellectual who turned to this project in the period imme-
diately following the war cites the feeling of astonishment at the suddenness 
with which, as Friedrich put it, totalitarianism had “burst upon mankind . . . 
unexpected and unannounced” (Friedrich 1954, 1). Its manifestations were 
so novel and unanticipated, so shocking, rapid, and unparalleled, that all 
of it eluded language, challenging every tradition, norm, value, and legiti-
mate form of action. Hannah Arendt described the defeat of Nazi Germany 
as “the first chance to try to tell and to understand what had happened . . . 
still in grief and sorrow and  .  .  . a tendency to lament, but no longer in 
speechless outrage and impotent horror” (Arendt 2004, 387). Later, histo-
rian Robert Conquest would document the similar failure of journalists, 
scholars, and Western governments in reckoning the full weight of Soviet 
totalitarianism’s monstrous achievements. The most salient reason for this 
failure, he observed, was that the actual facts were so “improbable” that it 
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was difficult even for specialists to grasp their truth. “Plenty of information 
was available contradicting the official picture,” wrote Conquest. “The Sta-
lin epoch is replete with what appear as improbabilities to minds unfitted 
to deal with the phenomena” (Conquest 2008, 486).
Ultimately, a courageous body of scholarship would evolve to meet the 
challenge of comprehension. It yielded different models and schools of 
thought, each with distinct emphasis and insights, but these shared com-
mon purpose in the work of naming. “Totalitarianism has discovered a 
means of dominating and terrorizing human beings from within,” wrote 
Arendt, the German- born philosopher who would spend the six years after 
World War  II writing her extraordinary study of totalitarian power, pub-
lished in 1951 as The Origins of Totalitarianism (Arendt 2004, 431). Arendt’s 
was a detailed disclosure and a pioneering attempt to theorize what had 
just occurred. “Comprehension,” she said, is the necessary response to the 
“truly radical nature of Evil” disclosed by totalitarianism. “It means  .  .  . 
examining and bearing consciously the burden which our century has 
placed on us— neither denying its existence nor submitting meekly to its 
weight.” Totalitarianism was bent on the “destruction of humanity” and 
“the essence of man,” but, she insisted, “to turn our backs on the destruc-
tive forces of the century is of little avail” (Arendt 2004, xxvii). Essential 
here was the deletion of all ties and sources of meaning other than “the 
movement”: “Total loyalty— the psychological basis for domination— can 
be expected only from the completely isolated human being who, without 
any other social ties to family, friends, comrades, or even mere acquain-
tances, derives his sense of having a place in the world only from his belong-
ing to a movement, his membership in the party” (Arendt 2004, 429).
Midcentury scholars such as Friedrich, Adorno, Gurian, Brzezinski, and 
Aron added to these themes, recognizing totalitarianism’s insistence on 
domination of the human soul (Adorno 1966, 1985, 1991; Aron 1968; Frie-
drich 1954, 1956 ). The Russian- born political scientist Waldemar Gurian, 
who escaped Nazi Germany in 1939, argued that totalitarianism functioned 
as a “secularized political religion” that requires “absolute obedience” and 
demands “active acclamation” (Gurian 1954, 119– 129). Political scientists 
Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski emphasized totalitarianism’s reli-
ance on terror to drive and sustain “human remolding,” “re- educative mea-
sures,” and “extensive revisions” of self and psyche (Friedrich and Brzezinski 
1956, 130– 133). Activist and theorist Franz Neumann’s courageous analysis 
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of National Socialism from 1933 to 1944 also elevated terror to the highest- 
order principle of action. Neumann described the Third Reich’s subordina-
tion of the means of production to the “means of violence,” as the Nazis 
asserted authority over property and production, both through the expro-
priation of Jewish assets and through the party’s command and control of 
key industries (Neumann and Hayes 2009, 470– 76, 632– 634).
Totalitarianism was bent on the purification of the human species 
through the dual mechanisms of genocide and the “engineering of the 
soul.” In this way totalitarian regimes could achieve their fantastical aim 
of “the People- as- one,” as Claude Lefort describes it. “Social unanimity cor-
responds to inner unanimity, held in place by hatred activated toward the 
‘enemies of the people’” (Lefort 1986, 297– 298). But to command popula-
tions right down to their souls requires unimaginable effort, which was one 
reason why totalitarianism was unimaginable. It measures success at the cel-
lular level, penetrating to the quick, where it subverts and commands each 
unspoken yearning in pursuit of the genocidal vision that historian Richard 
Shorten calls “the experiment in reshaping humanity” (Shorten 2012, 50). 
Each individual inner life must be claimed and transformed by the per-
petual threat of terror: punishment without crime. This craftwork requires 
the detailed orchestration of isolation, anxiety, fear, persuasion, fantasy, 
longing, inspiration, torture, dread, and surveillance. Arendt describes the 
relentless process of “atomization” and fusion in which terror destroys the 
ordinary human bonds of law, norms, trust, and affection, “which provide 
the living space for the freedom of the individual” (Arendt 1994, 343).
Arendt’s project of naming was embedded in a larger wave of postwar 
reform determined to inoculate civilization from the genocidal impulse 
and institutionalized in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR), beginning with the assertion, “All human beings are born free and 
equal in dignity and rights.” As Michael Ignatieff has argued, the UDHR 
founded a “judicial revolution,” establishing a global juridical framework 
of human rights that both ignited and legitimated the justice demands of 
colonial subjects, civil rights groups, and other movements originating in 
exclusion and oppression (Ignatieff 2001; see also Franck 2000).
Now a new surveillance- based economic order casts us adrift in a dif-
ferent dark sea of original and thus difficult- to- discern dangers, where 
the abrogation of human rights does not always or easily correspond to 
the historical development of human rights and its established juridical 
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frameworks. And just as the scholars of totalitarianism once looked to 
nineteenth- century imperialism to explain the violence of their time, it is 
we who now reach for the familiar vernaculars of twentieth- century power 
like lifesaving driftwood. Invariably we look to the specter of totalitarian-
ism as the lens through which to interpret today’s threats. The result is 
that Google, Facebook, and the larger field of commercial surveillance are 
frequently criticized as “Big Brother” or “digital totalitarianism” (Blakely 
2014; Borowicz 2014; Doctorow 2017; Economist 2004; Hirsh 2015; Menell 
2013; Schulz 2016; Sorell and Draper 2012). I admire those who have stood 
against the incursions of commercial surveillance, but I also suggest that 
the equation of its new power with totalitarianism and the Orwellian trope 
impedes our understanding as well as our ability to resist, neutralize, and 
ultimately vanquish its potency. Instead, we need to grasp the specific inner 
logic of a conspicuously twenty- first- century conjuring of power to which 
the past offers no adequate compass. Its aims are in many ways just as ambi-
tious as those of totalitarianism, but they are also utterly and profoundly 
distinct. The work of naming a strange form of power unprecedented in the 
human experience must begin anew for the sake of effective resistance and 
the creative power to insist on a future of our own making.
As to the new species of power, I have suggested that it is best understood 
as instrumentarianism, defined as the instrumentation and instrumentalization 
of behavior for the purposes of modification, prediction, monetization and control. 
In this formulation, “instrumentation” refers to the ubiquitous, sensate, 
computational, actuating global architecture that renders, monitors, com-
putes, and modifies human behavior. Surveillance capitalism is the puppet 
master that imposes its will through the vast capabilities of this connected 
puppet to produce instrumentarian power, replacing the engineering of 
souls with the engineering of behavior. There is no brother here of any 
kind, big or little, evil or good— no family ties, however grim. Instead, this 
new global apparatus is better understood as a Big Other that encodes the 
viewpoint of the Other- One as a pervasive presence, finally bringing Skin-
ner’s longed for “technology of behavior” to life. “Instrumentalization” 
denotes the social relations that orient the puppet masters to human expe-
rience, as surveillance capital overrides long- standing reciprocities of mar-
ket democracy, wielding its machines to transform us into the means to 
others’ market ends. Although he did not name it, Mark Weiser, the vision-
ary of ubiquitous computing, foresaw the immensity of instrumentarian 
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power as a totalizing societal project. He did so in a way that suggests both 
its utter lack of precedent and the danger of confounding it with what 
has gone before: “Hundreds of computers in every room, all capable of 
sensing people near them and linked by high- speed networks, have the 
potential to make totalitarianism up to now seem like sheerest anarchy” 
(Weiser 1999, 89). In fact, all those computers are not the means to a digital 
hypertotalitarianism. They are, as I think Weiser sensed, the foundation of 
an unprecedented power that can reshape society in unprecedented ways. 
If instrumentarian power can make totalitarianism look like anarchy, then 
what might it have in store for us?
While all power yearns toward totality, instrumentarian power’s specific 
purposes and methods are not only distinct from totalitarianism but they 
are in many ways its precise opposite. Surveillance capitalists have no interest 
in murder or the reformation of our souls. Instrumentarian power, there-
fore, has no principle to instruct. There is no training or transformation for 
spiritual salvation, no ideology against which to judge our actions. It does 
not demand possession of each person from the inside out. It has no inter-
est in exterminating or disfiguring our bodies and minds in the name of 
pure devotion. Totalitarianism was a political project that converged with 
economics to overwhelm society. Instrumentarianism is a market project 
that converges with the digital to achieve its own unique brand of social 
domination. Totalitarianism operated through the means of violence, but 
instrumentarian power operates through the means of behavioral modifica-
tion. And this is where our focus must shift. What passes for social relations 
and economic exchange now occurs across the medium of this robotized 
veil of abstraction.
Instrumentarianism’s specific “viewpoint of observation” was forged in 
the controversial intellectual domain of “radical behaviorism.” Thanks to 
Big Other’s capabilities, instrumentarian power reduces human experience 
to measurable, observable behavior, while remaining steadfastly indiffer-
ent to the meaning of that experience. It is profoundly, infinitely, and, 
following its behaviorist origins, radically indifferent to our meanings and 
motives. This epistemology of radical indifference produces observation with-
out witness. Instead of an intimate violent political religion, Big Other’s way 
of knowing us yields the remote but inescapable presence of impenetrably 
complex systems and the interests that author them, carrying individuals 
on a fast- moving current to the fulfillment of others’ ends. Big Other has 
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no interest in soiling itself with our excretions, but it may aggressively hunt 
data on the behavior of our blood and shit. It has no appetite for our grief, 
pain, or terror, although it welcomes the behavioral surplus that leaches 
from our anguish.
Trained on measurable action, Big Other cares only about observing 
what we do and ensuring that we do it in ways that are accessible to its ever- 
evolving operations of rendition, reinforcement, calculation, and moneti-
zation. Instrumentarianism’s radical indifference is operationalized in Big 
Other’s dehumanized methods of evaluation that produce equivalence with-
out equality by reducing individuals to the lowest common denominator of 
sameness— an organism among organisms.
In the execution of economies of action, Big Other simulates the behav-
iorists’ “vortex of stimuli,” transforming “natural selection” into the 
“unnatural selection” of variation and reinforcement authored by market 
players and the competition for surveillance revenues. We may confuse Big 
Other with the behaviorist god of the vortex, but only because it effectively 
conceals the machinations of surveillance capitalism that are the wizard 
behind the digital curtain. The gentle seductive voice crafted on the yonder 
side of this veil— Google, is that you?— gently herds us along the path that 
coughs up the maximum of behavioral surplus and the closest approxima-
tion to certainty.
Instrumentarian Power Thrives in Lawless Space
Instrumentarianism is not murderous, but it is as startling, incomprehensi-
ble, and new to the human story as totalitarianism was to its witnesses and 
victims. Thanks to Big Other’s capabilities to know and to do, instrumen-
tarian power aims for a condition of certainty without terror in the form of 
“guaranteed outcomes.” In pursuit of this certainty, the locus of economic 
power shifts from ownership of the means of production to ownership of 
the means of behavioral modification. Instrumentarian power produces 
endlessly accruing knowledge and control for surveillance capitalists and 
diminished self- determination for its populations who now fund their own 
domination as targets of extraction and modification.
The paradox is that because instrumentarianism does not claim our bod-
ies for some grotesque regime of pain and murder, we are prone to under-
value its effects and lower our guard. Instead of death, torture, reeducation, 
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or conversion, instrumentarianism effectively expels us from our own 
behavior. It severs our insides from our outsides, our subjectivity and inte-
riority from our observable actions. Otherized behavior takes on a life of its 
own that delivers our actions now, soon, and later to surveillance capital-
ism’s aims and interests.
Under the regime of instrumentarian power, the mental agency and self- 
possession of autonomous human action are gradually submerged beneath a 
new kind of automaticity: a lived routine of stimulus– response– reinforcement 
that operates outside of awareness and is aggregated as statistical phenom-
ena: the comings and goings of mere organisms. Our conformity is irrele-
vant to instrumentarianism’s success. There is no need for mass submission 
to social norms, no loss of self to the collective induced by terror and com-
pulsion, no inducements of acceptance and belonging as a reward for bend-
ing to the group. All of that is superseded by a market- based digital order 
that thrives within things and bodies, transforming volition into reinforce-
ment and action into conditioned response.
Using Polanyi’s lens, we have seen that surveillance capitalism annexes 
human experience to the market dynamic so that it is reborn as behav-
ior: the fourth “fictional commodity.” However, Polanyi’s first three fic-
tional commodities— land, labor, and money— were eventually subjected 
to law. Although these laws have been imperfect, the institutions of labor 
law, environmental law, and banking law provided regulatory frameworks 
intended to defend society (and nature, life, and exchange) from the worst 
excesses of raw capitalism’s destructive power. Surveillance capitalism’s 
translation of human experience into market commodities has thus far 
faced no such impediments.
In earlier work I detail the historical conditions and forms of corporate 
action that enabled surveillance capitalism’s successful pursuit and suste-
nance of lawless space (Zuboff 2019). While a reprise of those arguments 
exceeds the space of this chapter, two conditions float above them all, and 
they merit emphasis. The first reverts to the sociology of the unprecedented, 
as the original action of instrumentarian power works its will before it can 
be adequately understood, thus enjoying a substantial lag in social evolu-
tion and the eventual production of law. This problem is already evident 
in the commoditization of human experience, which does not easily corre-
spond to established legal frameworks, such as those that concern privacy 
rights or anticompetitive corporate practices. For example, laws that pertain 
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to “data ownership” or “data protection” overlook what is original in this 
latest “original sin,” namely, the assertion that human experience is free 
for unilateral (and secret) rendition into behavioral data in the first place.
A second condition that has enabled the pursuit and protection of law-
less operational spaces derives from surveillance capitalism’s historical and 
material origins as both American born and “born digital.” On both counts, 
surveillance capital has benefitted from the antiregulatory zeitgeist of US 
neoliberal economic policy and political ideology (Cohen 2016; Hoofna-
gle 2017; Short 2011). In this respect surveillance capitalists have enjoyed 
a political windfall, not unlike the Gilded Age titans who exploited the 
absence of industry regulation in their time to claim undefended territory 
for their own interests, declare the righteousness of their self- authorizing 
prerogatives, and defend their brand of raw capitalism from democracy 
(Nasaw 2005). Imbued with the conviction that “the state had neither right 
nor reason to interfere in the workings of the economy,” Gilded Age mil-
lionaires joined forces to defend the “rights of capital” and limit the role 
of elected representatives in setting policy or developing legislation (Nasaw 
2005, 124– 125). There was no need for law, they argued, when one had the 
“law of evolution,” the “laws of capital,” and the “laws of industrial soci-
ety.” John Rockefeller insisted that his outsized oil fortune was the result 
of “the natural law of trade development.” Jay Gould, when questioned by 
Congress on the need for federal regulation of railroad rates, replied that 
“the laws of supply and demand, production and consumption” already 
regulate rates (Nasaw 2005, 132).
Gilded Age business elites determined that the most effective way to 
protect the original sin of that economic era was, as historian David Nasaw 
puts it, “to circumscribe democracy.” They did this by lavishly funding their 
own political candidates as well as through the careful honing and aggres-
sive dissemination of an ideological attack on the very notion of democra-
cy’s right to interfere in the economic realm (Friedman 2004, 14– 28; Nasaw 
2005, 146, 148).
A similar determination to conduct surveillance capitalism free of demo-
cratic oversight dominates Google’s short but remarkable history. Its ability 
to discern, construct, and stake its claim to the unregulated territories of the 
Internet not yet subject to law and, in the United States at least, free from 
constitutional constraints, was essential to its frictionless accumulation of 
surplus as the means to its frictionless accumulation of power and capital. 
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Eric Schmidt and Jared Cohen celebrate their claim to operational spaces 
beyond the reach of political institutions on the very first page of their 
book on the digital age: “The online world is not truly bound by terrestrial 
laws  .  .  . it’s the world’s largest ungoverned space” (Schmidt and Cohen 
2014).
Surveillance capitalists are impelled to pursue lawlessness by the logic 
of their own creation. Google and Facebook vigorously lobby to kill online 
privacy protection, limit regulations, weaken or block privacy- enhancing 
legislation, and thwart every attempt to circumscribe their practices 
because such laws threaten the flow of behavioral surplus (Dougherty 2016; 
Google Transparency Project 2016, 2017; Mullins and Nicas 2017; Shaban 
2017a, 2017b; Statista 2017; Taplin 2017). Schmidt, Brin, and Page have 
ardently defended their right to freedom from law even as Google grew to 
become what is arguably the world’s most powerful corporation (Khosla 
2004). Their efforts have been marked by a few consistent themes: that 
technology companies such as Google move faster than the state’s ability 
to understand or follow; that any attempts to intervene or constrain are 
therefore fated to be ill- conceived and inept; that regulation is always a 
negative force that impedes innovation and progress; and that lawlessness 
is the necessary context for innovation (Cunningham 2011; Gobry 2011; 
Jenkins 2010; Yarow 2013).
Many hopes today are pinned on the new body of EU regulation known 
as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which became enforce-
able in May 2018. In time the world will learn if the GDPR can move out 
in front of Big Other, successfully challenging the legitimacy of surveil-
lance capitalism, its means of behavioral modification, and its production 
of instrumentarian power. Scholars and specialists debate the implications 
of the sweeping new regulations, some arguing the inevitability of deci-
sive change, and others arguing the likelihood of continuity over dramatic 
reversals of practice (Keller 2017; Mayer- Schönberger and Padova 2016; 
Rossi 2016; Wachter 2017; Zarsky 2017). The only possible answer is that 
everything will depend upon how European societies interpret the new 
regulatory regime in legislation and in the courts. It will not be the word-
ing of the regulations but rather popular movements on the ground that 
shape these interpretations. Just as a century ago workers joined in collec-
tive action to tip the scales of power, today’s “users” will have to mobilize 
in new ways that assert society’s rejection of an economic order based on 
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the dispossession of human experience as a means to the prediction and 
control of human behavior for others’ profit.
As a result of its successful pursuit of lawlessness and in the absence of 
the typical mechanisms of private governance associated with exit, voice, 
and loyalty, surveillance capitalism has wielded its instrumentarian power 
to bypass older distinctions between market and world, market and soci-
ety, market and home, or market and person. Instrumentarianism opens 
these borderlands to profit seeking, as market operations fill the void where 
democratic institutions should be. It is already clear that instrumentar-
ian power produces specific contests over the constitutionally established 
rights of citizens. For example, when US scholars and jurists assess the ways 
in which digital capabilities challenge Fourth Amendment doctrine, the 
focus is typically on the relationship between individuals and the state. It 
is of course vital that Fourth Amendment protections reflect the realities of 
twenty- first- century data production and dispossession (Brennan- Marquez 
and Henderson 2017; Gray 2017a, 2017b; Kerr 2005, 531– 585; Wydra et 
al. 2017). The problem is that even expanded protections from state sur-
veillance do not shield users from the assaults of instrumentarian power 
animated by surveillance capitalism’s private economic imperatives (Daskal 
2015; Kerr 2005).
Legal scholarship is just beginning to reckon with these new facts. Fourth 
Amendment scholar Andrew Guthrie Ferguson concludes, “If billions of 
sensors filled with personal data fall outside of Fourth Amendment protec-
tions, a large- scale surveillance network will exist without constitutional 
limits” (Ferguson 2015, 879– 880). Dutch scholars make a similar case for 
the inadequacy of Dutch law as it trails behind Big Other, no longer able to 
effectively assert the sanctity of the home from the invasive action of either 
industry or the state. “The walls no longer shield the individual effectively 
from the outside in the pursuing of . . . personal life without intrusion . . .” 
(Van Dongen and Timan 2017).
These and other contests over the extension of juridical rights to surveil-
lance capitalism’s market domain point us toward an even deeper crisis of 
human rights, delivering us head- on to Hannah Arendt’s meta- formulation 
of the “right to have rights.” Arendt’s assertion peels away juridical achieve-
ments—she refers to these as the “Rights of Man”—revealing the a priori 
grounds upon which the very possibility of juridical rights rests. It is here 
on the ground of what I shall refer to as “elemental human rights” that 
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I propose to consider the implications of surveillance capitalism and its 
instrumentarian power for the prospects of human freedom.4
Instrumentarian Power as a Coup from Above
For Arendt, the “right to have rights” stands in contrast to juridical rights 
as indelible, “Man, it turns out, can lose all so- called Rights of Man with-
out losing his essential quality as man, his human dignity” (Arendt 2004, 
377). This is because the “right to have rights” equates to the “right of 
every individual to belong to humanity,” and it “should be guaranteed by 
humanity itself” (Arendt 2004, 379). What does this belonging signify? For 
Arendt it means, above all, the possibility of effective life through voice and 
action, possibilities that are given in the elemental condition of inclusion 
in the human community. To belong to humanity is to belong to a world 
in which one can choose one’s actions and exercise one’s voice in ways that 
effectively further the aims of one’s own life and the life of one’s group.
How does the elemental condition of belonging to humanity translate 
into a “right to have rights”? Arendt argues that this conversion from ele-
mental condition to explicit right arises only in the confrontation with a 
threat to the condition of inclusion:
We became aware of the existence of a “right to have rights” (and that means 
to live in a framework where one is judged by one’s actions and opinions) and 
a right to belong to some kind of organized community, only when millions of 
people emerged who had lost and could not regain these rights because of the 
new global political situation. . . . Not the loss of specific rights, then, but the loss 
of a community willing and able to guarantee any rights whatsoever, has been the 
calamity which has befallen ever- increasing numbers of people. Only the loss of a 
polity itself expels him from humanity. (Arendt 2004, 376– 377)
Only exclusion from humanity itself, and thus exclusion from the elemen-
tal freedoms of voice and action, can abrogate the “right to have rights.” 
“The fundamental deprivation of human rights is manifested first and 
above all in the deprivation of a place in the world which makes opinions 
significant and actions effective” (Arendt 2004, 376).
In this Arendt foreshadows the linguistic philosopher John Searle’s 
“pragmatic considerations of the formulation of rights” (Searle 2010, 
194– 195). Searle argues that elemental conditions of existence are crystal-
lized as formal human rights only at that moment in history when they 
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come under systematic threat. So, for example, the ability to speak is an ele-
mental condition. The concept of “freedom of speech” as a formal juridical 
right emerged only when society evolved to a degree of political complexity 
that the freedom to speak came under threat. Searle observes that speech is 
not more central to human life than breathing or being able to move one’s 
body. No one has declared a “right to breathe” or a “right to bodily move-
ment” because these elemental conditions have not come under attack and 
therefore do not require formal protection. What counts as a basic right, 
Searle argues, is both “historically contingent” and “pragmatic” (Searle 
2010, 194– 195).
It is not surprising then, that Arendt wrestled with the elemental human 
conditions of inclusion, voice, and action at a time when totalitarianism 
forced many philosophers and social theorists to question the structure of 
human freedom (Adorno 2008; Arendt 1983; Sartre 1957, 1992). Were there 
elemental constituents of human freedom that remain ineradicable, even 
in the teeth of “no escape” from a totalizing power? For the Arendt of Ori-
gins “action” was an indelible manifestation of freedom. Of those deprived 
of human rights under totalitarianism she wrote, “They are deprived, not of 
the right to freedom, but of the right to action” (Arendt 2004, 376).
It was a theme that she would elaborate throughout her life: action 
initiates. It asserts beginnings that diverge from established lines of force. 
Action inserts itself into the already composed human world to make 
something new. “To act  .  .  . means to take an initiative, to begin  .  .  . to 
set something into motion” (Arendt 1998, 176– 177). Arendt observes that 
every beginning, seen from the perspective of the framework that it inter-
rupts, is a miracle. The capacity for performing such miracles is uniquely 
human. “What usually remains intact in the epochs of petrification and 
foreordained doom is the faculty of freedom itself, the sheer capacity to 
begin, which animates and inspires all human activities and is the hidden 
source . . . of all great and beautiful things” (Arendt 1993, 169).
Key to our discussion is Arendt’s insistence that “this insertion is not 
forced upon us by necessity. .  .  . It may be stimulated by the presence of 
others whose company we may wish to join, but it is never conditioned by 
them; its impulse springs from the beginning which came into the world 
when we were born and to which we respond by beginning something new 
on our own initiative” (Arendt 1993, 177). She explores this “impulse” in 
her extensive examination of “will,” which she characterizes as the “organ 
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for the future” in the same way that memory is the mental organ for the 
past. When we recall the past, we see only objects, but the view to the 
future brings “projects” that are latent in our will but have not yet come 
to be. Will is the organ with which we summon our futures into existence 
as we project ourselves into the future tense, make promises, and close the 
gap between present and future by fulfilling those promises as we translate 
the latent into the real.
These initiatives could have been “left undone” but for the inward free-
dom to project our commitments into the future and impose our will to 
see them through. It is not only that we make new beginnings, but also 
that these beginnings would not come into existence in the absence of 
our willing to undertake them. In this way, the future remains contingent 
on our will to create it and must therefore be understood as intrinsically 
unpredictable. Will is the human counterpoint to the fear of uncertainty 
that suffocates original action: “A will that is not free is a contradiction in 
terms” (Arendt 1978, 13– 14).
These elemental manifestations of human self- determination, Arendt 
argues, derive from the capacity “to dispose of the future as though it were 
the present.” Will is the means by which we annex the future tense, trans-
forming it into a territory for deliberation, choice, promises, and the initia-
tion of new beginnings in the fulfillment of those promises. This is how we 
manage the inescapable uncertainty of existence and achieve, as individuals 
and as communities, some “limited independence from the incalculability 
of the future.” Arendt thus describes promises as “islands of predictability” 
and “guideposts of reliability” in an “ocean of uncertainty.” They are, she 
argues, the only alternative to a different kind of “mastery” that relies on 
“domination of one’s self and rule over others” when the lust for certainty 
produces the impulse “to cover the whole ground of the future and to map 
out a path secured in all directions” (Arendt 1998, 243– 247). In this way 
human action as an elemental source of freedom expresses a dynamic biog-
raphy born in the inwardness of will in order to flourish in the embrace of 
a human community where wills are joined to produce effective life, prom-
ising and keeping promises in shared purpose.
We have seen that the “right to have rights” is crystallized only in the 
historical moment when inclusion in humanity comes under threat. But 
what of action’s birthplace in the elemental functions of human will and its 
annexation of the future? Arendt’s metaphor of will asserts the inalienable 
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status of this elemental inward capacity. What happens when the uniquely 
human capacity to dispose of the future as though it were the present—the 
right to count the future as one’s field of action—is threatened with sup-
pression or extinction? Following Arendt’s and Searle’s logic, such a threat 
demands the translation of this elemental condition of human freedom 
into a right, that it might be recognized as fundamental to effective life and 
accorded the protection of the political community.
This elemental condition in which we annex the future to the present 
as the field of autonomous action is what I have called the right to the future 
tense (Zuboff 2019). It asserts the inalienable capacity to will the future into 
existence through the force of one’s own choice and commitment, and it 
recognizes this capacity as a baseline condition of effective human life. In 
claiming the future as a potential field of self- determined action, the right 
to the future tense asserts the unbroken biography of will and action that 
founds Arendt’s “right to have rights.” The right to the future tense and 
the “right to have rights” are twinborn. Expressed in action and guaran-
teed by inclusion in the human group, the “right to have rights” already 
presupposes the future tense as the ground on which the inner organ of 
the will is made manifest in the shared reality of the human community. 
Each is essential to the meaning and manifestation of the other, joined in 
the biographical arc of birth and adulthood. If the right to the future tense 
is abrogated, the miracle of human action is subordinated to others’ plans 
that favor others’ certainty. In the absence of the right to the future tense, 
the “right to have rights” is shorn of its origins in will and drifts into mem-
ory, a token of earlier unpredictable times.
I suggest that we now face the moment in history when the elemental 
condition in which we claim the future for autonomous action is threatened 
by the laws of motion of a new economic order in which wealth derives 
from the predictability of human behavior. The competitive dynamics of 
this new order require economies of action that operate to configure human 
behavior in ways that facilitate predictability. These operations grow more 
muscular with the escalation of competitive intensity, driving the evolu-
tion of predictability toward certainty. They are made manifest in a ubiqui-
tous digital architecture of behavior modification owned and operated by 
surveillance capital outside of meaningful legal boundaries, indecipherable, 
and largely hidden. Motive and means combine to produce a new instru-
mentarian power that supplants freedom as the crucible of human action 
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for the sake of guaranteed outcomes and the competitive advantages that 
they confer in markets that trade in the future of human behavior.
Instrumentarian power employs the logic of radical behaviorism to exile 
persons from their own behavior, reducing action to measurable behav-
ior and severing interior meaning from observable performance. In this 
process, the human person is reduced to an organism among organisms. 
This constitutes a bloodless methodology through which not only are per-
sons excluded from humanity but, for the sake of others’ market success, 
humanity itself is excluded from the calculative knowledge that shapes the 
future. These new information territories are private and privileged, known 
only to the machines, their priests, and the market participants who pay 
to play in these new market spaces. Although it is obviously the case that 
we are excluded because the knowledge thus accumulated is not for us, the 
demands of economies of action suggest an even deeper structural basis for 
exclusion: the ability to evade individual awareness, and therefore individual 
will, is an essential condition for the efficient exercise of instrumentarian power 
and its economic objectives. Autonomous human action is costly friction that 
threatens surveillance revenues. In this way a new form of domination and 
its maps of a certain future override the right to the future tense.
Instrumentarian power does not simply destroy elemental rights; it 
usurps them. Such processes of expropriation were first evident in the trans-
fer of decision rights over personal information from individuals to surveil-
lance capitalists. The competitive demand for economies of action and the 
elaboration of the means of behavioral modification extends the pattern of 
expropriation to the elemental right to the future tense, which is the right 
to count the future as one’s field of action, to initiate beginnings, and thus, 
to borrow from Machado, to make the road as you go (Machado 2003).
For this reason surveillance capitalism and its instrumentarian power are 
best described as a market- driven coup from above— not a coup d’état in the 
classic sense but rather a coup de gens: an overthrow of the people concealed 
in the technological Trojan horse that is Big Other. Instead of unpredictable 
human actors, the organism among organisms is manipulated for the sake 
of others’ certainty at the expense of the arc of autonomous action that 
begins with the inner organ of free will and is completed in the mutual 
elaboration of a human community that guarantees the right to manifest 
one’s will in action. Instrumentarian power is the hammer that suppresses 
human freedom in favor of others’ market certainty. First to be extinguished 
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in this coup is the pure impulse to initiate action that constructs social life 
as a miracle of unpredictable beginnings and distinguishes human beings 
as those who are born to replicate the natal miracle in original action. 
Arendt anticipated the possibility of this threat to human freedom at the 
hands of a behaviorist project elevated by global capital to world- historic 
power. She feared that the “last stage of the laboring society” would reduce 
its members to “automatic functioning,” forced to acquiesce “in a dazed, 
‘tranquilized,’ functional type of behavior”:
The trouble with modern theories of behaviorism is not that they are wrong but 
that they could become true, that they actually are the best possible conceptual-
ization of certain obvious trends in modern society. It is quite conceivable that 
the modern age— which began with such an unprecedented and promising out-
burst of human activity— may end in the deadliest, most sterile passivity history 
has ever known. (Arendt 1998, 322)
Now it is the surveillance capitalists who enjoy the right to the future tense 
and who claim the “right to have rights” over the fields of action and knowl-
edge. Instrumentarian power accomplishes the dispossession of human 
experience as an economic imperative, decisively prosecuting the redistri-
bution of elemental human rights from individuals to capital. Surveillance 
capitalism’s economic imperatives cannot be satisfied without these incur-
sions into social and political territories that extend far beyond the tradi-
tional boundaries of private capital. In this way surveillance capitalism and 
its instrumentarian power are revealed as a profoundly antidemocratic con-
stellation. They do not simply evade democratic oversight, but rather they 
undermine the foundations of such oversight for the sake of guaranteed 
outcomes. Surveillance capitalists accumulate not only surveillance assets 
and capital but also the elemental right to action, which is to say, freedom.
Just as industrial civilization flourished at the expense of nature and 
now threatens to cost us the earth, surveillance capitalism and its unprece-
dented instrumentarian power will thrive at the expense of human nature 
and threaten to cost us our humanity. The industrial legacy of climate 
chaos fills us with dismay, remorse, and fear. As surveillance capitalism 
founds a new economic order, what fresh legacy of damage and regret will 
be mourned by future generations? By the time you read these words, the 
reach of this new order will have grown, as more sectors, firms, start- ups, 
app developers, and investors mobilize around this one plausible version of 
information capitalism. This mobilization and the resistance it engenders 
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will define a key battleground at the new frontier of power where elemental 
human rights will be contested in the name of humanity and the future. 
Who will write the music? Who will dance?
Notes
1. For readers who seek more detail, surveillance capitalism, its production of 
instrumentarian power, and many of its rights implications are fully analyzed in The 
Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power 
(Zuboff 2019).
2. A typical example is this statement from the Economist: “Google exploits informa-
tion that is a by- product of user interactions, or data exhaust, which is automatically 
recycled to improve the service or create an entirely new product.” “Clicking for 
Gold,” Economist, February 25, 2010, http://www.economist.com/node/15557431.
3. Between 2012 and 2015 I interviewed fifty- two data scientists from nineteen 
different companies with a combined 586 years of experience in high technology 
corporations and start- ups, primarily in Silicon Valley. These interviews were con-
ducted as I developed my “ground truth” understanding of surveillance capitalism 
and its material infrastructure.
4. I mean to introduce here a distinction between “elemental” and “fundamental” 
human rights. For example, “equality under the law” is a fundamental right. In 
contrast, “breathing” or “moving one’s arms” are elemental rights. Such rights are 
given under the condition of being alive and are rarely formalized as fundamental or 
juridical rights unless they come under direct threat of prohibition.
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2 Digital Transformations, Informed Realities, and  
Human Conduct
Mikkel Flyverbom and Glen Whelan
Introduction
The information that people search for, collect, and utilize on a daily basis 
is now largely sourced through what Jørgensen, in the Introduction to 
this volume, terms “the social web.” As many have recognized, this results 
in the most popular platforms— such as Google, Facebook, Twitter, and 
Instagram— being able to influence and direct human activities in relatively 
novel ways (Flyverbom et al. 2016; Gillespie 2014; Whelan 2019a; Zuboff 
2015, 2019). Despite various backlashes against these commercial platforms 
(such as that relating to the Facebook and Cambridge Analytica scandal 
of 2018), the perceived convenience and value of such services— in terms 
of consuming, communicating, socializing, and learning for example (cf. 
Hargittai and Marwick 2016; Varian 2010, 2014)— seem far from abating.
Given this context, we use the present chapter to introduce a frame-
work that helps conceive of how these platforms construct what we term 
“informed realities.” Like many before us, we are intrigued by the fact that, 
while people are free to act, they only ever act within environments that 
they have played, at best, a minimal role in constructing (Bourdieu 1977; 
Certeau 1984; Foucault 1977). More specifically, and just as popular plat-
forms (Schmidt and Cohen 2013) and their critics (Vaidhyanathan 2011) 
have also recognized, we seek to highlight how choice is constrained and 
directed by the continuously restructured platform interfaces that help peo-
ple satisfy their various desires (Flyverbom 2016; Mansell 2017). Further 
to the impacts it is having in terms of privacy (see chapter 10), freedom 
of expression (see chapters 8 and 9), and democratic accountability (see 
chapter 3), then, the social web impacts upon our personal freedom and 
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individual autonomy. While perhaps harder to define, these more general 
ideas are nevertheless central to human rights theory and practice (Camp-
bell 2006, 55– 58; Nickel 2006, 63– 64) and thus in need of discussion in the 
present volume.
With these considerations providing our motivation, we use the chapter’s 
next section to conceive of informed realities as the relationship between 
different sorts of data, information, and knowledge. We then differentiate 
between three types of informed realities— that is, “expert,” “popular,” and 
“algorithmic”— that exist in digital platforms to different degrees. Finally, 
we conclude with some brief comments on how the risks that informed 
realities present for autonomy and freedom might be managed at the indi-
vidual and organizational level.
Informed Realities
Google’s (2019) mission is to “organize the world’s information and make 
it universally accessible and useful.” As this indicates, the information that 
one accesses through Google Search, Google Scholar, Google Maps, and so 
on, is anything but unstructured. The same is true for other platforms that 
we utilize. Twitter and Facebook, for example, regularly make suggestions 
as to which tweets and posts users might be most interested in, and online 
rating sites like TripAdvisor draw attention to listings that are deemed the 
most popular by their users.
In such ways, these different platforms can be conceived as informed 
realities: for they are comprised of different assemblages of data, informa-
tion, and knowledge that result in users being made more or less aware of, 
or in their being directed toward, different news stories, websites, posts, 
and so on (Alaimo and Kallinikos 2017; Flyverbom and Murray 2018). So 
defined, questions about informed realities are far from new. Prior work 
on knowledge production (Berger and Luckmann 1966), communication 
processes (Meyrowitz 1985), and public opinion (Zaller 1992), for example, 
articulates how socio- material information environments create particular 
possibilities for acting and thinking, and how such developments contrib-
ute to social ordering. Likewise, it has long been recognized that informed 
realities have an impact on human freedom and autonomy. Habermas 
(1989, 160– 178), in particular, is famous for detailing the move from a 
public sphere characterized by “rational- critical debate” to one dominated 
by “manipulative publicity.”
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With regard to the social web, the idea of informed realities is important 
because it provides a counterpoint to the oft- noted ways in which digital 
technologies have contributed to the democratization of cultural produc-
tion (Lessig 2008), to new possibilities in terms of decentralized communi-
cation and organization (Whelan, Moon, and Grant 2013), and to increased 
choice and productive capacities (e.g., Benkler 2006). In doing so, and with-
out denying that digital technologies do contribute to autonomy and free-
dom in these and other ways, the idea of informed realities suggests that 
platforms can also diminish the extent to which we freely make decisions. 
Just as road systems encourage people to go to certain destinations, and to 
get there in certain ways, informed realities encourage us, in potentially 
much more subtle ways, to visit a particular website or to pursue an issue in 
one way rather than another.
This basic idea is suggested by Zuboff (2015, 82) when she writes of there 
being no escape from the “Big Other” that far exceeds anything that Jeremy 
Bentham imagined with his panopticon, and that results in “mental agency 
and self- possesion” becoming submerged within “a new kind of automa-
ticity.” Likewise, Langolis et al. (2009, 420) suggest this idea with their 
talk of different technical systems and architectures producing “a human- 
understandable visual interface” that imposes “specific constraints” on 
us, and so too Lazzarato (2004), when he proposes that we now exist in 
capitalist- produced worlds that require that we adopt or become inscribed 
with specific forms of subjectivation.
Although these ideas are sometimes considered in opposition to those of 
Habermas (e.g., Langolis et al. 2009, 416), they appear to share Habermas’s 
(1996, 92– 94) concern with maintaining or protecting Kantian- influenced 
notions of individual autonomy. Without going into undue detail, and 
alongside such other matters as the capacity to make rationally sound and 
universalizable moral claims, Kant (1785) associated individual autonomy 
with establishing, and judging between, our own means and ends. As a con-
sequence, he would have likely been concerned, as the above- mentioned 
authors are, that the social web is diminishing the complex decision mak-
ing capacities that are often thought to comprise our “humanity and 
human judgement” (Rainie and Anderson 2017, 46, 51).
Such claims can appear excessive and even melodramatic. Yet, as the 
social web has become the backbone that supports many parts of social 
life, we need to consider how this shapes our decision- making. For this 
reason, we use the chapter’s following section to detail three generic types 
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of informed realities that populate the online domain to varying degrees. 
But before we can turn to this task, we need to first identify the com-
ponents that comprise informed realities: that is, data, information, and 
knowledge. As each of these components could easily be made the subject 
of book- length treatment, we emphasize that the following discussions are 
far from exhaustive, and that our reason for providing them is the result 
of our heuristic concern, namely to differentiate between three types of 
informed realities.
Data
Data can be understood as traces of phenomena: for example, events, 
experiences, and experiments. In this way, data refer to discernible, expe-
rienceable differences that provide the resources from which (communi-
cable) information is subsequently constructed (Boisot and Canals 2004; 
Zins 2007). While it is tempting to think that we can somehow experience 
data “in and of themselves,” this is generally recognized as naive because 
of post- Kantian understandings of perception (Hacking 1979, 383), and 
because of data often being collected with a purpose and thus structured in 
certain ways while being collected and experienced (Flyverbom and Mad-
sen 2015; Gitelman 2013).
Despite such concerns, and through more or less complex and detailed 
means of argumentation and deliberation that enable people to attain the 
“objectivation of experienceable happenings” (Habermas 1978, 369), it is 
commonplace for people to reach agreement on what they experience in 
everyday life: for example, two people will often be able to agree that they 
have both seen the same post on Twitter; or that a Google search query 
results in one link being returned at the top of the first page of results (on 
a given laptop, at a given time and place). In these ways, we consider data 
to be one element that can help qualify and distinguish between different 
types of informed realities.
Information
The same data can be presented to people, or communicated to users, in 
different forms. Such structuring is comprised of labels, classifications, 
tropes, and so on (Bowker and Star 1999), that strategically and purpose-
fully mark differences in data, and that present data in certain ways. Aca-
demic writing, for example, can make use of different genres— such as the 
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detective story— to inform readers of, and explain the importance of, the 
same empirical findings (Czarniawska 1999).
Of course, once data have been turned into information, this informa-
tion can, in its turn, be treated as data by someone else: as when an aca-
demic uses other academic writings— which are themselves characterized 
by an informational structure— as the basis for a literature review. In addi-
tion to being widespread in academic circles, this tendency to treat already 
constructed pieces of information as data are a very prominent feature on 
the social web. To get a sense of just how widespread, it will suffice to once 
again note that Google’s mission is to “organize the world’s information 
and make it universally accessible and useful.” More generally, the point 
is that the ways in which different platforms inform their users about, and 
direct their users toward, different sets of data, is the second key compo-
nent used to discuss informed realities.
Knowledge
Two points are commonly emphasized in discussions of knowledge. First, it 
is often noted that regimes of knowledge associated with different disciplines 
and professions actively shape how we perceive, understand, and construct 
the phenomenal world. Such “knowledge” regimes, it tends to be empha-
sized, dictate, in a more or less automatic fashion, both the means and the 
ends of learning. Second, and consequently, it is often suggested that “real” 
or “genuine” knowledge is a critically reflective, and commonly deliberative, 
exercise (Dewey 1933; Habermas 1978; Kant 1784; Rabinow 2011).
Despite these points tending to be critical of (overly) instrumental under-
standings of knowledge, it remains commonplace to associate knowledge 
levels with specific know- how and with the attainment of specific qualifi-
cations. A computer science professor, for example, might be expected to 
teach a course on data compression, and a computer science undergraduate 
might be expected to prove capable of working with, and developing, data- 
compression algorithms. Further to this, it is commonplace to presume that 
those associated with prestigious institutions are more knowledgeable than 
those associated with an institution that is somehow deemed less presti-
gious. Whilst widespread, such credentialism is often critiqued for distract-
ing people from knowledge for knowledge’s sake (Dewey 1933, 216, 224), 
and due to the role it plays in perpetuating class distinctions (e.g., Bourdieu 
1984, 1988; Davies and Rizk 2018).
58 Mikkel Flyverbom and Glen Whelan
Whatever their normative worth, both the instrumentalist and creden-
tialist understandings of knowledge are important for our understanding of 
informed realities. Instrumentalist understandings are important because 
platforms wouldn’t exist in the absence of those that possess the requisite 
skill to construct them (e.g., computer scientists). More credentialist under-
standings, on the other hand, are important because it is often thought that 
an emphasis on formal educational achievements is in the process of being 
disrupted by the “hackers” who have helped construct the platforms and 
who are often presented as caring more about results than about accred-
itations (Turner 2009). Likewise, such credentialism is being challenged 
by the more “democratic” potential of the social web, which provide the 
(formally uneducated) masses with increased opportunities to express their 
voice (e.g., Whelan, Moon, and Grant 2013). For such reasons, knowledge 
comprises the third component of “informed realities.”
Influencing Action and Decision- Making on the Social Web
The above suggests that different and often recursive combinations of 
data, information, and knowledge contribute to the construction of dif-
ferent informed realities. These informed realities shape our experiences 
and actions. This, in itself, is no bold or surprising claim and is largely in 
line with ideas about social construction (Berger and Luckmann 1966) and 
socio- material affordances (Hutchby 2001). Nevertheless, we believe that 
such ideas are worth revisiting given that platforms direct and constrain 
our freedom and autonomy, and thus impact a multitude of human rights 
concerns such as access to information, freedom of expression, and collec-
tive mobilization (Foucault 1991; Hansen and Flyverbom 2015; Nardi and 
O’Day 1999; Whelan, Moon, and Grant 2013). Moreover, as the corpora-
tions that develop and control such ecosystems sometimes downplay these 
capacities (Zuckerberg 2016), and as they can also be very selective when it 
comes to their own transparency (Flyverbom 2015), it seems important that 
the scholarly community direct attention to the ways in which these pow-
erful corporations shape everyday experience for many people worldwide.
Three Kinds of Informed Reality
In building on the distinction between data, information, and knowledge, 
we now identify three types of informed reality that populate the online 
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domain, and that contribute to our freedom and autonomy being directed 
and constrained in different ways.
Expert Informed Realities
Expert informed realities often take the form of explicit evaluation and guid-
ance and are generally associated with the opinions of specialists related to 
established, legitimate institutions of one sort or another. While arguably 
of diminished importance when compared to the role they played in the 
age of mass media, expert informed realities continue to be of influence. 
Indeed, given the emergence of blogging platforms like Blogger, Medium, 
and WordPress, the expert guidance that these informed realities are asso-
ciated with can appear more populous, and more readily available, than 
ever before.
The knowledge used to construct expert informed realities is of a classi-
cally recognized sort. The experts involved will be distinguished from the 
rest of the population in terms of their training, their accomplishments, and 
often their privilege (Gabriel 1998, 3). Their training will have contributed 
to their capacity to make relatively fine distinctions between seemingly sim-
ilar objects. And their understanding of particular phenomena, genres and 
styles, and/or historical periods, will often result in their view of some given 
development being more critical than that of the broader population.
The reputable mainstream media, such as the British newspaper The 
Guardian, provides a good example of what expert informed realities have 
historically looked like. And, as noted by the paper’s former readers’ editor 
Chris Elliott (2011), such newspapers have long been accused of having an 
“Oxbridge” bias due to 81 percent of the UK’s leading journalists being edu-
cated at the world- renowned Oxford and Cambridge universities.
Just as the knowledge that is used in the creation of expert informed 
realities will tend to be more or less closely connected with, and even insep-
arable from, experts themselves (because of their education and personal 
experiences), so too will the data utilized. Social scientists, for example, 
often rely on elaborate methods for collecting and analyzing data and on 
secondary evidence from trusted sources. And experts in a particular profes-
sion, such as gastronomy or architecture, will often rely on data that they 
have gathered through their own professional activities. In short, the data 
drawn upon in expert informed realities tends to be limited to an expert’s 
personal experiences and resources.
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One type of information that experts produce is the narrative review or 
report. Such reviews will generally describe what the expert or critic thought 
was remarkable or prosaic, or enjoyable or annoying, about a given expe-
rience, event, product, or service. Expert information will also commonly 
proceed in a standard structure and will be written for a target audience 
with a presumed educational background.
The online publishing platform Medium provides one clear example 
of an expert informed reality. As noted at the top of its “Our Story” page 
(Medium 2019),
Medium taps into the brains of the world’s most insightful writers, thinkers and 
storytellers to bring you the smartest takes on topics that matter. So whatever 
your interest, you can always find fresh thinking and unique perspectives.
Some of the experts that Medium associates itself with include the renowned 
author of The Circle (2014), Dave Eggers, and Eve L. Ewing, whose brief 
biography on Medium lists her as a sociologist of race and education at 
the University of Chicago. In terms of writing style, the following remarks 
made by Miles Klee (2018) for his Medium piece on male victims in the 
#MeToo era is fairly representative of Medium’s style, and that of expert 
informed realities more generally:
my eighth grade math teacher . . . informed us that men can be victims [of sexual 
assault], too. . . . She . . . arrived at an anecdote that changed her whole demeanor. 
It was about a man whose girlfriend handcuffed him to their bed and started 
inserting foreign objects into his rectum— painfully and against his protests. As 
the woman listed the items used, including a pencil, she was taken by a giggling 
fit. “I’m sorry,” she gasped, “It’s not funny, I shouldn’t laugh.” But she did, and 
so did the class. I cannot forget the queasy jolt this laughter gave me. It was clear 
that although we had to be grimly mature in discussing the terrifying abuse and 
violence women face, a man suffering that way could be viewed as a weird excep-
tion, if not an outright absurdity. He’s a punchline.
By drawing upon his own school memories, and in using a fairly classical 
sort of structure, Klee— whose professional description on Medium asserts 
his expertise by noting that he is author of IVYLAND and TRUE FALSE:— 
complies with the above- noted points regarding the tendency of expert 
informed realities to encourage (suitably knowledgeable) contributors to 
draw on their own personal experiences as data and to make use of narra-
tive as a way of informing their audience. Medium implicitly encourages 
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such an approach by proposing that good writing is about what an author 
knows and loves.
While the likes of Medium are making it easier for more experts to get 
their voice out there, they may also be contributing to what some sug-
gest is the death of expert informed realities more generally (Mendelsohn 
2012). One reason why is that expert informed realities only really make 
sense if there are a limited number of experts. Another reason why is that, 
by increasing the number of accessible “experts,” expert informed realities 
provide users with an increased capacity to pick and choose among the 
experts they like.
While such choice also existed in the age of mass media, the choice or 
potential “openings” that one finds online (Isin and Ruppert 2015; Whelan, 
Moon, and Grant 2013) clearly outstrip those which could (and still can) 
be found in mainstream, reputable newspapers. Unlike the other informed 
realities discussed below, then, the world of expert informed realities looks 
more like a wild, unruly, and ungoverned frontier than it does an “informa-
tion superhighway” (Dzieza 2014).
Popular Informed Realities
Examples of digital platforms that are characterizable as popular informed 
realities include Airbnb, Amazon, TripAdvisor, Twitter, and Facebook. Such 
popular informed realities publish people’s opinions, reactions, and rank-
ings (e.g., 4 out of 5 stars) with regard to products, services, and experiences 
and enable users to like or circulate posts that are made by other users. 
In this fashion, popular informed realities can be understood as explicitly 
shaped by the value judgments of their users and customers.
Thus, whereas the knowledge of expert informed realities is character-
ized by its relatively rarified and specialized nature, the knowledge of popu-
lar informed realities is characterized by its much more general, democratic, 
and informal, nature. Moreover, while the knowledge of expert informed 
realities is, by and large, produced by an isolated individual, the knowledge 
of popular informed realities is intersubjective, majoritarian, and nonhier-
archical (Vaidhyanathan 2011, 60– 61).
Just as the form of knowledge associated with popular informed realities 
is diffuse and popular, so too is the data. In contrast with expert informed 
realities, once again, which are characterized by their data sets being 
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confined to that which a limited number of people can experience, pop-
ular informed realities can build on much larger sets of data. Rather than 
building on one person’s reading of a particular book, one person’s visit to a 
given restaurant, or one person’s perspective on a given politician, popular 
informed realities can build on the experiences of a large number of users. 
Dot Hutchison’s 2016 thriller The Butterfly Garden, for example, had over 
10,000 reviews (61 percent 5 out of 5 stars) on Amazon.com before Christ-
mas that same year.
Popular informed realities now guide decisions and inform experiences 
in important ways, and they are often seen to derive legitimacy and value 
from their scale and possibilities for comparisons. As individual experi-
ences and reactions are combined and transformed into numbers (such 
as a score from 1– 5) by the platforms where they are compiled, they gain 
value as both qualitative and quantitative forms of information that can 
guide experiences and conduct (Hansen and Flyverbom 2015). Increas-
ingly, such aggregations of popular information are combined with oth-
ers, enabling the creation of sites such as Metacritic, where a wide range 
of reviews are assembled and made available for scrutiny. Such packag-
ing of qualitative reactions into quantitative representations increases 
the distance from their experiential origins and thus enables information 
mobility and increases the possibility for “action at a distance” (Miller and 
Rose 1990).
By providing more opportunities for individual expression and engage-
ment, popular informed realities enable the (partial) circumvention of 
expert informed realities. The basic sense of this was captured nicely in 
Time magazine’s decision, given the emergence of social web platforms, to 
name YOU— rather than a president or other public figure— as person of 
the year in 2006. Nevertheless, popular informed realities can also be seen 
to diminish human agency and individual intent in a variety of ways.
Positive consumer reviews, for example, are widely considered as vital to 
the success of online retailers, service providers, and sharing platforms. The 
reason for this is that positive or negative reviews, or the correct number of 
both, strongly encourage users to purchase a given product or service. As 
the quality of reviews is also important, the likes of Amazon seek to bolster 
trust in them by asking users to rate each other’s reviews: for example, “26 
of 31 people found the following review helpful” (Mudambi and Schuff 
2010, 186).
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By and large, the efforts that Amazon and other prominent platforms like 
Yelp and Facebook are making to encourage their users to utilize reviews in 
their decision- making seem to be working. BrightLocal’s 2017 “Local Con-
sumer Review Survey,” for example, found that “97% of consumers looked 
online for local business in 2017, with 12% looking for a local business 
online every day”; that “85% of consumers trust online reviews as much as 
personal recommendations”; and that “49% of consumers need at least a 
four- star rating before they choose to use a business.”
In a sense, such reviews encourage users to outsource their critical 
decision- making facilities to the public at large. Moreover, they can be seen 
as part of a general shift toward populism on the social web. In the political 
sphere, for example,
Populists are [the current] stars in political cyberspace, far outshining their centrist 
opponents. The 2015 Facebook posts of the United Kingdom Independence Party, 
the leading voice of the Brexit campaign, received 4,000 likes on average, twice 
the number received by the Conservative Party. While Dutch voters rejected the 
populist, anti- immigrant candidate Geert Wilders in its recent election, Wilders’ 
social media following greatly outpaces that of other Dutch party leaders. (Hen-
drickson and Galston 2017)
Rather than being considered meaningfully democratic, then, popular 
informed realities are often perceived as little more than superficial forums 
that “chip away” at individual autonomy and social democracy.
Algorithmically Informed Realities
In contrast to expert and popular informed realities, which are structured 
through the decisions and choices of distinct individuals and a mass of 
individuals, respectively, algorithmically informed realities are primarily 
structured through the decisions made by automated systems. Although 
humans currently remain a key part of the assemblage that designs, trains, 
and tweaks the algorithms that enable computers to make such decisions 
(Martin 2018), algorithmically informed realities can still be understood as 
the least human- centric of the informed realities here identified. They can 
also be understood as the most novel of the three informed realities, and are 
arguably the most important of the informed realities that are found within 
the online domain (Madsen et al. 2016).
In terms of data, algorithmically informed realities build on the traces 
left by people and objects as they interact through digital technologies. 
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Every click, search, or like on social media, every product or service pur-
chased online, and every GPS followed movement, can be digitally recorded 
and surveilled (Whelan 2019b; Zuboff 2015). In turn, these digital traces, 
and various other digitized sources— such as books, paintings, news sto-
ries, maps, and video recordings— combine to provide what was, up until 
recently, an unimaginable amount of data that is only analyzable with the 
help of machines (Whelan 2019a).
The knowledge that drives algorithmically informed realities is ulti-
mately associated with a long line of specialists in computer science. Goo-
gle’s basic search algorithm, for example, was famously created by Larry 
Page and Sergey Brin when they were computer science PhD students at 
Stanford University in the late 1990s. Increasingly, however, the knowledge 
that drives algorithmically informed realities is associated with machines 
themselves.
In the case of deep learning technologies— which comprise an input 
layer (e.g., a web page, a sound recording), a set of hidden layers that repre-
sent an input in an increasingly abstract fashion, and an output layer that 
identifies something (e.g., a sound as an ambulance siren or a web page as a 
porn site; Goodfellow, Bengio, and Courville 2016, 6, 13, 168)— this means 
that it can be difficult not just for the general public but also for experts 
in machine learning to know why a machine makes the decisions it does 
(Ananny and Crawford 2016; Burrell 2016). Indeed, Yoshua Bengio has sug-
gested that it is “exactly because we can’t mathematically pick apart a deci-
sion made by deep learning software that it works so well” (Pearson 2016). 
This opacity is obviously problematic in terms of democratic accountabil-
ity, but it can lead to significant instrumental benefits (Danaher 2016).
Perhaps the classic example of such algorithmically informed instrumen-
tal benefits is provided by Google search, whose initial popularity was the 
result of it turning the “dynamic and messy . . . World Wide Web” (Vaid-
hyanathan 2011, 61) into an easily navigated list of results hierarchized 
in accord with expected utility and general popularity (Vise 2005, 37). As 
such search capacities have continued to develop, and to be combined with 
other sets of data relatable to a given user— such as the user’s age, national-
ity, educational background, travel history, reading history, video viewing 
history, and so on— algorithms have come to inform user experiences in 
increasingly specific ways.
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Spotify’s Discover Weekly provides a case in point. Every Monday morn-
ing users of Spotify find a list of thirty songs on their Discover Weekly 
playlist. This service has proved very popular and has resulted in what can 
only be termed a number of gushing testimonies. Ciocca (2017) for exam-
ple, writes that
I’m a huge fan of Spotify, and particularly Discover Weekly. Why? It makes me 
feel seen. It knows my musical tastes better than any person in my entire life ever 
has, and I’m consistently delighted by how satisfyingly just right it is every week, 
with tracks I probably would never have found myself or known I would like.
And in an interview with Pasick (2015), the person overseeing the Discover 
Weekly service, Matthew Ogle, explained,
We now have more technology than ever before to ensure that if you’re the small-
est, strangest musician in the world, doing something that only 20 people in the 
world will dig, we can now find those 20 people and connect the dots between 
the artist and listeners. . . . Discovery Weekly is just a really compelling new way 
to do that at a scale that’s never been done before.
Through a combination of techniques that include collaborative filtering 
models which analyze and compare users’ behavior; natural language pro-
cessing which analyzes text; and audio models that use deep learning to 
analyze a song’s “time signature, key, mode, tempo and loudness” (Ciocca 
2017)— Spotify’s Discover Weekly works its “magic.” Discover Weekly thus 
significantly reduces the work that individuals need to undertake to dis-
cover new music. Of course, the predictive capacities of such algorithmi-
cally informed realities also mean that they are commonly understood as 
constituting “a good first step toward controlling our behavior” (Morozov 
2011, 158). Given such conflicting positions, the ways in which algorith-
mically informed realities shape (cultural) tastes, popularity, quality, and so 
on, is deserving of more (critical) attention than it currently receives.
Conclusion
With this chapter we have proposed that expert informed realities, popu-
lar informed realities, and algorithmically informed realities constrain and 
direct human choice and decision- making on the social web. Although 
we are aware that such informed realities also enable human freedom and 
autonomy in different ways (e.g., through enabling voice and providing 
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alternatives to other media sources), we have chosen here to focus on their 
more directive and constraining aspects.
One reason why is that, despite the controlling and manipulative capac-
ities of the online domain being relatively well understood in the scholarly 
literature, the general population still seems surprised by stories and leaks 
about the darker sides of technology use (e.g., Edward Snowden’s release 
of the NSA files, Christopher Wylie’s blowing the whistle on Facebook and 
Cambridge Analytica). Moreover, and despite a growing trend toward the 
leaders of such platforms being portrayed as supervillains in Hollywood 
(Harrison 2018), they continue to portray themselves, and the platforms 
they control, as being driving forces of the “open and connected,” “free 
world” (read almost any Facebook or Google press release).
Although it appears that the constraining and directive capacities of the 
major platforms and services are likely to grow, potentially significantly, in 
the foreseeable future, there are a number of steps that might keep this in 
check. At the social or organizational level, efforts could be made to end 
the dominance of “sites and services owned and operated by Facebook and 
Google,” which “account for over 70 percent of all internet traffic” (Cuth-
bertson 2017).
A recent piece in the conservative US publication the National Review, 
for example, has suggested that while it may not be time to smash Google, 
Facebook, and Amazon “to pieces . . . perhaps we should reign in some of 
their most egregious practices,” such as Google’s “leveraging its monopoly 
over Web search to take other companies’ business” (Verbruggen 2017). 
And with ultimately similar concerns in mind, Bryan Lynn and Matt Stoller 
(2017) of the Open Market Institute have proposed that, while it is unclear 
how to “ensure Google, Facebook and the other giant platform monop-
olists truly serve the political and commercial interests of the American 
people,” their dominance might be slowed down by stopping them from 
buying other companies.
Presuming the political will exists— in North America; in Europe, 
whose Commissioner for Competition, Margrethe Vestager, has been 
described as “a scourge of big technology companies” (Birnbaum 2018); or 
elsewhere— then these sorts of measures would likely result in consumers 
being provided with an increasing number of platforms and platform own-
ers to choose from. Nevertheless, these measures would still not address 
the fact that digital platforms, and those associated with popular and 
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algorithmically informed realities in particular, tend to constrain and direct 
human decision- making by design. So while it would likely be better for 
there to be a multitude of corporate, state, or nonprofit owners of social 
media platforms, such platforms will, on the current evidence, continue 
to direct and constrain human freedom in what are likely to prove increas-
ingly sophisticated ways. Moreover, if platforms continue to be seen as hav-
ing more benefits (e.g., entertainment, socializing) than costs (e.g., privacy, 
manipulation), then their usage rates will grow (Varian 2014).
Whether one ultimately thinks the social web is for good or bad, it seems 
prudent for people to recognize, and understand, the extent to which 
their decision- making is constrained and directed by it. If people then 
proceed— perhaps following a series of meaningful, and even antagonistic, 
series of debates (Whelan 2013)— to continue engaging with their preferred 
platforms, then it would seem contrary to the freedom and autonomy at 
the heart of the human rights project for others to deny them such choice.
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3 Data as Humans: Representation, Accountability, and 
Equality in Big Data
Anja Bechmann
Introduction
This chapter examines the democratic implications of how we treat data 
as humans in the datafied society, and how we process such data through 
machine learning algorithms. Democracy as a concept has a long history 
in political and social sciences. The focus of the chapter will be limited to 
the connection between the processing of data as humans in learning algo-
rithms and the democratic values of representation (including participa-
tion), accountability, and equality.1 In line with existing studies, I illustrate 
how systematic discrimination and inequality may occur through machine 
learning if we do not take the preliminary measure of inscribing these dem-
ocratic values in the machine learning algorithms executed by, for instance, 
social media platforms. Moreover, I argue that free and open communica-
tion is an ideal that we must strive for if we wish to avoid democratic defi-
cits. The chapter theorizes on whom data represents, what we (as society) 
do with data, and how we govern these practices. I argue that while some 
problems of representation in the datafied society are not new, problems of 
discrimination may now happen in a more systematic manner without yet 
receiving the same regulatory impact.
In the pursuit of as many different data points as possible, technology 
companies develop products that intersect and datafy every aspect of human 
existence from self- reports (social media) to location data (self- driving cars 
and maps) and biometrics (health apps, exercise wearables, and biojewelry). 
These data traces are increasingly used to inform product and processual 
decisions by companies that want to “listen” to the user and optimize rec-
ommendations, products, and revenue accordingly or by politicians and 
governments that want to “adjust” behavior using large data streams and 
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big data methods. One example would be the recent Cambridge Analytica 
controversy and the use of social media data and microtargeting campaigns 
during the 2016 election of Donald Trump as US president that came as a 
shock to many citizens, including the press. Many blamed social media, 
because these platforms insisted on preserving the algorithm that provides 
users primarily with content that confirmed their social and political adher-
ences (Bakshy, Messing, and Adamic 2015) and at the same time allowed for 
third parties to implement microtargeted campaigns.
It is important for social media companies to keep users on the plat-
form for as long as possible in order to increase advertising profits through 
monetizing data (see Bermejo, this volume), and one way to do this is to 
display content that users agree with (Bakshy, Messing, and Adamic 2015). 
A platform like Facebook represents a large public forum for reading, view-
ing, listening to, and participating in discussions; however, the company 
is registered as a technology company, not a media company with press 
responsibilities. On Facebook, we do not know the principles and values 
(as opposed to journalistic values as outlined in International Federation of 
Journalists 1986) behind the editing done by the algorithm and are unable 
to see each other’s personalized news feeds. This is radically different from 
traditional editorials, where we can discuss the principles, and printed 
papers where we were/are able to purchase or subscribe to full papers with 
different viewpoints.
The chapter seeks to discuss such problems not only on the algorith-
mic level but also on the level of data, which plays an increasingly import-
ant role in everyday life (Schäfer and van Es 2017). The data that we leave 
behind when we use online platforms are central elements of the global 
online economy and a defining and pertinent characteristic of a citizen in 
the digital age, as is the processing of such data. Critical voices question 
whether informed consent is an option anymore, as it is impossible for 
companies to provide a comprehensible account of the vast places data is 
being used (Bechmann 2014; Nissenbaum 2011). Despite the right to access 
and transport one’s own data (Regulation [EU] 2016/679 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council L 119/1), it is debatable how this right should 
be executed and controlled. Opting out of the datafied society is no longer 
an option. Even so, exclusion from data- enriched decisions may also have 
profound consequences for the equal representation of individuals in soci-
ety (Ananny 2016). In response to these challenges, my questions are these: 
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How does democratic society strive to ensure that all humans are properly 
and equally represented— that is, that data traces actually represent the user 
and that all users are part of the data processing on equal terms? And how 
does it ensure that algorithmic decisions are transparent and reliable?
These questions cannot be answered easily, but they must be addressed; 
therefore, they drive the discussion in this chapter. Theoretically, the chap-
ter draws on pragmatism (Dewey 1927) and cyberfeminist theory (Bowker 
and Star 1999; Haraway 1991; Star 1990) to account for the meaning of 
underrepresentation, unaccountability, discrimination, and inequality as 
constituting democratic deficits in the use of big social data and machine 
learning. The chapter will draw on previous empirical work carried out pri-
marily with social media data, focusing on Facebook data as one of the 
most well- known sources of data enrichment and the use of big data meth-
ods such as cluster analysis, neural networks, and deep learning to account 
for usage patterns as a source of insight into human behavior and prefer-
ences. The purpose of the chapter is to provide critical insights into the 
consequences of (a lack of) data quality in machine learning processing.
Representation and Participation as Democratic Values
Let us begin by examining social media platforms and how such platforms 
themselves, and the datafied society at large (third parties), use social media 
as a data source for prediction through machine learning. In considering 
democracy in the datafied society, I will turn to the encounter between 
Lippmann and Dewey in the 1920s in which Lippmann criticizes the public 
as “the phantom public” (Lippmann 1927) and the ability for citizens to 
represent public opinion based on democratic values. In brief, Lippmann 
(ibid.) sees experts, facts, and science as the solution to the problem of the 
public and the sustainability of democratic values. Dewey (Dewey 1927; 
Bybee 1999) recognizes the problem but disagrees on the solution. Instead 
of relying on experts, facts, and science, he argues that democracy is cre-
ated, situated, and negotiated through the agency of citizens and their 
participation in the construction of democracy, thereby empowering both 
individuals and the social group:
[Democracy] consists in having a responsible share according to capacity in form-
ing and directing the activities of the groups to which one belongs and in par-
ticipating according to need in the values which the groups sustain. From the 
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standpoint of the groups, it demands liberation of the potentialities of members 
of a group in harmony with the interests and goods which are common. Since 
every individual is a member of many groups, this specification cannot be ful-
filled except when different groups interact flexibly and fully in connection with 
other groups . . . there is a free give- and- take: fullness of integrated personality 
is therefore possible of achievement, since the pulls and responses of different 
groups reinforce one another and their values accord. (Dewey 1927, 148)
In this sense, Dewey wants to restore agency to the users or citizens as a way 
of negotiating values and meanings in smaller or larger groups.2 He does 
not consider democracy to be something that relates solely to politics and 
the public sphere but rather as a basic social construct in groups. Democ-
racy happens in both the public and private spheres and does not connect 
only to public opinion. He also argues for an epistemological politics of 
“By what right do we act?” instead of “What are the facts?” (Dewey 1927, 
69). Open and free communication plays a central role in this value cre-
ation, enabling “a public to act as a public” (Dewey 1927, 55) and to judge 
how actions influence shared interests. Communication thereby creates the 
“very meaning that will be called knowledge” (ibid.).
Lippmann and Dewey’s debate on democratic values and the public is 
relevant when it comes to user participation in social media today (posts, 
comments, likes, and shares) and the way algorithms control how com-
munication is handled— whether on social media sites themselves or for 
data collected from them for predictions in other domains such as target-
ing and manipulation in political campaigns, risk assessments in financial 
sectors, or diagnoses and treatments in the health sector. On social media, 
individuals are represented through their data and connected and pro-
cessed through algorithms. Users develop networks of, and memberships 
in, several groups and communicate on broad or narrow topics of interest, 
with a broader or narrower group of people, and with strong or weak ties 
(Bechmann, Kim, and Søgaard 2016). In many ways, social media is the 
ideal participation platform in Dewey’s terminology, as it allows people to 
participate in debates across spheres. However, the transparency of who we 
are talking to and sharing behavioral data with and the overlap between 
groups have been the subject of extensive critical analysis (Bakshy, Messing, 
and Adamic 2015; Marwick and boyd 2014; Stutzman, Gross, and Acquisti 
2012). This topic has received renewed interest in the light of recent cases 
and events such as Cambridge Analytica, Brexit, and the election of Trump 
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as US president, raising the issues of informed consent (Bechmann 2014), 
free and open communication, and the need for different groups to meet 
as the basis for participatory democracy in Dewey’s sense. This debate rein-
forces the necessity of considering how data is constructed as a representa-
tion of the individual and the way algorithms encourage exchanges across 
groups with different interests.
Equality and Accountability as Democratic Values
Dewey’s focus is not primarily on whether all individuals have the same 
premises for participating in the creation of knowledge and democratic val-
ues and how free and open communication can be accounted for. This is 
a key concern of cyberfeminist theory as set out in Haraway (1991) and 
Star (1990). Haraway’s theory of the integration of technology and humans 
generates an interesting perspective: data not as something “apart” or alien-
ated from the individual but as an equal part of humans just like the body. 
Data cannot then be rejected as something alienating or “out there” (see 
also Mai’s discussion on personal information in this volume). Users may 
experience data as something bad or something that has been violated; 
the sense of “embodiment” contained in this feeling is striking in earlier 
studies on, for instance, cyber rape (Turkle 1995). Thus, from an algorith-
mic or developer’s point of view, data cannot be treated as something that 
is nonhuman— if we view it from the perspective of Haraway’s cyborg dis-
cussion, it is indeed an integrated part of the human being. There is no 
mother- and- child or host- and- guest relationship, nor any extension of the 
body as described in McLuhan (1964). Haraway’s point is that developing 
a perspective on data similar to that set out in McLuhan’s medium theory 
allows for alienation and a critical discussion of technology and data as 
something potentially harmful that can turn against humans. On the other 
hand, if we do not hierarchize the relationship, then we are already tech-
nology, data is already us.
Still, just as earlier cases of census and statistical data in aggregate show 
(Anderson 2015; Desrosières 2002), data does not equally represent all 
humans. The difference between traditional survey data and social media 
data is that in social media settings some humans create more data points 
than others. Star (1990) has a strong focus on the underrepresented in 
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specific socio- technical networks. Building on Law (1990), she also argues 
for technology as an arena for modulation, tacit power relations, inter-
ests, and conflicts. I will argue that questions of inclusion and exclusion 
(Kroll et al. 2017; Law 1990) also become relevant in the discussion on 
democracy, social big data, and machine learning processing. Star (Bowker 
and Star 1999; Star 1990) has a strong focus on the outliers— the under-
represented or “monsters” (Law 1990) that give meaning to the normal 
(Crawford and Calo 2016; Metcalf and Crawford 2016). To her, underrepre-
sentation and abnormality can take many forms, from sexuality and gender 
to being allergic. What they all have in common is that such individuals 
do not decide on the shared knowledge or meaning that binds the socio- 
technical network together in the manner suggested by Dewey. Unable to 
act, they are nonetheless important as a nonagent and as a confirmation of 
the rules for inclusion and exclusion. In the next section I will exemplify 
how I see such underrepresentation encoded into the algorithmic process-
ing of social big data and how this may subsequently lead to discrimination 
against protected classes (Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, Article 21).
Bowker and Star (1999) suggest that by accounting for the different lev-
els of exclusion, we are able to understand how the socio- technical is polit-
ical by nature. Accountability then also becomes an interesting aspect in 
terms of democracy. Although Star does not explicitly discuss democracy, I 
will combine her proposals with those of Dewey to argue that accountabil-
ity of underrepresentation and inequalities (Calo 2017; Crawford and Calo 
2016; Kroll et al. 2017) in the socio- technical is part of the transparency of 
participation processes that Dewey considers to be the core of democracy. 
I will argue that the accountability of data input and machine learning 
processing workflows rather than a focus on the transparency of the algo-
rithm itself (Ananny and Crawford 2018) is essential if we are to maintain 
an understanding of inclusion and exclusion rules as well as transparency 
in data processing. Still, this accountability does not solve the participation 
dilemma generated by social media platforms— thus the difficulty for citi-
zens of both participating and resisting datafication. This dilemma shows 
that Dewey- inspired participation in a datafied society may conflict with 
the right to privacy (see also van Hoboken’s analysis of datafication and 
privacy in chapter 10 of this volume).
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The Politics of Algorithms
Machine learning is built into social media algorithms as the backbone of 
the service, and by third- party companies as a way to interpret user behav-
ior and preferences. Algorithms are programs that control the logic and 
presentation of digital platforms and services, the specific recipe behind 
any computational decision:
Algorithms are now a communication technology; like broadcasting and publish-
ing technologies, they are now “the scientific instruments of a society at large,” 
(Gitelman 2006, 5) and are caught up in and are influencing the ways in which 
we ratify knowledge for civic life, but in ways that are more “protocological” (Gal-
loway 2004), i.e. organized computationally, than any medium before. (Gillespie 
2014, 169)
This chapter builds on the basic argument that the algorithms we use in 
data- driven decision- making are not objective tools that simply compute 
data. They are highly error prone, interpretive, and in need of adjustments 
to perform optimally, and in that sense, they are political and normative in 
nature. This argument is present in many existing critical contributions on 
algorithms within communication and media studies (Ananny and Craw-
ford 2018; Bodle 2015; Bucher 2012; Cheney- Lippold 2011; Kitchin 2014; 
Leese 2014; Pasquale 2015; Turow 2011).3 These studies focus on algorithms 
as a cultural phenomenon with unintended consequences for society. One 
such consequence relates to the exploitation of user data, the commodifi-
cation of personal data, and resulting challenges concerning the right to 
privacy (Cheney- Lippold 2011; Leese 2014; Solove 2004; Turow 2011).
Other critical accounts focus on surveillance mechanisms, where the 
discourse on algorithms does not relate primarily to how such computa-
tional processes violate individual privacy but rather, on the basis of Fou-
cault (1977), considers how they function as power tools for centralized 
entities such as a state or a government to control, adjust, and impose 
certain values upon the potentially surveilled citizen (Introna and Wood 
2004; Lyon 2007).
Another array of studies show how algorithms have consequences for 
what is presented to us as relevant information and communication. Algo-
rithms as filters are discussed in terms of filter bubbles, echo chambers, 
and digital divides (Bodle 2015; Bucher 2012; Introna and Nissenbaum 
2000; Mager 2012; Rogers 2009). These bodies of literature focus on the 
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democratic values of freedom of expression and social cohesion as threat-
ened in a personalized online space controlled by a small number of pow-
erful gatekeepers such as Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Amazon, and Apple.
Taken together, these critical algorithmic studies offer important insights 
into the societal consequences of algorithms and, indirectly, into how basic 
human rights and democratic values can potentially be violated through 
algorithms in a manner that is subtle, sometimes undeliberate, yet highly 
effective. A fairly new interdisciplinary approach to critical algorithmic 
studies consists of “audit” (Sandvig et al. 2014), “decipher” (Rieder 2005), 
or reverse engineering studies that seek to discuss the communicative con-
sequences of algorithmic processing through a close analysis of the actual 
structures and logics of specific statistical models or algorithmic construc-
tions (Diakopoulos and Koliska 2017; Mackenzie 2015; Rieder 2017). These 
studies show that algorithms encode certain types of values (Mackenzie 
2015) in the way they classify (Rieder 2017), cluster, or sort the data for 
a certain purpose without the developers knowing exactly how the statis-
tical model or algorithm leads to a particular optimal pattern or outcome 
predictor. I will supplement this interesting body of literature with my 
own empirical work to provide examples of how underrepresentation and 
inequality can occur in practice.
Big Social Data as Population and Census Data
All machine learning processing is conducted with the aim of recognizing 
patterns in order to predict outputs, which for instance can then be used 
for persecution, credit scores and subsequent insurance and loan offerings, 
health care, and propaganda. As algorithms become widely used to struc-
ture our culture and democracy, it is crucial for society, in an interdisciplin-
ary manner, to illustrate errors and interpretative spaces and to inscribe the 
“human” in standardized processes carried out to execute decisions fast 
and seamlessly. This is of particular importance when algorithmic decision- 
making moves from product and service optimization and marketing into 
the realm of governmental data and when such data is paired with social 
media data. Algorithmic decisions made here not only affect the media 
“bubbles” we live in, the people we engage with or exclude in consumer 
society (Bauman 2000)— they also affect our health care, educational 
opportunities, and probability of being a political target (Noyes 2015). In 
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this section, I will focus on Facebook as an arena for the creation of big 
social data that is often used for data enrichment to understand and predict 
user behavior both on and outside Facebook.
I will then examine more closely the critical algorithmic theories on the 
processes at work in machine learning models and provide examples from 
my own experience applying such models to Facebook data in order to 
illustrate the interpretive spaces and politics of such algorithms. In this 
way, I will focus on both the data layer and the model layer in algorithmic 
processing (Diakopoulos and Koliska 2017).
Facebook data is an example of an overwhelming pool of data that 
developers could access and use for various purposes, ranging from system-
atic surveillance to recruiting, political campaigning, and service optimiza-
tion.4 Currently, Facebook is globally only surpassed by Reddit as the online 
platform people spend the most time on (alexa.com), and Facebook data 
contains a wealth of different data points from self- reported demograph-
ics, interests (likes and shares), and personal accounts and opinions (sta-
tus updates, photos, links, and comments) to network and behavioral data 
(visit to external sites with Facebook plug- ins). The overwhelming amount 
of data both vertically and horizontally (over time) often lead to data 
rush— overly enthusiastic and bold uses of the data as an example of human 
behavior and opinions worldwide. Often, people are portrayed solely in 
terms of data for the purposes of predictions and subsequent decisions. 
This has fundamental consequences for the representation of individuals 
in decisions based on those data. For example, a study of the total amount 
of private status updates, shared links, and photos among 1,000 Danes over 
a period of eight years (Bechmann, 2019 in press) shows that the number 
of data traces created varies greatly when broken down into demographics, 
especially age. This means that when one is using such data— for example, 
in connection with the provision of public services — those who only read 
or listen are underrepresented and excluded from the data set that informs 
decision- making. Furthermore, although Facebook has a large penetration 
rate in many countries— often higher than Twitter, Snapchat, Instagram, 
and noninternational platforms— the data fails to represent those who 
are not active users of these platforms. Active users are here understood as 
those who leave data traces behind to be processed by algorithms (Hargit-
tai and Walejko 2008). Thus, when using social big data as an input in 
machine learning processing to represent populations, the data pool may 
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be extremely large but the sample bias is also significant. Often people 
“game” the Facebook advertising algorithm (Bechmann 2015; Marwick and 
boyd 2014) by deliberately reporting fake demographic parameters, ren-
dering the data quality weaker and, potentially, the predictions made from 
such data false if the calculations are not enriched with other data.
Sample bias is nothing new and as a concept has existed throughout 
the history of the political and social sciences (Desrosières 2002). Critics 
would argue that representation is always a problem when we have to 
reduce populations via aggregation and work with census data (Anderson 
2015), so what is new? There are at least two differences here. Social media 
data is produced in private domains with limited transparency obligations. 
When enriching public data with, for instance, social media data to create 
a more detailed understanding of personal behaviors and preferences, it 
is difficult to account for sample biases in detail and, consequently, for 
how the data sets used for predictions are effectively balanced. Further-
more, the data functions not only as a one- step analytical phase but also 
as training data for machine learning algorithms. This training data is 
often not provided from the same data pool. These data steps therefore 
obscure even further the results of the analysis and research phase before 
decision- making takes place. Cambridge Analytica is a good example of 
this, where people’s data was used to train a model to find the most pre-
dictive Facebook behaviors and attributes (e.g., like profiles) for a certain 
psychological profiles that again allowed the company to target specific 
voters with carefully tailored content.
Machine Learning and Training Data
Data in machine learning processing therefore becomes an issue not only in 
terms of the quality of data input itself but also in terms of its suitability for 
training the algorithms to recognize patterns and clusters and to create clas-
sifications. The more data and the more diversified training data you have, 
the better your algorithm potentially is at recognizing new data. The algo-
rithm can only interpret data and predict patterns from the data that it has 
already seen (training data). However, studies and incidents have shown 
that training data is biased historically, culturally, and contextually. Goo-
gle, for instance, labeled black people as gorillas (Cohen 2019), and a study 
has shown how women were described with discriminatory words due to 
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the historical role of women as, for instance, housewives (Bolukbasi et al. 
2016). To generate enough training data for the algorithm to recognize pat-
terns and connect those patterns to certain labels, researchers and develop-
ers often use data that spans a wide historical period. In such cases, training 
data creates a preservative construct of associated meanings and words with 
key concepts that may, for instance, enforce a conservative cultural under-
standing of the role of women. While societal values and interpretations 
are in general moving toward a more inclusive and diverse society and the 
nondiscrimination principle operates with protected classes, decisions and 
predictions automated through machine learning may reinforce historical 
biases. This, in turn, pulls societal values in the opposite direction from 
inclusiveness and diversity. Still, one could claim that the data is sound 
proof of Dewey’s participatory democracy in the sense that the data is a 
result of what people do with data in a particular domain or context, not 
what they ought to be doing according to democratic values of representa-
tion, accountability, and equality.
Similar problems arise when training data is used in, for instance, pic-
ture recognition and classification algorithms through deep convolutional 
neural networks. Here, training data is also the most important factor in 
high performance. Such algorithms are usually trained on what is avail-
able, which often means large picture databases such as ImageNet with its 
1,000 classes of pictures (e.g., dogs, trees, flowers) as the potential outcome 
of the algorithmic processing (the last layer in the network). To Internet 
industries such as IBM (Watson), Alphabet (Google), Amazon, Facebook, 
Tesla, and Microsoft, having a large and diverse pool of annotated training 
data becomes a lucrative business that potentially puts their algorithms and 
products at the forefront of the machine learning field. However, using 
algorithms trained on certain types of data may lead to decisions based on 
a false interpretation of the data source. If a picture classification algorithm 
is trained on a data set containing various types of annotated data (human 
as well as animal), the interpretation of human faces may resemble that 
of animal faces and thereby lead to false, and in terms of inclusion deeply 
problematic, classifications and decisions. In our own research lab, we tried 
to use vision convolutional neural networks pretrained on ImageNet to 
classify social media pictures (Bechmann 2017). The performance was very 
poor when compared to manual annotation and may indicate that con-
textual sensitivity in the training data is essential for the performance of 
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the algorithms and consequently as the basis for sustainable predictions 
and actions. In our case sensitivity toward social media features such as the 
importance of text in pictures and image focus led to false classifications 
of the picture from a sociological perspective. Also, the interpretation of 
clothes generated false output categories because the training data presum-
ably contained health care– related pictures in which staff wore uniforms 
that resemble white leisure wear; thus the model tried to interpret leisure 
clothes as business attire and provided a completely wrong prediction of 
the picture.
So how can we create context- sensitive annotated training data? Natural 
language processing researchers Derczynski, Bontcheva, and Roberts (2016) 
suggest that if the right type of data is available as training data, social 
media data is best annotated by a combination of experts/researchers and 
a diverse crowd of social media users. They also show how crowd train-
ing and continual performance measurements are a clear feature of social 
media annotations. Furthermore, they discuss how the reduction of output 
categories to between seven and ten is important for automatic clustering. 
However, despite higher performance with reduced multidimensional com-
plexity in output categories, this reduction of complexity can be problem-
atic for representation and democratic actions. Although a small number 
of computationally isolated categories do enable higher performance, the 
reduction in itself may give a false picture of data as humans. For instance, 
Facebook operates with six different categories of “like” in the data struc-
ture in order to understand the emotional reactions toward a post, despite 
the psychological field suggesting eight categories and twenty- four associ-
ated emotional dimensions (Plutchik 2001). The reduction of multidimen-
sionality in data processing may simply lead to measurement errors and 
false conclusions, predictions, and decisions in the use of data as humans.
Mathematical Models, Abnormality and Outliers
In the model layer (Diakopoulos and Koliska 2017), working with statisti-
cal learning models in machine learning and related interpretations and 
decisions may also lead to underrepresentation and inequality, as with the 
selections previously considered in the data layer. Rieder (2017) shows how 
Bayes classifiers, the most widespread prediction model within big data, 
produce “a basis for decision- making that is not a clear- cut formula, but an 
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adaptive statistical model containing potentially hundreds of thousands 
of variables” (Rieder 2017, 110). Accountability for the calculation of such 
variables may be very complicated. This was also true for the use of learning 
models (e.g., topic models and convolutional neural networks) tested at my 
research lab (datalab.au.dk). In our experience with topic models, it can be 
very time- consuming, if at all possible, to understand the statistical logic of 
clusters and the implications of such logic for clusters. In other words, why 
do these particular clusters result from the machine learning processing? 
The logic appears on a linguistic level (Jurafsky and Martin 2008; Manning 
and Schütze 1999) that does not necessarily relate to human field- specific 
interpretations. This discrepancy potentially distorts the actions carried out 
on the basis of the clusters found. The choices made in the preprocessing of 
data can create very different cluster predictions depending on what kind of 
words are included or omitted from the data set. Omitting words that have 
a tendency to occur in connection with certain groups of people or minori-
ties in order to normalize data and create “meaningful” clusters reduces 
their representation and “voices” in the final actions, just as omitting data 
from abnormal users would in classical social and behavioral sciences. 
Another example is that the developer’s choice of the optimal number of 
topics or distance between the different clusters significantly influences the 
visibility of less normal behavior or “monsters” (Law 1990) in the data. A 
larger distance creates less sensitivity toward diversity, whereas a smaller 
distance will potentially provide sensitivity to differences and diversity in 
the data. Setting the optimal numbers of clusters or distance requires closer 
examination and judgment based on data explorations, as we sought to 
ensure when balancing redundancy against diversity (Bechmann, Kim, 
and Søgaard 2016). On the other hand, microsegmentation (Bechmann, 
Bilgrav- Nielsen, and Jensen 2016) creates potential challenges to privacy, 
as abnormal or deviant usages and users light up in models with a large 
number of clusters. Such visibility can be used against users’ interests in 
risk assessments and behavioral adjustments by authoritarian regimes and 
other oppressive entities.
In our work with convolutional neural networks on pictures it is equally 
difficult, if not more difficult, to account for meaningful subclusters cre-
ated in the various layers of the network, even though researchers are able 
to account for the mathematical logic in different machine learning mod-
els (Davenport and Harris 2007; Freedman 2005; Zumel and Mount 2014). 
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Consequently, accounting for the exact reasons for certain predictions is 
very difficult (Bechmann 2017). For businesses with an interest in perfor-
mance this is not relevant, but for a democratic society that values account-
ability in decision- making processes it is a major issue (Calo 2017). False 
positives and false negatives may be hard to account for and instead have 
to be adjusted for through manual/human alerts and new training and test 
data iterations. With the development of still more complex models with 
an increasing number of layers, the challenge of accountability grows. And 
if such machine learning models have a still more widespread and seamless 
use in various products, services, and decisions, the processing of manual 
reports of false positives and negatives may not be prioritized enough, as 
this requires significant resources from industry and government. Abnor-
mal patterns or “monsters” thereby have a potential to create false posi-
tives and negatives because the training data is not sufficient to take these 
patterns into account in the interpretation and prediction of clusters, or 
the training data is not labeled sufficiently to take into account such rare 
or abnormal occurrences. This was also the case before machine learning, 
but the layers of adjusting for abnormality now become more complex. 
The lack of training data or labels for innovative structures, minorities, and 
deviant picture patterns have consequences for the ability of the datafied 
society to process data as humans on equal terms, especially if this is not a 
focal point in the design, training, and documentation of the models and 
their use in specific contexts.
These applied examples illustrate cases in which accountability is dif-
ficult and underrepresentation, inequality, and discrimination may easily 
occur. However, these are just examples of choices made when working with 
big social data and machine learning that have profound consequences for 
the democratic values of representation, accountability, and equality. Other 
examples include the choice of accuracy measures, confidence values, and 
interpretations of uncertainty information (Diakopoulos and Koliska 2017). 
The scientific field of machine learning thus filters out outliers but at the 
same time strives to achieve near- human processing (Harnad 2000; Turing 
1950). Machine learning tries to avoid a simple human model but at the 
same time uses models that normalize data and find similar results (Ananny 
2016) instead of concentrating on diversity, for instance in terms of out-
liers. To create a deeper understanding of the data processing that occurs 
and ideally enable equal treatment of all humans, documentation of the 
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algorithmic processing is not a stand- alone solution (Ananny and Crawford 
2018; Cohen 2019). Even if we demanded a circumvention of the intel-
lectual property rights of companies and/or accountability for public data 
processing, this would be too complex to account for and also insufficient, 
because discrimination happens when the algorithm is applied to the data 
as described in this section.
Conclusion
The chapter has provided a conceptual background for data as humans on 
the basis of Dewey’s theory of participatory democracy, and a further devel-
opment of this theory using cyberfeminist theory to highlight problems 
with the interpretation of data as humans. It has highlighted challenges to 
representation, accountability and equality as democratic values and exem-
plified how such underrepresentation, discrimination, and unaccountabil-
ity can take place in specific uses of machine learning processing on social 
big data. These examples have shown how the selection and processing of 
social big data is profoundly political in nature, thus the examples support 
existing critical voices in algorithmic studies.
Taking social media as its starting point, the chapter has analyzed 
democracy on two different levels; as media for democratic debate in Dew-
ey’s sense and as a data source for decision- making on a broader scale that 
defines the citizen in a datafied society (here, social media data plays a role 
for interpreting the citizen).
Firstly, the chapter has suggested that we should focus not on account-
ing for the algorithm itself as a standalone solution, but on the social values 
that have been encoded into the algorithm directly or indirectly as (polit-
ical) choices made by developers. Examples might be: What are the social 
values of the choices made by Facebook to only show posts people agree 
with in order to maximize time spent on the platform, or to censor nude 
pictures? Western media (which social media platforms deliberately avoid 
registering as) are accustomed to transparency on such issues, but they are 
challenged by increasingly global social media that also target non- Western 
societies. Furthermore, such transparency is challenged by Facebook’s con-
tent moderators situated in different cultures from the ones they serve and 
with very little editorial education compared to journalists. Can we inter-
nationally agree on shared values such as human rights and if not, would 
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it serve democracy and the online public debate to regulate for market cul-
tural sensitivity, that is, sensitivity toward different cultural interpretations 
of gender equality?
Secondly, the chapter has suggested a political and regulatory focus on 
documentation and accountability— not as open access to the actual (and 
often, in private domains, legally protected) algorithm as the only solu-
tion, but in terms of an increased focus on normalization logics and the 
potential negative consequences for protected classes, abnormal behavior, 
minorities, and underrepresented groups as a part of documenting compli-
ance with international human rights law and the democratic values of rep-
resentation, accountability and equality. We need new standards for how 
we create balanced big data data sets, and how we document such balance. 
Ultimately, if we do not find an effective modus operandi for demanding 
this documentation of balance and compliance, we will widen the divides 
already experienced in society more systematically. Again, critical voices 
would claim that these divides already exist, but I would argue that the 
systematic and integrated nature of these divides is what sets them apart 
as new. We no longer have a process of analysis and research followed by 
actions: instead, we now have a single computational process that operates 
in loops. If we do not account for balance and compliance with social val-
ues, citizen data mining (including in the welfare state) may develop into 
systematic self- reinforcing loops of discrimination due to the closed learn-
ing cycles of machine learning algorithms, informed by big social data.
Dewey’s ideal of participatory democracy is not without negative con-
sequences, especially in terms of user privacy when data points increase in 
tandem with participation. Apart from this big dilemma, future research 
needs to focus not only on how accountability is created in the different 
stages of machine learning processing for big (social) data, but also on how 
such accountability is made accessible to society at large. Finally, “Under-
represented” and outlier focus accounts (e.g., due to false negatives and 
positives) are a radically different way of approaching big data compared to 
engineering approaches tackling data- processing techniques and computa-
tional optimization. This emphasizes the need for media and communica-
tion sociologists to engage and contribute to the field of machine learning 
so that the analytical models we use in future research as well as in wider 
society can be tailored to a humanistic approach. This means accounting in 
detail for the human, both in terms of data and in terms of human decisions 
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in the data processing through machine learning algorithms. By doing so, 
we may provide a deeper and more detailed account of how power relations 
are enacted through algorithms and how platforms and services are shaped 
by designers and users, and in turn shape society.
Notes
1. The right to equality and nondiscrimination is recognized in Article 2 of the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights and is a crosscutting standard in different UN 
human rights instruments. Accountability is a process value related to transparency 
and the rule of law (see also McGonagle, chapter 9, this volume).
2. This perspective is also found in the growing body of literature on data activism 
(see, e.g., Gray 2018; Milan 2013).
3. For more references, see https://socialmediacollective.org/reading-lists/critical 
-algorithm-studies.
4. Facebook restricted the API for third party use in 2019 and has now chosen to 
commercialize the data and knowledge within the company’s own platforms, pre-
venting anyone from monitoring their use of this data.
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Informational privacy is often understood as the ability or right to have 
control over one’s personal information. In fact, as discussed in the Intro-
duction to this volume, there is a growing concern that platforms use per-
sonal information in ways that compromise their users’ right to privacy. In 
his classic definition, Westin stated that privacy is “the claim of individuals, 
groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what 
extent information about them is communicated to others” (Westin 1967, 
7). This basic idea of a tight link between informational privacy and per-
sonal information is echoed in today’s two major approaches to informa-
tional privacy: the access approach in which privacy is about the ability to 
“limit or restrict others from information about” oneself (Tavani 2008, 141) 
and the control approach in which privacy is the ability to have “control of 
personal information” (Solove 2008, 24). These notions of informational 
privacy turn on the basic assumption that informational privacy is about the 
protection of personal information. In this chapter, I will discuss and prob-
lematize this assumption and explore the notion of personal information as 
it is formed in the age of algorithms, datafication, and big data.
The notion of “information” often assumes that information somehow 
represents, relates to, corresponds to, or points to particular people, places, 
or things in the world. This use of “information” follows a tradition in the 
philosophy of information that takes data and information to be reified 
entities that can be manipulated and subjected to abstract, rational anal-
ysis and that exist independent of context, situation, time, and place. In 
this sense, information just is— or as information philosopher Tom Stonier 
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(1990, 21) stated, “Information exists. It does not need to be perceived to exist. 
It does not need to be understood to exist. It requires no intelligence to inter-
pret it. It does not have to have meaning to exist. It exists.”
I will argue, however, that personal information is in fact created in con-
texts, in situations, in use, and via conversations and constructions about 
the significance of the information. As such, information doesn’t simply exist. 
The understanding of information I use here is based on semiotic com-
munication theory that places the construction of meaning as central to 
understanding information (cf., e.g., Fiske 2011). It follows that informa-
tion is best understood as a semiotic sign in communicative practices.
In the following section, I will review how a few central privacy theo-
ries have used the notion of information. Next, I present three cases that 
illustrate how data and information are collected, processed, and used in 
the algorithmic age. In the final section, I outline a theoretical framework 
for understanding information as a sign, and I discuss the consequences of 
such an approach for informational privacy.
To Control Information
The idea that information just is is most clearly articulated in the tradi-
tion that considers informational privacy to be concerned with property 
rights over information— that information has thinglike characteristics and 
is owned by specific people. Moore (2010, 5) conceptualizes privacy as the 
“right to control access to and use of physical items, like bodies and houses, 
and information, like medical and financial facts” and defends a “control 
over access and use” (ibid., 5) definition of privacy. The claim to privacy is a 
claim to “control access to places and ideas” (ibid., 23) which can be “writ-
ten, recorded, spoken, or fixed in some other fashion” (ibid., 23). The basic 
idea is that we have a property right to our personal information and the 
condition of privacy is one of “voluntary seclusion or walling off” (ibid., 
26) and making “personal information inaccessible” (ibid., 26). This idea 
was most clearly articulated by Murphy (1996, 2383– 2384), who asserted 
about personal information that “such information, like all information, is 
property” and therefore the basic question is simply to determine “[w]ho 
owns the property rights to such information” (ibid., 2384).
Solove (2008, 29) criticizes the control theory for being “too vague, too 
broad, or too narrow.” It is too vague because it fails to define the various 
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types of information in play in privacy situations; it is too broad because it 
fails to accommodate the relational nature of information and the fact that 
not all personal information is private; and lastly it is too narrow because it 
fails to account for privacy situations that are not informational in nature. 
Instead, Solove proposes that we “identify the various types of informa-
tion and matters that are private” (ibid., 67) and determine those types of 
information in which intimacy or sensitivity is involved. The traditional 
approach has been to classify information as “public or private under the 
assumption that these are qualities that inhere in the information [emphasis 
added]” (ibid., 69). Solove proposes— from a grounding in “philosophy of 
pragmatism” (ibid., 46)— a contextual approach to privacy with a focus on 
specific privacy problems that there is a need to address, and he proposes 
that instead of defining privacy from a general perspective, the aim should 
be to start with practical problems that privacy theory and practice ought 
to solve and let those contexts define the privacy problems at hand and 
whether information is public or private.
Nissenbaum (2010) is likewise critical of the control approach to infor-
mational privacy. She argues that the control approach relies on the notion 
of a distinction between a public realm and a private realm and the abil-
ity to master the location of the information. Nissenbaum suggests that 
the social norms governing a given situation should provide the context 
to understand the privacy issues at stake. As such, Nissenbaum’s focus is 
on the contextual, social norms that determine whether some information 
belongs in the public realm or in the private realm— the basic idea being 
that the information itself can be moved from the public realm to the pri-
vate realm without having an effect on the information itself; the same 
information can exist in the public realm and in the private realm. Rubel 
and Biava (2014, 2424) are also critical of the control approach to informa-
tional privacy and suggest that informational privacy is better understood 
as a relation between three entities: “some person or persons, some domain 
of information, and some other person or persons.” The point is that noth-
ing is said beforehand about the nature of these relations, merely that those 
are the relations to be analyzed and understood in a given privacy situation 
or context. The nature of the relations then defines the particular privacy 
issue at stake and makes it possible to compare various privacy situations.
Common for these— and other similar— conceptualizations is that they 
take a pragmatic approach and aim to give voice to the contextualization 
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of privacy issues, arguing that there are norms, specifics, or matters 
within a given situation that define and limit the privacy issues at play. 
However, they do not explicitly consider how the notion of information 
might be affected by their pragmatic, contextual, situational interpretation 
stance— they maintain the basic idea that information just is, that infor-
mation is an entity that can be manipulated and moved between different 
spheres or domains.
Being Pragmatic
One route to conceptualize the role of information in informational pri-
vacy theories is to determine the “various types of information or matters 
that are private” (Solove 2008, 67) and which other types of information or 
matters are not private and to use this distinction to draw a line between 
privacy and non- privacy. A common approach is to draw this line based 
on the “intimacy or sensitivity” (ibid., 67) of the information in question; 
information that by nature is intimate or sensitive is personal information, 
while other types of information are not.
Solove (2008) suggests that a better approach is to look at the purposes 
for which the information is used to analyze the privacy issues involved; 
“information is public or private depending upon the purposes for which 
people want to conceal it and the uses that others might make of it” (ibid., 
69). In other words, the focus ought to be on the nature of the purpose for 
which the information is applied. This is similar to Nissenbaum’s (2010, 3) 
call for “contextual integrity” in which “finely calibrated systems of social 
norms, or rules, govern the flow of personal information.”
Both Solove and Nissenbaum— as well as other privacy scholars— have 
been influenced by the idea that the particular situation or context is of 
importance to understanding the privacy issues at play. What is not dis-
cussed is the status or conceptualization of information; except for the use 
of notions such as sensitive, personal, intimate, or private about the infor-
mation and the acknowledgement that it can take different forms (written, 
recorded, spoken, etc.), nothing is said about the nature of information 
involved in informational privacy. Solove and Nissenbaum seem to hold 
“the self constant” and ignore “the problem of the evolving subjectivity” 
(Cohen 2012, 20). That is, while they recognize the importance of the spe-
cific situation or context, their analyses are limited to understanding the 
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privacy situation as specific and unique and to acknowledging that it is a 
mistake to assume that information by nature is either private or public.
In this chapter I augment these contextual approaches to privacy by 
arguing that information itself is a contextual, situational, and pragmatic 
construct. As such, the present chapter builds upon and expands the work 
of Nissenbaum, Solove, and others who have advocated a contextual 
approach to privacy. This chapter augments their work by providing a con-
textual understanding of personal information.
The concept of information is tricky, and it is used in several different 
ways with various connotations. As Agre once noted,
Computers are frequently said to store and transmit information. The term infor-
mation, though, conceals a significant ambiguity. On one hand, information 
can be defined (as per Shannon and Weaver) as a purely mathematical measure 
of information and information- carrying capacity, without regard for the con-
tent. On the other hand, information is information also about something. (Agre 
1994, 107)
In this sense, the scholars discussed above can be said to use a notion of 
information where information has an information- carrying capacity. 
What is of concern for these scholars is not so much the content of the 
information as the information itself; in such conceptualizations, informa-
tion just is.
However, as Agre noted, information can also be conceptualized as infor-
mation about something; as Westin (1967, 7) originally noted, privacy is 
the claim to determine the “extent information about them is commu-
nicated to others.” To reuse Warren and Brandeis’s (1890, 214) famous 
question— “What is the thing which is protected?”— is informational pri-
vacy concerned with protecting the stuff called “information” or with pro-
tecting the state of affairs that the information is about? The answer to 
that question will lead to different kinds of informational privacy theories. 
Therefore, we need to ask “What is information?” But first, let us pause 
to clarify the interrelation between information and personal information.
Information and Personal Information
As a way to avoid the larger philosophical discourse about the notion of 
information, one could suggest that information and personal information 
should be regarded as separate notions that are not related (figure 4.1). In 
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this sense, information and personal information are different in nature; 
they do not share characteristics or have properties in common. In such an 
understanding, information and personal information would be different 
concepts, and one would conceptualize personal information as a unique 
ontological unit. This understanding would allow one to define personal 
information as a specific set of ontological concepts that operate in specific 
and unique ways, independent of discussions of the notion of information 
as such. My sense is that this is not an attainable understanding and that 
personal information in many ways behaves in the same way as informa-
tion per se and entails the same challenges. In this chapter, I will therefore 
regard information and personal information as the same conceptual unit.
We could consider personal information to share characteristics with 
information per se— and it could be argued that personal information is in 
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out personal information as a special kind of information— as a subset of 
information— defining it as “data about an individual that is identifiable to 
that individual— for example, my genetic code, my video preferences, my 
sexual preference, my credit history, my eye color, my income” (Murphy 
1996, 2383) or as “any information relating to an identified or identifiable 
natural person” (Data Protection Working Party 2007, 4).
In this chapter, however, I will argue two things about this relation 
between information and personal information. First, the distinction is not 
as sharp as figures 4.1 and 4.2 might imply. As we will see in the next sec-
tion of this chapter, the flow, use, and production of information in digital 
environments can blur the distinction between information about individ-
uals (personal information) and information about all other things— in fact, 
if we were to maintain the distinction between information and personal 
information, there would probably be very little information in the digital 
information environment that would not be personal information (figure 
4.3). As Cohen (2012) has noted, the idea of designating some information 
as “intimate” or “sensitive” and of specific interest in a privacy context is 
problematic considering today’s data and information practices:
Although privacy law purports to recognize a  .  .  . principle, that  .  .  . operates 
primarily to protect small islands of concededly “intimate” or “sensitive” infor-
mation and correspondingly small enclaves of acknowledged physical seclusion. 
In an age of distributed information processing, moreover, even those islands are 
eroding. (Cohen 2012, 248)
In the algorithmic age, most information can be used in the construction 
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personal information becomes less clear, as lots of seemingly casual and 
informal information is used in the algorithmic creation of personal data 
profiles. There would, of course, still be some information that we would 
not regard as personal information, such as tree rings or fossils— until they 
are picked up by an individual and entered into a personal sphere at which 
point tree rings and fossils might in fact also become personal information, 
as pointed out by Van Hoboken (Joris van Hoboken, comments to author, 
January 12, 2017).
My second argument about the relations between information and per-
sonal information is that to understand the nature of information and 
appreciate the challenges of constructing a theory of informational privacy, 
we need to conceive of information as signs in a communicative process. 
What is interesting about personal information is that it is stuff that means 
something about something, and we ought to be concerned with the situa-
tions in which that meaning is produced. In other words, information is 
not best conceptualized as footprints of a state of affairs but as signs in a 
communicative process (Mai 2016b).
For a better understanding of informational privacy, we need a more 
granular understanding of the concept of information, as well as a more 
nuanced language to discuss it. With these in place, we can explore and 
articulate different approaches to what informational privacy is about and 
the avenues one might take to address current challenges. However, before 
digging into theories of information, let us first explore a few cases of infor-
mation and data in the wild.
Three Examples of Datafication
I present three examples below in which there is an intersection between 
the collection, processing, and use of personal information and privacy. 
These examples will demonstrate how the control- oriented approach to pri-
vacy is too weak and insufficient in today’s algorithmic age.
The first example is the application of algorithms in basically any and 
all digital platforms today, which has resulted in algorithms playing “an 
increasingly important role in selecting which information is considered 
relevant to us” (Gillespie 2014, 167). Such algorithms increasingly domi-
nate our daily interactions with social media; they are an integral compo-
nent of search engines, recommender systems, online newspapers, social 
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networking platforms, and so forth. The use of algorithms and the degree 
to which they “black box” (Pasquale 2015) information processes and deci-
sions has been widely discussed. However, as Burrell (2016, 2) argues, “what 
is new in this domain is the more pervasive technologies and techniques 
of data collection, the more vast archives of personal data including pur-
chasing activities, link clicks, and geospatial movement.” Although these 
algorithms are already nestled “into people’s daily lives and mundane 
information practices” (Gillespie 2014, 183), there is still very little known 
about the “ways in which users know and perceive that algorithms are part 
of their ‘media life’” (Bucher 2017, 31). One challenge, of course, is that 
people rarely understand— because it is black boxed— which information 
about them has been collected and how that information is processed and 
used to generate the personalized services offered by platforms. As Gillespie 
(2014, 173– 174) has noted,
The most knowable information (geo- location, computing platform, profile infor-
mation, friends, status updates, links followed on the site, time on the site, activ-
ity on other sites that host “like” buttons or cookies) is a rendering of that user, a 
“digital dossier” or “algorithmic identity” that is imperfect but sufficient. What is 
less legible or cannot be known about users falls away or is bluntly approximated.
Sophisticated Internet users might be able to determine that personal 
information is being collected in their daily interaction with various dig-
ital media; many people are aware that whatever data and information 
they themselves provide is being collected, and that hardware information 
about their devices is collected as well. But, as Gillespie notes, that is rarely 
enough information to provide detailed personalized services— much is 
approximated in the construction of personal profiles. Bucher (2017, 34) 
gives the example of Shannon, a professional career counsellor in her for-
ties, who has blogged about Taylor Swift and then starts receiving “Face-
book ads for products that younger people might like.” The reason for 
this might be that Facebook’s algorithm has recomputed her age given the 
information about Taylor Swift and makes the assumption that Shannon 
is younger than she actually is. Shannon is rather relaxed about this and 
finds that it is “rather amusing” though she often finds “Facebook ads to be 
‘slightly offensive as they make assumptions about me, which I don’t like 
to think are true’” (ibid., 34).
Bucher’s example is a good illustration of Cohen’s (2012, 26) point that 
“raw information . . . is not terribly useful to anyone”; the fact that Shannon 
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has blogged about Taylor Swift says very little about Shannon without an 
understanding of the contextual situation in which Shannon has generated 
this information. The meaning of the information that is entered into the 
algorithms and personal data profiles, therefore, is best understood within 
the context of the “origins, purposes, and effects of [the] socially situated 
processes of sorting and categorization” (ibid., 26). The challenge, as Burrell 
(2016, 1) has pointed out, is that “the inputs themselves may be entirely 
unknown or known only partially”; once the information has been col-
lected, it has been separated from the context in which it was produced and 
now interpreted and used in new contexts and therefore “is both already 
desiccated and persistently messy” (Gillespie 2014, 170).
The second example I will present here is the widely used but very illus-
trative Target case. The Target case illustrates the point that the distinction 
between ordinary, everyday information and sensitive information is not as 
clear- cut as sometimes imagined. The case was first reported in the New York 
Times by Charles Duhigg (2012), who told the story of a father who went 
to a Target store complaining that his daughter had received coupons for 
maternity clothing and baby products. Like many other chain stores, Tar-
get assigns each customer a unique “Guest ID number.” This allows Target 
to identify and track each customer, provide customers with personalized 
services, and offer customers coupons that are tailored to their shopping 
interests. One set of customers of interest are pregnant women. Through 
research and data mining, Target assigns each customer a “pregnancy pre-
diction” score, representing the likelihood that the customer is pregnant. 
Target is even able to calculate an expected due date. Target had found that 
they could assign the pregnancy score fairly precisely by analyzing the pur-
chasing history for approximately twenty- five products, such as “quantities 
of unscented lotion,” “supplements like calcium, magnesium and zinc,” 
“scent- free soap,” “extra- big bags of cotton balls,” “hand sanitizers,” and 
“washcloths” (Duhigg 2012). It is valuable for Target to know that a cus-
tomer might be pregnant because this is a “watershed moment for couples” 
(Mayer- Schönberger and Cukier 2013, 57) in which they might change 
their shopping habits and develop new brand loyalties.
It could be argued that the daughter had control of the information 
regarding her purchases of the twenty- five products used to calculate her 
pregnancy prediction score that she provided to Target through her mem-
bership card, and that she benefitted from the transaction through coupons 
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and discounts. The challenge is that it is not misuse of personal informa-
tion that in itself creates a privacy problem; rather, the issue is that Target is 
able to produce sensitive personal information through predictive analysis 
of the young girl’s purchasing history. As Inness (1992, 58) argues, “[I]t is 
the intimacy of this information that identifies a loss of privacy.” The fact 
that Target knows a customer’s purchase history for, say, washcloths might 
not feel like a violation of their privacy, especially if the information is 
traded for a discount on washcloths. However, most people would probably 
consider knowledge about their health— such as whether or not they are 
pregnant— too personal and intimate to share with Target. This example 
demonstrates that in the age of big data, predictive analysis, algorithms, 
and machine learning, the challenges to informational privacy are less 
about the control of personal information and more about what companies 
know about their customers. The focus has “shifted from concerns about 
revealing information about oneself to others to concerns about the new 
insights that others can generate based on the already available data” (Mai 
2016a, 199).
The last example I will present here is Cheney- Lippold’s (2011) Quancast 
case. Quancast builds profiles of Internet users based on their interactions 
with a range of sites and platforms. These profiles are constructed based 
on the users’ seemingly meaningless data collected as they go about their 
daily activities; the data about these interactions flows “into rigid database 
fields as part of the subsumption implicit in data mining” (ibid., 169). One 
element in the process is the establishment of a user’s gender:
As a user travels across these networks, algorithms can topologically striate her 
surfing data, allocating certain web artifacts into particular, algorithmically- 
defined categories like gender. The fact that user X visits the web site CNN.com 
might suggest that X could be categorized as male. And additional data could 
then buttress or resignify how X is categorized. As X visits more sites like CNN.
com, X’s maleness is statistically reinforced, adding confidence to the measure 
that X may be male. As X visits more sites that are unlike CNN.com, X’s maleness 
might be put into question or potentially resignified to another gender identity. 
(Cheney- Lippold 2011, 169– 170)
The data collected about an individual user is analyzed and checked against 
other statistical analyses to ultimately establish the gender of the user. 
However, as new data is collected and analyzed, the gender of the user 
might change, and, as such, “gender becomes a vector” (ibid., 170) that is 
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de- essentialized and constructed on a purely digital basis merely to develop 
marketing information about the users, which Quancast can then sell. The 
construction of gender within the context of Quancast becomes decontex-
tualized from the social and cultural construction of gender; for Quancast 
the category of “gender” is merely a category “embedded in the logic of 
consumption” (ibid., 171) and is divorced from real, actual, and lived gen-
der experiences.
Cheney- Lippold’s (2011) Quancast example shows that data is collected 
to establish personal information about an individual, for example, “X is 
male” (ibid., 170). This establishment of maleness, however, has little to do 
with X as a human being; it is merely for marketing purposes. X’s gender is 
established through predictive and inferential analyses of X’s interactions 
with various sites and platforms, and X’s gender is established through 
algorithmic analyses based on information that might not in the first place 
be regarded as personal information.
A common question raised for these three examples is whether they 
involve the notion of privacy. It is my sense that we could explore and read 
the cases from the perspective of privacy and discuss in which ways and to 
what extent the individuals’ personal information was used in improper 
ways, and whether they had control over their personal information in 
the situations. I think most of us would agree that there is at least some 
degree of privacy involved, and that the individuals involved are at risk 
at least to some degree, given specific interpretations of the cases and the 
data practices involved. However, I would submit that we cannot meaning-
fully understand and analyze the privacy issues at play in these scenarios 
using the framework of control of personal information. In fact, I believe 
applying a control approach would cause us to misread the privacy con-
cerns at stake in these examples for two reasons. The first reason is that 
the three cases demonstrate that the issue here has less to do with the 
data provided by the users/customers, and everything to do with the new 
insights and information the companies produce about them. The users/
customers have no direct control over this new information and will, in 
most circumstances, not know that the information even exists. On the 
other hand, the fact that such information is produced and exists currently 
provides a flourishing personal data economy, as outlined by Zuboff in the 
first chapter of this volume.
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The second reason for this potential misreading of the privacy concerns 
in the examples is that we have mistakenly based the idea of informational 
privacy on a specific understanding of information. When informational 
privacy is reduced to the challenge of controlling information, then it nec-
essarily objectifies information, turning it into a reified entity that can be 
managed, that can be manipulated, and to which we can restrict access. If 
we regard information as a sign, as something about something, then informa-
tional privacy becomes concerned with the fact that something is known 
about someone and how we might act in such a situation. Information 
then becomes less central to informational privacy, because we cannot con-
trol and regulate the interpretation and production of meaning. Rather we 
must “control” the situations in which meaning is ascribed: the use of data.
At this point we need to return to and address the basic question for 
this exploration of the conceptual foundation of informational privacy, 
namely, what is information?
Information as Signs
One way to answer the question “What is information?” is to list all the 
things that one considers to be information: books, numbers, addresses, 
health records, phone bills, names, DNA codes, computer programs, 
weblogs, credit card statements, purchasing records, e-mails, likes on Face-
book, and so on— a list of everything in the world that we consider to be 
informative. Such a list might end up containing almost everything in the 
world: cows, cups, and coffee are quite informative, but “if anything is, or 
might be, informative, then everything is, or might well be, information” 
(Buckland 1991, 356). This “extensional approach” (Furner 2016, 289) to 
determining the answer to the question of what is information has been 
labeled “information realism” (Fox 1983, 17) in the sense that it is an onto-
logical quest for finding and listing the things in the world that are infor-
mative and therefore are information.
Another approach to understanding the nature of information is to 
adopt what Furner (2016, 289) calls an “intentional approach,” in which 
the “properties that something must have” (ibid., 289) to be treated as 
information are identified. These might be that the information must be 
true to be information, that it can be used to generate knowledge, that it 
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can be used as a vehicle for communication, that it represents some state 
of affairs, or some combinations of such sets of properties. One dominant 
approach along these lines is advocated by Floridi (2008, 2010), who has 
developed a philosophy of information for “fields that treat data and infor-
mation as reified entities, that is, stuff that can be manipulated (consider, 
for example, the now common expressions ‘data mining’ and ‘information 
management’)” (Floridi 2010, 20). Floridi defines information as “meaning-
ful independent of an informee” (ibid., 22) and thereby constructs a notion 
of information that does not rely on a knowing subject. Dretske (2008) 
takes a similar approach to understanding information; he suggests that 
information “is independent of what we think or believe. It is independent 
of what we know” (ibid., 31) because information is “answers to questions” 
(ibid., 29) and “not just any answers  .  .  . [but] true answers” (ibid., 29). 
Information cannot simply be understood in terms of meaning— as in what 
the information is about— because, as he explains, “[M]eaning is fine. You 
can’t have truth without it” but “information, unlike meaning, has to be 
true” (ibid., 29).
In this sense information exists before human activities, language, and 
thought. It is true, and it has no agency. Cohen (2012, 20) has criticized 
these approaches to information within the context of informational pri-
vacy for accepting “liberal individualism’s commitments to immateriality 
and disembodiment” and, as such, creating a construct of information that 
“appears to be the ultimate disembodied good, yielding itself seamlessly to 
abstract, rational analysis” (ibid., 20). These conceptualizations of “infor-
mation” follow a tradition of conceptualizing “information” as what has 
been called “natural information,” following Grice’s (1957, 1989) distinc-
tion between natural and nonnatural meaning.
Natural and Nonnatural
Grice uses “natural” and “nonnatural” meaning to distinguish between 
statements that entail their meaning and statements that mean through 
conventions. As an example, Grice (1957, 213) uses the statement “Those 
spots mean (meant) measles” to illustrate statements that entail meaning; 
if someone utters that sentence, we would rightly expect that there is an 
actual correlation to a state of affairs in which someone has the measles. In 
other words, one cannot say, “Those spots meant measles, but he hadn’t got 
measles” (ibid., 213); if someone has these particular spots, then he or she 
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has measles. There is no room for uncertainty and debate. Grice’s notion of 
natural meaning is a notion of meaning where a statement entails a given 
state of affairs; it is true and objectively correct.
If we regard information to be natural, as in natural meaning, then infor-
mation is regarded as a state of affairs. In this approach, information is 
viewed as that which reflects what is actual and true— and, as such, infor-
mation can be manipulated and analyzed to gain knowledge about people’s 
actual affairs, interests, and intentions. For people to enjoy freedom from 
surveillance and enjoy privacy, they should merely be able to control the 
flow of the material representations of information. If one controls when, 
how, and to what extent others have access to the material information, 
then one enjoys privacy.
Under this tradition, the fact that Shannon writes about Taylor Swift 
entails a particular age, the fact that a girl shops for particular products at 
Target entails that she is pregnant, and the fact that an Internet user visits 
certain web sites entails a particular gender.
Contrast that with the example of nonnatural meaning, which Grice 
(1957, 214) gives as “Those three rings on the bell (of the bus) mean that 
the bus is full.” This utterance does not in the same way entail a particu-
lar state of affairs. One could very reasonably, “go on and say, ‘But it isn’t 
in fact full— the conductor made a mistake’” (ibid., 214). In this instance, 
someone has the intention of communicating something; there is a human 
agent present who can be correct or incorrect in his or her understanding 
of the actual state of affairs. There is no direct entailment between the state-
ment and the fact that the bus is or is not full. The meaning of the state-
ment is based on conventions— we have agreed that three rings mean that 
the bus is full. There is room for uncertainty, debate, and interpretation.
Grice’s concept of nonnatural meaning is those situations in which 
meaning emerges out of use and in context. It is the type of meaning that 
is based on conventions and intentions; a statement means something 
because we have agreed on the correct usage of that statement. Similarly, 
with information, information is created and used in particular contexts 
and situations, and we can only understand information within those 
boundaries. In other words, to assign meaning and significance to Shan-
non writing about Taylor Swift, a girl shopping for particular products at 
Target, and an Internet user visiting CNN.com outside those particular con-
texts is, to use Gillespie’s (2014, 174) words, “bluntly approximated.” To 
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suggest that these people ought to be able to protect their informational 
privacy by using their abilities to control their personal information would 
be a mistake.
Within philosophy of information, Grice’s work on the distinction 
between natural and nonnatural meaning is used to develop the notions of 
natural information and nonnatural information (Søe 2016). While natural 
information only allows for true, objectively correct information, nonnat-
ural information allows for mistakes, misinterpretations, and misuse— and 
hence opens the way for concepts such as (personal) misinformation, that 
is, unintended misleading information, and (personal) disinformation, that 
is, information which is intentionally misleading (Søe 2016). Following 
Grice’s conceptualization of meaning, and his grounding in semiotic think-
ing, we could articulate the core properties of information by stating that 
it functions as a vehicle used in the production and exchange of meaning. 
That is, information is a sign (Mai 2013).
If we regard information as a sign, and personal information as nonnat-
ural information— then we arrive at a significantly different understanding 
of informational privacy. Information gains meaning through interpreta-
tions with specific contexts, situations, and usages. In this conceptualiza-
tion, informational privacy cannot be reduced to the flow and control of 
information but must be understood in the sense of what is known and 
knowable about the individuals in question.
However, what is known and knowable about individuals is always con-
structed at an interpretive distance and is always one take on the mean-
ing of what is being said and done. So, let us now consider practices that 
involve the production and use of information about individuals.
Situating Informational Practices
Big data has been associated with a particular ideology or belief system 
about the world, that is, specific understandings of how humans operate in 
the world and how people make sense of the world and communicate— this 
ideology can be labeled “data behaviorism” (Rouvroy 2013, 143) or “data-
ism” (van  Dijck 2014, 198). Common for much work in big data is the 
belief in “the objective quantification and potential tracking of all kinds of 
human behavior and sociality through online media technologies” (ibid., 
198), and “prediction is the hallmark” (Ekbia et al. 2015, 1529) for work 
in big data. However, in practice, it may be difficult to attain the goal of 
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objectivity and disinterestedness, because “big data does not arrive in the 
hands of analysts ready for analysis” (ibid., 1531); data has to be cleaned 
or conditioned to be usable, which involves deciding which attributes and 
variables to keep and which to ignore. In fact, in a study of working data 
scientists, Carter and Sholler found that,
disinterest may not always be possible, especially for workers in business settings 
that involve contact with a client. Analysts might aspire to objectivity but be 
forced by circumstances to recognize their own positioning and the role of com-
munication in data analysis. (Carter and Sholler 2016, 2317)
So, even if “dataism presumes trust in the objectivity of quantified meth-
ods” (van Dijck 2014, 204), in reality, this trust does not hold up.
The drive behind big data is a belief in the decontextualization of 
data— that data has meaning beyond particular situations and that more 
data will lead to more meaning and better understanding. The hope is that 
ultimately, we can do away with theories, perspectives, and interpretation. 
As Chris Anderson (2008) wrote, in a small piece in Wired where, even 
before big data was in vogue, he foresaw a future where it would be possible 
to harvest massive amounts of data, “With enough data, numbers would 
speak for themselves” (Anderson 2008). This is a hype, of course, but a 
dangerous hype that “leads to the withering away of interpretation— not 
through the actions of a cabal, but through a sociologic excluding from the 
archive all data which is not big” (Bowker 2014, 1797) and which, “thanks 
to relatively simple algorithms allowing, on a purely inductive statistic 
basis, to build models of behaviors or patterns, without having to consider 
either causes or intentions” (Rouvroy 2013, 143).
The challenge is that both the individuals interacting with platforms 
producing personal information and the analysts trying to make sense of 
their data are “real embodied people [who] do not experience ‘information’ 
in the abstract; [but] rather . . . through the lens of embodied perception” 
(Cohen 2012, 33). When people interact with digital platforms and write 
about Taylor Swift, shop at Target, or surf various websites, they produce 
data. This data can be used to infer something about them: that they are 
of a certain age, that they are pregnant, or that they are a certain gender. 
These are categories. Big data analysis, machine learning, and predictive 
analysis are ways to categorize— techniques to place people, objects, and 
phenomena into categories. Until recently, categories were thought to be 
unproblematic containers:
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They were assumed to be abstract containers, with things either inside or outside 
the category. Things were assumed to be in the same category if and only if they 
had certain properties in common. And the properties they had in common were 
taken as defining the category. (Lakoff 1987, 6)
However, scholarship across the social sciences and humanities as it has 
played out at least since the linguistic turn in the middle of the twentieth 
century (Rorty 1967) has found that categories, meaning, and understand-
ing are embodied experiences. It is now widely accepted that categories are 
constructions; categories are not objectively in the world. They are con-
structed to make sense of and explain the world.
Even for simple concepts or categories— such as “dog”— there is no objec-
tive and universal meaning or sense. A dog is a pet; it is sometimes owned by 
people as their property; it is a mammal, a guard, a dish; it sometimes lives in 
houses and other times in herds; and it may even be a show dog. The notion 
of dog does not have a life or a meaning per se. There is nothing that is the 
concept dog or the properties that define dog:
Our concept of the dog involves a lot more than a list of dog- like properties— it 
involves knowledge of how the dog operates in the world and how it is related 
to other things in that world. Concepts are not isolated entities. In order to grasp 
a concept, we require not only definitional, but also encyclopedic knowledge. 
(Bryant 2000, 59)
To understand the notion of dog, we need to be part of the usage and 
situations in which the concept is used. If we do not know the concept, 
we might look it up in a dictionary, but “‘dictionary words’  .  .  . must be 
defined in terms of other dictionary words” (Eco 1984, 50). Dictionaries 
and dictionary- like definitions require encyclopedic knowledge of the cul-
ture, the context, and the languages in which they are used.
There is no such thing as raw data, just as there is no such thing as the 
meaning of a word: “The meaning of a word is its use in the language” (Witt-
genstein 1958, §43). Similarly, with categories, we understand the world 
not merely through individual concepts “but also in terms of categories of 
things,” and if we change those categories, “we change our understanding 
of the world” (Lakoff 1987 9).
We might attribute meaning and properties to the facts that Shannon 
writes about Taylor Swift, that a young girl who is shopping for particular 
products at Target is pregnant, or that people create particular patterns of 
surf history as they visit various websites. However, that meaning and those 
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properties will only be one of many possible interpretations, one particular 
take on what the data could show or tell us about the people who engaged 
in activities and thereby produced data. Hence, personal information is 
signs open for interpretation, analysis, and (mis)use.
Conclusion
It is commonly suggested that informational privacy seeks to protect peo-
ple’s personal information, the basic idea being that people’s ability to enjoy 
privacy is tied to their ability to control the flow of their personal informa-
tion. However, the notion of personal information has remained largely 
unmarked and undertheorized in the privacy literature, leaving behind an 
understanding of personal information in which information just is.
Privacy scholars have tended to focus on informational control as “the 
claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves 
when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated 
to others” (Westin 1967, 7)— when in fact the core challenge is the pro-
cesses by which personal information is created. If one focuses on the term 
“information,” one might start to list all the things we consider personal 
information and then argue that people have property rights over those 
things, that they ought to be able to control the flow of those things, or 
that they should give consent for the use of such things— and then believe 
that once those property rights, control, or consent issues are in place, then 
people can enjoy privacy. However, the challenge that privacy ought to be 
concerned with is the situation in which meaning is created; thus we must 
ask, “What does it mean that others have information about individuals, 
groups, or institutions? And when does a certain use of information consti-
tute a privacy intrusion?”
Digital platforms and services utilize big data analyses, predictive anal-
ysis, algorithms, and machine learning to produce (personal) information 
about individuals. The next major challenge for informational privacy 
theory is thus to develop a foundation that recognizes the complex and 
often opaque processes by which that (personal) information is produced. 
As Van Hoboken argues in this volume, this might lead to the position that 
regulation should turn away from regulating the collection of personal infor-
mation altogether and instead regulate the use of (personal) information. In 
fact, people might only be able to enjoy informational privacy once digital 
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platforms and services’ business practices are based on ethical foundations 
in which their practices are truly virtuous. Privacy cannot be limited solely 
to an individual, liberal right but should be expanded to an expectation of 
how society allows individuals to be treated by companies. The next gen-
eration of informational privacy theory should establish and make explicit 
the internal goods, norms, and standards of the algorithmic age, which 
should include as necessary components “justice, courage, and honesty” 
(MacIntyre 1981, 191).
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II Platforms
The second part of the book takes a closer look at digital platform prac-
tices, in particular how the online advertising model has developed into its 
current form, the dynamics (and conflicts) related to content moderation, 
and the sense making around human rights at Google and Facebook. The 
contributions point to the intimate link between the revenue model of the 
social web and practices of data capture (Bermejo); the threats that content 
moderation pose to the networked public sphere and to freedom of expres-
sion (York and Zuckerman); and the way corporate narratives frame and 
delimit the commitment to human rights (Jørgensen).

5 Online Advertising as a Shaper of Public Communication
Fernando Bermejo
Introduction
The privatization of the Internet in the mid- 1990s opened the door to its 
commercialization (Greenstein 2000, 2015). A technological infrastructure 
that had for decades been financed and controlled by different government 
agencies was immediately, and almost completely, shaken by business 
interests (Abbate 1999). As a result, and two decades later, a handful of 
companies have emerged as central actors of the online public sphere. With 
the advent of the social web, the arena in which individuals communicate 
and discuss collective issues and problems is to a large extent supported by 
digital platforms controlled by corporations. Their practices, policies, and 
technologies play a fundamental role in shaping private communications 
and public discourse and affect the exercise and level of protection of a 
range of human rights, as illustrated throughout this volume.
In order to understand these “new media” companies and how they 
shape communication and affect human rights, it is necessary to pay atten-
tion to their business logic, to the ways in which they generate revenue and 
maximize profits.
This chapter attempts to do that, first, by linking the idea of revenue 
model to that of control over the communication process and by showing 
how these revenue models have evolved over the history of public commu-
nication. It presents a brief overview of the evolutionary line that goes from 
models in which control is purely physical to those in which it is informa-
tional and in which advertising is central.
It then proceeds to examine the transformation of the advertising model 
as the main source of revenue for online communication platforms. The 
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understanding of the Internet, and especially of the World Wide Web, as 
a tool for publishing and consuming information allowed the advertising 
industry to lead the charge in the commercialization of the Internet in the 
1990s (Donaton and Sloan 1995). Advertisers and media had been dealing 
with human attention for decades and were ready to do the same in the 
new digital environment: measurement tools were adapted and invented, 
data collection processes were implemented, new metrics and analysis 
techniques were applied. The goal was to reproduce the model that had 
served the broadcasting and advertising industries so well. However, online 
advertising quickly evolved around the turn of the century. Understanding 
this evolution and placing it in context helps us explain the influence of 
advertising on public communication in the second decade of the twenty- 
first century.
The chapter ends with an examination of some of the key influences of 
advertising over the shape of the online public sphere. In particular, it con-
siders the oligopolistic tendencies favored by online advertising through its 
dependence on ever- increasing amounts of data, the ability of advertising 
to influence the content circulating in the public sphere, and the subser-
vient situation in which users are placed by a small number of companies 
that have become essential to a range of human activities and require data 
to fuel their business.
Control and the Business of Communication
The establishment of a revenue model around communication processes 
responds to a variety of factors. The general characteristics of these pro-
cesses and of the technologies that facilitate them constitute an essential 
element, since the modes and degrees of control that can be exerted bias 
in specific ways the viability of the different models.1 Different modes of 
communication, and different technologies, make some revenue models 
more viable than others. By looking back at the history of forms of public 
communication and the different modes of control they favor, it is possible 
to better understand and examine the way control over public communica-
tion is currently exercised.
Early forms of public communication, which in a Western cultural con-
text are often traced back to public spectacles in ancient Greece and Rome 
(McQuail 1997), were not technologically mediated. They can be described 
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as live performances, such as a play performed in a theater, a concert, or a 
sports competition, which are clearly defined by time and space— they hap-
pen in a particular place at a specific moment. These space/time constraints 
facilitate a direct and hard form of control that seems to naturally lead to a 
simple revenue model based on payment. The simplest way to turn a per-
formance into a business is to control access to the auditorium and demand 
some kind of compensation for the right to enter.2 This is a physical form 
of control that has to do with bodily presence and that is able to sustain a 
revenue model in which other forms of control— softer, more complex, and 
having to do with information gathering— are not strictly necessary.
While such live performances continue to be an important ingredient 
of public communication, the use of technology became, centuries ago, 
an essential component of it. The first significant uses of technology as 
facilitator of public communication had to do with the ability to inscribe 
a message in a physical medium, as was the case with writing (Ong 1982). 
Technological mediation transformed, to a large degree, the nature of pub-
lic communication and the afforded forms of control over it. Time and 
space lost their prominence as defining features since written texts could 
be read far from where and when they were written. Once the message has 
been inscribed, the author easily loses the ability to control it. There is, 
however, a way of retaining control: if reading does not require presence 
at a particular place in a specific moment, it requires at least access to the 
physical substrate on which words are written. Controlling the container 
allows for control over the process. This specific form of control would 
actually be key when the ability to copy and reproduce messages at scale 
thanks to the printing press transformed writing into a business (Eisenstein 
1979). In fact, all cultural industries are based on this premise: the ability 
to mechanically copy a message— words, music, images— at scale and to 
control access to the physical medium in which this is copied— book, disc, 
videocassette— in order to demand compensation from those interested in 
consuming it. While the producers of messages lose control over the con-
tainer once it is sold and thus cannot prevent pass- along readers/listeners/
viewers, this situation allows for the creation of a viable revenue model 
based on payments.
The advent of the mass media would transform public communica-
tion at many levels, including the way in which a revenue model could be 
established. Newspapers, with different formats, periodicity, and content, 
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had existed for centuries. And they had relied on the model of the cultural 
industries by demanding a fee in exchange for the medium in which mes-
sages were recorded, the paper. However, in the nineteenth century, news-
papers consolidated a revenue model based on a two- sided market structure 
(Baldasty 1992). Part of the revenue would come from the sales of the paper, 
but an increasing portion of those revenues would be provided by adver-
tisers eager to sell products and services to the growing number of readers. 
The reliance on advertising could only be sustained if new forms of control 
were implemented, controls that had to do with the collection of infor-
mation and could guarantee advertisers that they were getting the prod-
uct they were paying for: audiences (Smythe 1977). In consequence, the 
physical container, the paper, was taken as the first source of information, 
and the number of copies printed or delivered through the mail became a 
data point relevant for this new advertising market. The conflicting interest 
over the precise value of this data point— publishers were keen to inflate 
the number, while advertisers were keen to deflate it— led to the creation 
of independent third parties tasked to control how many copies of a pub-
lication did actually reach the readers, and thus certify circulation figures. 
Audit bureaus of circulation, in different forms and shape, started to appear 
in the first decades of the twentieth century (Beniger 1986).
Auditing circulation has obvious limitations in terms of what can be 
learned about the communication process and the audiences. In fact, and 
because of the lack of control over the container once it is sold, there is 
no way of knowing how many people end up consuming the message, let 
alone who they are. New measurement techniques for controlling the com-
munication process were needed, and they would be fully developed upon 
the arrival of broadcasting as a powerful force that would upend public 
communication (Beville 1988; Buzzard 1990). The broadcasting technology 
broke any direct link between senders and receivers, between producers 
and consumers.3 The signal was up in the air for anyone to capture and 
consume, with no record of how often this happened. In this context, it 
was impossible to replicate the revenue models of live performances and 
cultural industries. For some time, the sale of receiving sets was seen as 
a viable revenue model, while content production was considered as an 
ancillary activity. But it was soon clear that wrapping content with adver-
tising would be a natural fit for the new mode of communication (Smulyan 
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1994). To make this a viable model, a whole series of breakthroughs were 
required, such as the development of sampling theory, the implementation 
of telephone surveys, and the invention of meter technology for audience 
measurement (Bermejo 2009; Beville 1988). Once in place, these innova-
tions created the right environment for a thriving revenue model in which 
the audience would be traded as a currency produced through measure-
ment (Ang 1991). In the broadcasting mode of control, the measurement 
of media consumption was structured around independent third parties 
(such as Nielsen or Arbitron) that used data collection techniques (such 
as surveys and panels) to produce syndicated studies that homogeneously 
covered most media outlets and offered quantifications of media exposure 
(mostly in terms of time) of a collectivity of individuals (usually referred to 
as the audience) who resided in a delimited geographical area (a market) 
and were classified according to a series of sociodemographic variables to 
yield a profile on which advertisers would rely to target their commercial 
messages. In this model, instead of demanding payment, the media would 
provide their content to the audience for free, and the content would serve 
as bait to capture the audience’s attention, which would then be sold to 
advertisers for a profit (Jhally and Livant 1986; Smythe 1977). Advertisers 
would rely on measurement data as evidence that showed they were get-
ting their product (the audience) and as a tool to make their investment 
decisions and choose which media and which audiences to target (Napoli 
2003). Audiences would receive free content but in exchange, and in aggre-
gate, would indirectly pay for it by purchasing advertised goods.
This general description accounts for the bulk of the revenue model of 
broadcasting throughout the second half of the twentieth century. There 
are, however, a couple of additional elements that have to be taken into 
consideration to complete the picture. The first one has to do with the 
possibility of controlling access to television programs. While the technol-
ogy of broadcasting, consisting of sending a signal into the ether, made 
it impossible to control who consumed that signal, new technologies for 
the distribution of television signals— such as cable and satellites— achieved 
popularity, and techniques for encrypting and decrypting signals were 
developed. This allowed for the introduction of conditional access to the 
content being distributed and, thus, for the use of a revenue model based 
on payment. Though not prevalent, and almost exclusively applied to 
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television rather than radio, this revenue model achieved great prominence 
in some countries (most notably, the US) and was often combined with the 
pure advertising model described above.
The second element that has to be considered is the idea of public ser-
vice. As broadcasting became a central venue for public communication, 
the idea that it played a pivotal role in national communication systems led 
to the creation of public broadcasting services. These services became most 
prominent in European countries, where they were primary actors in the 
popularization of radio and television and acted as barriers to their com-
mercialization and to the influence of advertising interests. Despite their 
relevance, public broadcasting systems were weakened in the last decades 
of the twentieth century under the forces of privatization (Servaes and 
Wang 1997).
The different forms of control of mediated communication described 
here, and the revenue models established around them, did not supersede 
one another. Rather, they accumulated over the course of the past cen-
tury to produce a complex environment. In this environment, the cul-
tural industries attempted to maintain control over their products in order 
to generate revenues in the form of fees, and while public service broad-
casting played a significant role in some countries (especially in Western 
Europe), and pay television achieved a growing prominence, the majority 
of the mass media relied on the advertising industry as their mode of sus-
tenance. This is the context in which the Internet arrived and that would 
be shaken by it.
Control and Business Models in Online Communication
The Internet was in incubation for a couple of decades within defense and 
academic circles, shaped by alternative technology movements, and under 
the umbrella of governments that provided the necessary resources for its 
development (Abbate 1999). Over these formative decades, there was no 
revenue model to speak of. In fact, any commercial activity over the Inter-
net was explicitly prohibited (Greenstein 2000). But this situation would 
drastically change in the 1990s with the privatization, commercialization, 
and popularization of the Internet.4 Different factors contributed to this 
change. The privatization of the Internet affected all different layers, from 
the physical backbones of the network to end users’ activities (Greenstein 
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2000; Shah and Kesan 2007). The wave of privatization in telecommuni-
cations and broadcasting that took place in the 1980s (Feigenbaum 2009); 
the cultural influence of the hacker, alternative, and libertarian tech culture 
(Himanen 2001); and the fact that the epicenter of the Internet was located 
in a country with a weak culture of communication media as public service 
(Avery and Stavitsky 2003) all help to explain the lack of any counterbalanc-
ing forces that could have advocated for a stronger role of the state in the 
online environment. The popularization of the Internet was also motivated 
by different factors, such as the increased availability and affordability of 
personal computers, the growing number of Internet service providers, and 
most prominently the advent in the early 1990s of the World Wide Web. 
The creation of a popular and private network in which the ban on com-
mercial activities imposed by the National Science Foundation’s Acceptable 
Use Policy was lifted led to an increasingly business- driven environment, 
in which commercial online services (such as AOL and CompuServe) made 
large strides, e-commerce began to take shape, and advertising started to 
penetrate the online communication fabric.
Because the advent of a new technology does not occur in a vacuum, 
the Internet was necessarily affected by existing dynamics, stakeholders, 
and interests— while affecting these in turn. A first moment of friction took 
place when the cultural industries, in particular the music industry, realized 
that the ability to produce and distribute a large number of copies of a spe-
cific cultural product was no longer exclusive to them. Any Internet user 
with minimal investment and rudimentary digital tools was able to copy 
and distribute at scale the products from which the cultural industries har-
vested their revenues. The popularization of peer- to- peer networks, most 
prominently the success of Napster, made clear that the revenue model of 
these industries was under threat. They responded by using the law in an 
aggressive campaign to stop what the technology has made not only pos-
sible but easy and convenient, while in parallel attempting to protect their 
interests by reinforcing copyright regulation and trying to come up with a 
technological solution that would restrict the ability to copy and distribute 
their products (Gillespie 2009; Lessig 2004).
While the cultural industries tried to prevent the loss of control gen-
erated by digital technology, the mass media attempted to replicate the 
advertising model that had successfully supported them for decades. The 
ever- growing offer of content and the ease with which this could be copied 
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or replicated, coupled with the lack of new and convenient forms of micro-
payment and with the general perception that the Internet was “free,” as in 
“free beer” (Williams 2002), contributed to pointing to advertising as the 
natural source of revenue of the nascent online public sphere. Starting in 
the mid- 1990s, the advertising industry made a concerted effort to adjust 
to the online environment the structures and procedures that had served 
to sustain this model. Organizations that were involved in auditing press 
circulation, together with some new players, started to measure online 
activities through log files analysis; joint industry committees and private 
companies that had been measuring the mass media through the use of 
surveys began to use this same technique to account for online behavior; 
and electronic measurement panels that paralleled the ones used to mea-
sure broadcasting audiences appeared in many countries around the world. 
The proliferation of online advertising agencies and the standardization of 
online advertising formats contributed to this effort (Bermejo 2007).
These developments were based on the assumption that the web was 
but a new publishing platform. The large number of new users, the lack 
of editing capabilities in popular web browsers, the increasingly visual ele-
ments in online content, the use of dynamic IP addresses, and reduced 
upload speeds all pointed to a new era in which the mass communication 
structure, with a limited number of content providers and a large number 
of consumers, would prevail (Berners- Lee 1999; Napoli 1998; Roscoe 1999). 
Despite the obvious similarities, the replication of the advertising model 
did not quite succeed. Advertising would remain the main source of reve-
nue, but it would undergo a significant transformation. Part of the reason 
had to do with the inability of the audience measurement operations to 
provide a credible and widely acceptable currency to fuel the system. The 
technological complexity of the new medium and the diverse use patterns 
led to the coexistence of competing methodologies, all of them with their 
problems and limitations, and of competing measuring organizations, each 
of them fighting for a space in the new market (Bermejo 2007; Buzzard 
2012; Napoli 2010). While the audience measurement market in the mass 
media, save for a few exceptions, had converged in every country into a 
single measurement operation per medium, this was never the case in the 
online world (Bermejo 2007; Buzzard 2002). An additional problem was the 
inflation of advertising spaces, which caused a generalized reduction in the 
price of the audience product generated by the media.
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A technical feature of the web further hindered the possibility of repli-
cating the mass media advertising model in the online realm. For the first 
time, the decision on which ad to show next to a piece of content was 
completely individualized and ad hoc. On the Internet there’s no perma-
nent connection between content and ads, and the management of both 
content and advertising can be done in parallel and independently (Evans 
2009). Two users can thus be consuming the same content while being 
exposed to completely different ads. This meant that the idea of the audi-
ence as a collective that was sold by the media began to disappear, since 
individual users could be targeted in different ways, and advertisers did not 
have to buy the whole audience as a collective but could choose certain 
segments or individuals. Also, the idea that the role of measurement was to 
produce a quantification of that collective and a profile of it began to lose 
sense, giving way to the field of web analytics (Kaushik 2007).
At the turn of the century, it seemed clear that the advertising model 
had to reinvent itself to adapt to the online environment. A first and very 
successful adaptation was search advertising. The idea that query terms 
are a valuable piece of information to target ads created a novel system 
in which users were shown ads based on their interests expressed in the 
searches they performed (Battelle 2005). This system fueled the growth of 
what is now known as search engine marketing, which became a substan-
tial source of revenue and turned Google into one of the most powerful 
online companies. But it also presents some limitations. First, it is only 
applicable to a particular type of online player, search engines, and thus 
cannot be expanded to generate revenue for other types of online services 
and products. Second, search engine marketing falls on the side of demand 
satisfaction rather than creation. In the mass media, advertising played a 
dual role: it both provided information about products for people already 
interested in purchasing, and it generated the purchase intent through per-
suasion (Pope 1983). Over the course of the twentieth century the latter 
role became increasingly important, but search advertising did a poor job at 
playing that role since it was conceived as a mechanism to match products 
and services to manifested interests. Thus, the advertising model had to 
find ways of expanding throughout the Internet and of compensating for 
the lack of demand creation.
The idea of using language as a targeting tool was soon applied to e-mail, 
and thus users of free web mail accounts began to see next to their messages 
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ads that were selected according to the words used in those messages. Also, 
some advertising programs scanned the content on blogs and other web 
pages and chose the ads to be shown accordingly (Bermejo 2011). But these 
applications of language- related targeting proved to be much less successful 
than search engine advertising, since the keywords in the content being 
consumed were not so indicative of users’ purchase intent as the keywords 
used in searches.
The solution was found in the identification of interests, desires, and 
intents not explicitly stated but gleaned from users’ behavior and from any 
data point left in their online activities. Rather than producing demand 
through persuasion, it was generated through targeting techniques that 
became much more precise by inferring from online traces which products 
and services would appeal to each individual user (Evans 2009). The way to 
do so was to gather information on all users’ online activities and transform 
the Internet from a tool for information publishing to a tool for information 
collection. But because the web is based on a stateless protocol, and thus 
treats each request as independent of any other request, new techniques for 
linking actions and attributing them to specific users had to be developed. 
The first one was the cookie, created in 1994 to support e-commerce in the 
Netscape web browser (Montulli 2013). Cookies quickly evolved to expand 
their reach, both in terms of their life span and in terms of their ability to 
track users across the web, with the use of permanent cookies and third- 
party cookies. New tracking mechanisms, such as JavaScript tags, were also 
introduced to create user profiles for targeting purposes (Kaushik 2007).
There were additional developments in the direction of increased control 
over users’ identities and activities. The creation of different kinds of online 
pointers able to track users through their online activities was a way to 
compensate for the statelessness and anonymity of the web, turn the open 
web into a marked space, and in the process make of it a viable advertis-
ing vehicle. By linking activities, an identity was created (Cheney- Lippold 
2011). The opposite strategy toward the same goal was to start with the user 
identity by offering personalized services. The first successful wave came in 
the form of free web mail accounts. The next one, even more transforma-
tive, was social networking sites. By creating individual services to which 
users had to log in, it was possible to link all subsequent activity to specific 
people. Using a web mail service, or having a social network profile, greatly 
simplifies the tracking process, since logins serve as identity pointers.
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The advent of the mobile Internet deepened this process of increased 
individualization. One of the traditional limitations of online tracking has 
to do with the possibility of having multiple users of the same machine, 
or a single user of multiple machines. With the spread in the use of lap-
tops and smartphones these phenomena greatly diminished, as it could be 
assumed that each device corresponded to one user, facilitating the creation 
of profiles. In addition, the mobile Internet introduced a new axis for con-
trol: location (Gordon and de Souza 2011). Through the situation of Wi- Fi 
networks, the triangulation of cell phone towers positions, and the infor-
mation from GPS systems, the location of most users became part of the 
routine menu of data points collected online. The mobile web also brought 
with it a new set of artifacts (applications, apps, or widgets) that created 
controlled environments that greatly facilitated the collection of personal 
information (Wang, Xu, and Grossklags 2011).
In sum, the attempts at replicating online the advertising business model 
that has served the mass media industry so well failed at a certain level but 
were immensely successful at another level. They failed in the sense that it 
was impossible to replicate the specific structure of the revenue model in 
which the mass media captured people’s attention through attractive pro-
gramming, the audience measurement industry measured this attention in 
aggregate and created the audience product, and the advertising industry 
allocated resources based on this measurement and bought a collective of 
potential customers. It was, however, successful at maintaining advertising 
as the main sustenance of public communication, even though the shape of 
the model changed significantly. The need to collect information in aggre-
gate about media consumption and some basic sociodemographic variables 
gave way to a system of data collection at the individual level affecting 
every facet of human behavior. The pivotal role in this system is not played 
by companies in the content creation and distribution business, but rather 
by companies in the business of organizing and aggregating at scale content 
produced by others while collecting in the process the personal information 
that fuels the system, as eloquently argued by Zuboff in the first chapter.
The Impact of Advertising
While the effects of a particular revenue model in the dynamics of public 
communication are necessarily important, it is always difficult to isolate 
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those effects from other contributing factors. Nonetheless, it is possible to 
explore some of the consequences of the advertising model prevalent on 
the social web and to examine them by looking at three different elements: 
companies, content, and users.
First, while there is a long tail of small enterprises that collect data from 
apps, online services, and digital gadgets, the social web is dominated by a 
handful of big players that benefit from economies of scale. The tendency 
toward markets dominated by a single platform or service has to do with 
the need for large provisions of capital required to sustain any large- scale 
online operation, but it is also related to network effect (Katona, Zubcsek, 
and Sarvary 2011) and learning mechanisms (Joachims and Radlinski 
2007). Social networking sites, in particular, benefit from network external-
ities that make them more attractive as they grow their number of users, 
making them hard to compete with once they have achieved a certain size. 
Search engines, in turn, become more attractive as they learn from prior 
use, providing a competitive advantage to those with a large user base and 
a record of user activity. But the tendency toward a few dominant platforms 
is also related to the logic of data- driven advertising, in which the more 
that is known about the largest possible number of individual users, the 
better the interests of advertisers will be served (Krishnamurthy and Wills 
2009). In this context, traditional media are clearly disadvantaged, since 
they are but one possible point of contact with users that visit many other 
destinations and use many other services, and that can be targeted any-
where across the Internet. Only companies with the scale to follow a signif-
icant portion of Internet users across a good portion of the online domain 
are in a situation to fully benefit from the advertising revenue model. And 
these companies, in return, have an unprecedented power over individual 
expression and public communication, as discussed by Land and by Calla-
mard in this volume.
Second, the business logic sustaining public communication has a signif-
icant impact on the type of content that is produced and distributed. When 
advertising began to play an important role in funding the press through 
the creation of a dual market of readers and advertisers, publications began 
to consider content production not just in terms of what could interest 
readers but also what could attract advertisers, leading to the creation of 
new newspaper sections (Baldasty 1992). In broadcasting, the influence of 
advertisers led to the direct production of programming and the creation 
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of specific genres, like the soap opera (Barnouw 2004). On the Internet, the 
influence of advertising on content can be perceived at two levels: what 
is discouraged and even prohibited and what is produced and promoted. 
Because an important share of the circulating online content is produced 
by users, online platforms supported by advertising and carrying this con-
tent have to set limits on what is acceptable and what is not as, illustrated 
by York and Zuckerman (see chapter 6 of this volume). Demotion in search 
engine results, and “community rules”5 and blockage in social network 
sites, help to mark the contours of acceptable discourse and contribute to 
creating a friendly environment for advertising. In turn, a large amount of 
content is created with the only goal being to attract attention and adver-
tising, explaining the existence of content farms and the phenomenon of 
clickbait. While tailoring content production to consumers’ demands is a 
core practice of any commercial medium, the online unbundling of con-
tent and audiences introduces a level of sophistication, individualization, 
and adaptability that calls into question the very idea of a public sphere 
(Pariser 2011; Turow 2011).
Third, for users the social web involves the acceptance of the data cap-
ture that serves to fuel the advertising model. While the vast majority of 
the content they consume and the services they use are free in the sense 
that they do not require a monetary transaction, the payment here takes a 
different form. In order to enjoy the benefits of the services, users not only 
need to accept the terms of use and the boundaries for communication 
programmed into the platforms but they also have to allow for intensive 
data mining. Moreover, since the social web is increasingly described as a 
sort of utility, a social infrastructure that supports and facilitates personal 
and professional activities,6 there is little room for choice, agency, or nego-
tiation. Technical limitations are hardwired, terms of use are nonnegotia-
ble, and intensive collection of personal data is part of the experience of 
being online.
Conclusion
This chapter has traced the evolution of revenue models and forms of control 
over the history of public communication, focusing on the transformation 
of advertising over the past two decades, and ending with an examination 
of how this transformation influences the current state of the online public 
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sphere. It has shown how different modes of control facilitate different rev-
enue models, which influence the activities of commercial enterprises and, 
in turn, have consequences for the exercise of human rights.
Advertising, as a revenue model, has no doubt fueled a dynamic com-
municative ecosystem online. Much of the content, tools, and services 
available to Internet users might have never existed if they had not been 
supported by ads. But it has also shaped the nature of public communica-
tion in specific ways. It has favored the creation of a few large and powerful 
platforms with a tremendous power over public discourse, it has set limits 
with respect to acceptable discourse while flooding the Internet with ad- 
friendly content, and it has created a system of data harvesting from which 
it is almost impossible to escape.
The growing perception of these negative consequences of the preva-
lent model of data harvesting and advertising targeting has not produced 
any viable alternative to it, at least yet. The peer production economy that 
emerged with the open source software movement (Moody 2001; Weber 
2004) is in retreat and has only been able to produce a significant impact 
in online public communication with the creation of an online repository 
of knowledge such as Wikipedia. Besides the recent implementation of 
the European General Data Protection Regulation, the role of the state in 
the online environment seems to oscillate, depending on the countries, 
between minimal intervention and authoritarian control (Kalathil and Boas 
2003). The increasing role of philanthropy in subsidizing online content, 
besides difficult to maintain over time, is dwarfed by the sheer size of the 
advertising- supported domain (Deighton, Kornfeld, and Gerra 2017). And 
pay models, demanded in some quarters as an alternative to the intrusive 
nature of data capture, face major barriers. If the goal is to know everything 
about everyone, why let the most valuable users, those with the disposable 
income to pay for online content and services, evade the panoptic.com?
Notes
1. For a detailed analysis of the idea of control, and of its relationship with commu-
nication technology, see Beniger (1986).
2. The process of exerting control over live performances can also affect many other 
elements, such as lighting, seating arrangements, or stage design, but the analysis of 
these different facets of control exceeds the scope of this chapter. For details on the 
evolution of control over live performances in the United States, see Butsch (2000).
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3. The original meaning of the word “broadcasting,” according to the Oxford English 
Dictionary, refers to the act of scattering seeds in a field.
4. These three processes are closely related but distinct. Privatization occurred 
when government agencies transferred control over the Internet to corporations, 
commercialization occurred when different companies began to make money out of 
Internet- related activities, and popularization occurred with the rapidly increasing 
number of users. For more detail on these processes, see chapter 4 in Bermejo (2007).
5. The concept of “community rules” has a flavor of enlightened despotism (“every-
thing for the people, nothing by the people”), since they are rarely defined by the 
community but enforced in its name.
6. “Utility” and “infrastructure” are used here to refer to services regarded as essen-
tial or foundational for certain activities. See Sandvig (2013) for an elaboration of 
the idea of the Internet as infrastructure.
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6 Moderating the Public Sphere
Jillian C. York and Ethan Zuckerman
Introduction
More than one billion users worldwide use Facebook on a daily basis to 
share photos, videos, links, and brief updates about their lives with doz-
ens or hundreds of friends. Many use Facebook not just as a space for per-
sonal expression but also as a space for political discussion or organizing. 
As a result, how platforms like Facebook control speech critically affects the 
boundaries for freedom of expression. The revenue model in which users 
produce content for free and platforms monetize that content is a massively 
profitable one. Facebook earned $15.06 billion in 2015, capturing 16 per-
cent of total online ad revenue in the process (Kint 2016). However, while 
Facebook’s revenue model is a profoundly successful one, the apotheosis of 
the user- generated content (UGC) businesses has led to the increasing need 
to address a problem that, in the end, could prove an existential threat to 
both the platforms and the networked public sphere: content moderation.
Not all users follow a platform’s rules when they post to that site. Mixed 
with quotidian updates about workplace milestones and weekend parties 
are hate speech and harassment, as well as less serious violations of Face-
book’s regulations, like nude imagery and misuse of copyrighted material. 
For UGC businesses to remain viable, they require a steady stream of con-
tent posted by users. Nevertheless, for these businesses to maintain their 
user populations over the long term, they have to control the stream of con-
tent so that offensive material does not chase users away from the platform.
As Facebook, Twitter, and other UGC businesses emerge as a key compo-
nent of the networked public sphere, their decisions about content mod-
eration have increased public importance and come under intense public 
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scrutiny. In the wake of Donald Trump’s election to the US presidency 
in 2016, media commentators accused Facebook of swaying the election 
toward Trump by enabling the spread of fake news, namely, articles, often 
originating in foreign countries, which made baseless accusations against 
Hillary Clinton and spread widely on the platform (Silverman and Alex-
ander 2016). Commentators suggested that Facebook had an obligation to 
identify and warn users of fake news or block the spread of these links.
Others noted that asking Facebook to act as editor for the billions of 
pieces of content spread on the site daily was both unrealistic and poten-
tially dangerous. Weeks before the controversy about conservative bias, 
Facebook had experienced a wave of negative publicity not for spreading 
news but for blocking it. The Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten cried foul 
after Facebook removed The Terror of War, a Pulitzer Prize– winning photo-
graph by Nick Ut that portrayed nine- year- old Kim Phúc naked as she ran 
to escape a napalm attack. It is unclear whether automated algorithms used 
to detect and block nudity identified the post or whether an overzealous 
Facebook user or employee flagged the image, but its removal opened a 
debate about whether it was appropriate for Facebook to act as “the world’s 
most powerful editor” and whether more context was vital to content mod-
eration decisions (Wong 2016).
Facebook’s problems with UGC are not limited to decisions about what 
may be published but include decisions about what content is prioritized. 
To protect users from being overwhelmed by the posts their friends publish, 
the Facebook news feed uses an algorithm to decide what posts are most 
likely to be to a reader’s interest. This algorithm generates enormous spec-
ulation among publishers who syndicate content to Facebook and wonder 
how to ensure the widest possible readership for their content and among 
readers, who worry that Facebook chooses to feature content a reader is 
likely to ideologically agree with, a problem Eli Pariser (2012) calls “the fil-
ter bubble.” This algorithmic selection has a clear editorial component, and 
former Facebook employees have complained that this editorial process 
was intentionally biased to exclude conservative news sources, preventing 
such posts from receiving widespread attention on the site and from emerg-
ing on Facebook’s trending topics list (Nunez 2016). In responding to these 
complaints, Facebook eliminated its trending topics team and turned over 
the job of identifying popular news topics to a purportedly more neutral 
curation algorithm. Almost immediately, Facebook’s trending topics began 
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featuring wholly invented news stories, forcing biased humans to intervene 
on behalf of accurate news (Newitz 2016).
As the brief history above suggests, content moderation is a wicked prob-
lem for UGC companies for which there are no easy solutions. Facebook is 
not alone in its struggles— Reddit, a UGC site organized around volunteer- 
moderated subreddits, which resemble bulletin board systems, has been 
accused of fomenting hatred, harassment and nurturing a community of 
far- right- wing trolls accused of chasing others out of political dialogue 
through the process of shitposting, or posting hateful, irrelevant, or other 
content intended to derail a thread. Since its founding, Twitter has dealt 
with a number of complex regulation issues, most notably harassment, 
which saw the company team up with the nongovernmental organization 
(NGO) Women, Action, & the Media (WAM!) in an attempt to track inci-
dents of harassment and tackle the problem (Lapowsky 2015).
However, content moderation is not just a problem for platform owners. 
As users of these systems become increasingly dependent on these platforms 
for news and information, the platforms take on an important civic role. A 
combination of user choice and algorithmic decision- making tends to lead 
users toward content that primarily aligns with their ideological precon-
ceptions (Zuckerman 2013). Cass Sunstein’s research suggests that commu-
nities grow more polarized and less able to compromise with each other as 
they deliberate among themselves, concluding that isolation within these 
platforms may be damaging democracy (Sunstein 2006). Beyond concerns 
about the effects of online dialogue, legitimate concerns exist that a plat-
form like Facebook or Google might influence an election by pointing users 
to content aligned with one political point of view and suppressing another 
(Epstein and Robertson 2015). We should expect increasing scrutiny of the 
decisions made by these platforms, as well as pressure on the companies to 
increase transparency around their decision- making.
From the perspective of freedom of expression, this pressure needs to 
increase as platforms have tremendous power over what can and cannot 
be said online. Strategies favored by platforms that leverage community 
behavior to identify inappropriate content are gamed by actors in political 
conflicts, for example, Israelis trying to silence Palestinian speech, and vice 
versa, by reporting the other side’s content as inappropriate. Under current 
systems, minority voices are in danger of being silenced on UGC platforms, 
and platforms are ill prepared to protect controversial but legal speech. It 
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is in extreme cases like this that problems of online harassment can esca-
late to the scale of human rights issues. As these platforms have become 
important venues for local and international debate, attacks that silence 
voices by harassing them into nonparticipation or triggering platform pol-
icies to remove controversial speech can rise to the level of a freedom- of- 
expression concern.
In this chapter, we introduce the concepts of hard control— a platform’s 
authority over what can be published online— and soft control— a platform’s 
authority over what we are likely to see, and what is deprioritized in algo-
rithms that govern a user’s view of posts on the network (the feed). Con-
sidering these methods of control from the perspective of human rights, 
we examine the power of the platform within a larger context of threats to 
freedom of expression, including threats from state actors and threats from 
individual users acting alone and in consort. We consider these hard and 
soft controls in terms of not only the power that platforms are able to assert 
over online speech but what individuals and organized groups can do to 
influence or silence speech.
Socio- technical problems— like control of UGC— often inspire primar-
ily technical solutions, many of which fail because of their singular focus 
on a multidimensional problem. At the bleeding edge of Internet develop-
ment are advocates of decentralized platforms, who believe the only viable 
counterweights to the power of companies like Facebook and Twitter are 
alternative platforms that allow individual publishers, not platform own-
ers, to decide what content is appropriate. These novel platforms, just now 
experiencing the early stage of adoption, replace one set of moderation 
problems— the massive power of the platform owner— with another prob-
lem: the inability to remove offensive or illegal content from the Internet, 
often without distinguishing between the two. Ultimately, they return the 
Internet to an earlier model, where users were responsible for choosing 
what they did and did not see, a solution that may prove entirely unfeasible 
in the era of mass publics online.
With no easy technical solution in sight, the problems of UGC moder-
ation demand increased transparency and responsiveness from platform 
owners and vigilance from the human rights community. Ultimately, 
solutions that protect dialogue in online spaces will require a combina-
tion of technical innovation, regulation, transparency, and public pressure 
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from human rights advocates. This chapter explores the challenges all 
parties— platforms, publishers, users, and advocates— face with the current 
system and some possible ways forward.
A Brief History of User- Generated Content
The rise of UGC is often referred to with the shorthand “Web 2.0,” a piece of 
marketing slang coined by publisher and tech guru Tim O’Reilly and writer 
Dale Dougherty (O’Reilly 2005). Web 1.0 was dominated by the idea that 
businesses could offer products and services online, with the emergence 
of giants like Amazon and Google. In Web 2.0, the focus was on content, 
not on products and services, and the key shift was the idea that end users, 
not professionals, would be responsible for creating online content. While 
O’Reilly and Dougherty began promoting the term in 2004, UGC long pre-
ceded efforts to market it. The preweb Internet, consisting of mailing lists 
and text- based conversations called newsgroups, was entirely user created, as 
was much of the early web. Outside of the Internet, communities develop-
ing around AOL and CompuServe had much the same dynamic, with user 
content providing much of the value on those early platforms. Until the 
decommissioning of NSFNET in 1995, much of the Internet was a techni-
cally noncommercial space, and UGC was the dominant form of content.
In the late 1990s, commercial publishers flocked to the Internet, now 
open for business and newly user- friendly with the graphical user interface 
of the World Wide Web. User- generated content quickly took a back seat 
as commercial publishers repurposed reams of old content online. Recog-
nizing a shift in the online landscape, companies like GeoCities and Tri-
pod1 realized that creating web pages was difficult for most inexperienced 
users, who lacked the technical skills to author HTML documents or set 
up web servers. The communities of tens of millions of users those sites 
hosted anticipated the billions hosted on sites like Facebook today, includ-
ing the use of platforms as a space for controversial political speech and the 
challenge of moderating these communities. Companies like Tripod had as 
many staff dedicated to supporting these content creators as they did pro-
grammers, and the most challenging customer- facing work involved abuse 
teams, responsible for interpreting the terms of service (ToS) a customer had 
agreed to and removing material that violated those terms.
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User- generated content would likely have failed as a business model if 
not for a key legal change in 1998. Prior to passage of the Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act in October 1998, it was unclear whether UGC hosts 
were liable for copyright infringement committed by their users. On find-
ing copyrighted software or images on a user’s web page, content owners 
would routinely threaten to sue the companies hosting UGC. The Online 
Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act added section 512 to Title 
17 of the United States Code, providing safe harbor for platform owners 
as long as they followed a set of procedures designed to protect copyright 
holders. When being alerted to copyrighted information on their servers, 
online service providers were required to notify the user who posted it, 
allow that user to defend his or her ownership of the content, and if the 
user did not voluntarily remove the content, connect the copyright holder 
with the alleged infringer.
One aspect of section 512 is worth special notice. If online service provid-
ers were aware they were hosting copyright- violating content, they were no 
longer able to claim safe harbor. Section 512 did not require online service 
providers to actively monitor their sites for copyrighted content— instead, 
it discouraged them from doing so, because an active content monitoring 
strategy might prohibit a later safe harbor defense. For UGC companies 
hosted in the United States, there is neither incentive nor requirement 
to uphold the principle of freedom of expression. In addition to section 
512, 47 U.S.C. § 230, a provision of the Communications Decency Act 
often referred to as section 230 or CDA 230, protects UGC platforms— or 
intermediaries— from legal liability for what they host (with some excep-
tions, including some related to intellectual property) by treating them as 
intermediary hosts rather than publishers of content. This intermediary 
protection has allowed freedom of expression to flourish on UGC platforms.
At the same time, section 230 also provides such platforms with a right 
to restrict access to a range of materials, regardless of whether such content 
is constitutionally protected. This provision enables companies to put into 
place restrictions that— if undertaken by a state— would otherwise raise con-
cerns about censorship. US- based UGC platforms commonly place restric-
tions on the display of nudity, for example, with some (such as Facebook 
and its various properties) banning it almost entirely. The combination of 
fears of lawsuits and the enormous expense of reviewing user- submitted 
content led toward a paradigm in which the less an online service knew 
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about user content, the better. This paradigm was challenged by the birth 
of social networks and the increased focus on social interactions.
Early UGC platforms focused on individual expression— they allowed 
users to post what they wanted but didn’t work to connect them with each 
other. With the rise of Friendster, which connected UGC with the social 
graph, a visualization of people’s online relationships, the focus shifted to 
connecting communities of users through UGC, which became known as 
social media. By the mid- 2000s, platforms like YouTube, MySpace, and Flickr 
and, later, Facebook and Twitter had emerged, offering various options for 
sharing content, including publicly. Where ToS had previously been suf-
ficient for a world of individual expression, the uptick in public sharing 
and the ability to create multiple accounts created a need for user- oriented 
rules, or as they are often called, community guidelines.
Online service providers tend to create community guidelines designed 
to give them maximum flexibility in removing user accounts: almost all 
ToS include ability to remove content at the company’s discretion. These 
are contracts of adhesion, whereby the individual user has no ability to 
modify or help shape them. The more user- friendly community guidelines 
that followed put into clearer terms existing regulations that appeared in 
ToS, often with further additions. Companies nevertheless set very low bar-
riers to creating new accounts; if users were removed for violating the rules, 
they were most often able to come back almost immediately under a new 
identity. While companies sought to remove controversial content, the 
dynamics of the early web business were centered on growing advertising 
revenue and, particularly, demonstrating a strong and growing user base. 
(Most early UGC companies were not profitable— they made money for 
their founders by being acquired by old media content providers who had 
difficulty finding readers of their content online.) As a result, power often 
ended up being in users’ hands, as UGC businesses had strong disincentives 
to remove content and users, with the exception of content that led to 
lawsuits. Other than the nuisance of reposting, users had very few reasons 
not to share controversial, copyrighted, or otherwise prohibited content.
In today’s social web, users who violate such prohibitions face increas-
ingly harsh consequences. Typically, a first post in violation of Facebook’s 
nudity prohibitions will result in removal of the content; a second or 
third violation will result in increasingly lengthy bans from the platform, 
during which a user cannot post information, send private messages, or 
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administrate pages. Penalties range depending on the severity of the viola-
tion; some violations eventually result in full account suspension. Having 
your Facebook account suspended has become an obstacle to visibility in 
your social circles, a strong disincentive to post certain types of controver-
sial content. LinkedIn, a social network centered on professional connec-
tions, raises the stakes even higher: post content that leads to suspension or 
elimination of your account, and your professional reputation can suffer. 
Twitter, perhaps assuming that there’s only so much harm a user can do 
in 280 characters, has remained accepting of anonymous and pseudony-
mous accounts, authenticating a small number of verified accounts with 
blue check marks, reinforcing the idea that the majority of Twitter accounts 
are wholly unverified.
While the real- name policy shifts the balance of power from users to 
platform owners, increasing the costs for bad behavior, it may be accompa-
nied by another effect: a growing reticence on the part of users to produce 
content. Facebook routinely prompts users to post content, recycling past 
posts as memories ready for reposting, assembling albums commemorating 
friendships between two users so they have something new to post. Scholar 
Trebor Scholz points out that platforms like Facebook rely on its users to 
create content— without user- created content, the sites would have noth-
ing to offer (Scholz 2012). This insight has yet to turn into the workers’ 
rights movement Scholz and others have hoped for. While concerns are 
sometimes raised that the growth of platforms like Facebook is slowing, 
UGC sites are the most popular and powerful sites on the Internet.
According to analytics company Alexa, six of the top ten websites in the 
United States, in terms of traffic, are built on UGC— YouTube, Facebook, 
Wikipedia, Reddit, eBay, and Twitter— and two others, Google and Yahoo!, 
are arguably built on indexing UGC. At this point, UGC sites are not the 
exception to the rule but the dominant model of the social web. The beauty 
of this model for the platforms is that users do almost all of the work. The 
platform is responsible only for providing a space where a user can pub-
lish, while the user does the work of creating the content. The platform 
succeeds fiscally if it can make more from advertising on user content than 
it spends creating and maintaining the space. A major cost in maintaining 
these spaces is moderating user content, to prevent the site from getting 
sued or from melting down into a space so abusive and hostile as to chase 
users away.
Moderating the Public Sphere 145
The Importance of UGC Platforms to the Human Rights Community
Social media has emerged as a battleground for human rights defenders 
because of its value in mobilizing resistance movements and in publicizing 
otherwise invisible points of view. The 2011 uprisings in the Arab world 
and beyond demonstrated the mobilizing power of UGC platforms, while 
their aftermath— from the emergence of new democratic norms in some 
places to war in others— exhibited UGC platforms’ value in the documen-
tation of human rights abuses.
In late 2010, a Facebook page emerged in Egypt entitled “We Are All 
Khaled Said” (in English and in Arabic). Set up to memorialize Khaled Said, 
a young man killed by police in Alexandria, the page was then used to pro-
mote an already- organized set of protests, following in the footsteps of the 
Tunisian protests that had just effectively deposed the country’s autocratic 
leader of twenty- three years, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. The page’s call to pro-
test went viral among Egyptians, many of whom had previously only used 
Facebook for ordinary activities and communications, and on January 25, 
2011, tens of thousands of people took to the streets in protest. The initial 
effectiveness of the Egyptian uprising, which deposed long- term autocrat 
Hosni Mubarak, inspired movements throughout the Arab region and well 
beyond. Some of those movements, such as that which took hold in Syria 
in February 2011, sparked violent clashes, leading to civil war. In the case 
of Syria, social media has been effective both in documenting and sharing 
human rights abuses, as well as in the dissemination of propaganda. Such 
content is not immune from the impact of content moderation; Facebook 
and YouTube have both been accused of contributing to the erasure of evi-
dence from Syria (Ascher- Shapiro 2017).
UGC platforms today are the world’s most dominant information carri-
ers. Facebook has more than one billion daily active users, making it more 
populous than any single entity on earth, save for China and India. It is 
most certainly the world’s largest censorship body, regulating countless 
unknown pieces of content on a daily basis, both on the basis of its own 
rules and at the behest of government bodies. The global human rights 
movement has relied on media attention to support two of its key theories 
of change. First, naming and shaming human rights abusers requires use 
of the media to communicate these abuses to a wide audience, and that 
media is increasingly dependent on social media platforms for distribution. 
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Second, organizing human rights defenders so that they will lobby legis-
lators and political leaders to defend rights is vastly aided by use of social 
media platforms. The importance of social media platforms to the protec-
tion of human rights forces us to interrogate their practices of content mod-
eration and to draw attention to cases where such practices might have a 
negative impact on freedom of expression.
Platforms and the Public Sphere
From earliest conceptions of democracy in ancient Greek times, through 
experiments with representative democracy in the early United States, 
democratic theorists have postulated the need for a space where members 
of the public can discuss issues of the day and come to a consensus on ways 
forward. In Athens, the agora served as a physical space accessible to the 
(few, privileged, wealthy) citizens of Athens to meet and have discussions. 
In colonial America, town meetings served much the same function for dis-
cussion of local issues. However, the sprawling nature of the United States 
in the early 1700s led to the need for a mediated public space for discourse. 
The combination of newspapers and a massive, heavily subsidized postal 
system gave the early republic a textual public space in which literate citi-
zens could share opinions, disagree, and discuss issues with fellow citizens 
across the country, despite being separated by time and distance (Gallagher 
2016; Starr 2005).
In 1962, German sociologist Jürgen Habermas offered a new concep-
tual vocabulary for understanding these spaces for democratic discourse. 
He examined the ways in which well- to- do merchants in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries served as a counterweight to the power of rulers, 
even in monarchies (Habermas 1991). Leaders needed to take seriously the 
concerns of the bourgeoisie— “public opinion”— lest they find their policies 
challenged by commercial interests. The space for the shaping of public 
opinion, Habermas explained, was not just the physical spaces of coffee-
houses but a literary space in which writers and thinkers reflected on criti-
cal issues through newspapers and journals. Habermas termed this physical 
and mediated sphere for discourse “the public sphere” (Habermas 1991). 
Numerous critiques of Habermas’s public sphere exist, and many center on 
the exclusive nature of who could participate in public discussions. Nancy 
Fraser’s (1990) “Rethinking the Public Sphere” collects many of these 
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critiques, finding ways in which Habermas excludes women, the poor, and 
those marginalized by occupation, religion, or race. The public that Haber-
mas celebrates is only a small fraction of the actual public, according to Fra-
ser. Other critiques have examined ways that access to media has restricted 
access to the public sphere, putting the power of opinion shaping into the 
hands of those who control broadcast media.
The Habermasian visions of the public sphere have been challenged by 
developments in media production, from an activist culture of pamphlets 
and leafleting in the 1960s in resistance to the Vietnam War to the emer-
gence of community access broadcasting in the 1970s, allowing a broader 
range of citizens to create video content. But the revolutionary shift has 
been the emergence of digital media technologies (see also Bermejo, this 
volume).
In The Wealth of Networks, Yochai Benkler introduces the idea of the 
networked public sphere, an updated understanding of this space of dis-
course for the digital age (Benkler 2006). According to Benkler, the rise of 
the Internet as the dominant space for discourse leads to two significant 
changes: it’s cheaper for people to participate in discourse, and broadcast 
media owners no longer have absolute gatekeeping power by sitting at the 
center of hub- and- spoke networks. Individuals can share perspectives and 
opinions with each other at very low cost, without the mediation of editors 
and publishers restricting the flow of opinions. For Benkler, these structural 
changes solve many of the problems with Habermas’s public sphere, open-
ing discourse to a much wider set of actors. Based on comments Habermas 
made in 2006, Stuart Geiger noted that Habermas did not seem to share 
Benkler’s enthusiasm for the transformations the Internet had made to the 
public sphere (Geiger 2009). Interrogating the gap between Habermas and 
Benkler, he offered an important insight on the freedoms offered by the 
networked public sphere. While powerful individuals and institutions may 
not have had the ability to shape speech as they had in the age of broad-
cast media, a new set of actors was sculpting our discourse: the algorithms 
that determine what ideas were widely shared on sites like YouTube, Reddit, 
or Digg. Geiger’s “algorithmic public sphere” acknowledges the potential 
openness that Benkler celebrates but recognizes the power that platform 
owners and algorithm authors have over contemporary discourse.
Our current public sphere is both algorithmically mediated and cen-
trally controlled. Platform owners have enormous power over what speech 
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is possible, and the algorithms they deploy govern which perspectives are 
seen and which are buried. Moderation, both in terms of blocking content 
from being published and in terms of promoting or demoting content, is 
the mechanism through which control is asserted over the networked pub-
lic sphere. To realize the hopes put forward by Habermas and Benkler, we 
need a close look at the challenges and paths forward for UGC, the space in 
which contemporary public discourses unfold.
What’s Moderated, and How?
There are two key ways in which UGC platforms enact moderation: they 
control what users pay attention to, using algorithms that determine what 
is shown in a given feed (soft control), and they determine what con-
tent is acceptable for publication on the platform (hard control). Both 
types of moderation employ algorithms— often combined with human 
intervention— through processes that are opaque to users and are therefore 
difficult to review, analyze, and criticize.
Hard control relies primarily on what Sarah T. Roberts refers to as “com-
mercial content moderation.” This control is governed by a company’s ToS, 
a contract of adhesion that gives almost all of the power to the platform, 
rather than to the user (Roberts 2017). In theory, a user is free to leave a 
platform and bring his or her content elsewhere, but in practice, a lack of 
alternatives, the difficulty of migrating the collection of content one has 
created, and tie- ins to third- party services and apps make leaving difficult. 
While these platforms are not natural monopolies— you can choose not to 
participate in social networks, choose Twitter over Facebook, or choose a 
decentralized alternative like Mastodon over either— the combination of 
network effects, in which systems grow more valuable as their user base 
expands, and barriers to interoperability give platforms monopolistic 
lock- in effects.
In addition to ToS are the aforementioned community guidelines, which 
aim to educate users about a platform’s rules in clear, user- friendly language. 
These guidelines vary across popular platforms but generally include prohi-
bition of hate speech, sexually explicit content, support for violent extrem-
ism, harassment, and copyrighted content. Platforms may have a legal 
responsibility to remove certain content, depending on the jurisdiction in 
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which they are located, but community guidelines frequently include con-
tent that is otherwise legally permitted.
In moderating content, platforms are playing a complex game. They are 
responsible to their shareholders and advertisers but also seek to keep the 
cost of content moderation low. They are responsible for responding appro-
priately to legal requests for content removal. They must mitigate conflict 
between users to prevent users from abandoning the system because of 
patterns of abuse. Finally, they are under pressure from users, the media, 
advocacy organizations, and sometimes their own employees or share-
holders to permit certain kinds of speech. Some platforms, such as Twitter, 
have explicitly oriented themselves toward an ideology of free expression. 
In order to maintain low overhead, a majority of platforms rely on user 
reporting, or flagging as a means of locating prohibited content for moder-
ation. Flagging is far from a simple behavior— users deploy it not only to 
identify content that violates ToS but also to attempt to remove content 
they find politically or socially undesirable or simply do not want to see 
online. Flagged content is then reviewed by humans, a practice which has 
had a documented health cost for these workers, who must review graphic 
violence and other toxic imagery (Roberts 2017). These low- paying jobs are 
often outsourced to third- party companies, located in countries where the 
cost of labor is relatively low. Mary Gray and Siddharth Suri (2019) refer 
to such work as “ghost work,” suggesting this invisible human labor is the 
force that ultimately allows “automated” systems like publishing platforms 
to operate.
Today, automation appears to be increasingly taking the place of human 
content moderation. YouTube pioneered the practice with audio finger-
printing of content in 2009. As YouTube increased in popularity and visi-
bility, it became a popular place for users to post copyrighted music, in the 
form of either music videos recorded from cable television or digital music 
tracks uploaded as videos. Music publishers began searching for their con-
tent and sending reams of takedown notices to YouTube, following the pro-
cedures outlined in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. As the volume 
of takedown requests became overwhelming, music publishers began argu-
ing that YouTube could not reasonably claim ignorance that it was hosting 
massive collections of copyright- violating material. In settling these claims, 
YouTube agreed to implement a process of audio fingerprinting, in which 
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it would accept databases of copyrighted music from publishers and scan 
videos uploaded to YouTube to identify those that used copyrighted music. 
Those videos could be blocked from being uploaded or could have their 
soundtracks altered, or, eventually, publishers could offer limited licenses of 
their music in exchange for a split of advertising revenues associated with 
the videos.
Content providers are now using a form of fingerprinting called hashing 
to identify images they know to be controversial. When they manually 
remove images of child sexual abuse, images promoting or glorifying terror-
ism, or images used to harass an individual user, or spam thousands of users 
with promotional materials, they generate digital signatures— hashes— of 
each image and store them in a database. As images are uploaded in the 
future, they are checked against the database of hashes and blocked from 
being posted if they match an image that was previously removed (Franz 
2017). While automation makes aspects of moderation easier for platform 
owners, it does not eliminate the need for human decision- making. New 
images and videos are created every day, some of which violate ToS or com-
munity guidelines and have to be added to hash databases. Other content 
requires interpretation to decide whether it is harassing or abusive, deci-
sions that can require local language and subject knowledge to make accu-
rate assessments.
In both the tech and human rights community, innovators are exploring 
ways to make moderation better and fairer, including empowering users to 
hold platforms accountable for their content moderation decisions. In the 
meantime, moderation remains a major cost for platform providers and a 
frequent place of conflict between platform owners, their users, and the 
human rights community.
The Human Side of Hard Moderation
A purely algorithmic understanding of hard control misses a key feature 
of automated systems: these systems are trained using human behaviors, 
and edge cases are inevitably the responsibility of humans to solve. While 
human moderation through outsourcing tasks to labor in the developing 
world raises complex ethical questions, utilizing the free labor of users of 
the service involves even more complex factors.
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Hard content moderation via flagging, as Kate Crawford and Tarleton 
Gillespie write, may appear simple, but its simplicity “belies a tangle of 
system designs, multiple actors and intentions, assertions and emotions.” 
Flags use a “narrow vocabulary of complaint” that results in a messy pro-
cess, “fraught with the vagaries of human interpretation and shaped by 
competing institutional pressures” (Crawford and Gillespie 2014, 418– 419). 
Further, flagging encourages users to “snitch” on other users— often their 
friends— effectively creating a culture of reporting.
Indeed, flagging is frequently used by conflicting actors as an attempt 
to silence opposition. Groups band together to flood a UGC platform with 
reports of abuse, often reporting users for alleged breaches of guidelines 
that, when violated, trigger a request to the user to provide ID — policies 
such as Facebook’s authentic name requirement or the requirement of US- 
based sites that users be age thirteen or older. In other cases, reporting abuse 
focuses on severe violations that trigger an immediate suspension (Bran-
dom 2014).
Governments have enthusiastically adopted the tactic. In Vietnam, 
activists have documented having their accounts removed en masse, fol-
lowing targeted reporting allegedly by the government. Between June and 
August of 2014, more than a hundred Facebook accounts belonging to 
Vietnamese activists were maliciously reported and removed (IFEX 2014). 
Similarly, WAM! has documented “report trolling” in cases of sexual harass-
ment, “in which people make fake claims about harassment just to gum up 
the works for reviewers and make it tougher to address legitimate claims” 
(Lapowsky 2015).
The introduction of automation to flagging and moderation processes 
may prove to be even more fraught than the status quo. Training artificial 
intelligence— or humans, for that matter— to distinguish between allowed 
and prohibited content is a complex task. As Kate Crawford has argued 
in the New York Times, proprietary algorithms are human built and thus 
contain human biases (Crawford 2016). For example, an image- recognition 
algorithm learns by being fed images (chosen by humans) and builds a 
model based on those images; therefore, if such a system is trained on pho-
tos of white people, it will have difficulty recognizing nonwhite faces (see 
also Bechmann’s chapter in this volume). A well- known instance of such 
bias occurred in 2016 when a New Zealand citizen of Asian descent tried to 
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renew his passport and was told his photograph did not meet requirements 
because “subject eyes are closed” (Titcomb 2016). Content moderation 
algorithms are likely to unearth similar problems. While replacing human 
with algorithmic moderation may spare human moderators from having 
to see horrific images— by having computers scan images before they’re 
posted to a UGC platform— the parameters used to define such images can 
be inadvertently discriminatory. Unless designed to do so, algorithms do 
not take into account who is posting a given item of content. A news orga-
nization sharing a violent image may occur in a different context than an 
individual doing so.
Context becomes even more essential when algorithmic decisions are 
applied to text- based content. While Facebook has made strides toward 
transparency, releasing its content guidelines in late April 2018 in response 
to scrutiny and criticism following the Cambridge Analytica case, review-
ing those standards makes it clear that the devil is in the details. An earlier 
leak of content moderation guidelines from Facebook’s Berlin office, ana-
lyzed by the German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung, reveals that regula-
tion of certain categories of content— such as hate speech— are particularly 
nuanced, differentiating between examples such as “migrants are scum” 
(not allowed) and “migrants are so filthy” (allowed). Furthermore, separate 
rules apply to public figures and nonpublic entities (Krause and Grassegger 
2016). Algorithmic moderation is already increasingly being employed by 
UGC platforms for the purpose of countering violent extremism, a tricky 
gambit in which context— and expertise— is key. When cultural, politi-
cal, and legal differences become more pronounced— such as in times of 
war— decisions on content moderation increase in complexity (Taylor 
2014). Lebanese organization Social Media Exchange (SMEX) notes the 
imperative of UGC platforms “hiring and training teams with cultural and 
linguistic sensitivity” in order to ensure that any restrictions on freedom of 
expression are legitimate and limited (Dheere 2016).
Indeed, UGC platforms already struggle with context when dealing with 
violent content. In the summer of 2015, as police shootings of black men 
in the United States were making headlines, Facebook removed a live video 
of the Minneapolis shooting of school cafeteria worker Philando Castile, as 
filmed by the victim’s girlfriend. Facebook called the incident a “technical 
glitch,” which may or may not have involved algorithmic moderation— the 
company did not comment (Russell 2016). Specific communities are more 
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likely to be impacted by discrimination in content moderation decisions, 
whether made by humans or computers. Ultimately, content moderation 
decisions are often highly subjective when made by humans, a problem 
that algorithms— designed by humans— are unlikely to solve.
Soft Controls
When Michael Brown, an unarmed eighteen- year- old African American 
man, was killed in Ferguson, Missouri, by police officer Darren Wilson, 
some corners of the Internet learned the news before television crews 
arrived in the St. Louis suburb. Twitter, which is disproportionately popu-
lar with African American users, lit up with the news of protests erupting 
in Ferguson and many tweets demanding that mainstream media net-
works pay attention to the unfolding events. On Facebook, another trend 
demanded readers’ attention: the Ice Bucket Challenge, in which partici-
pants dumped a bucket of ice water over their heads to raise awareness of 
and funds for treatment of amyotrophic lateral sclerosis. Sociologist Zeynep 
Tufekçi noted this disparity and wondered, “Would Ferguson be buried in 
algorithmic censorship?” (Tufekçi 2014).
Facebook and Twitter present content to their users through a similar 
interface, a feed of recent posts from accounts a user has chosen to follow. 
But those feeds are assembled very differently on the two platforms. Twit-
ter’s feed is (largely) uncurated,2 which means what you see depends on who 
you follow, how often you check, and which settings you have selected. 
Facebook’s feed is heavily curated, which means you see posts Facebook 
thinks you most want to see— or, as some have speculated, perhaps what 
Facebook wants you to see. Tufekçi (2017, 156) have argued that the Ice 
Bucket Challenge may have been more popular on Facebook than Fergu-
son posts because Facebook’s algorithm favors stories many of your friends 
engage with, and the Ice Bucket Challenge encouraged friends to pledge 
their support using Facebook comments. Others, more darkly, wondered if 
Facebook would weigh the positive stories of charitable giving over the neg-
ative stories of racism and protest, hoping to encourage user engagement.3
It is not possible to verify or dismiss Tufekçi’s concerns. As Christian 
Sandvig and collaborators have noted, it is virtually impossible to audit the 
behavior of an algorithm like Facebook’s without running afoul of the US 
Computer Fraud and Anti- Abuse Act, which prescribes severe legal penalties 
154 Jillian C. York and Ethan Zuckerman
for probing a system with automated queries (Sandvig et al. 2014). Sandvig 
and others are now suing the US Department of Justice over these provi-
sions, hoping to affirm a right for researchers to audit these systems (Zetter 
2016). In the meantime, we face largely unanswerable questions about 
whether the content Facebook serves users is influenced by commercial 
motives (favoring a partner’s news stories over those from a nonpartner), 
social engineering (sharing more stories designed to increase engagement 
over those intended to inform), or political bias (suppressing conservative 
viewpoints). Soft censorship through algorithmic means has become a 
major concern in part because it is so difficult to verify whether or not it 
should be a major concern.
Other forms of soft control are clearly ones we need to worry about. Over 
the past few years, consensus has emerged among human rights advocates 
that harassment— in particular, targeted harassment— is, in effect, a form 
of censorship. One needn’t abuse the flagging system to remove someone 
from a platform— harassment, often by large groups of people, is often just 
as effective a method. Stories abound of individuals, often women, leaving 
platforms like Twitter after experiencing weeks of extended harassment. In 
January 2017, popular writer Lindy West publicly declared her exit from 
the platform, calling it “unusable for anyone but trolls, robots and dicta-
tors” (West 2017). Similarly, Jonathan Weisman— deputy editor of the New 
York Times— quit Twitter in 2016, stating that he would “leave [it] to the 
racists, the anti- Semites, the Bernie Bros that attacked women reporters yes-
terday” (Weisman 2016). The hostility evinced on the platform has caused 
numerous such public departures. Hostile online cultures— be they mes-
sage boards, subreddits, or Facebook groups— can create a censorship effect 
for users who, when feeling attacked, may choose to self- censor. A 2016 
study of US Internet users established that 47 percent of respondents had 
experienced some form of online harassment or abuse (Lenhart et al. 2016). 
That same study found that 27 percent of respondents say that they have at 
some point self- censored online for fear of attracting harassment, and that 
more than 40 percent of respondents had changed some of their contact 
information (including, in some cases, a social media user profile) to escape 
an abuser.
The shift from straightforward hard control to a more complex web of 
soft and hard controls is a conceptual shift the human rights community 
needs to understand better. Historically, human rights defenders saw the 
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state as the primary implementer of hard controls. Dozens of countries, 
ranging from Morocco and Thailand (where key websites were banned for 
crossing cultural red lines) to Iran, Saudi Arabia, and China (all of which 
heavily censor UGC platforms and other content) block web pages and/or 
keywords for users inside each country, barring them from access without 
a virtual private network or other proxy (Freedom House 2018). The rise of 
UGC platforms— which have global reach and are difficult to block, as Tuni-
sia learned the hard way in 2010— alleviated some of the pressure being put 
on states for censorship, as users gravitated away from blocked blogging plat-
forms and news sites and toward Facebook, Twitter, and their competitors.
Nevertheless, as UGC platforms have gained prominence, our percep-
tions of censorship have shifted. We have begun to face the complex fact 
that censorship online now often stems from other users, including those 
in our own networks. Not only are we affected by hard control from plat-
forms and governments and by algorithmic filtering from platforms. We 
can be silenced and chased off platforms by other users, through harass-
ment or flagging. We have met the enemy, and it is us. Now we must find 
a way not only to make platforms accountable for hard control but to pre-
vent us from enacting censorship upon each other.
Finding a Way Forward
The reliance on companies to moderate speech is itself problematic. Tradi-
tionally, censorship has referred to the restriction of speech or publication 
rights by the state or religious bodies, but, argue Luca Belli and Jamila Ven-
turini, ToS form a “quasi- legislative function” in defining allowed behaviors 
on platforms (Belli and Venturini 2016), impacting users’ ability to exercise 
their human rights (see also Land’s chapter in this volume). Whereas legis-
lation enacted by a democratic state actor to restrict speech is created trans-
parently and with input from a wide variety of actors, regulations created 
by UGC platforms are opaquely crafted and may only include input from 
a handful of individuals. Further, UGC platforms seek to regulate content 
in the most cost- efficient way, which is not always with the rights of the 
user in mind. UGC platforms, opaque by design, frequently fail to provide 
a means by which the user can challenge content moderation decisions: 
88 percent of ToS examined in a report by former UN Special Rapporteur 
Frank LaRue were found to permit platform providers to terminate specific 
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user accounts without notice or a path of redress (United Nations 2011). 
Even when a path for appeals is offered, such processes can be difficult to 
use or even locate; in a number of cases tracked by Onlinecensorship.org,4 
users have reported seeking alternative means of redress, such as writing 
to technical support or advertiser pages (Anderson et al. 2016). Facebook 
announced in April 2018 that it was implementing an appeals process for 
content removal, news that is exciting, but also long overdue.
Finally, UGC platforms rarely publish information about the number of 
ToS- related content removals they make. This lack of transparency makes it 
difficult for users and human rights groups to advocate for progressive policy 
changes. Although most popular platforms have for some years published 
transparency reports that show the percentages of content removed at the 
request of governments, only Twitter has begun to include some ToS- related 
takedowns in their reports. These points suggest a combination of transpar-
ency, regulation, and careful consumer scrutiny à la Rebecca MacKinnon’s 
Ranking Digital Rights project (Ranking Digital Rights 2018). But transpar-
ency is meaningless without real competition in the space— there is a need 
for competitive platforms that we can use and the right to control our data 
so we can move to those platforms. The portability provision entailed in 
Europe’s new General Data Protection Regulation is a step in this direction.
One possibility for competition comes from decentralized platforms. 
Platforms like Diaspora, an open source social network, have promised for 
years that a user could leave the controlled space of Facebook and move to 
a server he or she individually controlled or to a server controlled by some-
one with a consonant approach to content moderation. While Diaspora 
has failed to develop a critical user base, Mastodon, designed as a decen-
tralized alternative to Twitter, experienced a wave of popularity in 2017 
and may emerge as the first prominent decentralized alternative to the 
megaplatforms. However, while decentralized social networks solve some 
problems, they generate others. It is near certain that someone will offer 
a social network with a strong policy designed to protect speech, possibly 
augmented by storing posts on the InterPlanetary File System, a distributed 
system of content storage similar to BitTorrent, which will make it virtually 
impossible for content to be removed from a web server. While this offers 
strong protections for speech, largely avoiding the problems of both hard 
and soft control by platforms, it opens the scary notion of content that can-
not be removed. Whereas this might sound good to freedom- of- expression 
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absolutists (a stance both authors flirt with), phenomena like revenge porn 
and other illegal phenomena become deeply problematic in a world where 
content is technically unremovable.
As we head toward a more complex future, it is necessary that approaches 
to content control— both soft and hard— recognize that moderation is a 
major function of successful social media platforms, and that efforts from 
human beings will be essential, likely in cooperation with algorithms. 
Both human and algorithmic models of content moderation present chal-
lenges but with expert oversight can be improved to limit the effects of 
bias. Human- in- the- loop machine learning is a method by which systems 
are trained by or with the input of domain experts, in this case, experi-
enced moderators. By incorporating experts— or the broader public— into 
the training of algorithms employed by UGC platforms, platform owners, 
and those that regulate them, can work to ensure that such systems take 
into account diversities and minimize bias. We have witnessed the effects 
of advocacy toward UGC platforms by NGOs over the past decade. When 
faced with pressure from the public and media, companies have often 
changed course on particular policies or content presentation. In the case 
of the photo The Terror of War, removed from the page of a Norwegian news 
editor, outcry— from NGOs, Facebook users, and the media— led to a shift 
in content moderation policy (Levin, Wong, and Harding 2016). The hear-
ings in the US Congress in the wake of the Cambridge Analytica scandal in 
2018 have led to another move toward transparency by Facebook.
However, perhaps most important is the incorporation of society into the 
decision- making processes of UGC platforms. As instances of overzealous or 
erroneous content moderation reach the public, there is the opportunity 
for a strong citizen movement— that monitors abuse of power by platforms, 
demands transparency, and fights for freedom of expression— to emerge, 
building on existing efforts (by NGOs) to hold companies to account.
Notes
1. One of the authors, Ethan Zuckerman, was an early employee at Tripod.com, 
responsible for setting up much of the company’s content moderation infrastructure.
2. In 2015 and 2016, Twitter made a number of tweaks to its interface, adding 
algorithmically suggested “in case you missed it” and “you might be interested 
in” tweets. However, users are able to see an unaltered feed by scrolling past these 
suggestions.
158 Jillian C. York and Ethan Zuckerman
3. See, for example, John McDermott on Digiday UK. https://digiday.com/media/
facbeook-twitter-ferguson.
4. One of the authors, Jillian C. York, is the cofounder of Onlinecensorship.org, an 
advocacy project that tracks user- reported incidents of censorship on UGC platforms.
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7 Rights Talk: In the Kingdom of Online Giants
Rikke Frank Jørgensen
Introduction
Powerful companies like Facebook and Google have the ability to influ-
ence human rights in ways traditionally reserved for governments yet oper-
ate outside the direct reach of human rights law. Although their impact 
on a number of human rights is widely acknowledged, including within 
the industry itself, the regulation of this impact varies considerably. In the 
European Union context, for example, the privacy rights of Facebook’s and 
Google’s users are regulated via data protection regulation, whereas their 
potential negative impact on freedom of expression is not. It is fair to say 
that in most national contexts (including that of the United States), the 
companies’ responsibilities in regard to international human rights law 
are governed by soft- law frameworks and voluntary measures defined and 
enforced by the industry itself (for an extensive elaboration of this point, 
see the chapters by Callamard and Land in this volume).
Whereas some of the subsequent chapters extensively discuss the respon-
sibility of these companies vis- à- vis human rights law, the focus of this 
chapter is on the internal storytelling around human rights. Using Google 
and Facebook as empirical case studies, the chapter focus on three corporate 
narratives related to the companies’ commitment to respect human rights. 
The first narrative concerns the role the companies are depicted to play as 
safeguards against government overreach. The second narrative relates to 
their role as cooperators with governments. Finally, the third narrative con-
cerns the way privacy is constructed within company discourse.
With reference to Luhmann’s (1993) communicative theory of social 
systems, the narratives represent specific ways of producing, reproducing, 
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and legitimizing meaning by staff at Facebook and Google. As part of this 
sense making, the narratives serve to maintain the boundary between a 
relatively closed system and its environment and to legitimize specific prac-
tices within the organizations. The analysis also draws on the notions of 
platform and infrastructure, which are used to unpack and critically discuss 
some of the underlying assumptions in the corporate storytelling.
The chapter will argue that the companies’ efforts vis- à- vis human rights 
tend to focus exclusively on state interference and pays limited attention to 
the companies’ own business practices and the way the data- driven econ-
omy informs those practices.
Methodology
The analysis draws in part on empirical data collected as part of a two- 
year research project on the commercialized public sphere (Jørgensen 
2017a, 2017b). The research project relied on a context- oriented qualita-
tive approach, including publicly available statements from the two com-
panies, terms of service, and policies, as well as semistructured interviews 
with company staff, primarily in Europe and the United States. The inter-
views focused on the internal discourse and sense making related to human 
rights; the translation of this normative basis into specific features or prod-
ucts, and the governance mechanisms set up to enforce the norms. The 
interviewed were staff with responsibility for human rights (e.g., partici-
pation in the Global Network Initiative; GNI), public policy, privacy, com-
munity operations (Facebook), and removal requests (Google). However, 
meetings were also conducted with technical staff (Google), as well as more 
research- oriented staff working on education and user experience (Google). 
With a few exceptions, the respondents had been with the companies for 
some years and carried some level of responsibility within the organiza-
tion. In total, twenty- one interviews were conducted (thirteen Google, 
eight Facebook), and twenty publicly available talks and testimonies were 
analyzed in relation to the above themes. The public talks and testimonies 
were selected on the basis of topic (relevance) and located via YouTube and 
the Zuckerberg Files, which is a digital archive of all public statements made 
by Mark Zuckerberg, from 2004 to 2018.1
While the three narratives presented in the following are derived from 
the research project, it is important to note that they are neither exclusive 
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nor exhaustive. Rather, they are chosen for this chapter as telling examples 
of how the two organizations understand their role and responsibility in 
relation to human rights.
Analytical Framework
The analysis relies on the concept of frames (Goffman 1974; Johnston 
2005; Tannen 1993), as sets of relatively coherent meanings that organize 
the identity and activities of an individual or organization. As such, frames 
are used to situate events, fashion a shared understanding of the world, and 
guide problem- solving (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, 33). In short, concepts 
such as freedom of expression and privacy do not have an objective meaning 
but are framed in particular ways deemed to give meaning in a specific 
context— in this case, that of Google and Facebook. This implies attention 
to ways in which individuals and organizations frame and explain partic-
ular meanings, as well as how these meanings are translated into practice 
(Latour and Woolgar 1986).
It also considers organizations as communicative systems, inspired by 
the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann and his extensive theory on social 
systems (Luhmann 1993). According to this framework, each system (e.g., 
an organization) has a distinctive identity that marks the border between 
system and the environment and is constantly reproduced through com-
municative processes. These communicative processes (sense making) are 
governed by “interpretation codes” that guide how information is selected, 
processed, and understood within the specific organization— for example, 
true/false (a scientific system), economic gains/losses (a business system), 
legal/illegal (a justice system) (Luhmann 1992, 253). In relation to human 
rights such as the right to privacy, this has the function of protecting the 
boundaries of specific systems— for instance, by preventing sensitive infor-
mation from one context from proliferating into other ones (Hornung and 
Schnabel 2009, 85).
In terms of understanding the services that Facebook and Google pro-
vide, the analysis is inspired by the literature on platforms and infrastruc-
tures as two notions increasingly used to describe the companies, but with 
different policy implications. The notion of infrastructure is generally used 
to describe the underlying foundation of a system or organization. Exam-
ples include transportation systems such as highway, railway, and airline 
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systems; communication systems such as telephone networks and postal 
services; and basic public services and facilities such as schools and water 
systems (Frischmann 2012, 4). Infrastructure often exists as an invisible, 
taken- for- granted resource, whereas a breakdown in the infrastructure 
can make its design and effects visible (Bowker et al. 2010, 97– 98). The 
term “platform” is commonly used to characterize the economic model 
of the social web (Helmond 2015, 5) and connotes openness, functional-
ity, empowerment, and neutrality (Pangrazio 2016, 2– 3), whereas in fact 
the economic model, technical design, and policies of platforms steer user 
interaction in certain directions. Van  Dijck (2013, 29) has importantly 
noted that “a platform is a mediator rather than an intermediary,” because 
it shapes sociocultural performance rather than merely facilitating it. As 
such, the owners of the platforms— the companies— hold great power over 
the wide range of social activities they facilitate, which include small- or 
large- scale communication, public debate, social interaction, information 
search, and so forth (van  Dijck and Poell 2013). Since online platforms 
serve varied audiences that include users, shareholders, third parties, and 
advertisers, part of their governance challenge is to manage expectations 
between a diverse range of interests in order to serve the company’s busi-
ness interests (Ananny and Gillespie 2016).
Arguably, major online platforms effectively function as social 
infrastructures— that is, as foundational and largely unseen services that 
govern public action (Bowker and Star 1999). They are embedded, taken for 
granted, ruled by unquestioned standards, and visible only when seen to be 
failing (Star and Ruhleder 1996). While traditional infrastructures undergo 
platformization (Plantin et al. 2016, 298), online platforms experience infra-
structuralization as companies exploit the power of platforms to “gain foot-
holds as the modern- day equivalents of the railroad, telephone, and electric 
utility monopolies of the late 19th and the 20th centuries” (Ananny and 
Gillespie 2016, 14– 15). The increasingly infrastructural nature of major 
platforms makes it difficult for people to leave them (Ananny and Gillespie 
2016), just as the platforms benefit from the socio- technical investments 
users have made over time: “profiles and identities that have been tended 
to for years; networks and relationships that exist nowhere else and would 
be nearly impossible to recreate; media and metadata embedded within 
particular platforms and difficult to extract” (ibid., 1).
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The above perspectives on platforms and infrastructures remind us that 
the notions used to describe the services provided by Google and Facebook 
carry specific— and often contested— meanings. Moreover, if major plat-
forms are considered to function as societal infrastructures, this prompts 
consideration of the appropriate regulatory response— a point I return to 
in the Conclusion.
First Narrative: Google and Facebook Protect Their Users against 
Government Overreach
In March 2016, US lawyer and commentator Jeffrey Rosen argued that he 
was happy with the governance of freedom of expression conducted by 
Facebook, Google, and Twitter. Rosen had previously described these com-
panies as more powerful than any king when it comes to free speech deci-
sions in the online domain (Rosen 2012).
Especially in light of these new pressures, I really have to express admiration for 
Monica, and Juniper and their colleagues at Twitter . . . they are trying to tread an 
incredibly delicate and difficult line where (one has) all of these pressures from 
Europe and from society to take speech down and to ban speech, and yet this 
constitutional principle that says it has to stay up unless it is intended to cause 
harm. . . . I really have concluded that if someone has to do it I would rather that 
it be these two incredible powerful women than a government, like Europe, or an 
international body like the illiberal groups that are calling for repression of speech 
at the network level, led by China and Russia. (Rosen 2016)
The Rosen quotation reflects the first narrative discussed here, namely, how 
staff at both Google and Facebook frame their human rights responsibility 
as an obligation to safeguard users against overreach by governments. The 
interviewees from both companies explicitly acknowledge the importance 
of protecting and advancing human rights and emphasize their services 
as enablers of specific rights, most notably freedom of expression. Services 
such as Google Search and Facebook’s social network are seen to counter 
existing inequalities and contribute to making the world a more just place. 
“There is asymmetry. Those in power can call a newspaper or television 
and get access. Ordinary people can’t. We want to rectify that asymmetry 
in communication power” (Facebook interview #2, 2015). “Googlers share 
a common view of the world; more access to information makes the world 
a better place” (Google interview #3, 2015). Also, staff at both companies 
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refer to freedom of expression as a crucial element of the corporate identity 
and as a guiding normative base. “Censorship is against everything Face-
book stands for” (Facebook interview #2, 2015). “Freedom of expression 
runs deep in Google’s engineering culture” (Google interview #10, 2015).
When questioned about perceived threats to human rights in relation to 
their services, all respondents referred to government intervention at either 
a formal or an informal level. The examples of government intervention 
included shutting down or blocking access to services, requesting access to 
user data, or attempting to gain greater control over the platforms. Respon-
dents from both companies stress that they push back fiercely against gov-
ernment attempts to narrow the boundaries for allowed expression, or to 
withdraw user data, whenever these attempts are not lawful and consis-
tent with international human rights standards. By contrast, none of the 
respondents highlight the fact that corporate practices may themselves 
have a negative impact on users’ rights, for example, the enforcement of 
terms of service. “Our purpose is to highlight Government action. That’s 
where the focus should be. That’s where the pressure is, and that pressure 
is increasing. Takedown is not really a user concern” (Facebook interview 
#6, 2015). “It will impact the scope of expression, but we don’t consider 
ourselves to be deciding on freedom of expression. We take decisions on 
a specific product. We don’t take down political speech; it’s hate, pornog-
raphy, and so on” (Facebook interview #6, 2015). “In relation to human 
rights, we mostly focus on minimizing harm from governments” (Google 
interview #7, 2015).
This focus on the company– government relationship is also reflected in 
the main industry initiative in this field— the GNI, which was established 
in 2008 as a multistakeholder initiative to help the companies enact pol-
icies to anticipate and respond to situations in which local law and prac-
tice differ from international standards on the rights to privacy and free 
expression online (Maclay 2014, 11). The corporate member base is lim-
ited and includes Google, Oath, Facebook, Microsoft, and LinkedIn, while 
seven telecommunication companies have joined the affiliated initiative, 
the Telecommunications Industry Dialogue. On the basis of international 
law, the GNI has developed a set of standards that the companies should 
follow to mitigate violations of privacy and freedom of expression caused 
by governments. The standards focus entirely on company pushback 
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against illegitimate government requests, while failing to provide similar 
benchmarks for other types of business practices. It is also unclear how 
these standards translate into corporate practices. In November 2015, GNI 
cofounder Rebecca MacKinnon launched the Ranking Digital Rights cor-
porate accountability index in an attempt to increase the transparency of 
human rights- related business practices.2 The index measures the human 
rights commitment of twenty- two major Internet and telecommunication 
companies at an annual basis, based on the information they disclose on 
their policy and practices related to freedom of expression and privacy.
In relation to Facebook, the 2017 and 2018 index found evidence that 
the company’s senior leadership exercises oversight of issues related to 
freedom of expression and privacy, an improvement from the initial 2015 
index.3 Facebook’s disclosure regarding its human rights due diligence 
has also improved, as has as the company’s commitment to conduct reg-
ular human rights impact assessments. By contrast, there is still a lack of 
information on remedy and grievance mechanisms for users who allege 
infringements of their rights. There is also limited information about the 
volume and nature of content that Facebook restricts or removes in the 
course of enforcing its terms of service, although this has improved in the 
2018 index. Facebook now publishes some data on the volume and nature 
of content restricted for violating rules against hate speech and inauthentic 
accounts, yet there should be more transparency on how it identifies and 
restricts content found to violate its rules. As for privacy, the 2018 index 
found that while Facebook offers some disclosure about the types of infor-
mation it collects, it revealed less about what it shares and with whom, for 
what purpose, and for how long it retains such information. Its disclosure 
of options users have to control what information the company collects, 
retains, and uses was especially poor. The company offers some ways to opt 
out of targeted advertising, suggesting it is on by default. The index found 
no evidence that Facebook respects the “Do Not Track” standard that allows 
users to opt out of certain types of web tracking. By contrast, its transpar-
ency reporting on government requests for user data is fairly strong.
As for Google, a founding member of the GNI, the 2017 and 2018 index 
found no evidence of executive oversight of business practices that affect 
users’ freedom of expression and privacy.4 The index found that although 
Google is committed to conducting human rights risk assessments when 
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entering new markets, there is no evidence that it conducts assessments of 
risks related to terms of service enforcement. It also had notably weak rem-
edy and grievance mechanisms. Google discloses more than any other com-
pany in the index about how it handles government and private requests 
to restrict content and accounts, yet the company´s disclosure of private 
requests could be significantly improved. For example, in 2015, Google 
reported removing 92 million videos from YouTube for terms of services 
violations, but there has been no follow- up disclosure since or evidence of 
similar disclosures for other Google services evaluated. Google does, how-
ever, report on requests related to copyright infringement (globally) and 
the de- indexing of particular search entries following the “right to be for-
gotten” ruling (for Europe).5 As for privacy, Google lacks clarity and speci-
ficity in its disclosures related to the handling of personal data, in particular 
the collection of user data from, and the sharing of it with, third parties. 
The 2018 index noted that Google has improved its disclosure of options 
users have to control the collection of some user information, including 
their location, search history and browsing activity. In line with Facebook, 
there is no evidence that it respects the “Do Not Track” standard that allows 
users to opt out of certain types of web tracking.
The Ranking Digital Rights assessment highlights the key point of this 
section, namely, the disproportionate focus on governments as the cause of 
human rights problems in the online domain. While it must be acknowl-
edged that governments pose significant threats to human rights around 
the globe, and that standards are needed to ensure that companies respond 
to government pressure in ways that comply with human rights law, this 
is only part of the picture. Arguably, Internet giants such as Facebook and 
Google have a substantial impact on human rights globally through the 
corporate policies they adopt and enforce for their users. As stressed in 
the initial quote from Rosen, the companies tread “an incredibly delicate 
and difficult line” subjected to a complex mix of pressures to take speech 
down. These pressures are exercised not only by governments but also by 
users, advertisers, shareholders, specific interest groups, public opinion, 
and so forth. Effectively, a small minority of removed content is removed 
because of government requests, whereas the majority of removed content 
originates from users flagging specific content in violation of the terms of 
service.6 With more than a million posts flagged every day at Facebook 
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(Bickert 2016a) and 400 hours of video uploaded to YouTube every minute 
(Downs 2016), the exact drawing of this line greatly impacts the scope of 
allowed expression. “The real hard part is how we can enforce those poli-
cies when we receive more than one million reports per day of violations 
on Facebook” (Bickert 2016a). “We do try to strike a balance to make sure 
there’s plenty of due process and transparency in how we approach this” 
(Downs 2016).
Likewise, the collection of personal data represents an unprecedented 
social graph of users’ communications, habits, networks, and preferences, 
with great ramifications for billions of users’ ability to enjoy the right to 
privacy. In this light, focusing entirely on responses to government requests 
and leaving out, for example, terms of service enforcement and business 
practices related to data collection and user profiling provides a partial and 
limited assessment of the potential negative impact on human rights that 
these companies’ business practices may cause.
From a policy perspective, the corporate approach to translating the 
companies’ human rights responsibility is based on a selective understand-
ing of human rights threats, in which governments are depicted as the 
main violators and the role of the company is to protect users and thus to 
safeguard the boundaries of the system from unjustified interference. Gov-
ernment requests potentially pose a threat to the autonomy of the com-
panies, which in response have established subsystems to deal with these 
disturbances in the form of specific organizational units trained to respond 
to this particular kind of interference. The subsystems dealing with govern-
ment requests do so through a number of procedures and checks related to 
due diligence— for example, is the request submitted via a legitimate public 
authority, does the request have a valid legal basis, is it proportionate, and 
so on. After having approved a government request, the interference is doc-
umented in a transparency report that serves to maintain users’ trust in the 
system and provide evidence that the companies guard the boundaries of 
their users’ rights to freedom of expression and privacy.
In the interviews I conducted, staff from neither Google nor Facebook 
reflected critically on their potential negative human rights impact, out-
side the company– government axis. Nor are these human rights impacts 
addressed in the context of GNI, which is instrumental in developing 
benchmarks for corporate compliance with human rights law. While both 
172 Rikke Frank Jørgensen
companies are heavily engaged in policy discussions around freedom of 
expression and privacy in a number of policy venues, not least in Wash-
ington and Brussels, these debates have mostly focused on how the compa-
nies may support the Internet freedom agenda (Carr 2013; Morozov 2011; 
Powers and Jablonski 2015) and have rarely involved a critical take on the 
business practices of these major services vis- à- vis human rights. The com-
panies’ potential negative impact on freedom of expression by terms of 
service enforcement, for instance, has only recently started to emerge as 
a policy topic, although it has been flagged as a human rights concern for 
several years, for example, in the Ranking Digital Rights Index. The recent 
Cambridge Analytica/Facebook case, in which Mark Zuckerberg provided 
testimony in a joint hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee and the 
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and then to 
the House Energy and Commerce Committee, marks a significant change 
in this regard, since it explicitly addresses the democratic implications of 
Facebook’s business practices.7
Interestingly, the respondents from both companies describe an orga-
nizational culture that is fairly blunt and open to debate with top- level 
management yet mostly anchored within a technical discourse, for exam-
ple on specific solutions and developments, rather than a critical sociopo-
litical discourse. In addition, from a research perspective both companies 
appeared as closed systems, both in terms of gaining access and in terms 
of the interview situation itself. Such entry and interview barriers are not 
unique to these two companies but well described in the literature on elite 
interviews within corporations (Dexter 2006; Harvey 2011), and in this case 
included difficulty with obtaining contact details of specific staff members, 
circular responses referring me continuously to a single point of contact, 
restrictions on the interview situation itself (no recording of conversations), 
and difficulty in obtaining more elaborated responses. While both compa-
nies have an extensive number of policies available on their website, it was 
difficult to get staff to elaborate on these policies beyond what is already in 
the public domain. In relation to obtaining information from policy doc-
uments vis- à- vis interviews, the interviews provided limited information 
beyond the official policies but rather illustrated the high degree of coher-
ence in the way these issues are presented in corporate policies, official 
statements, and interviews. As for descriptions of internal processes— for 
example, the escalation procedure for content removal— such information 
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was (not surprisingly) treated as confidential and only provided at a very 
general level.
Contrary to recent scholarship on platforms that emphasizes the way 
the economic model, technical design, and platform policies direct social 
practices in certain directions, the findings indicate that Facebook and 
Google staff generally depict their services as neutral platforms that facil-
itate communicative practices among users but have no role in curating 
this communication. The process of coding is described as detached from 
political considerations, and algorithms are described as neutral tools for 
providing the services. “We take all the information that we can find on 
these crawls and we organize them with algorithms. We try very hard not 
to have biases” (Schmidt 2013). “The way that Google makes money is by 
understanding what you want and giving it to you in the moment that 
you want it. We have the technology, the algorithms that can understand 
intent” (Green 2015). Specific algorithms (e.g., the PageRank and EdgeRank 
algorithms) are depicted as important corporate assets, and the respondents 
generally take great pride in the technical innovations produced by their 
respective companies. As for policies, these are spoken of as product guide-
lines, not as measures that essentially influence how expression and privacy 
rights may be exercised. Mark Zuckerberg also emphasized the “neutral 
platform view” in a response to allegations about the role of Facebook in 
spreading fake news that influenced the US presidential election. In his 
response, Zuckerberg stressed that 99 percent of the content users see on 
Facebook is authentic, that Facebook facilitates access to news of all kinds 
but does not “identify truth,” and that the company has no intention of 
becoming “arbiters of truth” (Zuckerberg 2016).
In sum, the first narrative refers to Facebook and Google services as neu-
tral products or platforms guided by a commitment to human rights, and 
free speech in particular. Both companies identify governments as the core 
threat to their users’ rights and freedoms and have established systems and 
processes to secure their services from governmental interference. From this 
perspective, the boundaries of their users’ right to freedom of expression 
and privacy is protected by the companies, whereas there is no acknowl-
edgment of the fact that such rights are vulnerable to intrusion by the com-
panies themselves. In short, Facebook and Google treat their users’ rights 
as part of the Facebook/Google social system, not as outside systems with 
independent borders.
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Second Narrative: Google and Facebook Assist Law Enforcement by 
Removing Illegal Content
In May 2016, the European Commission and social media platforms Face-
book, Microsoft, YouTube, and Twitter agreed on a Code of Conduct to 
tackle hate speech online. With the agreement, the companies committed 
to take the lead on tackling illegal hate speech online. This includes the 
continued development of internal procedures and staff training to guar-
antee that they review the majority of valid notifications for removal of 
illegal hate speech in less than twenty- four hours and remove or disable 
access to such content if necessary. The companies will also strengthen 
their partnerships with civil society organizations that will help flag con-
tent promoting incitement to violence and hateful conduct. The Code of 
Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online adopted between the 
European Commission and Facebook, Microsoft, YouTube, and Twitter 
relates to the second narrative discussed in this chapter— that is, the way 
that company– government cooperation on law enforcement is framed.
In the fight against unwanted content on the Internet (extremism, ter-
ror, hate), governments are increasingly turning to the major online ser-
vices and enlisting their assistance via more or less formalized cooperation. 
From a regulatory perspective, this is not surprising, since the private own-
ership of online communication platforms confronts states with obstacles 
when they seek to sanction speakers or listeners directly. In consequence, 
governments enlist private actors as proxy censors to control the online 
flow of information (Kreimer 2006, 1). Practical measures to control the 
information flow require either cooperation from these companies, com-
monly referred to as “gatekeepers” of the online sphere (Laidlaw 2015), 
or coercion exercised upon them. The policy models that derive from this 
challenge are addressed extensively in the literature on self- and coregula-
tion as mentioned in the Introduction to this volume. Coregulation refers 
to a legal model for public authorities based on the voluntary delegation 
of all or some part of implementation and enforcement of norms to pri-
vate actors. Self- regulation, by contrast, refers to practices whereby private 
actors define, implement, and enforce norms without public intervention 
(Frydman, Hennebel, and Lewkowicz 2008, 133– 134). As addressed in the 
chapters by Land, Callamard, and McGonagle, such policy models carry 
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human rights implications due to the lack of due- process safeguards and 
the risk of overreach by companies.
While the first narrative concerns the way the companies are seen to 
safeguard the freedoms of their users from overreach by governments, this 
narrative relates to their role in assisting law enforcement by removing 
illegal content. The recently adopted EU Code of Conduct is an example 
of such cooperation. The code defines illegal hate speech according to EU 
Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of November 28, 2008, as “all conduct 
publicly inciting to violence or hatred directed against a group of persons 
or a member of such a group defined by reference to race, color, religion, 
descent or national or ethnic origin” (Code of Conduct on Countering Ille-
gal Hate Speech Online 2016, para. 2). The code is not a legally binding doc-
ument but establishes a public commitment for the companies, including 
the requirement to review the majority of valid notifications for removal 
of illegal hate speech in less than twenty- four hours and to make it easier 
for law enforcement to notify the companies directly. Currently, there is no 
uniform definition of what constitutes hate speech around the world, and 
the Framework Decision has been criticized for lack of compliance with 
international standards on freedom of expression.8 When the code was 
launched in June of 2016, public policy staff at both Google and Facebook 
stressed that the code is a continuation of work they are already doing 
in terms of fighting illegal content on their platforms. “We’re committed 
to giving people access to information through our services, but we have 
always prohibited illegal hate speech on our platforms. . . . We are pleased 
to work with the Commission to develop co- and self- regulatory approaches 
to fighting hate speech online” (Junius 2016). “With a global community 
of 1.6 billion people, we work hard to balance giving people the power to 
express themselves whilst ensuring we provide a respectful environment. 
As we make clear in our Community Standards, there’s no place for hate 
speech on Facebook” (Bickert 2016b).
The code is a recent (but not unique) example of the way Internet com-
panies are enlisted to cooperate with law enforcement in the fight against 
illegal content on their services.9 It is also an example of the complex mix of 
legal and nonlegal standards that govern allowed expression and conduct 
on social media platforms. As stressed in the code, enforcement of criminal 
law sanctions against perpetrators of hate speech must be complemented by 
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“actions geared at ensuring that illegal hate speech online is expeditiously 
acted upon by online intermediaries and social media platforms” (Code of 
Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online 2016, para. 6). In other 
words, law enforcement by public authorities must go hand in hand with 
privatized enforcement by companies. As stressed in the code, the increased 
effort to cut down on hate speech online is guided by the companies’ own 
activities (Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online 2016, 
para. 7, my emphasis), and the notification of alleged illegal content is 
assessed against their community standards and “where necessary national 
laws transposing the Framework Decision” (Code of Conduct on Coun-
tering Illegal Hate Speech Online 2016, para. 10, my emphasis). In other 
words, the companies commit to consider expeditiously whether alleged 
illegal content (i.e., hate speech) is to be removed based on their inter-
nally defined community standards, rather than the law on hate speech in 
the country in question. Effectively, this form of coregulatory arrangement 
implies that the EU governments sanction a content- removal process based 
on privately defined standards and enforced by private actors. Hence, com-
panies, rather than courts, decide on the legality of content. As pointed 
out by several commentators, this raises concerns both from a freedom- of- 
expression and a due- process perspective.10 However, from the perspective 
of Google and Facebook, the process is not controversial, as it basically cod-
ifies a practice that is already in place. On the contrary, the code reinforces 
the narrative of assisting legitimate government requests while maintain-
ing full autonomy over the process. As repeatedly stressed by policy staff at 
Facebook and Google, their services cover numerous jurisdictions and so 
the community standards cannot reflect the national law in each country 
where they operate. Rather, the standards represent a commonly agreed- 
upon baseline developed over time. This baseline— the corporate consti-
tution for what is allowed— provides the basis for excluding expressions 
that are potentially unlawful (such as hate speech), as well as those that are 
lawful but unwanted (such as certain categories of nudity, graphic content, 
or misleading information). In short, the decision on when to sanction 
content, remove it, and ultimately close an account is an internal com-
pany decision based on the corporate logic that the community standards 
represent at YouTube and Facebook, respectively. “There’s not one single 
source that provides us with an answer (on hate speech policy). What we 
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have to consider is what is best for the people that are in our community” 
(Bickert 2016a).
The companies’ cooperation with law enforcement on tackling hate 
speech effectively means that the companies have government approval 
for removing content according to the corporate version of what con-
stitutes hate speech. From a social system point of view, the partnership 
constitutes an uneven mix of communicative codes (legal/illegal, profit/
loss). Government practice is driven by a need to target illegal content in 
a domain that they do not control, whereas company practice is guided 
by the need to keep users safe in order to maximize the user base and thus 
profit. Consequently, decisions that should be dealt with by the legal sys-
tem (ideally a court) are transferred to a commercial system and decided 
upon on the basis of legally inspired but commercially defined norms. “To 
expect the kind of heavyweight process you get in the judiciary, or almost 
expect the police and judiciary to intervene in every dispute that you have 
in a domestic space or in one of the public spaces like this, is I think unre-
alistic” (Allan 2013).
In sum, the company narrative on assisting and cooperating with legit-
imate law enforcement serves several purposes. First, it affirms the role of 
the companies as law- abiding and socially responsible corporations that 
commit to assist law enforcement in the countries where they operate. 
Second, voluntary agreements on public– private cooperation, such as the 
one on hate speech, reaffirm the autonomy of the companies in deciding 
exactly how specific categories of unwanted content should be defined 
and processed within the company. In other words, such an agreement 
provides the content removal processes with legitimacy and governmen-
tal approval, while serving the companies’ interest in keeping full con-
trol over the processes that determine how content on their platforms is 
governed.
Third Narrative: Privacy Equals User Control within the Platform
In March 2016, Joe Cannataci, in his position as newly appointed UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy, called for increasing attention toward 
companies’ collection and use of personal data. Cannataci argued that the 
data available for the profiling of individuals is now of an unprecedented 
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magnitude and that the extent of the privacy risks associated with this data 
collection is yet to be understood:
The first 25 years of the existence of the world- wide web have led to a largely 
unregulated organic growth of private corporations. . . . One of the hallmarks of 
this growth has been the collection and use of all forms of personal data: every 
search, every read, every e-mail or other form of messaging, every product or 
service purchased leaves hundreds of thousands of electronic tracks about an indi-
vidual which are capable of being aggregated into forming a very accurate profile 
of that individual’s likes, dislikes, moods, financial capabilities, sexual prefer-
ences, medical condition, shopping patterns as well as the intellectual, political, 
religious and philosophical interests and sometimes even the relevant opinions of 
the netizen. (Cannataci 2016, para. 9)
The third narrative refers to the way privacy is spoken of within the two 
companies. This narrative unfolds against the backdrop of an increasingly 
intense debate on platforms and privacy, raised especially within Europe 
over the past five years, and brought to the forefront of international 
attention by high- profile cases such as the class action Europe v. Facebook 
initiated by Austrian privacy advocate Max Schrems.11 The European focus 
on privacy is also reflected in the new General Data Protection Regula-
tion, which imposes an updated regime of data protection rules on public 
authorities as well as private actors that process personal data of Euro-
pean citizens.12 At the international level, the increased focus on privacy 
is reflected in the appointment of the first UN Special Rapporteur on the 
Right to Privacy in 2015.
When interviewing staff at Google and Facebook, it was remarkable how 
much they emphasized the importance of privacy and acknowledged that 
the many European cases have made it increasingly important to get privacy 
right. “It was a very conscious decision to take privacy more seriously. Not 
only legal compliance, it’s much broader than that. The whole idea of pri-
vacy is core to what Facebook does. But we often have a different approach 
compared to what the other companies do. We are very bold as to product 
development— constantly pushing the use of technology, the limits of what 
you can do” (Facebook interview #8, 2016). “There are people in every cor-
ner of the organization that care deeply about privacy” (Google interview 
#9, 2015). Arguably, awareness around privacy has developed with dedi-
cated subsystems within both organizations. For example, extensive inter-
nal systems of control and governance around compliance with European 
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data protection regulation have been established, including several layers 
of checks and balances to ensure that no product revision or new product is 
released without privacy clearance. “So whenever a new product or feature 
is conceived of, the tech lead for that project has to complete a document 
that includes a lot of information about how information is going to be col-
lected, processed, shared, used, deleted” (Enright 2015). “Every staff mem-
ber gets privacy training when joining the company” (Facebook interview 
#8, 2016). The conversations revealed, however, that the respondents had 
a very specific understanding of privacy— as user choice within the bound-
aries of the platforms, and as protection against outside interference with 
these boundaries.
None of the staff I spoke to related privacy to either specific limits or 
general minimization of data collection by their services.13 Rather, privacy 
is described as the ability of the users to foresee and control the sharing 
of personal information with other users. “Putting people in control is an 
art. Look at the dashboard in a car” (Facebook interview #8, 2016). “To get 
privacy right, to provide a solution of choice— is the leadership mantra” 
(Google interview #8, 2015). As long as users have measures of control, 
interviewees felt there is not a conflict between the right to privacy and 
their company’s collection and sharing of data. When asked to exemplify 
how this user control is implemented, the respondents point to Facebook 
privacy features such as the Facebook Privacy Basics, Privacy Checkup, and 
Accessing and Downloading Your Information, and within Google, fea-
tures such as Incognito Mode, Google Takeout, and the Privacy Dashboard, 
which are repeatedly mentioned as examples of how the idea of user con-
trol is implemented into the design of the platforms.
A privacy issue, however, is seen to arise when someone outside the cor-
porate system demands access to user data. In line with the first narra-
tive, governments are depicted as the main cause of privacy problems. “I 
don’t think a democracy functions when your government collects data 
and doesn’t at least fundamentally say what it’s doing” (Page 2015). “I 
hear people say that it’s okay to give the government all this data because 
you’re giving it to Facebook anyway, and I’d say that’s actually completely 
different, the power relationship between me and Facebook— however 
important Facebook is— is just fundamentally different from the power 
relationship between me and the government” (Allan 2014). In line with 
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the freedom- of- expression safeguards, both companies have subsystems for 
handling government requests for user data, and there is a corporate sense 
of protecting user privacy by pushing back against government requests for 
user data with due diligence standards. “We want to make sure that existing 
legal processes for legitimate government access to data work appropriately 
so that we can push governments to use the front door to use legitimate, 
transparent, accountable legal processes to access information and we will 
not, have not and have no intention of collaborating with any effort to give 
governments information through the back door” (Enright 2015). 
While many respondents were willing to talk about privacy, both in 
terms of tools provided to users and due diligence standards in relation to 
governments, few were willing to discuss the negative privacy impact that 
may arise from a business model based on harnessing users’ personal data. 
My interviews revealed the absence of a more critical corporate discourse 
on the companies’ potential negative human rights impact as a result of 
their business model. Relying on the outlined construction of privacy, the 
respondents saw no conflict between users’ privacy and the massive col-
lection of personal data, as raised by Cannataci in the quote given above. 
The mapping and profiling that inform their business model are seen as an 
industry default and as uncontroversial as long as users are provides with 
means of controlling the flow of their information within the services pro-
vided. “To a significant degree the privacy discourse is paternalizing; people 
share what they want to share” (Google interview #8, 2015). “I don’t see a 
conflict between the business model and privacy provided individual users 
are in control” (Facebook interview #4, 2015).
Whereas Facebook and Google both take great pride in the way their 
services push the boundaries for technosocial innovation, thereby break-
ing new ground for connecting people and information, their approach to 
human rights is conveniently conservative. Despite the explicit commit-
ment to the industry benchmark in the field— the UN Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs)— their practices do not take into 
account the practical implications of this soft- law framework. Whereas the 
UNGPs explicitly call for a human rights impact assessment of all business 
practices that may impact individuals’ enjoyment of human rights, the 
implementation of these principles within the companies only addresses 
cases in which there is government interference with business practices.
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Conclusion
In this final section, I will relate some crosscutting observations on how 
human rights responsibility is governed by the two companies, as well as 
the broader implications of these practices.
First, the analysis pointed to an exclusive focus on governments as the 
cause of human rights violations. While states have a legal obligation to 
respect human rights law, the UNGPs explicitly state that private compa-
nies have a responsibility to assess and mitigate business practices across 
their entire operations for any negative human impact they may cause. 
The framing of human rights within the two companies, however, reduces 
this human rights responsibility to an obligation to safeguard their users 
against government overreach. Corporate practices that have given rise 
to human rights concerns among scholars and activists alike, such as the 
extensive collection of users’ personal data, is not framed as a privacy issue 
within either company. Privacy is constructed in terms of user control and 
pushback strategies against illegitimate government requests for user data, 
rather than as data minimization. Nor is the massive content moderation 
exercised each day, as the platforms govern compliance with their terms of 
service, spoken of as a human rights issue. These critical debates simply do 
not resonate with the human rights framing at Facebook and Google.
Second, the way the EU Code of Conduct enlists the companies to effec-
tively carry out privatized law enforcement on their services normalizes 
a logic whereby decisions on legal/illegal content and behavior are sanc-
tioned by private actors. From the perspective of Google and Facebook, 
cooperating with governments is part of a narrative of serving legitimate 
law- enforcement interests as law- abiding and socially responsible compa-
nies, while effectively the cooperation (Code of Conduct) legitimizes their 
internally defined community standards as the documents governing what 
content is allowed or removed within the boundaries of their services.
Third, despite the numerous policies, algorithms, and governance mech-
anisms that define the boundaries for possible user actions within the Face-
book and Google services, these services are depicted as technically neutral 
products or platforms via which users may communicate, share, search, 
connect, and so forth. As such, there is limited (public) discourse by com-
pany staff on the way specific policies or platform features determine the 
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radius of allowed user action and, in effect, shape users’ means of exercising 
privacy or freedom- of- expression rights. On the contrary, it is emphasized 
that users may at any time choose not to use the products offered or decide 
to leave the platform, while taking their data with them. Whereas scholars 
have called for a repertoire of governance strategies that “sees platforms as 
something other than simply market actors” or “privately owned public 
utilities” (Ananny and Gillespie 2016, 16), my analysis pointed to a dis-
course firmly anchored in free market terminology, emphasizing the right 
of the companies to set and enforce their own terms in a competitive and 
deregulated market.
Finally, from a public policy perspective, it is significant how these ser-
vices are framed. Whereas the notion of infrastructure raises (and legiti-
mizes) expectations of regulation, the notion of platform is anchored in 
a technology/market perspective with essentially different expectations. 
Arguably, Google and Facebook serve as a social infrastructure for billions 
of users, and although they are increasingly referred to as such in the pub-
lic debate, this has not led to regulatory proposals, despite an increasing 
debate on these issues. In the United States, the Federal Trade Commission 
has begun to explore questions of platform governance through algorith-
mic accountability, but thus far there has not been the political will to 
address the broader implications that platforms may have for the social 
and political discourse (Ananny and Gillespie 2016, 2) nor for human 
rights more generally. Despite the fact that these services have an increas-
ing impact on civic life (Moore 2016), their impact on rights of expression, 
access to information, public participation, and so forth have remained 
outside the scope of state regulation. By contrast, their impact on privacy 
and data protection is subjected to relatively detailed regulation in specific 
regions, such as the EU. While the companies acknowledge that they influ-
ence the rights of billions of users worldwide, they refer to their autonomy 
as private actors and require the freedom to set and enforce their own rules 
of engagement. The governance gap with regard to the Internet giants is 
increasingly giving rise to policy concerns, not only in Europe but also in 
the United States, and it will be interesting to see whether events such as 
the Cambridge Analytica/Facebook scandal mark a turning point toward 
regulation of technology giants such as Google and Facebook.
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Notes




5. See, for example, the European Commission’s factcheet on the right to be for-
gotten ruling (C- 131/12) https://www.inforights.im/media/1186/cl_eu_commission 
_factsheet_right_to_be-forgotten.pdf.
6. In June 2018, the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression issued a the-
matic report to the Human Rights Council on the regulation of user- generated online 
content. The rapporteur recommends among others things that companies apply 
human rights standards at all stages of their operation. The report is available at 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/FreedomOpinion/Pages/ContentRegulation.aspx.
7. Transcript of Zuckerberg’s appearance before the House Energy and Commerce 
Committee April  11, 2018: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/
wp/2018/04/11/transcript-of-zuckerbergs-appearance-before-house-committee.
8. For a critical assessment of the Framework Decision in relation to interna-
tional standards on freedom of expression, see the brief by Article 19; “EU: Euro-
pean Commission’s Code of Conduct for Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online 
and the Framework Decision”, June 2016. https://www.article19.org/resources/
eu-european-commissions-code-of-conduct-for-countering-illegal-hate-speech 
-online-and-the-framework-decision.
9. See, for example, Europol’s work with IT companies, covered in EDRi- gram, May 
18, 2016: https://edri.org/europol-non-transparent-cooperation-with-it-companies.
10. See, for example, the brief by Article 19; “EU: European Commission’s Code of 
Conduct for Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online and the Framework Decision”, 
June 2016. https://www.article19.org/resources/eu-european-commissions-code-of 
-conduct-for-countering-illegal-hate-speech-online-and-the-framework-decision.
11. See http://europe-v-facebook.org/EN/en.html.
12. See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2016.119 
.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ:L:2016:119:TOC.
13. These are established data protection principles and part of the EU’s General 
Data Protection Regulation.
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The third part of the book looks at the human rights challenges raised 
by datafication and platforms from a legal perspective. It examines the 
human rights obligations of non-state actors such as digital platforms and 
explores options for a stronger framework of protection (Callamard). It 
considers how a regional human rights institution, Council of Europe, 
have dealt with Internet intermediaries from a freedom- of- expression and 
rule- of- law perspective (McGonagle) and explores challenges to protecting 
online privacy, including the tension between the approaches taken in the 
United States and Europe (Van Hoboken). Finally, it proposes how content 
moderation can be addressed under human rights law, and more generally, 
what a human- rights- based framework could look like for Internet inter-
mediaries (Land).

8 The Human Rights Obligations of Non- State Actors
Agnès Callamard
Introduction
In a world dominated by news of states’ violations of human rights, includ-
ing by encroaching on the digital space to track activists or control political 
expression, it is easy to forget or downplay the fact that many non- state 
actors, such as corporations, wield far more power, influence, and reach 
than a number of governments. This includes the power to do good and 
bring much needed benefits to populations, as it does the power to cause 
great harm, alone or in complicity with states, and often enough inter-
nationally. “Externally, NSAs [non- state actors] are no longer confined 
within the territory of a single State but actively operate across national 
borders. . . . As a result, States now have less control, let alone a monopoly, 
over developments both within their own territory and at the international 
level” (International Law Association 2016; see also Drake, Cerf, and Klein-
wächter 2016).
The large- scale privatization of state activities and competencies, includ-
ing law and order, the overall globalization process, which has weakened 
the factual power of the state, and evidence pointing to the multiplication 
of actors engaged in a variety of acts, including transborder acts, amounting 
to violations of human rights— these have all compelled many, particularly 
within civil society, to call for greater accountability on the part of non- 
state actors and greater recognition of their human rights obligations, from 
the 1990s onward. Such calls resulted in a number of initiatives to address 
the responsibility of these actors, and in so doing mitigate accountability 
deficits (Ruggie 2013).
Such arguments apply with particular force to the field of the Internet 
in the twenty- first century, the “geography- defying” sector if ever there 
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was one, challenging the realities and legal constructs of boundaries and 
sovereignty. As argued elsewhere (Callamard 2017a), the state was largely 
absent from the early decades of Internet development, with technologists 
and academics first and Internet companies second largely dominating the 
field, including in terms of its regulation. While there is no doubt that the 
state is now a far more central actor, certainly in terms of regulating the dig-
ital space and the online actors (de La Chapelle and Fehlinger 2016; Drake, 
Cerf, and Kleinwächter 2016), it is not, by any stretch, the sole one. Nor is 
it, necessarily or everywhere, the most powerful one. Internet intermedi-
aries1 are currently powering this extraordinary technological, social, and 
economic revolution. The benefits it has brought to humankind are incon-
testable. So is the vast power some of these companies hold over the global 
data economy and the production and circulation of news and informa-
tion, as well as over individuals and commercial entities. Largely mirroring 
the 1990s process regarding business and human rights, there have been 
an increasing number of calls for intermediaries to protect human rights 
online, in the first place freedom of expression but also the right to privacy 
(Article 19 2017; Kaye 2017; MacKinnon et al. 2014). States too have been 
particularly vocal, demanding that intermediaries protect the digital space 
against content inciting terrorism or hate speech or that violates interna-
tional copyright law. The outcome, so far, has not quite matched the efforts 
and the rhetoric, and the digital space is slowly transforming into a battle-
field, with human rights protection one of its victims.
This chapter focuses on the protection of freedom of expression in the 
online world and on the role of Internet intermediaries in protecting and 
abusing human rights online, including freedom of expression. The focus 
on Internet intermediaries is not meant to suggest that they are the “worst” 
abusers of free speech online. As argued elsewhere (Callamard 2017a, 
2017b), this is far from being the case, with states around the world seeking 
to control and censor legitimate expressions online. The focus on Internet 
intermediaries in the violations of freedom of expression online is meant 
to respond to the legal and normative gaps resulting from the centrality 
of these non- state actors in the expansion, regulation, and censorship of 
information and expression. This chapter argues that Internet intermedi-
aries have human rights obligations, different from those of states, which 
should, ideally, be set in hard international law. Alternatively, failing that, 
they ought to be established in meaningful and effective self- regulatory 
The Human Rights Obligations of Non- State Actors 193
mechanisms. The chapter will trace these obligations to international treaty 
provisions; to the treatment of intermediaries as international human rights 
law duty bearer; and to their role in influencing, if not shaping, normative 
development. It will offer an overview of some of the recent broader devel-
opments as far as non- state actors’ human rights obligations are concerned 
and assess how these compare to what happened in the Internet field. It 
will conclude with a set of recommendations.
The Inclusion of Non- State Actors in the Post– World War II International 
Freedom- of- Expression Protection Regime
The provisions adopted to protect freedom of expression under the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) do not explicitly refer to non- state 
actors, be it the media, private individuals, or others. ICCPR Article 19(3), 
however, does include a reference to the “special duties and responsibilities” of 
those whose right to freedom of expression must be respected and protected. 
This is a clause which either has been largely ignored in the years since the 
ICCPR adoption or has been used rhetorically, politically, and ideologically 
to insist that “speakers,” including the media, have responsibilities, without 
further elaboration. To offer a possible explanation of the terms, I will have 
recourse to the UDHR and ICCPR travaux préparatoires to determine who or 
what the drafters had in mind. In the following sections, I will consider the 
possible meaning of the clauses in the current context by turning to national 
and regional jurisprudence regarding Internet intermediaries.
As early as 1946, at its very first session, the UN General Assembly 
adopted Resolution 59(I), which states “Freedom of information is a funda-
mental human right and . . . the touchstone of all the freedoms to which 
the United Nations is consecrated” (UN General Assembly 1946). The res-
olution goes on to stress that “understanding and co- operation among 
nations are impossible without an alert and sound world opinion which, in 
turn, is wholly dependent upon freedom of information.” The resolution 
(which calls for an international conference on freedom of information) 
conceives of freedom of information as both a fundamental human right 
and a precondition for global “understanding.”
The importance of information to peace (and conflict) immediately after 
World War II is reflected in the UN’s attempts at the time to adopt three 
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related conventions: on freedom of information, on the gathering and 
international transmission of news, and on an international right of reply. 
The now long forgotten draft convention on the international transmis-
sion of news and the right of correction (UN General Assembly 1949, 22) 
was seeking to protect the work of foreign correspondents and news agen-
cies while giving states “directly affected by a report which they considered 
false or distorted” the possibility of securing corrections. The driving force 
behind the convention was the perception then that inaccurate report-
ing posed clear dangers to the maintenance of friendly relations among 
nations. Member states at the time recognized that such a danger could 
not be addressed “at present” by instituting, at the international level, a 
procedure for verifying the accuracy of a report. Instead, the drafters go on 
to suggest that to prevent the publication of such reports or reduce their 
pernicious effects, “it is above all necessary to promote a wide circulation of 
news and to heighten the sense of responsibility of those regularly engaged 
in the production of news” (UN General Assembly 1949, 23). They also 
suggested a rather complicated process of corrections, involving the UN 
Secretary General and ultimately a right of reprisal if a member state failed 
to uphold a correction. The draft convention was reinvented on a couple 
of occasions but subsequently abandoned, a fate that also beset similar ini-
tiatives at the time, including a UK- led Convention on Freedom of Infor-
mation first adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1949 and abandoned 
afterward.
These attempts are nevertheless of particular interest because of their 
focus on private individuals (the journalists) and companies (the media) 
and the notion that the publication of false and distorted news had “per-
nicious” effects, which needed to be addressed through a treaty. In the 
aftermath of World War II, the complex relationship between states, infor-
mation, and non- state actors certainly was one of the issues dominating the 
international agenda.
The development of the UDHR and the ICCPR were initiated at the same 
time. The expectation was that the UDHR and the ICCPR would be pro-
claimed shortly after one another with the UDHR offering universal and 
concise principles, elaborated upon by the ICCPR. While this dual track was 
ultimately respected, twenty years ended up separating the adoption of the 
two documents.
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The drafting of the UDHR article on freedom of expression and that of 
the ICCPR were initiated together, largely driven by the Sub- Commission 
on Freedom of Information and of the Press and of the International Con-
ference on Freedom of Information and of the Press, which ended up pro-
viding various advice and feedback to the drafting committees tasked with 
developing and agreeing on the wording of the UDHR and ICCPR.
Article 19 of the UDHR ended up proclaiming that “Everyone has the 
right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to 
hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart infor-
mation and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.” The indi-
viduals involved in drafting UDHR Article 19 (initially, an Article 17) over 
two years or so debated thoroughly a range of issues (Schabas 2013). These 
included the role of non- state actors. Drafters discussed the fact that gov-
ernments alone were not responsible for censorship but that private groups 
too prevented access to means of communication of ideas, radio stations 
and time on air. At issue was not whether this was correct (there was no 
debate on this issue) but whether this should be reflected in the UDHR. 
Ultimately, member states’ representatives agreed that the focus of the dec-
laration was the “moral obligations of governments,” not the “question 
of monopolies.” The basis for rejecting the inclusion of non- state actors, 
particularly media corporations, was thus not substantial but rather proce-
dural: such a focus would involve “going in too much detail” and the focus 
of the declaration was “a succinct statement of principles.” Similar con-
clusions were reached regarding the discussion on individuals and others’ 
responsibilities, a theme particularly favored by the French delegate, who 
repeatedly insisted that freedom of expression entailed duties.2
The drafters of Article 19 of the ICCPR returned to both themes, which 
ended up being reflected in the final wording. The twenty- year process can-
not be thoroughly described here (see also Land 2013). For the purpose of 
this chapter, the following debates are highlighted (Bossuyt 1987).
The adopted version of Article 19 of the ICCPR reads as follows:
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include 
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regard-
less of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or 
through any other media of his choice.
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3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with 
it special duties and responsibilities [italics added]. It may therefore be subject to 
certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are 
necessary:
a. For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
b. For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or 
of public health or morals.
There was discussion on whether to retain the expression “freedom to 
seek” with some states arguing that “seek had come to imply unrestrained 
and often shameless probing into the affairs of others, while gather, far 
from having any passive connotations, merely lacked the aggressive con-
notations of seek.” The amendment (put forward by Ethiopia, Ghana, 
India, Libya, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) also suggested replacing 
“through any other media of his choice” with “any lawfully operated visual 
or auditory devices of his choice.” The proposal was rejected, and the cur-
rent wording, to this day, offers an inspiring and visionary protection to 
freedom of expression in the online world, along with a strong normative 
basis for access to government- held information.
It was suggested that freedom of expression should be protected “against 
interference by governmental action, save as provided in paragraph 3.” This 
would have been added to the end of paragraph 2 but was rejected because 
“private financial interests and monopoly control of media and informa-
tion could be as harmful to the free flow of information as government 
interference, and that the latter should therefore not be singled out to the 
exclusion of the former” (Bossuyt 1987, 385). In her in- depth interpretation 
of Article 19(2), relying on both the travaux préparatoires and the textual 
analysis of the article, Molly K. Land (2013, 445) argues that the drafting 
history of Article 19(2) suggests that there is a basis for applying it directly 
to the conduct of private actors, in other words, that these may be treated 
like state actors in some instances (ibid., 447):
Private actors do not trigger the application of Article 19(2) unless and until they 
interfere with a protected right. In most instances, private activity will not rise 
to this level. For example, if one hosting service declines to display my content, 
there are plenty of other services for me to choose from. In that instance, the 
intermediary has “interfered” with my right to seek, receive, and impart ideas and 
information. When, however, an intermediary assumes such a dominant mar-
ket position that its decision not to display my content means that I effectively 
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cannot reach a meaningful audience, that intermediary is “interfering” with my 
right and must justify its decision according to the three- step test of Article 19(3).
Article 19(3) is introduced with a strong statement about the duties and 
responsibilities that the exercise of freedom of expression entails: “The 
exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with 
it special duties and responsibilities.” A number of states opposed the men-
tion of duties and responsibilities because the purpose of the covenant was 
to “guarantee civil and political rights” rather than impose duties upon 
individuals (Bossuyt 1987, 386). They also argued that the purpose of the 
ICCPR was to lay down rights and the corresponding obligations of states, 
and that there was no other article in the covenant that included such 
formulation, even though it could be said that each right had also cor-
responding duties. In contrast, the view that came to prevail maintained 
that “freedom of expression was a precious heritage as well as a dangerous 
instrument; that in view of the powerful influence the modern media of 
expression exerted upon the minds of men and upon national and inter-
national affairs, the duties and responsibilities in the exercise of the right 
to freedom of expression should be especially emphasized” (Bossuyt 1987, 
386). Ultimately, the addition of the word “special” before “duties and 
responsibilities” closed the debate, although how “special” these were was 
not the object of further clarifications.
A central debate concerned the legitimate restrictions to freedom of 
expression. There were no debates seemingly as to whether restrictions 
should be imposed, but on how these should be listed and of course what 
these should be. Some states favored an all- encompassing, general word-
ing while others preferred a full catalogue of restrictions. Indeed, one of 
the drafts submitted included some thirty possible limitations to freedom 
of expression. The advocates of a general clause argued that a specific list 
will be far too long and should be included in a separate convention— not 
in the ICCPR. Those in support of a long list feared that a general clause 
could be the object of abusive interpretations and that, to be effective at 
protecting rights, the covenant should set forth in precise and unequivocal 
terms the permissible limitations to freedom of expression. There were also 
debates regarding the limitations of freedom of expression when expression 
amounts to war propaganda, incitement to violence, and so forth. These 
were rejected for the time being at least on the ground that they could 
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not be well defined. Ultimately, the adopted formulation reflects a balance 
between those who favored a general clause and those who preferred a list, 
although clearly the formulation is closer to laying down general principles 
for limitations.
At the end of this brief overview, the following conclusions may be high-
lighted. First, throughout the travaux préparatoires, the drafters have dis-
cussed the option of including non- state actors (particularly “monopolies”) 
as a duty bearer alongside states. This is well reflected in the discussion 
relative to Article 19 of the UDHR as well as Article 19(3) of the ICCPR. 
There is an explicit recognition of the power and monopoly that private 
actors may exercise over the media, a control which could be as harmful as 
government interference. However, this explicit recognition did not result 
in suggesting that private actors bear the same obligations as those of the 
state. This option was implicitly, if not explicitly, rejected in the course of 
the discussion regarding Article 19(3).
Second, it is as rights holders that non- state actors have “special duties 
and responsibilities.” It is then incumbent upon the state (the duty bearer 
under Article 19(2)) to respond to failures by rights holders to uphold their 
special responsibilities, through regulation, which, to be legitimate, must 
follow the so- called three- part test.
Third, the travaux préparatoires indicate different types of non- state 
actors with specific duties and responsibilities: there are private individ-
uals but also private financial interests and monopolies controlling the 
media. Debates accompanying the development of the three aforemen-
tioned conventions indicate that individual journalists and the media in a 
more general sense were also strong objects of interest and interventions. 
Land (2013, 407) demonstrates that the reference to the media under Arti-
cle 19(2) may be said to include new technologies, including the Internet, 
that have emerged since the adoption of the ICCPR: “The party’s intention 
that the term ‘media’ evolve over time and be interpreted with reference to 
current facts is clear from the text itself. The parties chose to use the general 
term ‘media’ instead of more specific terms referring to particular technol-
ogies.” Consequently, “media” might be understood as “any technology 
that allows individuals to connect with information and expression and 
with one another.” Non- state actors thus include all those who control the 
technology, from newspaper owners to Internet intermediaries, and corpo-
rate actors that may control them, along with individual or private citizens. 
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A textual analysis of Article 19 and a review of the travaux préparatoires 
further suggest that duties and responsibilities attached to these non- state 
actors are not one and the same but “specific.” They are distinct from the 
obligations imposed upon states, and they are distinct from one non- state 
actor to another.
In subsequent developments, highlighted below, the duties and responsi-
bilities of non- state actors have tended to be played down, if not ignored, by 
scholars, lawyers, and governments but also regional courts which tended 
to focus on protecting freedom of expression against state censorship and 
on guarding Article 19 and human rights more generally against spurious 
and nonuniversalist interpretations.3 Before returning to freedom of expres-
sion online, the following section will present the legal and theoretical 
developments regarding the human rights obligations of non- state actors.
Developments: Non- State Actors and Human Rights Obligations
Academic legal debates have gone on for years as to whether human rights 
obligations should be extended to non- state actors. Many international 
lawyers and scholars argue that corporations do not have international 
legal personality and therefore cannot be treated as subjects of interna-
tional human rights law; they warn against the dilution of international 
human rights law and point out that non- state actors, including businesses, 
are already the objects of international human rights law largely through 
a focus on the role of the state to prevent violations by third parties. In 
contrast, others have questioned the obsession with the centrality of inter-
national legal personality (Alston 2005) or its hegemonic interpretation 
(Clapham 2006; Higgin 1994; Reinisch 2005), pointing to an outdated 
vision and an intrinsic lack of imagination and suggesting that whether 
non- state actors have international duties depends largely on their capac-
ity to bear such obligations (Clapham 2006, 68– 69, 2017b). The distinct 
issue of jurisdiction has also been hotly debated. The result, as summed 
up in 2016 by a panel of eminent legal experts who reviewed non- state 
actors under the law, is that “the ascension of NSAs is not yet adequately 
reflected in international law nor led to another wave of pluralization rati-
one personae of this law. . . . Thus, though factually interconnected, States 
and NSAs remain normatively separated at the international level” (Inter-
national Law Association 2016, 11).
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In the remaining part of this section, I will review the legal and doctrinal 
developments that indicate a path forward in terms of including (some) 
non- state actors in a human rights framework and holding them to account 
as duty bearers.
Criminal and Civil Law
It should be first noted that non- state actors, including Internet interme-
diaries, may be and have been held accountable under legal regimes other 
than human rights, such as civil and criminal law. In Europe, the national 
courts of many member states have imposed criminal accountability on 
companies, although not for their extraterritorial acts. Under certain juris-
dictions, a corporation can be held criminally responsible for the conduct 
of its employees. Criminal responsibility is thus transferred from an agent 
or employee to the corporation itself, while the agent or employee remains 
responsible for the crime committed (Heyns 2016).
Regulating corporate behavior, however, may demand legal liability 
beyond national borders and across corporate groups. There, the develop-
ments are ambiguous at best. In Europe, for instance, both corporate crim-
inal laws and civil tort lack extraterritorial reach, making it difficult for 
companies to be held accountable for extraterritorial abuses (Kirshner 2015, 
13– 18). Cases alleging extraterritorial liability of corporations or banks are 
routinely dismissed or settled out of court (United Nations Environmental 
Programme [UNEP] Finance Initiative and Foley Hoag LLP 2015; Yeginsu 
and Jones 2016). Under US tort law, it had been possible, albeit difficult, 
to hold international corporate actors to account for violations commit-
ted elsewhere. However, in 2013, in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co, the 
US Supreme Court reduced the extraterritorial scope of the US Alien Tort 
Statute by demanding that claims touch and concern the territory of the 
United States “with sufficient force to displace the presumption against 
extraterritorial application.” According to Kirshner (2015), the withdrawal 
of the US tort law jurisdiction has produced a governance gap, which the 
EU or others must or could fill.
Non- State Actors Can Violate Human Rights
Under international human rights law, there seems to be emerging consen-
sus that non- state actors may engage in behaviors amounting to human 
rights violations or abuses. While particularly true as far as armed groups 
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are concerned, corporations too have been found to be abusing interna-
tional human rights standards, in the first place those related to workers’ 
rights, the prohibition of forced labor or the forced relocation of commu-
nities from their lands (UNEP Finance Initiative and Foley Hoag LLP 2015; 
Yeginsu and Jones 2016).4
The prevailing view, though, is that corporations are not said to have 
human rights obligations in the legal sense of the word. The state (prin-
cipally of a company’s country of incorporation) does. It is the state that 
is under the legal human rights obligation to prevent abuses by these cor-
porations. Practically, this means that states are obligated to put in place 
regulative and legislative frameworks that ensure that private companies, 
including Internet intermediaries, act in a manner respectful of human 
rights and are held accountable in instances in which they do not, regard-
less of whether the contracting party is the state itself (Heyns 2016, 65). 
Further, under the prevalent interpretation of international human rights 
responsibilities, states’ responsibilities to respect and protect human rights, 
including freedom of expression, can apply extraterritorially, even though 
some states dispute this interpretation.5
Non- State Actors Should Respect Human Rights
There is also increasing consensus that corporations should at the very least 
respect human rights (Pillay 2009, 63– 68). This understanding is particu-
larly reflected in the large development of international or sector- specific 
soft- law regulations and codes of conduct focusing on strengthening 
human- rights- based self- regulation and accountability. This includes, for 
instance, the work of the Special Representative of the Secretary- General on 
the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other busi-
ness enterprises, John Ruggie, culminating in the development of the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights adopted by the Human 
Rights Council in 2011 (UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights 2011).
The Guiding Principles’ framework rests on three pillars: the state has 
a duty to protect against human rights abuses by third parties, including 
business enterprises, through appropriate policies, regulation, and adjudi-
cation; business enterprises should act with due diligence to avoid infring-
ing on the rights of others and address adverse impacts with which they are 
involved; and victims should have greater access to effective remedy, both 
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judicial and nonjudicial (Ruggie 2010, 54– 78; UN General Assembly 2008). 
Corporation acting with due diligence should seek to identify, prevent, and 
mitigate “human rights risks,” defined as the corporations’ potential viola-
tions of international human rights standards, including with regard to the 
corporations’ customers, workers, or society at large. The corporate respon-
sibility to respect human rights, including freedom of expression, has been 
further recognized in soft- law instruments such as the Tripartite Declara-
tion of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, 
the Organisation for Economic Co- operation and Development Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises, and a vast number of initiatives related to 
corporate social responsibility, which are largely self- regulatory.
Importantly, the Guiding Principles have been cited in a range of state- 
initiated policies, such as those of the Council of Europe regarding Inter-
net companies. For instance, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe explicitly refers to the Guiding Principles and other self- regulatory 
schemes to suggest the following:
The corporate social responsibility of online service providers includes a com-
mitment to combating hate speech and other content that incites violence or 
discrimination. Online service providers should be attentive to the use of, and 
editorial responses to, expressions motivated by racist, xenophobic, anti- Semitic, 
misogynist, sexist (including as regards Lesbian Gay Bisexual and Transgender 
people) or other bias. (Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe 2014)
While not legally binding, the Committee of Ministers recommendations 
are still legal instruments with legal significance.6 These examples testify 
as well to the fact that self- regulatory, nonbinding norms of the kind pro-
duced by and for corporate actors may have the potential to harden over 
time. For example, they may inform legal reasoning and jurisprudence by 
domestic or regional courts, they may be incorporated into legislation, 
they might become the basis for an international treaty, and they can be 
included as binding clauses in private party contracts (UNEP Finance Initia-
tive and Foley Hoag LLP 2015, 53– 55).
Non- State Actors Should Be Held Accountable for Human  
Rights Violations
There have been a few judicial developments regarding non- state actors’ 
human rights obligations, which merit attention because of their possible 
implications for the online world and its corporate actors.
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The draft articles adopted by the International Law Commission in 2001 
on the responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts (Interna-
tional Law Commission 2001) identify four instances when the acts of a 
private entity may be directly attributed to the state. As pointed by Alston 
(2005, 24), the articles are essentially neutral with regard to the responsi-
bilities of non- state actors in that “they neither discourage nor seek to pro-
mote those trends which favor an enhanced role for non- state actors. . . . 
By the same token, they leave the door open for further developments in 
the future.”
Other developments, though, have moved in the direction of holding 
non- state actors directly liable for human rights violations. These have 
tended to concern themselves with core human rights obligations, such as 
the right to life; the absolute prohibition of torture, cruel, inhuman, and 
degrading treatment; the recruitment of child soldiers; the prohibition of 
slavery; and the prohibition of enforced disappearance, as well as freedom 
of conscience. But other rights have been considered as well.
First, as demonstrated by Heyns (2016), a number of jurisprudence 
decisions have confirmed that it is the nature of the conduct, and not the 
entity, that will determine whether or not international human rights law 
is applicable, thus suggesting that international human rights law does not 
exclusively govern the conduct of states (Heyns 2016, 108; Kadic v. Karadzic, 
Sosa v. Alvarez- Machain).
Second, there is increasing support for the view that non- state actors, as 
a group, including armed groups and corporations, have a binding obliga-
tion to obey jus cogens and not to engage in conduct amounting to inter-
national crimes (UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry 
2012, 106– 107). The International Criminal Court jurisprudence supports 
the proposition that non- state actors may be viewed as carrying out crimes 
against humanity provided they meet the requirements of constituting “an 
organization” (International Criminal Court 2010; see also Open Society 
Foundations 2016). The African Union Head of States in 2014 adopted a 
treaty establishing the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, accord-
ing to which corporations could be prosecuted for certain international 
crimes (Clapham, 2018). The protocol applies to fourteen crimes,7 which, 
on the surface, may not seem relevant to the operations of companies pro-
viding access to the Internet or social media. On the other hand, various 
developments regarding online “terrorism,” cybercrime, and cyberwarfare 
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impact on all the crimes identified by the African Union. Andrew Clapham 
further suggests that the new protocol comes close to resolving the issues 
of how to tackle corporate intention, attribution, and corporate knowledge, 
further suggesting a doctrinal milestone.
Finally, there are also suggestions that armed groups have a range of 
human rights obligations in the territories they control, including obliga-
tions regarding the rule of law (Clapham 2017; the author argues that armed 
groups have human rights obligations related to fair trial and punishment). 
Such obligations may also include freedom of expression. For instance, 
Ben Emmerson, the Special Rapporteur on the Protection of Human Rights 
while Countering Terrorism, has argued that where the Islamic State of Iraq 
and the Levant (ISIL) engages in violations that are unrelated to the conflict 
and not direct consequences of it, the governing legal framework should be 
international human rights law. In practice, this means that ISIL is legally 
bound to respect freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, and freedom 
of movement. These rights should be protected without discrimination on 
any of the grounds prohibited by international law. The right to a fair trial 
should also be guaranteed. He further suggested “the more effective control 
ISIL has over a territory or individuals, the greater is the extent to which 
human rights law will constitute the appropriate legal framework” (Emmer-
son 2015, 30– 31).
Human Rights Obligations of Non- State Actors in the Online World
Since its adoption, the protection of freedom of expression has been the 
object of a range of analyses and litigation in domestic, regional, and inter-
national courts. Most of these have largely focused, at least until recently, 
on states’ obligation to protect the right to freedom of expression and infor-
mation, and to respect it, including against actions by non- state actors, 
such as armed groups or others targeting journalists for killings.
Internet intermediaries had been somewhat shielded from accusations 
that they too violate human rights, thanks to two forces. The first was cul-
tural and ideological: a number of states and civil society, until the late 
twentieth century at least, saw intermediaries as the main vehicle for, and 
allies in, the protection and expansion of freedom of information. This 
was, and remains to a certain extent, a reasonable conclusion. These actors 
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have been central to the development of the Internet, the first technology 
ever to potentially realize the vision of the UDHR Article 19 of a borderless 
freedom. Critiques were few and far between in the first decades of Internet 
development. Nongovernmental organizations and activists have largely 
focused their efforts on denouncing censorship by the state and less fre-
quently on the failure of the state to prevent censorship by others. By so 
doing, the press freedom field has followed conventional interpretations of 
international law according to which human rights law binds states only: 
non- state actors are not considered subjects of international law. Toward 
the end of twentieth century, however, a few voices started raising concerns 
regarding these actors’ business model and the transformation of the global 
economy and society unleashed by technology (see Callamard 2017a and 
2017b for an overview).
The second factor was linked to the various liability regimes devised 
by states for the purpose of managing the regulation of online content. 
With notable exceptions discussed below, Internet intermediaries have 
been largely immune from liability regarding content produced online by 
others. In the United States, there is a broad immunity regime that has 
granted them immunity from liability for third- party content, while in 
some other areas (Europe, Latin America, and India, notably), the so- called 
safe harbor regime has granted intermediaries immunity, provided they act 
“expeditiously” to remove or disable access to “illegal” information when 
they obtain actual knowledge of such content. China and other countries 
in Asia, on the other hand, are enforcing a strict liability regime, accord-
ing to which Internet intermediaries are liable for content produced by 
others— that is, third- party content. In practice, this requires of intermedi-
aries that they monitor all content in order to comply with the law: “if they 
fail to do so, they face a variety of sanctions, including the withdrawal of 
their business licence and/or criminal penalties” (Article 19 2013, 7).
In practice, though, the different liability regimes may coexist in a sin-
gle country. For instance, Europe has devised two, possibly three,8 different 
legal regimes that are applicable to Internet intermediaries, depending on 
the nature of the issue or right (copyright, data protection, right to pri-
vacy) and the nature of the intermediaries (passive or mere messengers vs. 
active or indeed publishers), a diversity which has weakened the presump-
tion of immunity.
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Internet Intermediaries Can Violate Human Rights
Increasingly, the tacit understanding that non- state actors are human rights 
allies has broken down, replaced with increasing skepticism regarding these 
actors’ human rights benevolence, if not outright rejection. In the early 
twenty- first century, these non- state actors have morphed into some of 
the largest and most influential monopolies in the world, while their busi-
ness model demands the collection, analysis, and sale of personal data, not 
unlike a form of untargeted surveillance on a global scale. These realiza-
tions have compelled many within the freedom- of- expression community, 
along with courts and governments, to question and challenge the human 
rights behavior of these corporate actors.
Corporations operating in countries with a strict liability regime, such as 
China, have been accused of complicity in human rights violations. At the 
time of writing this chapter, for instance, Apple has removed its VPN app 
from its China App store, creating “one of the biggest setbacks for the free 
internet in China’s history” (Russell 2017). Yahoo! has been the object of 
a number of accusations and lawsuits for giving information about online 
activities to Chinese law enforcement, leading to the detention of activists. 
Under the aforementioned US tort law, Yahoo! has been accused of know-
ingly and willfully aiding and abetting the commission of torture and other 
human rights abuses. An earlier case was settled out of court with Yahoo! 
agreeing to establish a fund “to provide humanitarian and legal aid to dis-
sidents who have been imprisoned for expressing their views online.” Sub-
sequently, a Yahoo! shareholder and a Chinese activist have filed a lawsuit 
alleging misappropriation of the fund’s assets by the managers of Yahoo! 
Human Rights Fund (Business & Human Rights Center 2014).
In places where the notice and takedown regime is in place, Internet 
intermediaries too have been attacked for their alleged involvement in 
abuses of freedom of expression. One critique addressed to intermediaries 
is of willingly or cowardly acting as the state’s proxy to regulate and censor 
content,9 a process linked to the privatization of censorship (Kreimer 2006, 
16– 22). Evgeny Morozov, who has written with deep skepticism about the 
democratic potential of the Internet, wrote, for instance, “Being able to 
force companies to police the Web according to state- dictated guidelines is 
a dream come true for any government. The companies must bear all the 
costs, do all the dirty work, and absorb the users’ ire. Companies also are 
more likely to catch unruly content, as they are more decentralized and 
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know their own online communities better than do the state’s censors” 
(Morozov 2012). An often- heard critique is that intermediaries are over-
zealous in their “regulatory role,” perceived increasingly as amounting to 
censorship. The then UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression well 
captured this phenomenon in a 2011 report when he wrote that “given 
that intermediaries may still be held financially or in some cases criminally 
liable if they do not remove content upon receipt of notification by users 
regarding unlawful content, they are inclined to err on the side of safety by 
over censoring potentially illegal content” (La Rue 2011).
On the other hand, intermediaries have also been accused of being too 
slow in removing problematic content such as hate speech, expression 
allegedly amounting to bullying or harassment, or more recently “fake 
news,” or failing to remove it at all. Platforms such as Facebook and Twitter 
in particular have found themselves at the center of multiple controversies 
linked to their policies on hate speech or “fake news” (see, for instance, 
Hopkins 2017; ProPublica 2017). States too have been particularly aggres-
sive in pursuing intermediaries and insisting that they remove “terrorist” 
content or “fake news” in particular (The Guardian 2016).
At issue here is the exponential growth of the online space along with 
the business models of the intermediaries, centered on data production, 
circulation, and sale, these intermediaries’ self- image and normative 
framework as freedom- of- expression advocates (Jørgensen 2017), and the 
many contradictory pressures they are confronting. Altogether, these have 
resulted in potential abuses of both substantive and procedural rights. Sub-
stantively, it is often unclear which content is likely to be taken down by 
intermediaries and on which basis. Procedurally, the process lacks essential 
guarantees, such as a right of appeal or the involvement of a court backing 
the takedown demand from a public agency or another user. The result is 
a move away from the legitimate regulation of “illegitimate” content laid 
out by the ICCPR and regional conventions toward a censorship regime 
governed by non- state actors as the censor (by proxy or otherwise), arbi-
trariness, and lack of due process, as also addressed extensively by Molly K. 
Land in this volume.
The notion that Internet intermediaries can abuse human rights has 
also been addressed through formal judicial processes. Internet corpora-
tions have been held accountable under criminal or civil law throughout 
the world, including under charges that are directly related to the exercise 
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of freedom of expression. There are, by now, thousands of cases, which 
touch on the exercise of online freedom of expression and implicate Inter-
net intermediaries.10
One category of cases, rare but worth highlighting, is that of individual 
users charging Internet companies with censorship. In the United States, 
such claims are very unlikely to succeed because Internet companies’ deci-
sions to remove content, or, in the case of Google, to rank it, are consti-
tutionally protected speech, akin to the decisions of a newspaper editor 
regarding which content to publish: “The First Amendment protects these 
decisions, whether they are fair or unfair, or motivated by profit or altru-
ism” (E- Ventures Worldwide, LLC v. Google, Inc. 2016). In Europe, such cases 
are at least more likely to get a full hearing. One such case concerns a French 
teacher who posted an image of Gustave Courbet’s “L’Origine du Monde” 
on his Facebook page. Facebook suspended Durand- Baissas’s account for 
five years on the grounds that it violated the company’s terms and condi-
tions on nudity. Durand- Baissas subsequently sued Facebook France first 
and then Facebook Incorporated demanding that his account be reacti-
vated. Facebook Incorporated, for its part, argued that the French courts 
did not have jurisdiction over the matter, and that under its terms of ser-
vice, only a specific court in California, where Facebook is headquartered, 
could rule over this lawsuit. The social network also argued that French 
consumer- rights law does not apply to French Facebook users because its 
worldwide service is free. In 2016, the Court of Appeal confirmed the lower 
court findings, dismissing both Facebook arguments11 (Facebook Inc. v. Jean 
Durand 2016).
The most prevalent cases directly relevant to this chapter concern Inter-
net corporations charged with allowing third- party content which, it is 
alleged, violates criminal or civil law provisions, such as defamation, pri-
vacy rights, hate speech, and incitement to violence, but also consumer 
rights. The main question asked by courts is whether these companies may 
be liable for content produced and posted by their users.
In principle, provided Internet companies have removed content 
deemed to be violating criminal provisions swiftly upon notification, they 
ought to be held nonliable for such content. For instance, in Amas M. v. 
Facebook Ireland, a German court ruled that Facebook was not the perpe-
trator or a participant in the alleged defamation of the claimant because 
under  the European Union’s electronic commerce rules Facebook, as a 
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“hosting provider,” was not obliged to “proactively” search for and remove 
content unless the content is reported and is clearly unlawful. Facebook 
had also used geo- blocking to prevent access to the illegal content within 
Germany and Austria, a measure deemed sufficient for the handling of 
reported unlawful content (Amas M. v. Facebook Ireland 2017). There are, 
however, an increasing number of exceptions to this rule, particularly in 
Europe, which tend to indicate inconsistent jurisprudence, and potentially 
a move away from the nonliability of Internet intermediaries.
Liability is usually found on three bases: (1) the content in question vio-
lates criminal or civil law (such as laws related to reputation, privacy, etc.); 
(2) the platform has been notified that such content should be taken down 
but failed to do so, or it did not do so expeditiously, or, and more contro-
versially, in the absence of notification, it failed to act with due diligence; 
(3) the court has jurisdiction over the company responsible for the social 
media platform and/or the company controls and owns the data posted on 
the platform. Such findings have multiplied with regard to the so- called 
right to be forgotten or de- indexed. Other recent examples are detailed in 
the following paragraphs.
In 2017, the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal held Facebook and 
one of its users liable for “misuse of private information” since the user’s 
posts disclosed a sex offender’s photograph, name, address, and previous 
offences. On the basis of the European Court of Justice decision, the so- 
called “Right to Be Forgotten” decision, the Irish Court held that Facebook 
Ireland was a data controller and could therefore be held liable for failing 
to expeditiously respond to requests to take down the impugned infor-
mation. However, it found that Facebook was not under an obligation to 
monitor information it transmits and stores, and it therefore rejected the 
lower court’s assertion that Facebook should have been aware of previous 
litigation against the plaintiff and proactively removed the private infor-
mation (CG v. Facebook Ireland 2016). The lower court was in effect propos-
ing that a due diligence standard “knew or should have known” should be 
applied to determine liability.
In Austria, the Court of Appeal ruled that Facebook must delete all 
hate postings against Austria’s Green Party leader, Eva Glawischnig. It rea-
soned that once Facebook had been notified of at least one infringement, 
in the past, it should have continued to monitor whether repostings of 
the original hate posts were occurring and take them down (Die Grünen v. 
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Facebook Ireland Limited 2017). In these circumstances the Court said that 
Facebook could not rely on the European Community E-Commerce direc-
tive, which excludes host- providers from liability for their users’ content. 
The Austria Court is here in essence applying a due diligence standard to 
Facebook.12 The Court further dismissed Facebook’s argument that it was 
governed by the laws of California, where it is headquartered, or Ireland, 
the base of its European operations. It finally ruled that blocking the hate 
posts in Austria was not enough and they must delete the postings across 
its global platform. 
Most recent developments in countries governed by mixed liability 
regimes have included enshrining intermediaries’ responsibilities in law. In 
July 2017, the Upper Chamber of the German Parliament approved the Act 
to Improve Enforcement of the Law in Social Networks, which entered into 
force on October 1, 2017. The German act demands of Internet platforms 
such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube that they remove hate speech 
material that is “manifestly unlawful” under German law within twenty- 
four hours or else face fines that start at five million euros and range up 
to fifty million euros. If content has been flagged as offensive but is not 
“manifestly” illegal, it must be examined within seven days. The act further 
includes a secondary review of unlawful content through self- regulation 
institutions, which have to be recognized by an administrative body. The 
act raises a range of concerns regarding the protection of freedom of expres-
sion, both substantively and procedurally (Article 19 2017). Its implementa-
tion, though, will be the real test: will the act result in increasing instances 
of removal and blocking of content actually legitimate under German law 
and international human rights law? Or will it bring some coherence to the 
existing piecemeal and arbitrary approach? There is little doubt that the 
implementation will be scrutinized closely by other governments, who may 
be tempted to follow suit, in Europe and elsewhere.
Internet Intermediaries Should Respect Human Rights
A 2012 recommendation of the European Union Committee of Ministers 
concluded that social network services may threaten the human rights of 
users:
The right to freedom of expression and information, as well as the right to pri-
vate life and human dignity may also be threatened on social networking ser-
vices, which can also shelter discriminatory practices. Threats may, in particular, 
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arise from lack of legal, and procedural, safeguards surrounding processes that 
can lead to the exclusion of users; inadequate protection of children and young 
people against harmful content or behaviours; lack of respect for others’ rights; 
lack of privacy- friendly default settings; lack of transparency about the purposes 
for which personal data are collected and processed. (Committee of Ministers of 
the Council of Europe 2012)
Two years later, in 2014, Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)6 of the Commit-
tee of Ministers on a guide to human rights for Internet users suggests that 
companies such as social networks may interfere unlawfully with the right 
to freedom of expression:
It is possible that companies, such as social networks, remove content created 
and made available by Internet users. These companies may also deactivate users’ 
accounts (e.g. a user’s profile or presence in social networks) justifying their 
action on non- compliance with their terms and conditions of use of the service. 
Such actions could constitute an interference with the right to freedom of expres-
sion and the right to receive and impart information unless the conditions of 
Article 10, paragraph 2 of the ECHR [European Convention on Human Rights] 
as interpreted by the Court, are met. (Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe 2014, 53)
Both recommendations go on to explicitly demand of intermediaries that 
they “respect human rights and the rule of law” by implementing self- and 
coregulatory mechanisms, including procedural safeguards and access to 
effective remedies, as well as by “combating hate speech and other content 
that incites violence or discrimination. Online service providers should be 
attentive to the use of, and editorial responses to, expressions motivated 
by racist, xenophobic, anti- Semitic, misogynist, sexist (including as regards 
Lesbian Gay Bisexual and Transgender people) or other bias.”
Sector- wide regulation has been initiated but remains limited, owing 
possibly to the fact that the sector is relatively new and evolving constantly. 
The most important framework is that of the Global Network Initiative 
(GNI), established in 2008, which includes Internet intermediaries but also 
participants from civil society and academia. Members commit to imple-
menting GNI core principles on freedom of expression and privacy (there-
after GNI principles).
The GNI principles place a large emphasis on the commitment of the 
intermediaries in terms of protecting the rights of their users against gov-
ernment interference. On the other hand, little is said of their commitment 
to respect freedom of expression online, that is, to respect the right of their 
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users vis- à- vis their own activities and decisions. This state focus is also 
reflected in the transparency reports issued by the intermediaries, which do 
not include data taken down by the intermediaries as part of the implemen-
tation of their terms and conditions. A 2014 United Nations Educational, 
Scientific, and Cultural Organization study on the role of Internet interme-
diaries commended the GNI principles but found
a glaring absence of similar principles, guidelines and standards for companies’ 
self- regulatory practices, including terms of service enforcement. Given the lack 
of transparency and consistency in how companies enforce their terms of service 
and other private rules, and given the impact of such enforcement of internet 
users’ freedom of expression, there is a clear need for the development of guide-
lines and “best practice” standards for intermediaries’ own rules on user expres-
sion. (MacKinnon et al. 2014, 168)
It is also suggested that while the legal context of the country in which a 
company is headquartered is particularly important for the respect of user 
rights, “freedom of expression can be strongly influenced in a positive or 
negative direction by companies’ own rules, processes and mechanisms on 
matters including terms of service enforcement, user privacy and identity. 
Companies are much less transparent and accountable with the public on 
these matters” (MacKinnon et al. 2014, 166).
Since then, a new civil society initiative, Ranking Digital Rights, has 
been launched, seeking to put more pressure on Internet intermediaries so 
that they address the “glaring” absence of principles to guide self- regulatory 
practices. Ranking Digital Rights establishes an index of the most power-
ful intermediaries’ corporate accountability based on their public commit-
ments and disclosed policies affecting users’ freedom of expression and 
privacy (Ranking Digital Rights 2017). Altogether, these critiques point to 
the privatization of a public space for communication, governed not by 
the national laws adopted by parliaments but by the rules and regulations 
drafted by the companies providing Internet services, largely on the basis 
of commercial interest.
Non- State Actors as Human Rights Norms Developers
Internet intermediaries are also actively involved in formal processes lead-
ing to the creation of hard and soft international legal norms. They may 
do so as part of their active role in the multistakeholder approach, which 
characterizes Internet governance, such as the Internet Governance Forum 
The Human Rights Obligations of Non- State Actors 213
or NetMundial. Indeed, according to participants and scholars, the power-
ful, well- equipped, and well- trained corporate actors are particularly able to 
influence multistakeholder processes and outcomes, such as NetMundial, 
for instance.13 Internet intermediaries may also play a significant role in the 
development of treaties adopted by states, such as the now defunct Trans- 
Pacific Partnership Agreement and the Trans- Atlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership, which have been regularly denounced by civil society because 
of their lack of transparency and broad- based consultation. Yet, they may 
greatly influence the realization of online freedoms, if implemented. It may 
be argued that through their role and influence, Internet intermediaries are 
entering into nondisputable commitments over these processes outcomes, 
including over human rights protection.
Non- State Actors as Human Rights Advocates
Internet intermediaries make explicit commitments to defend freedom of 
expression, as part of their mission or its implementation, in the context of 
their interaction and negotiations with states or in court cases as highlighted 
above. This role is also reflected in the jurisprudence: they challenge states’ 
policies, regulations, or bills which, while targeting intermediaries, are said 
to impact fundamental human rights. Examples of such cases include Goo-
gle appealing to the French Conseil d’État against decisions by the French 
regulator that search results found to be infringing on the right to privacy 
should be delisted globally. In July 2017, the Conseil d’État ruled to seek 
European Court of Justice advice on the matter. Google is arguing, among 
other factors, that a global implementation violates the right to freedom 
of expression. In the United States, Facebook has challenged search war-
rants, which it considers to be fishing expeditions by prosecutors against 
its users, arguing that they are unconstitutionally overbroad, violate the 
privacy rights of their users, and have serious Fourth Amendment impli-
cations. So far, the New York State Court of Appeals affirmed that Internet 
service providers cannot appeal a judge’s decision to issue search warrants 
in a criminal case, even in situations where the Internet service provider 
believes the search warrants violate its users’ constitutional rights (In re 381 
Search Warrants Directed to Facebook, Inc. 2017). Recent such cases are mixed 
in terms of their outcomes. But they are important in terms of human 
rights commitments and seeking to provide for an access to remedy with a 
collective dimension.
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On the other hand, intermediaries’ framing of online freedom of expres-
sion embraces largely a state- centered approach consisting in protecting 
users and private actors against illegitimate interference by governments 
(Callamard 2017b; Jørgensen 2017). The commitment to freedom of 
expression is expressed, explicitly or implicitly, as a stand against the state. 
There is no acknowledgement that private actors, such as intermediaries, 
may impact negatively on users’ freedom of expression, including through 
enforcing their terms of services: “In sum, there is limited reflection on the 
power that these internet giants exercise over public participation in the 
online domain, and the responsibility that follows in terms of systemati-
cally assessing all business practices for potential negative impact on their 
users’ rights and freedoms” (Jørgensen 2017, 13).
Conclusion
It is impossible to escape the proposal that Internet intermediaries, by 
their birth, mission, public expression, and roles, have moral obligations 
which extend beyond their duties to uphold the interests of their share-
holders (Falk 1994). The companies currently powering the Internet have 
human rights responsibilities. These responsibilities concern not just free-
dom of expression but also a range of other rights and liberties, which find 
specific realization in the online world— meaning that their respect and 
protection take on specific dimensions because of the space within which 
they are exercised.
It is also difficult to escape the conclusion that these companies have 
been ill prepared for the range and extent of their human rights respon-
sibilities. Their various attempts at regulating content so far, according to 
human rights principles, have been at best naive and amateurish and at 
worst irresponsible (Callamard 2017b). Self- regulation has been weak and 
hypocritical, including because of the refusal of these intermediaries to 
consider that the content of their terms of service, and their implementa-
tion, may amount to an abusive contractual framework, violating human 
rights standards.
Andrew Clapham (2017b, 8) suggested that the extent of non- state actors’ 
obligations depends on “what kind of non- state actor they are, the context 
in which they are operating, and any relevant promises made by them. 
In other words the scope of their obligations depends on their capacity, 
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context, and commitments.” The context as far as the online world is con-
cerned is one characterized by the central role of non- state actors, in the 
first place Internet intermediaries. Put simply, the online world will not 
function, and possibly, it will not exist, without the corporate actors that 
are providing the technologies and services powering this new world. Most 
importantly, many of these non- state actors are US corporations, operat-
ing in situations of quasi- monopoly, whether as Internet service providers, 
search engines, or platforms. The US monopoly over the technology run-
ning the economy of the twenty- first century weighs heavily in the way 
states, including China or Russia, but also the US traditional allies, such as 
Europe, approach these non- state actors and seek to regulate them.
It is also a context with great accountability deficits, and a legal vacuum, 
largely because of the jurisdictional questions over extraterritorial con-
tent and nondomestic actors. From a human rights standpoint, the initial 
claims that the Internet will create a more humane and fairer civilization of 
the mind (Barlow 1996) are under duress, if not outrightly rejected. Factors 
include the millions of trolls around the world, threatening and harass-
ing those they disagree with, the multiplication of websites and content 
preaching hatred, the manipulation and instrumentalization of informa-
tion directed at an ill- informed and poorly educated public unable to rec-
ognize “fake news,” to mention a few. Arbitrariness, lack of transparency, 
political pressures, ad hoc legal developments, and surveillance: all appear 
to be dominating the working of the online space. Non- state actors at best 
are playing an ambiguous role and at worst are contributing to the demise 
of Internet founding claims, through their business models; their norma-
tive framework and US- centric culture; and their lack of investment in, and 
commitment to, effective self- regulation of the kind that other sectors have 
been forced to embrace.
One of the strongest arguments in support of calling for a reconceptu-
alization of the role of intermediaries in the protection of human rights 
in the online space comes from their capacities. Internet intermediaries 
alone have the capacity to ensure respect for human rights online. The 
sheer quantity of online, transborder content means that it is out of both 
the technical and jurisdictional range of most states to regulate or protect. 
Indeed, the current approach, hostage of jurisdictional conflicts results in 
endless legal uncertainties and accountability vacuums. Many, although 
not all,14 potential human rights violations occurring online, including 
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violations of freedom of expression, require the active involvement of 
Internet intermediaries— to take down content, to lift anonymity, to close 
accounts, and alternatively, to allow for the circulation of content which 
may be violating human rights, such as privacy, discrimination, the right 
to be free of harassment or bullying, and so forth. By the same token, they 
alone have the technical capacity to ensure rights are protected and ful-
filled. To the extent that access to the Internet is a right, this is one right 
whose realization is heavily dependent upon them. States remain the ulti-
mate duty bearer in terms of ensuring that the right is enshrined in law, 
respected, and protected. But the fulfillment of this right is unlikely to be 
realized, under the current technological and economic conditions, with-
out the active involvement of these non- state actors.
At the conclusion of this reflection, I see two options for a stronger pro-
tection of human rights online. Both require a better understanding and 
delineation of the specific duties and responsibilities of non- state actors, 
along with their rights. One option is meaningful self- regulation. Overall, 
and compared to similarly powerful economic actors, the Internet inter-
mediaries have yet to demonstrate a thorough commitment to meaning-
ful self- regulation or indeed to establish strong sector- wide associations 
able to regulate their members, individually and collectively. Not only is 
this situation weakening online freedom, and the rights of users, but it is 
also weakening the hands of the corporations in their interactions with 
states. The failure at strong and meaningful self- regulation justifies, if not 
explains, the multiplication of coregulatory initiatives by states, and their 
increasing policy and legal pressures on social media platforms to monitor 
specific content.
One particularly strong example of self- regulation is the 2010 Interna-
tional Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers. By adher-
ing to the code, private security companies undertake to respect human 
rights and comply with international humanitarian law when providing 
security services in regions where the rule of law has been undermined. 
They undertake to respect all applicable laws, including local, regional, 
and/or national laws. In September 2013, multistakeholder negotiations 
established an independent governance and oversight mechanism in the 
form of an association under Swiss law: the International Code of Conduct 
for Private Security Providers’ Association (ICoCA), based in Geneva. The 
ICoCA Board of Directors is made up of representatives from government, 
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industry, and civil society. The ICoCA has developed procedures for certifi-
cation, monitoring, reporting, assessing performance, and addressing com-
plaints. Governments are also considering integrating membership to the 
self- regulatory body when recruiting private security providers.
Meaningful self- regulation demands not only agreed- upon standards of 
behavior but also a system of accountability that can be trusted by users 
and other actors, including governments. This requires complaints mech-
anisms, effective and independent investigation of alleged violations of 
agreed standards, and measures to address the violations. As presented 
above, existing self- regulation within the online world still has a long 
way to go to meet minimum requirements for effective self- regulation. On 
the other hand, there appears to be increasing awareness that the current 
approach is failing to deliver human rights protection in the online world, 
while strengthening the hands of those intent on controlling and censor-
ing. There are a number of multistakeholder processes, such as the Internet 
Governance Forum, which offer avenues and opportunities to put together 
meaningful self- regulation. But time is running out.
The second option, more difficult to realize, is through international 
law. As suggested by Bethlehem (2014, 23),
[I]ncreasingly aged treaties and other crystallized rules of international law are 
left to carry the burden of addressing conduct, and of shaping an international 
system, that may bear little relation to the conduct and system for which the 
rules were originally crafted. This is ultimately unsatisfactory. .  .  . In the era of 
Globalization 3.0, in which the principal agents of change are individuals and 
corporations, international law needs to develop a more sophisticated apprecia-
tion of international legal personality and of subject- hood of international law, 
and more inclusive, responsive, and efficient mechanisms to address the interests 
and voices of these subjects.15
The development of an appropriate and relevant international legal 
framework for the online space, including through the adoption of a treaty, 
ought to be on the agenda of actors concerned with the protection of 
human rights online. At this point in time, a number of factors militate 
against considering practically the emergence of a new body of interna-
tional public law. To name a few such factors, human rights indicators are 
on the decline, particularly those related to freedom of expression and asso-
ciation; the birth of a new global governance system, to replace US hege-
mony and the bipolar system of the cold war, is proving to be particularly 
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painful and bloody, characterized by the multiplication of proxy wars and 
conflicts; around the world, electorates have brought to power populist 
leaders who embrace nationalism and reject the globalization project and 
human rights protection; and so forth. Any international treaty- based reg-
ulation, if it were to occur, will thus be likely to result in a shrinking of 
human rights protection, online and offline.
Still, it is worth reflecting on what an international legal framework 
for the online space, protecting human rights, and incorporating Internet 
intermediaries as duty bearers, would require. At a theoretical and concep-
tual level, this may require rethinking the notion of territory, with the view 
of defining and incorporating the concepts of digital territory and digi-
tal boundaries, and of identifying the international legal implications and 
content of these concepts.16 Such a process, no doubt, demands rethinking 
the sources of law, to include industry- driven and coregulatory standards, 
and to give legal meaning and weight to the principles that would have 
been the objects of “raw consensus” through multistakeholder discussions 
and gatherings such as the Internet Governance Forum. It will, also, and 
most importantly, require a better appreciation of the working of the world 
and global society of the twenty- first century, understanding Internet cor-
porations and other non- state actors as subjects of international law, with 
specific rights and duties.
Notes
1. As mentioned in the Introduction to this volume, “internet intermediaries” refers 
to “third- party platforms that mediate between digital content and the humans who 
contribute and access this content” (DeNardis 2014, 154).
2. The French delegate proposed that the clause “Every one shall have the right to 
freedom of thought and expression” should be followed by “provided that he shall 
be answerable, in cases defined by the law, for abuses of that freedom.”
3. These include the “Asian values” interpretation of freedom of expression, for 
instance.
4. See, for instance, the many reports by international human rights organiza-
tions, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, on corporate 
accountability.
5. As far back as 1995, the United States has argued that obligations under the 
ICCPR, including those related to freedom of expression or the right to privacy, 
only apply to individuals who are both within the territories of a state party and 
The Human Rights Obligations of Non- State Actors 219
subject to that state party’s sovereign authority. This position ran contrary to the 
jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee, according to which a state party 
must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the covenant to anyone within 
the power or effective control of that state party, even if not situated within the 
territory of the state party (UN Human Rights Committee 2004). In a subsequent 
2014 development related to the protection of the right to privacy (UN Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights 2014), the OHCHR has endorsed this posi-
tion and further stated that “where the State exercises regulatory jurisdiction over a 
third party that physically controls the data, that State also would have obligations 
under the Covenant. If a country seeks to assert jurisdiction over the data of private 
companies as a result of the incorporation of those companies in that country, then 
human rights protections must be extended to those whose privacy is being inter-
fered with, whether in the country of incorporation or beyond.”
6. Among other things, they are cited by European Convention on Human Rights 
decisions and listed under the “Relevant International Instruments Section.”
7. (1) Genocide, (2) Crimes Against Humanity, (3) War Crimes, (4) the Crime of 
Unconstitutional Change of Government, (5) Piracy, (6) Terrorism, (7) Mercenarism, 
(8) Corruption, (9) Money Laundering, (10) Trafficking in Persons, (11) Trafficking 
in Drugs, (12) Trafficking in Hazardous Wastes, (13) Illicit Exploitation of Natural 
Resources, and (14) the Crime of Aggression.
8. The E-commerce directive, the data protection directive, and the European Court 
are establishing three different liability regimes (Van der Sloot 2015).
9. Content censored upon demands from the states has been reported (on a meta-
data basis) biannually by a number of intermediaries since 2010.
10. The cases discussed below are taken from the Columbia Global Freedom of 
Expression database of free speech jurisprudence from around the world. It includes 
a large number of cases implicating Internet companies, including social media plat-
forms and search engines.
11. The ruling points to the many revenues extracted by and through the Facebook 
platform. It also argues that under French consumer law, a noncommercial/non- 
professional party to a contract can sue the other party of the contract in either his 
or her country or that of the other party. It finds that the teacher in this particular 
case acted for noncommercial purposes. It further points to the “abusive clause” 
provision under French consumer law according to which some contractual engage-
ments may be found to be “abusive” because they result in a significant imbalance 
(déséquilibre) between the parties to the contract.
12. However, the Court also said that while Facebook could easily delete verbatim 
repetitions of the hate posts by automated process, it would be unreasonable to 
require it to monitor and control all content on its platform for postings similar to 
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the ones in the original posting because of the vast number of its users. Accordingly, 
the Court reversed the lower court’s decision in this regard.
13. Critiques over their influence included the following: Just Net Coalition “The 
Caravan Has Set Out for a Neo- liberal Capture of Global Governance,” “They have 
forcefully declared that the Internet is special and that its governance is to be left 
to vaguely defined “stakeholders” among whom of course would be the dominant 
Internet corporations, thus for example allowing Amazon to share in decision- 
making concerning global taxation of its Internet e-commerce activities and Face-
book to be a partner in deciding what should be the power of citizens in controlling 
their own information” (Just Net Coalition 2014); the Internet Governance Civil 
Society Coordination Group, “Civil Society Coordination Group and NETmundial 
Initiative Information,” “Among the underlying concerns of many are that the 
involvement of the World Economic Forum in the initiative signals an attempt by 
economic and political elites to secure a central role in Internet governance; that the 
Initiative has been organised in a top- down manner that privileges its three promot-
ers above other stakeholders” (NETmundial Initiative 2014).
14. The clear exception is Internet shut- down.
15. Bethlehem also suggests reconceiving notions of jurisdiction, for instance by 
seeking to develop a consensual approach around the notion of “deemed jurisdic-
tion,” “a notion that, for certain given forms of conduct, jurisdiction will be deemed 
to rest with x or y or z, or with some configuration of all of them. An approach along 
these lines might be particularly appropriate, for example, in respect of cyber activ-
ity, given the challenges of saying with any clarity where, in geographic space as 
opposed to virtual space, such conduct occurs. . . . A deemed jurisdiction approach 
could craft a flexible conception of jurisdiction that may be more appropriate to the 
virtual geography of the medium.”
16. The 2017 Microsoft- led proposal for a Digital Geneva Convention to prevent 
warfare in cyberspace seeks to adapt a treaty- like approach to the multistakeholder 
nature of Internet governance. It somehow radically suggests a set of legal obliga-
tions imposed on states, along with the adoption of self- regulatory principles for 
tech companies and the establishment of an independent multistakeholder over-
sight mechanism responsible for investigating cyberattacks (Smith 2017). Yet, the 
proposal fails to acknowledge the active role of the tech corporate actors in violating 
human rights and contributing to cyber insecurity (Microsoft 2017).
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9 The Council of Europe and Internet Intermediaries:  
A Case Study of Tentative Posturing1
Tarlach McGonagle
Internet intermediaries wield enormous power in the evolving digital eco-
system. The extent of their power, as detailed insightfully throughout this 
book, has prompted increased scrutiny of their activities and the impact 
they have on the human rights of Internet users. This chapter offers a crit-
ical analysis of the suitability of the Council of Europe’s system for the 
protection of freedom of expression as a framework for regulating the activ-
ities of Internet intermediaries. The title of the chapter refers to the Coun-
cil of Europe’s “tentative posturing” in respect of the roles and regulation 
of Internet intermediaries. The institutional posturing can be described as 
“tentative” for a number of reasons, not least of which is the difficulty 
of (re- )calibrating regulation for a relatively new and complex medium. 
Another reason is the difficulty of bringing powerful private actors under 
the scope of an international system of human rights protection that is 
built around the relationship between states and individuals.
The chapter opens with a brief overview of the Council of Europe’s sys-
tem for the protection of freedom of expression, the centerpiece of which is 
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (Council 
of Europe 1950). It will then explore the efforts of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) to keep apace of technological developments and to 
retain and revamp its general freedom- of- expression principles in an infor-
mation and communications environment that is increasingly dominated 
by the Internet and the intermediaries which strongly influence its oper-
ation. This exploration will focus in particular on the growth spurts and 
growing pains of the ECtHR’s case law. Besides the court, other bodies within 
the Council of Europe contribute to and strengthen the system of protec-
tion for freedom of expression, in particular the Committee of Ministers 
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with its political standard- setting activities. The chapter will also focus on 
the legal complications involved in bringing Internet intermediaries into 
the fold of a traditional, international, and treaty- centric system of human 
rights protection. It will conclude with a reflection on the rights, duties, 
and responsibilities of Internet intermediaries that flow from the existing 
system. “Hate speech” will be used to illustrate how frictional the relation-
ship between intermediaries’ rights, duties, and responsibilities— and those 
of their users— can be in practice.
A System for the Protection of Freedom of Expression
The Council of Europe has developed an elaborate system for the protec-
tion of freedom of expression, which is a source of guidance for the organi-
zation’s forty- seven member states in respect of their national media laws 
and policies. The system comprises principles and rights, as enshrined in 
treaty law and developed in case law; political and policy- making standards; 
and state reporting/monitoring mechanisms. Each of the instruments and 
mechanisms has its own objectives and emphases and/or mandates and 
working methods. To understand these instruments and mechanisms as a 
systemic whole is to “take into account the actual forces at work and make 
possible the realistic achievement of the objectives sought” (Emerson 1970, 
4). Each has its place in the system due to the overall “unity of purpose and 
operation” (ibid.).
The interplay between each of the system’s components determines 
how the right to freedom of expression is exercised in practice. The system 
strives to operationalize abstract theories of freedom of expression and turn 
them into a right to freedom of expression that is meaningful and effec-
tive in practice. It seeks to create an enabling environment for freedom 
of expression, including as exercised by journalists, the media, and oth-
ers who contribute to public debate. Internet intermediaries are important 
actors within this enabling environment, insofar as they can facilitate or 
obstruct access to the online forums in which public debate is increasingly 
conducted. The operators of social network services, for instance, “possess 
the technical means to remove information and suspend accounts,” which 
makes them “uniquely positioned to delimit the topics and set the tone of 
public debate” (Leerssen 2015, 99– 100; see also Jørgensen’s Introduction to 
this volume and Land’s chapter in this volume). Search engines, for their 
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part, have the aim and the ability to make information more accessible and 
prominent, which gives them influence over how people find information 
and ideas and what kinds of information and ideas they find (see, generally, 
van Hoboken 2012). Both of these types of Internet intermediary therefore 
have clear “discursive significance” in society (Laidlaw 2015, 204).
The ECHR is the most important instrument in this system. Article 10 
protects the right to freedom of expression (see further below), but that 
protection is integrated into the ECHR’s broader, more general scheme 
of protection for human rights. The rights safeguarded by the ECHR, as 
interpreted by the ECtHR in its jurisprudence, are the drivers of the whole. 
This must remain the case when exploring new dimensions to freedom of 
expression, such as Internet intermediary regulation, and when overcom-
ing persistent and emerging threats and challenges to the exercise of the 
right to freedom of expression.
Over the years, various other treaties have been adopted by the Council 
of Europe, which reflect the general principles of the ECHR in their own 
theme- specific focuses. A systemic approach to freedom of expression helps 
to ensure that relevant treaties remain largely consistent and complemen-
tary in their focuses.
There is an important measure of interplay between the Council of 
Europe’s treaties, which are legally binding on contracting states, and polit-
ical standard- setting texts, which typically take the form of declarations 
and recommendations and are not legally binding. Political and policy- 
making texts (hereinafter, “standard- setting texts”) ought to be grounded 
in the ECHR and the case law of the ECtHR, but they can also influence the 
development of that case law.
As standard- setting texts tend to focus on particular (human rights) 
issues or (emerging) situations with democratic or human rights implica-
tions, they can serve to supplement existing treaty provisions and case law. 
They can do so by providing a level of detail lacking in treaty provisions 
or by anticipating new issues not yet dealt with in treaty provisions or case 
law. It is noteworthy that judgments of the ECtHR refer to the Commit-
tee of Ministers’ standard- setting texts in an increasingly systematic and 
structured way. It has referred to Recommendation CM/Rec(2011)7 of the 
Committee of Ministers to member states on a new notion of media (Com-
mittee of Ministers of the Council of Europe 2011a), in its Yildirim and Delfi 
judgments (ECtHR 2012a and 2015a, respectively).2 These standard- setting 
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texts can also facilitate the interpretation of existing treaties by applying 
general principles to concrete situations or interpreting principles in a way 
that is in tune with the times.
The Basics and Centrality of Article 10 of the ECHR
Article 10(1) sets out the right to freedom of expression as a compound 
right comprising the freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart 
information and ideas. As such, there are three distinct components to the 
right, corresponding to different aspects of the communicative process, that 
is, holding views, receiving content, and sending content. A distinct right 
to seek information and ideas is conspicuous by its absence. In this respect, 
Article 10 of the ECHR contrasts with equivalent provisions in other inter-
national human rights treaties, such as Article 19 of the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). It should be noted, though, that 
the evolution of the court’s case law has served to compensate for and, to 
an extent, close the gap between the texts of Article 10, ECHR, and Article 
19, ICCPR, on this point (ECtHR 2016a).
Article 10(1), ECHR, countenances the possibility for states to regulate 
the audiovisual media by means of licensing schemes. This provision was 
inserted as a reaction to the abuse of radio, television, and cinema for Nazi 
propaganda during the Second World War. Article 10(2) then proceeds to 
delineate the core right set out in the preceding paragraph. It does so by 
enumerating a number of grounds, based on which the right may legiti-
mately be restricted, provided that the restrictions are prescribed by law and 
are necessary in a democratic society. It justifies this approach by linking the 
permissibility of restrictions on the right to the existence of duties and 
responsibilities which govern its exercise. Whereas the right to freedom of 
expression is regarded as being subject to general duties and responsibilities, 
the ECtHR sometimes refers to the specific duties or responsibilities per-
taining to specific professions, for example, journalism, education, military 
service, and so forth. The court has held that those duties or responsibilities 
may vary, depending on the technology being used. In light of the case- by- 
case nature of the court’s jurisprudence on duties and responsibilities and 
in light of its ongoing efforts to apply its free expression principles to the 
Internet (see further, below), it is only a matter of time before it begins to 
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proffer indications of the nature of Internet actors’ duties and responsibili-
ties in respect of freedom of expression.
Notwithstanding the potential offered by Article 10(2) to restrict the 
right to freedom of expression on certain grounds (although legitimate 
restrictions must be narrowly drawn and interpreted restrictively), as the 
ECtHR famously stated in its Handyside judgment, information and ideas 
which “offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population” 
must be allowed to circulate in order to safeguard the “pluralism, toler-
ance and broadmindedness without which there is no ‘democratic society’” 
(ECtHR 1976). The question of how far the Handyside principle actually 
reaches in practice is very pertinent as regards online content because of 
the widely perceived permissiveness of the Internet as a medium. It is of 
particular relevance for the reflection, below, on what duty of care can be 
expected of Internet intermediaries to combat hate speech.
Aside from the permissible grounds for restrictions set out in Article 
10(2), ECHR, the right to freedom of expression may also be limited, or 
rather denied, on the basis of Article 17, ECHR (“Prohibition of abuse of 
rights”). It reads, “Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as imply-
ing for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or per-
form any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set 
forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in 
the Convention.” In the past, the court has applied Article 17 to ensure that 
Article 10 protection is not extended to racist, xenophobic, or anti- Semitic 
speech; statements denying, disputing, minimizing or condoning the Holo-
caust; or (neo- )Nazi ideas (McGonagle 2013b). This means that in practice, 
sanctions for racist speech do not violate the right to freedom of expres-
sion of those uttering the racist speech. In other words, national criminal 
and/or civil law can legitimately punish racist speech. The straightforward 
application of Article 17 can lead to a finding that a claim was manifestly 
ill founded and a declaration of inadmissibility. Such a finding means that 
the court will usually not examine the substance of the claim because it 
blatantly goes against the values of the ECHR. That is why Article 17 is 
sometimes referred to as a “guillotine” provision (Tulkens 2012, 284). How-
ever, the criteria used by the court for resorting to Article 17 (as opposed to 
Article 10(2)) are unclear, leading to divergent jurisprudence (Cannie and 
Voorhoof 2011; Keane 2007).
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The scope of the right to freedom of expression is not only determined 
by the permissible restrictions set out in Articles 10(2) and 17, ECHR. It is 
also determined by the interplay between the right and other ECHR rights, 
including the right to privacy, freedom of assembly and association, and 
freedom of religion.
The ECtHR has developed a standard test to determine whether Article 
10, ECHR, has been violated. Put simply, whenever it has been established 
that there has been an interference with the right to freedom of expres-
sion, that interference must first of all be prescribed by law. In other words, 
it must be adequately accessible and reasonably foreseeable in its conse-
quences. Second, it must pursue a legitimate aim (i.e., correspond to one 
of the aims set out in Article 10(2)). Third, it must be necessary in a demo-
cratic society, that is, it must correspond to a “pressing social need,” and it 
must be proportionate to the legitimate aim(s) pursued.
The particular importance of the media for democratic society has been 
stressed repeatedly by the court. The media can make important contri-
butions to public debate by (widely) disseminating information and ideas 
and thereby contributing to opinion- forming processes within society. As 
the court consistently acknowledges, this is particularly true of the audio-
visual media because of their reach and impact. The court has traditionally 
regarded the audiovisual media as more pervasive than the print media. It 
has yet to set out a clear and coherent vision of online media, but it has 
ventured to say, in 2013, that “the choices inherent in the use of the Inter-
net and social media mean that the information emerging therefrom does 
not have the same synchronicity or impact as broadcasted information” 
(ECtHR 2013a, para. 119). It continued by stating that notwithstanding 
“the significant development of the Internet and social media in recent 
years, there is no evidence of a sufficiently serious shift in the respective 
influences of the new and of the broadcast media in the [United Kingdom] 
to undermine the need for special measures for the latter” (ibid.). Commen-
tators have been left guessing as to what would amount to a “sufficiently 
serious shift” in the eyes of the court (Plaizier 2018). The media can also 
make important contributions to public debate by serving as forums for 
discussion and debate. This is especially true of new media technologies 
which have considerable potential for high levels of individual and group 
participation (see further: ECtHR 2012a).
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Furthermore, the role of “public watchdog” is very often ascribed to the 
media in a democratic society. In other words, the media, acting as the 
Fourth Estate, should monitor the activities of governmental authorities 
vigilantly and publicize any wrongdoing on their part. In respect of infor-
mation about governmental activities, but also more broadly in respect of 
matters of public interest generally, the court has held time and again that 
“[n]ot only do the media have the task of imparting such information and 
ideas: the public also has a right to receive them” (ECtHR 1979, para. 65). 
The extent to which Internet intermediaries also fulfill or facilitate the pub-
lic watchdog role depends on their actual functions (see further, below).
To date, the ECtHR has engaged meaningfully with the Internet generally 
(ECtHR Research Division 2015; Murphy and Ó Cuinn 2010, 636), and the 
specific features of the online communications environment in particular, 
in a surprisingly limited number of cases (ECtHR Press Unit 2017; McGona-
gle 2013a). It has focused on the duty of care of Internet service providers 
(ECtHR 2008a, para. 49), the added value of online newspaper archives for 
news purposes (ECtHR 2009a, 2013b), and the challenges of sifting through 
the informational abundance offered by the Internet (ECtHR 2011a). How 
the court dealt with the final point is of interest:
It is true that the Internet is an information and communication tool particularly 
distinct from the printed media, in particular as regards the capacity to store and 
transmit information. The electronic network serving billions of users worldwide 
is not and potentially cannot be subject to the same regulations and control. 
The risk of harm posed by content and communications on the Internet to the 
exercise and enjoyment of human rights and freedoms, particularly the right to 
respect for private life, is certainly higher than that posed by the press. Therefore, 
the policies governing reproduction of material from the printed media and the 
Internet may differ. The latter undeniably have to be adjusted according to the 
technology’s specific features in order to secure the protection and promotion of 
the rights and freedoms concerned. (ibid., para. 63)
The court made these observations in a case involving a newspaper that, 
owing to a lack of funds, “often reprinted articles and other material 
obtained from various public sources, including the Internet” (ibid., para. 
5). In short, the court is calling for a rethink of familiar principles of media 
freedom and regulation in the expansive, global context of the Internet.
Again, these findings by the court focus on journalists and professional 
media, but in light of the expanding understandings of the roles such 
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professions play, they are also of relevance for other actors. This reading 
is confirmed by the reference to the importance of the Internet “for the 
exercise of the right to freedom of expression generally” (ECtHR 2009a, 
para. 27). The court has repeatedly recognized that besides professional 
journalists and media, an expanding range of actors— such as individuals, 
civil society organizations, whistle- blowers, academics, and bloggers— can 
all make valuable contributions to public debate, thereby playing a role 
similar or equivalent to that traditionally played by the institutionalized 
media (ECtHR 2016a; McGonagle 2015, 19 et seq.).
From the passage cited above, it is clear that the court places the onus 
on states’ authorities to develop a legal framework clarifying issues such as 
responsibility and liability. It is unclear, however, to what extent an equiv-
alent self- regulatory framework would suffice. The court has held in other 
case law that self- and coregulatory mechanisms can suffice, provided they 
include effective guarantees of rights and effective remedies for violations of 
rights (Hans- Bredow- Institut 2006, 147– 152, especially paras. 108 and 109). 
In any case, it is clear that “the State cannot absolve itself from responsi-
bility by delegating its obligations to private bodies or individuals” (ECtHR 
1993c, para. 27, and 1983, paras. 29– 30). As will be explained below, state 
responsibility can, in certain circumstances, be triggered indirectly by the 
acts or omissions of private bodies.
In its Ahmet Yildirim v. Turkey judgment of December 18, 2012, the court 
recognized in a very forthright way the importance of the Internet in the 
contemporary communications landscape. It stated that the Internet “has 
become one of the principal means for individuals to exercise their right 
to freedom of expression today: it offers essential tools for participation in 
activities and debates relating to questions of politics or public interest” 
(ECtHR 2012a, para. 54).
This recognition clearly places great store by the participatory dimen-
sion of free expression. The court found that a measure resulting in the 
wholesale blocking of Google Sites in Turkey “by rendering large quantities 
of information inaccessible, substantially restricted the rights of Internet 
users and had a significant collateral effect” (ibid., para. 66; ECtHR 2015b, 
para. 64). The interference “did not satisfy the foreseeability requirement 
under the Convention and did not afford the applicant the degree of pro-
tection to which he was entitled by the rule of law in a democratic society” 
(ibid., para. 67). In addition, it produced arbitrary effects (ibid., para. 68). 
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Furthermore, the court found that “the judicial- review procedures concern-
ing the blocking of Internet sites are insufficient to meet the criteria for 
avoiding abuse, as domestic law does not provide for any safeguards to 
ensure that a blocking order in respect of a specific site is not used as a 
means of blocking access in general” (ibid.). This reasoning suggests that 
the court would also disapprove of other intrusive or overly broad blocking 
techniques.
In the case of Delfi AS v. Estonia, the Estonian courts held a large online 
news portal liable for the unlawful third- party comments posted on its site 
in response to one of its own articles, despite having an automated filtering 
system and a notice- and- takedown procedure in place (ECtHR 2015a). The 
Grand Chamber of the ECtHR found that this did not amount to a violation 
of Article 10, ECHR. The judgment has proved very controversial, particu-
larly among free speech advocates, who fear that such liability would create 
proactive monitoring obligations for Internet intermediaries, leading to pri-
vate censorship and a chilling effect on freedom of expression.
The contentious nature of the judgment stems from a number of the 
court’s key lines of reasoning therein. First, the court took the view that 
“the majority of the impugned comments amounted to hate speech or 
incitements to violence and as such did not enjoy the protection of Arti-
cle 10” (ibid., para. 136). By classifying the comments as such extreme 
forms of speech, the court purports to legitimize the stringent measures 
that it sets out for online news portals to take against such manifestly 
unlawful content. The dissenting judges objected to this approach, point-
ing out that “[t]hroughout the whole judgment the description or charac-
terisation of the comments varies and remains non- specific” and “murky” 
(ibid., Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Sajó and Tsotsoria, paras. 12 and 
13, respectively).
Second, the court endorses the view of the Estonian Supreme Court that 
Delfi could have avoided liability if it had removed the impugned com-
ments “without delay” (ibid., para. 153). This requirement is problematic 
because, as pointed out by the dissenting judges, it is not linked to notice 
or actual knowledge (ibid., Joint Dissenting Opinion, para. 8) and paves the 
way for systematic, proactive monitoring of third- party content.
Third, the court underscored that Delfi was “a professionally managed 
internet news portal run on a commercial basis which sought to attract a 
large number of comments on news articles published by it” (ibid., para. 
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144). The dissenting judges aptly argued that the economic activity of the 
news portal does not cancel out the potential of comment sections for facil-
itating individual contributions to public debate in a way that “does not 
depend on centralised media decisions” (ibid., Joint Dissenting Opinion, 
paras. 39 and 28).
Fourth, the court failed to appreciate or articulate the broader ramifica-
tions of far- reaching Internet intermediary liability for online freedom of 
expression generally. It was at pains to stress that “the case does not con-
cern other fora on the Internet where third- party comments can be dissem-
inated, for example an Internet discussion forum or a bulletin board where 
users can freely set out their ideas on any topics without the discussion 
being channelled by any input from the forum’s manager; or a social media 
platform where the platform provider does not offer any content and where 
the content provider may be a private person running the website or a 
blog as a hobby” (ibid., para. 116). The dissenting judges again took great 
exception to this line of reasoning, describing it as an exercise in “damage 
control” (ibid., Joint Dissenting Opinion, para. 9).
The court subsequently revisited the issues of the responsibility and lia-
bility of Internet service providers for comments posted on their sites by 
users of their services in MTE & Index.hu v. Hungary (ECtHR 2016b). Unlike 
in Delfi and perhaps smarting from the critical fallout to Delfi, the court 
seemed keen in MTE & Index.hu to talk up the importance of Internet inter-
mediaries in fostering public debate online. It referred to them as “protag-
onists of the free electronic media” (ibid., para. 88; see also para. 69). This 
is an important realization of the broader implications of intermediary lia-
bility for robust public debate. Similarly and more recently, in Tamiz v. the 
United Kingdom, the court referred to “the important role that ISSPs [Infor-
mation Society Service Providers] such as Google Inc. perform in facilitating 
access to information and debate on a wide range of political, social and 
cultural topics” (ECtHR 2017a, para. 90).
The court emphatically distinguished the Delfi and MTE & Index.hu cases 
on the basis of the nature of the comments. Whereas it had deemed that 
some of the comments in Delfi amounted to hate speech, it described the 
comments at issue in MTE & Index.hu as “offensive and vulgar,” but found 
that they “did not constitute clearly unlawful speech” and “certainly did not 
amount to hate speech or incitement to violence” (ECtHR 2016b para. 64). 
The court has followed this line in a more recent inadmissibility decision in 
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Pihl v. Sweden, a case involving a defamatory blog post and an anonymous 
online comment (ECtHR 2017b). This distinction shows how important it is 
to be clear- sighted about what “hate speech” entails in legal terms.
Political Standard Setting by the Council of Europe
While the above developments remain quite tentative in the case law of 
the ECtHR, they are more advanced in other Council of Europe standard- 
setting activities (see, generally, Benedek and Kettemann 2013). Although 
such standard- setting work, notably by the organization’s Committee of 
Ministers and Parliamentary Assembly (see Nikoltchev and McGonagle 
2011a and 2011b, respectively), is not legally binding, it is politically per-
suasive and offers a number of advantages over treaty- based approaches. It 
can, for example, engage with issues in a more detailed way than is possible 
either in treaty provisions or case law or monitoring pursuant to treaty 
provisions. It can also address issues that have not arisen in case law but are 
nevertheless relevant. In the same vein, it can identify and address emer-
gent or anticipated developments, thereby ensuring a dynamic/modern 
approach to relevant issues.
Standard setting by the Committee of Ministers includes a number of 
focuses that are relevant for Internet intermediaries (as also noted by Jør-
gensen in her Introduction to this volume), for example, self- regulation 
concerning cybercontent; human rights and the rule of law in the informa-
tion society; freedom of expression and information in the new information 
and communications environment; the public service value of the Internet; 
respect for freedom of expression and information with regard to Internet 
filters; network neutrality; freedom of expression, association, and assem-
bly with regard to privately operated Internet platforms and online service 
providers; human rights and search engines; human rights and social net-
working services; risks to fundamental rights stemming from digital track-
ing and other surveillance technologies; human rights for Internet users; 
the free, transboundary flow of information on the Internet; and Internet 
freedom. These normative texts generally explore their subject matter in an 
expansive way, while grounding the exploration in relevant principles that 
have already been established by the ECtHR. As such, the texts tease out 
the likely application of key legal principles to new developments, thereby 
also giving an indication of the likely content of specific state obligations 
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in respect of those principles. Their role and influence, while not legally 
binding, can nevertheless be seen as instructive.
Thus, the Committee of Ministers has highlighted the gravity of vio-
lations of Articles 10 and 11, ECHR (“Freedom of assembly and associa-
tion”), “which might result from politically motivated pressure exerted on 
privately operated Internet platforms and online service providers” (Com-
mittee of Ministers of the Council of Europe 2011b, para. 7). It has insisted 
that the use of filters be strictly in accordance with Articles 10 and 6, ECHR 
(“Right to a fair trial”), and specifically be targeted, transparent, and subject 
to independent and impartial review procedures. It encourages member 
states and the private sector to “strengthen the information and guidance 
to users who are subject to filters in private networks, including informa-
tion about the existence of, and reasons for, the use of a filter and the crite-
ria upon which the filter operates” (Committee of Ministers of the Council 
of Europe 2008, Guidelines, section 3). It has also called on member states 
to “promote transparent self- and coregulatory mechanisms for search 
engines, in particular with regard to the accessibility of content declared 
illegal by a court or competent authority, as well as of harmful content, 
bearing in mind the Council of Europe’s standards on freedom of expres-
sion and due process rights” (Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe 2012a, para. 8). Finally, in the present string of examples, the Com-
mittee of Ministers has stated that social networking services should refrain 
from “the general blocking and filtering of offensive or harmful content in 
a way that would hamper its access by users” (Committee of Ministers of 
the Council of Europe 2012b, para. 11); develop and communicate edito-
rial policies about “inappropriate content,” in line with Article 10, ECHR 
(ibid., para. 10, and see also para. 3), and “ensure that users are aware of 
the threats to their human rights and able to seek redress when their rights 
have been adversely affected” (ibid., para. 15). It has called on member 
states to “encourage the establishment of transparent co- operation mech-
anisms for law- enforcement authorities and social networking services,” 
which “should include respect for the procedural safeguards required under 
Article 8 [“Right to respect for private and family life”], Article 10 and Arti-
cle 11,” ECHR (ibid., para. 11).
Another prong to the Committee of Ministers’ standard setting that is 
important for Internet intermediaries, without addressing their role explic-
itly, is its Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)3 to member states on human 
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rights and business. A central aim of this recommendation is to ensure that 
states “effectively implement the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights as the current globally agreed baseline in the field of busi-
ness and human rights” (CM 2016, Appendix, para. 1). The recommenda-
tion includes focuses on the state’s obligation to protect human rights as 
well as on the kinds of state action that can enable corporate responsibil-
ity to respect human rights. Such action includes the application by states 
of “such measures as may be necessary to encourage or, where appropri-
ate, require that” businesses based within their jurisdiction apply “human 
rights due diligence throughout their operations” and businesses “conduct-
ing substantial activities” within their jurisdiction “carry out human rights 
due diligence in respect of such activities” (ibid., para. 20). States should 
also ensure that access to judicial mechanisms, namely, courts and reme-
dies, is available for everyone in respect of (allegations of) business- related 
human rights abuses (ibid., para. 31).
Many of the above principles and recommendations are played out in 
detail in the Committee of Ministers’ Recommendation CM/Rec(2018)2 to 
member States on the roles and responsibilities of Internet intermediar-
ies (Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe 2018). In the Pre-
amble to the recommendation, the Committee of Ministers observes, “A 
wide, diverse and rapidly evolving range of players, commonly referred to 
as ‘Internet intermediaries,’ facilitate interactions on the internet between 
natural and legal persons by offering and performing a variety of functions 
and services” (ibid., Preamble, para. 4). It goes on to acknowledge that indi-
vidual intermediaries are capable of performing different functions and ser-
vices simultaneously (ibid., para. 5). Referencing the UN Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights, it further states, “Owing to the multiple 
roles intermediaries play, their corresponding duties and responsibilities 
and their protection under law should be determined with respect to the 
specific services and functions that are performed” (ibid., para. 11). Taken 
together, these observations and recommendations plead for a targeted and 
differentiated regulatory approach— not a “one- size- fits- all” model.
In its Appendix, the recommendation sets out detailed and extensive 
Guidelines for states on actions to be taken vis- à- vis Internet intermediaries 
with due regard to their roles and responsibilities. The Guidelines have a 
dual focus: obligations of states and responsibilities of Internet interme-
diaries. The identified obligations of states include ensuring the legality 
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of measures adopted; legal certainty and transparency; safeguards for free-
dom of expression, privacy, and data protection; and access to an effective 
remedy. The responsibilities of Internet intermediaries include respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, transparency and accountability, 
responsibilities in respect of content moderation, the use of personal data, 
and the ensuring of access to an effective remedy.
Positive Obligations
General Observations
The international legal system for the protection of human rights pivots 
on the linear relationship between individuals (rights holders) and states 
(duty bearers). The recognition that different types of non-state/private 
actors should also be (explicitly) positioned within the system has come 
about in a gradual and frictional manner. And even that reluctant recogni-
tion has only been achieved through the dynamic interpretation of exist-
ing legal norms and the interplay between those norms and policy- making 
documents. As noted by Land in her chapter in this volume, this presents 
a real conceptual and regulatory “dilemma” (for extensive and insightful 
analysis, see the chapters by Land and Callamard and the Introduction by 
Jørgensen in this volume).
All international human rights treaties share the primary objective of 
ensuring that the rights enshrined therein are rendered effective for every-
one. There is also a predominant tendency in international treaty law to 
guarantee effective remedies to individuals when their human rights have 
been violated. In order to achieve these dual objectives, it is not always 
enough for the state to simply honor their negative obligation to refrain 
from interfering with individuals’ human rights: positive or affirmative 
action will often be required as well. This may, on occasion, require the 
state to intervene in relations between third parties. It is therefore import-
ant to acknowledge the concomitance of negative and positive state obli-
gations to safeguard human rights. While this acknowledgement typically 
informs treaty interpretation, relevant formulas and approaches tend to 
vary per treaty.
In the context of Internet intermediary self- regulation as well, in addi-
tion to the traditional negative obligations that bind public authorities, the 
positive obligations of the state to safeguard human rights can mean that 
public authorities may be obligated to prevent private parties from engaging 
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in different types of behavior that endanger the fundamental rights of third 
parties. This can result in restrictions by public authorities on the use of 
self- regulation as a regulatory paradigm for the online environment.
The positive obligations doctrine has developed in piecemeal fashion, 
and its precise scope and finer details continue to evolve (for extensive 
analysis, see McGonagle 2015). As correctly noted by Land (see chapter 
11 of this volume), the doctrine is germane to European human rights 
law. Besides the doctrinal evolution in the case law of the ECtHR, it is also 
instructive to consider the potential guidance offered by relevant standard- 
setting work by the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers. For ana-
lytical purposes, it is useful to group positive state obligations relating to 
the rights to freedom of expression, privacy, and data protection as well 
as media freedom (hereinafter, for convenience, “communication rights”) 
online into three categories: preventive, promotional, and remedial. These 
categories are not, however, mutually exclusive. As will be shown, preven-
tive and promotional obligations, for example, overlap to an extent.
Preventive Obligations
States are required to put in place regulatory frameworks (including legisla-
tive frameworks) to ensure the effective exercise of communication rights 
in the online environment. These frameworks should include legislative 
frameworks (ECtHR 2011a) and, more specifically, criminal- law frame-
works, as appropriate— for instance, for combating child pornography 
(ECtHR 2008a). In respect of medical data, which constitutes “highly inti-
mate and sensitive” data, states must ensure that the law affords “practical 
and effective protection to exclude any possibility of unauthorised access” 
to such data (ECtHR 2008b, paras. 38, 39, and 47, and 1997, paras. 95– 96). 
States must ensure that laws not only meet the Sunday Times criteria con-
cerning the quality of law (foreseeability and accessibility (ECtHR 1979); see 
also Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights 2014, Recommen-
dation 16, p. 24) but in particular for surveillance of communications, for 
example, additional criteria apply in the interests of transparency/avoiding 
chilling effect and to ensure safeguards against various possible abuses (see, 
in particular, ECtHR 2006a, para. 95, and, generally, ECtHR 1984, 1990, and 
1993b, and Eskens, van Daalen, and van Eijk 2015).
The obligations described in the previous paragraph exist regardless of 
the existence of self- regulatory mechanisms. While states may enjoy discre-
tion as to the means they use to fulfill their fundamental rights obligations, 
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they may not delegate those obligations to private parties (ECtHR 2006b, 
2012b; see also ECtHR 1985, 2000, 2003; see also Land’s chapter in this vol-
ume). Relatedly, these obligations also exist regardless of states’ obligations 
under other international treaties, especially when the source of those obli-
gations is an international organization with “equivalent” levels of human 
rights protection (ECtHR 2005, 2011b). Thus, EU law, for example, may nei-
ther displace nor dilute positive state obligations identified and developed 
by the ECtHR pursuant to the ECHR.
Promotional Obligations
States also have positive obligations to actively promote different values, 
such as pluralistic tolerance in society and media pluralism. Whereas the 
role of the state as “ultimate guarantor” of media pluralism has tradition-
ally concerned the audiovisual media sector (ECtHR 1993a, 2001, 2009b), 
it is likely— in light of the living instrument and practical and effective 
doctrines— that this principle will have to be developed and applied muta-
tis mutandis to the online environment. Similarly, states’ positive obliga-
tion to ensure an environment that is favorable to freedom of expression 
(ECtHR 2010, para. 137) necessitates adaptation for optimal realization in 
the online environment. Étienne Montero and Quentin Van Enis (2011, 
24) have posited that states’ positive obligations, when “[t]ransposed to the 
digital universe,” include the adoption of “a genuinely reassuring frame-
work for intermediaries in order to avoid the private censorship they are 
liable to effect through fear of liability action.”
Remedial Obligations
Review and redress are also important elements of states’ positive obliga-
tions to uphold communication rights in an online environment. In accor-
dance with Article 13, ECHR (“Right to an effective remedy”), states must, 
first and foremost, ensure that effective remedies are available for violations 
of communication rights. Remedies should have corrective, compensatory, 
investigative, and punitive functions and effects. These obligations mean 
that states must ensure that alleged violations of communication rights 
by private parties are subject to independent and impartial judicial review 
(see also Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights 2014, Recom-
mendation 16, p. 24). Such review would necessarily consider the extent to 
which policies and practices of private actors, for example, for blocking and 
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filtering content, show due regard for process values such as transparency 
and accountability, as well as respect for rule of law (ECtHR 2003).
General Guidance
Primary guidance for ongoing attempts to clarify the scope and content 
of states’ positive obligations to guarantee the effective exercise of com-
munication rights in an online environment is provided by the ECHR, as 
interpreted by the ECtHR. In that context, the ECtHR has stated that the 
legitimate aims of restrictions on, for example, the rights to privacy and 
freedom of expression (as set out in Articles 8(2) and 10(2)) may be relevant 
for assessing whether states have failed to honor relevant positive obliga-
tions (ECtHR 1986, 2012c). The ECtHR has also found that the margin of 
appreciation is, in principle, the same for Articles 8 and 10, ECHR (2012c, 
para. 106). In all cases involving competing rights guaranteed by the ECHR, 
a fair balance has to be struck between the rights involved, as relevant for 
the particular circumstances of the case. However, when restrictions are 
imposed on a right or freedom guaranteed by the ECHR, in order to protect 
“rights and freedoms” which are not guaranteed by the ECHR, the ECtHR 
has insisted that “only indisputable imperatives can justify interference 
with enjoyment of a Convention right” (ECtHR 1999, para. 113).
Internet Intermediaries and “Hate Speech”
Intermediaries have a complex relationship with freedom of expression 
and “hate speech.” Under the “safe harbour” regime created by the EU’s 
E-commerce Directive, a neutral or passive stance would ordinarily entitle 
intermediaries serving as hosting providers to exemption for liability for 
the hosted content (European Parliament and the Council 2000). Service 
providers hosting third- party content may avail themselves of this exemp-
tion on the condition that they do not have “actual knowledge of illegal 
activity or information and, as regards claims for damages, is not aware 
of facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is 
apparent” and that “upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts 
expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information” (ibid., Arti-
cle 14). The directive also stipulates that states shall not impose a general 
obligation on (hosting service) providers to “to monitor the information 
which they transmit or store, nor a general obligation actively to seek facts 
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or circumstances indicating illegal activity” (ibid., Article 15). Although the 
E-Commerce Directive is extraneous to the Council of Europe’s regulatory 
system, it is an essential reference point for the twenty- eight EU member 
states which are also members of the Council of Europe. EU Directives 
require EU member states to achieve certain results but give them some 
flexibility as to the measures used to achieve those results.
Yet, the binary distinction between active and passive intermediaries 
that held sway at the time of the adoption of the directive in 2000 no lon-
ger adequately reflects the varied relationships that many intermediaries 
have with third- party content today. Some activities carried out by Internet 
intermediaries go beyond passive hosting toward editorial, presentational, 
recommendation, and ranking functions.
The optic through which the Council of Europe examines the question of 
Internet intermediary liability is rather that of rights, duties, and responsi-
bilities. Intermediaries contribute to public debate by facilitating (or imped-
ing) access to the arenas— and thereby also the content of— public debate. 
Their ensuing duties and responsibilities are shaped by the nature of their 
gatekeeping functions and the techniques they employ to carry out those 
functions. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (2011a, 
para. 7) has called for a “new, broad notion of media” encompassing all 
relevant actors. It advocates “a graduated and differentiated response for 
actors [ . . . ], having regard to their specific functions in the media process 
and their potential impact and significance in ensuring or enhancing good 
governance in democratic society” (ibid.). Furthermore, evolving interna-
tional norms and expectations of corporate social responsibility and human 
rights due diligence can provide useful guidance (Committee of Ministers 
of the Council of Europe 2016; see also Land, this volume). The size and 
dominance of the intermediary and whether there are viable alternative 
opportunities for individuals to exercise their right to freedom of expres-
sion in a practical and effective manner are all contextual variables that 
are taken into account in this calculus. The commercial or noncommercial 
character of the intermediary is another and somewhat controversial con-
textual variable (see the discussion of the Delfi case above). The nature of 
the expression at issue in a given case is also a central consideration.
When the expression at issue is “hate speech,” it is important to recall 
that the term does not appear in the ECHR and the court, having first used 
the term in 1999, does not have a hard- and- fast definition of the term (see, 
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generally, McGonagle 2013b). Its understanding of the term is subject to 
continuous development on a case- by- case basis in which the interplay 
between Articles 10 and 17, ECHR, is crucial. From the court’s case law to 
date, it is possible to distill an approximation of a definition. Hate speech 
is any type of expression via any medium that intentionally targets some-
one on the basis of certain fundamental characteristics shared with other 
members of a specific group, which is hateful in essence and/or incites to 
hatred, discrimination, or violence or amounts to a grave assault on human 
dignity and therefore is devoid of redeeming social value and constitutes 
an abuse of the rights and freedoms safeguarded by international and Euro-
pean human rights law. However, as already noted, the Delfi judgment has 
added to the murkiness of this understanding by omitting a reference to the 
group dimension usually present in relevant cases.
The upshot of this is that in the absence of a legally binding definition of 
hate speech, as well as inconsistencies in the court’s application of the term, 
the precise scope of the term remains uncertain and problematic from the 
perspective of legal certainty and foreseeability. If the Grand Chamber of 
the ECtHR is prone to depart— without explanation or motivation— from 
previously held understandings of what hate speech involves, intermediar-
ies cannot be expected to be able to accurately identify types of expression 
which, from a legal perspective, amount to hate speech. The sophisticated 
legal knowledge and diagnostic skills required to determine what is hate 
speech and whether it should be removed are therefore far beyond the 
competences of what could reasonably be expected of ordinary content 
moderators employed by intermediaries. Moreover, as submitted by some 
of the intervening parties in Delfi, many intermediaries are small enter-
prises, compared to the leading global players, and would often lack the 
resources to proactively make the necessary legal assessment and then, if 
warranted, block or remove hate speech and other illegal content (ECtHR 
2015a, para. 108).
Nevertheless, the problem remains that if hate speech is not removed 
expeditiously, the harm it causes to victims is aggravated by its perpetua-
tion and/or further dissemination. If multiple postings, cross- posting, or 
extensive hyperlinking has taken place, the removal of particular material 
from a particular online source cannot guarantee the unavailability of the 
same material elsewhere, thus strengthening its “incessant and compound-
ing” aspects (Delgado and Stefancic 2009, 367– 368). This pleads strongly 
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for the need for Internet intermediaries to raise their game when it comes to 
countering hate speech, a call that is resonating in legal and political circles 
across Europe at the moment.
Conversely, if the urgency for action leads to intermediaries erring on 
the side of caution (including to avoid liability) and blocking or removing 
content that may be offensive while not being illegal, the consequences for 
freedom of expression can be severe. The practice of private actors making 
and acting on their own determinations about the (il)legality of content is 
sometimes described as privatized law enforcement or privatized censorship, 
terms which— out of concern for rule of law— question the legitimacy of 
private actors to determine whether particular content is illegal.
Tentative Conclusions about Tentative Posturing
The analysis in this chapter offers some modest, initial guidance on the 
seemingly intractable problem of how to calibrate and operationalize the 
duties and responsibilities of Internet intermediaries regarding hate speech 
that is disseminated via their platforms or networks without jeopardizing 
users’ right to freedom of expression. First, states may not delegate their obli-
gation to counter hate speech in an effective manner by passing the buck 
to Internet intermediaries and requiring them to take sole responsibility 
for eradicating hate speech within their services/networks. States’ positive 
obligation to uphold individuals’ human rights may be triggered when the 
action or inaction of an intermediary amounts to a human rights violation 
(see, further, Callamard’s chapter in this volume). If such a scenario could 
and should have been prevented by proactive measures by the state, then 
the state could well have failed to honor its relevant positive obligations.
Not all interferences with individual human rights involving Internet 
intermediaries will trigger states’ positive obligations, however (ECtHR 
2017a, paras. 82– 84). If an interference does not attain a certain level of 
seriousness and the person(s) whose right to freedom of expression has 
been interfered with can still exercise their right effectively in alternative 
ways, such as in other forums or through other networks, a state will ordi-
narily not have a positive obligation to take a particular course of action. 
It is also important to recall that states’ (positive) obligations are not solely 
grounded in the ECHR but (at least for EU member states) can also arise 
from the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (European 
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Union 2010; Angelopoulos et al. 2016; Kuczerawy 2017, 2018). Moreover, 
EU member states are also subject to the E-Commerce Directive— another 
detailed regulatory frame of reference. The intertwined character of rele-
vant regulatory frameworks points to a second piece of guidance: regulators 
need to have very keen positional awareness, in order to be able to properly 
gauge the requirements, implications, and interaction of different regula-
tory instruments.
Third, even though states may not delegate their obligation to counter 
online hate speech to Internet intermediaries, the latter are coming under 
increasing political and public pressure to raise their own game in this 
regard. But this is by no means a straightforward task. “Hate speech” has 
not been pinned down by an authoritative, legally binding definition, and 
its precise scope remains somewhat unclear. This makes it very difficult for 
private actors such as Internet intermediaries to make accurate assessments 
of borderline cases; it often leaves them trying to hit a moving target. These 
definitional difficulties, coupled with a desire to avoid legal liability for ille-
gal third- party content, will inevitably lead to instances of intermediaries 
blocking or removing contested content as a precautionary measure. Such 
scenarios violate— or at least jeopardize— the right to freedom of expres-
sion of their users. Conversely, though, persons targeted by illegal types 
of expression have the right to be protected against such expression. This 
is a very difficult circle to square. Emerging principles of corporate social 
responsibility and human rights due diligence, if developed and operation-
alized further, may be able to help Internet intermediaries to safeguard their 
users’ rights to freedom of expression, equality, and nondiscrimination and 
their right to an effective remedy.
The Committee of Ministers’ Recommendation CM/Rec(2018)2 on the 
roles and responsibilities of Internet intermediaries would have been an 
obvious place to provide further, detailed guidance on these issues. How-
ever, while it provides much valuable guidance on the roles and responsi-
bilities of Internet intermediaries in various contexts, the recommendation 
does not contain any explicit references to “hate speech” and only a couple 
of passing references to “hatred” (Committee of Ministers of the Council 
of Europe 2018). It therefore remains to be seen how the Council of Europe 
will concretely engage with these issues in the future. Growing awareness 
and use of the Committee of Ministers’ standard- setting work and a num-
ber of pending cases before the ECtHR focusing on Internet intermediaries 
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and freedom of expression are sure to keep, and sharpen, the focus on these 
relevant issues.
This chapter has focused primarily on the approach of the Council of 
Europe, with intermittent references to the EU’s approach. Although the 
approaches taken by the Council of Europe and the EU are broadly con-
gruent and sometimes overlap and influence each other, they remain dis-
tinct legal and political systems, each with its own particular objectives and 
emphases. All of this can create consistency in European states’ national 
law and policy, but it can also give rise to confusion and uncertainty in sit-
uations where the approaches (appear to) diverge. Recent standard- setting 
work at the Council of Europe has sought to clarify the human rights 
framework governing the roles and responsibilities of Internet intermediar-
ies, paying particular attention to freedom of expression, privacy, and data 
protection and effective remedies. The EU’s current approach, as typified 
by the 2016 Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online, 
adopted by leading tech companies and driven by the European Commis-
sion (for an overview and analysis, see Jørgensen’s chapter in this volume), 
focuses on the responsibility of intermediaries to remove illegal hate speech 
very expeditiously. The code pays scant attention to the importance of, 
and the need for, freedom- of- expression safeguards. This is a significant 
difference between both approaches and one that will have to be addressed 
“expeditiously”: #WatchThisSpace.
Notes
1. This is an abridged, updated, and adapted version of the present author’s contri-
bution to Christina Angelopoulos, Annabel Brody, Wouter Hins, Bernt Hugenholtz, 
Patrick Leerssen, Thomas Margoni, Tarlach McGonagle, Ot van  Daalen, and Joris 
van Hoboken, “Study of Fundamental Rights Limitations for Online Enforcement 
through Self- regulation,” commissioned by the Open Society Foundations, Institute 
for Information Law (IViR), 2016.
2. For further discussion of the added value of standard- setting texts for the court’s 
decision- making, especially on Internet- related issues, see Spano (2016).
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10 The Privacy Disconnect
Joris van Hoboken1
Introduction
In the last decade, a flurry of regulatory, legislative and judicial activity 
has taken place responding to concerns over commercial and govern-
ment interferences with data privacy.2 Europe stands out in this regard. 
In May 2018, the highly anticipated new General Data Protection Regu-
lation (GDPR) came into force.3 The European legislature is debating revi-
sion to the regulatory framework for electronic communications privacy 
(European Commission Proposal for ePrivacy Regulation 2017a).4 New 
frameworks for cross- border access to digital evidence are being discussed.5 
Privacy regulators are stepping up enforcement in relation to Internet com-
panies and adopting a growing stream of regulatory guidance.6 National 
courts as well as the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the 
European Court of Human Rights have been asked to rule, as a consequence 
of citizen and privacy activist initiatives, on the legality of government sur-
veillance measures and the legality of international data flows in view of 
the fundamental right to privacy and the protection of personal data.7 The 
CJEU has been particularly impactful, by invalidating the Data Retention 
Directive (CJEU 2014a), imposing a right to be forgotten on search engines 
(CJEU 2014b), and invalidating the Safe Harbour agreement for data flows 
between the EU and the United States in a sweeping ruling on the need to 
guarantee data privacy in the context of personal data flowing outside of 
the EU. The UN General Assembly adopted several resolutions on the right 
to privacy in the digital age and has also appointed a UN Special Rapporteur 
on the Right to Privacy.
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From these developments alone, one would be tempted to draw the con-
clusion that, at least in Europe, we are living in a golden age of privacy. 
Finally, the conditions are being set for the right to privacy and the pro-
tection of personal data to be valued and enforced. Research and practice 
appear to be following suit. Privacy has become an increasingly active field 
of study in law, economics, social science, computer science, and engineer-
ing.8 Nongovernmental privacy organizations are understaffed but growing; 
professional organizations of privacy practitioners such as the International 
Association of Privacy Professionals (IAPP) have seen membership soar and 
conferences and educational programs fill up with professionals seeking to 
make a new living.9
This contribution’s starting point is that the amount of energy, resources, 
and good intentions going into privacy alone is a bad measure for evalu-
ating whether fundamental challenges to data privacy are being addressed 
in practice. Clearly, when the European Commission proposes new rules 
for electronic communications privacy with the headline that they “will 
increase the protection of people’s private life and open up new opportuni-
ties for business” (European Commission 2017a), close scrutiny of whether 
the specifics of the proposals back up this claim is warranted.10 However, 
the problem with the protection of data privacy may run deeper than can 
be uncovered by a close reading of specific legislative acts and their partic-
ular legal consequences. Ultimately, the question is whether the current 
legal and policy frameworks for data privacy provide robust underpinnings 
for the legitimacy of pervasive processing of personal data in our societ-
ies. It is through this divide between the demands for such legitimacy and 
what current privacy governance offers in practice, a divide I will call “the 
Privacy Disconnect,” that developments in the realm of privacy may be 
running into a wall.
With the aim to sketch some of the contours of a Privacy Disconnect, 
this chapter will review some of the major challenges related to the estab-
lishment of legitimacy for the pervasive processing of personal data. First, I 
will discuss the consolidation in the Internet service industry and its trans-
formation into a data- driven environment, where the continuous capture 
and analysis of data in individualized networked relationships between ser-
vices, third parties, and users has become an inseparable ingredient for the 
production of digital functionality and the accumulation of data- driven 
power (Gürses and Van  Hoboken 2018). This transformation challenges 
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established core principles of data privacy, such as transparency and pur-
pose limitation, in ways that are not easily addressed without radical reform. 
The way in which the environment is currently shaped along the principle 
of modularity also challenges the attribution of responsibility for observing 
data privacy laws and principles, without which the project of protecting 
and enforcing privacy is perhaps most fundamentally challenged.
Second, the discussion turns to the continuing erosion of restrictions 
on data collection and the recent debates about a refocus on regulating use 
instead. Historically, a debate has existed in privacy scholarship on whether 
privacy law, policy, and engineering should concern itself centrally with 
limiting the collection and flow of personal information (data minimiza-
tion) or whether it is enough to put entities processing personal data under 
an obligation to act fairly, transparently, and lawfully, observing the right 
of individuals to exercise relative control over the collection and use of 
their personal data (De  Hert and Gutwirth 2006; Gürses and Diaz 2013; 
Warren and Brandeis 1890; Westin 1967). More recently, a somewhat more 
radical position has emerged, arguing that regulation should turn away 
from regulating collection altogether and regulate the use of personal data 
instead.11 This proposition may be understandable in the face of ever more 
pervasive data collection practices, the value that can be extracted from 
data through advances in data analytics and machine learning, and the 
limited success of data minimization standards. However, relevant legal 
frameworks, in Europe, but also in the United States, would require a rather 
unfeasible overhaul to facilitate this shift in practice. At a theoretical level, 
the argument for use regulation, as an alternative to the current broader 
focus of data privacy, is weak.12 In addition, considering the repeated news 
about large- scale data breaches, most recently Equifax, Uber, and the use of 
Facebook by Cambridge Analytica,13 the argument that people should no 
longer be concerned about the mere collection of their data rings hollow.
Third, the chapter will discuss the continued reliance on the concept 
of informed consent for providing legitimacy to data privacy interferences 
and the related emphasis on giving individuals control over their personal 
data. This is striking considering the theoretical issues with consent as cen-
tral to privacy as well as the mountain of evidence that in current- day set-
tings, meaningful consent and control are not practically possible in the 
first place. The European Union’s legislature doubled down on the impor-
tance of consent and individual control over personal data in the GDPR. 
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Consent is the one legitimate ground for the processing of personal data, 
out of six, that is enshrined in the fundamental right to the protection of 
personal data in the Charter of Fundamental Rights.14 Data subject rights 
to gain access to and erasure of personal data are strengthened, and a new 
right to data portability has been added to the legal mix.15 It is possible that 
allowing people to reap some of the benefits of the economic value in per-
sonal data with a right to data portability could strengthen the legitimacy 
of pervasive personal data processing in certain regards.16 However, there 
are reasons to doubt this will work in practice and whether this will further 
privacy or other values entirely, potentially with significant unintended 
distributive effects across industries and populations.
Finally, we will turn to the international level, specifically the tension 
between the different regulatory approaches to data privacy in the United 
States and Europe and the role of the human rights framework at the inter-
national level. In the commercial sphere, the comprehensive and rights- 
based approach to data privacy regulation in Europe stands in clear contrast 
to the sectoral and market- oriented approach to privacy law in the United 
States.17 In addition, the fact that the dominant firms of the data- driven 
economy are US- based companies has turned the enforcement of Euro-
pean privacy law into a trans- Atlantic battle of the regions, in which a lot 
more than privacy is at stake. The latter is also true in the area of lawful 
access by government agencies. The frameworks for lawful access have been 
under pressure because of the Snowden revelations and generally need a 
rigorous internationally coordinated update in view of globally operating 
cloud service providers that see themselves confronted with growing pres-
sure to provide access to data at home and abroad. While a series of efforts 
to bridge some of the divides between Europe and the United States on 
privacy remains ongoing and some strengthening of data privacy in the 
human rights context can be observed, the political realities seem to have 
become more challenging over the last years.
The chapter will conclude with some observations of the way in which 
the multiplicity of concerns and values that has informed privacy frame-
works, debates, and practices can lead to a situation in which significant 
resources are spent on protecting certain aspects of data privacy while other 
aspects remain unaddressed. In my conclusion I call for data privacy reg-
ulation and discourse to move beyond a concern with the organizational 
handling of people’s “personal data” and become more centrally concerned 
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with the value of the fair accumulation and exercise of data- driven power 
and the material and political conditions for this value to thrive.
Consolidation in a Networked Internet Service Industry
Over the last decade, we have witnessed a remarkable concentration of 
power in the hands of a handful of dominant technology companies, which 
are together providing the services and platforms that are giving shape to 
the digital environment. Personal information, including data from and 
about individualized interactions between users and Internet- based ser-
vices, has become a key ingredient in the production of digital functional-
ity in this environment in ways that challenge existing approaches to data 
privacy rights.
While some of the underlying developments in the Internet services 
industry are discussed in more detail and more eloquently elsewhere in this 
book, it is worth taking note of some of the basics. Of the top ten global 
companies in terms of market capitalization, the first seven are technology 
companies, that is, Apple, Alphabet, Amazon, Alibaba, Facebook, Micro-
soft, and Tencent.18 The valuations of these companies are so staggering 
that they raise macroeconomic concerns beyond the specifics of the digital 
economy itself (Wolf 2017). The monetary assets controlled by these major 
companies amount to more than four trillion USD, and a general sense has 
emerged that there is a widespread problem of monopoly and supernormal 
profits (ibid.).
One of the most important ways in which these companies have become 
as dominant as they are is through acquisitions, including of potential future 
competitors. Facebook, for instance has bought Instagram, WhatsApp, and 
more than fifty other companies since 2005; Google has bought YouTube, 
Nest Labs, and Motorola and more than 200 other companies since 1999; 
and Microsoft recently bought Skype, Nokia, and LinkedIn.19 The role of 
user data assets in these acquisitions raises important issues at the interface 
of data privacy and competition law.20 It is undeniable that in many regards, 
the dominant tech companies are in competition with one another. Face-
book and Alphabet, for instance, are in competition over digital advertis-
ing revenues in a market that is now seen as an effective duopoly, earning 
more than half of all digital advertising revenues worldwide.21 In the cloud 
computing market, Amazon is firmly in the lead but has competition from 
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Alphabet, Microsoft, IBM, and a variety of strong niche players.22 Without 
exception, however, leading technology companies have moved toward 
and built a technology and services environment in which service offerings 
and innovation have become dependent on the continuous capture of data 
about users, their behavior, and their interactions (Gürses and Van Hobo-
ken 2018; Zuboff 2015).
Considering the reliance of the tech industry on the processing of data 
in individualized relationships with users, data privacy concerns abound. 
At a high level, a question that has to be tackled is how macrolevel con-
cerns about the accumulation and exercise of data- driven power can be 
better incorporated into discussions of data privacy, which have a tendency 
to focus on microlevel, decontextualized, and individualized relations 
with users. Still, existing data privacy laws do offer ample opportunities 
for regulatory scrutiny. In Europe, in particular, consumer- facing major 
tech companies are facing regular enforcement actions with respect to their 
data- related practices.23 Besides the enforcement of the so- called right to 
be forgotten since the Google Spain ruling,24 Google has faced considerable 
pushback related to the consolidation of its privacy policies across its wide 
portfolio of different consumer- facing services.25 Such combination of data 
from different sources easily breaks with the principle of purpose limitation 
enshrined in European data protection law, raising the question of law-
fulness and often requiring a renegotiation of consent. Facebook, too, has 
been hit with a variety of enforcement actions, including litigation by pri-
vacy activist Max Schrems in relation to data flows to the United States and 
lawful access for intelligence purposes, as well as enforcement with respect 
to the pervasive tracking of Internet users, the breaking of its promises with 
respect to the use of WhatsApp user data, and the lack of proper oversight 
over the collection of data from the platform by Facebook apps.26 Microsoft 
is being investigated over its privacy policy with respect to the Windows 
10 operating system,27 which signals a clear and final break with the age of 
shrink- wrapped software.
Gone are the days in which users bought software and technology prod-
ucts after which they would enjoy these in their relative private sphere, 
removed from direct interaction with software and technology produc-
ers. In the age of the cloud and the emerging Internet of Things, access to 
technology and software amounts to entering into continuous data- driven 
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relationships that require significant individualized data flows to function 
properly (Gürses and Van Hoboken 2018).
There is one aspect of the Internet services environment that is worth 
highlighting here, considering the resulting complications for the attribu-
tion of responsibility for privacy rights and values. This is the deployment 
of the concept of modularity in the cloud environment (ibid.). The term 
“modularity” is used to describe the degree to which a given (complex) 
system can be broken apart into subunits (modules), which can be coupled 
in various ways. As a design or architectural principle, modularity refers to 
the “building of a complex product or process from smaller subsystems that 
can be designed independently yet function together as a whole” (Baldwin 
and Clark 2003). Modularity can operate within the boundaries of tech 
companies, leading to the internal decomposition of software into so- called 
microservices. These components talk to each other through service inter-
faces and can get loosely coupled in integrated service offerings to users. 
Separate service components can grow into successful industry- wide offer-
ings, as in the case of the cloud, which was developed internally by Amazon 
and Google before being offered as a service to others.
The principle of modularity can be seen in action outside the boundaries 
of technology companies, too. The integration of services into other ser-
vices and organizational offerings is most simply illustrated by the so- called 
mash- up, which was pioneered by services such as HousingMaps.28 It is also 
well illustrated by the start- up mantra of doing one thing really well. The 
range of basic service components that is available for integration into the 
offering of companies and organizations has grown significantly over the 
last decade.29 All of these services tend to have direct privacy implications 
for users. Typical service components for publishers, retailers, and other 
organizations include30 user analytics,31 advertisement,32 authentication,33 
captcha,34 performance and (cyber)security,35 maps and location,36 search,37 
sales and customer relation management,38 data as a service,39 payment,40 
event organizing and ticketing,41 stockage,42 shipping,43 reviews,44 sharing 
and social functionality,45 commenting,46 and embedded media.47 Notably, 
the amount of attention that has been paid to the privacy- invasive practices 
of online advertising may have distracted privacy researchers and regulators 
from looking at the integration of a variety of other service components 
(Englehardt 2017).
262 Joris van Hoboken
The strength and attraction of these third- party services is strongly linked 
to the fact that they can be built in such a way that they can be offered 
across organizational offerings and domains, at so- called “internet scale.” 
The unbundling of service components leads to a situation in which users, 
when interacting with one organization, let us say a newspaper app or web-
site or the IT infrastructure of one’s employer, are pulled into a whole set of 
additional service relationships (Gürses and Van Hoboken 2018). Each of 
those relationships has its own (dynamic) privacy implications for users. The 
resulting network of relationships between different services and users raises 
the question of who the proper addressee is for privacy norms in such an 
environment. Privacy law and practice are struggling to provide an answer. 
Should the organization that decides to integrate a particular third- party 
service simply be held responsible for that service’s compliance with data 
privacy laws? The CJEU is set to rule on these issues, which boil down to the 
interpretation of the concept of “controller” and the possibility of contrib-
utory liability of platforms for data privacy violations in the coming years.48 
Without answering this question precisely and effectively, data privacy law 
and policy can hardly be hoped to be achieving their more substantive aims.
Furthermore, even though the Internet industry may have become orga-
nized according to this principle of modularity, this does not appear to 
be the case in the way that users are offered a chance to negotiate and 
give shape to the value of data privacy that is affected by different service 
components. When using available software and services online, users are 
defaulted into bundles of relationships with first- and third- party service 
providers, which are collecting their information in ways that leave little 
room for real choice or escape.49
Erosion of Restrictions on Personal Data Collection
As mentioned in the introduction, one of the key debates has been whether 
data privacy centrally involves a restriction on the collection of personal 
data (data minimization) or whether data privacy should merely guarantee 
that the collection and use of personal data take place in ways that observe 
the fairness, transparency, and lawfulness of personal data- processing oper-
ations. In the first view, privacy involves the respect of a private sphere, 
the possibility of keeping information about oneself confidential and the 
respect of the so- called right to be let alone. In the second view, data privacy 
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can still be possible once data has been collected by others for further use 
if it is put under appropriate conditions that guarantee the respect for data 
protection principles.
It will come as no surprise that many have concluded that data min-
imization principles have failed entirely.50 The growing commercial and 
government appetite for personal data has created a situation in which 
it is hard to imagine any social, economic, or administrative relationship 
that does not involve the collection of one’s personal data. The data- driven 
nature of service offerings discussed in the previous section plays a role 
in this regard as well. In addition to developments in the commercial 
realm, governments have increasingly pushed for legal frameworks that 
ensure the general availability of personal data for administrative and law- 
enforcement purposes— for instance, through interagency data- sharing 
arrangements, data- retention obligations on telecommunications compa-
nies, license- plate- scanning programs, and fraud detection.
Where does this state of affairs lead us in terms of the connection between 
privacy regulations and the collection of personal data?51 Answering this 
question, some have put forward the argument that privacy regulation 
should turn its focus toward the use of data instead of its mere collection.52 
The main argument for this shift tends to be pragmatic, namely, that the 
collection of personal data has become the normal state of affairs. As a 
result, focusing the regulation of personal data- driven processes by limiting 
the collection of data (data minimization) is considered to be no longer 
feasible and desirable. It is not feasible since the current environment can 
only function properly when data collection is left relatively unrestrained. 
It is not desirable considering the societal value involved in big data, which 
would be unduly restrained by the regulation of data collection practices. 
Thus, the argument goes, privacy regulation should focus (more) on issues 
arising from the actual use of personal data.
The arguments for “use regulation” tend to involve two specific ele-
ments. First, the existing mechanisms for establishing the legitimacy of 
personal data collection and further use need to move away from a negoti-
ation from the moment of the collection, in terms of specified, legitimate 
purposes, toward a focus on data use and management practices. Second, a 
use- based approach would provide the flexible reuse of data across contexts, 
which is argued to be required to extract the optimal value from data ana-
lytics. Cate et al. (2014) argue as follows:
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The evolution of data collection and data use necessitates an evolving system of 
information privacy protection. A revised approach should shift responsibility 
away from individuals and toward data collectors and data users, who should 
be held accountable for how they manage data rather than whether they obtain 
individual consent. In addition, a revised approach should focus more on data 
use than on data collection because the context in which personal information 
will be used and the value it will hold are often unclear at the time of collection.53
Variations of the argument can be found in the technical literature on 
privacy engineering, too. Weitzner et al. (2008), for instance, argue for a 
refocusing of privacy engineering practices away from the implementation 
of data minimization strategies, which have been developed in the com-
munity working on privacy- enhancing technologies, toward information 
accountability architectures.
The resulting debate about regulatory flexibility for big data analytics 
may be one of the core data privacy debates of our time. Privacy scholar 
Helen Nissenbaum, known for her work on providing a theory of privacy 
in terms of contextual norms, has characterized the argument as “big data 
exceptionalism” (Nissenbaum 2017). For the purposes of this chapter, the 
problem with the argument for use regulation is that it proposes to redefine 
the legal and political question as regards the legitimacy of pervasive per-
sonal data processing in a way that is instable, both from a legal point of 
view and from a broader societal perspective (Van Hoboken 2016).
From a legal and fundamental rights point of view, the establishment 
of the legitimacy of processing of personal information is still very much 
connected to the situation that comes into being once personal data is col-
lected. This is the case in Europe, where the fundamental rights guaran-
tee for the protection of personal data in Article 8 of the EU Charter kicks 
in as soon as personal data is collected. Once personal data is collected, 
the legal framework requires that this happens transparently and in view 
of specified lawful and legitimate purposes, in observance of data subject 
rights and the guarantee of independent oversight.54 In the United States, 
there is some more flexibility, considering the lack of a comprehensive reg-
ulatory framework for data privacy. Still, consent requirements in sectoral 
legislation tend to connect to the question of whether data is collected. In 
addition, the constitutionally grounded third- party doctrine in the United 
States, while ever under scrutiny, generally implies that once data has been 
collected by a third party, one loses one’s expectation of privacy in relation 
to government surveillance (Kerr 2009, 561).
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There may be a variety of reasons for hoping that people can be stopped 
from caring about privacy in terms of the mere access of organizations to 
information about their identity, behavior, and preferences in their per-
sonal, professional, and social lives. However, the empirical support that 
can help ground this wish is lacking. In fact, the growing impact that col-
lected information has on the conditions for living one’s life, through the 
potential use as well as misuse of such data, only makes such concerns 
about the mere collection of information more pertinent to address.
In conclusion, even if one were to support the attempt to answer the 
question about the legitimacy of pervasive personal data processing in 
terms of data use, instead of in terms of data collection, the legal and soci-
etal conditions for this attempt to succeed simply do not exist. If the use 
regulation argument is in essence a project of deregulation, as Chris Hoof-
nagle (2014) has argued, a shift to use regulation would increase the Pri-
vacy Disconnect even further. As long as the law provides legal standing 
to individuals, individually or in a more organized fashion, to investigate 
and contest personal data- processing practices from the moment of data 
collection, a shift to use regulation in practice would hardly respond to 
deeply entrenched legal data privacy dynamics. Perhaps even more impor-
tantly, a shift in privacy governance toward use regulation is not informed 
by empirical evidence that people will stop worrying about pervasive data 
processing from the moment data is being collected. In fact, the more data 
is collected about oneself for more purposes, ever more flexibly defined, 
the more reason there seems to be to simply worry about the accumula-
tion of data- derived power in the first place. This does not mean this is a 
productive stance toward current pervasive data- processing operations but 
simply that a negotiation around use involves even more complexity than 
a realistic, be it abstract, concern about the existence of data- derived power. 
In sum, the argument for use regulation may be more informed by our cur-
rent inability to find robust mechanisms for establishing the legitimacy of 
pervasive personal data processing than anything else.
Legitimacy and Informed Consent
The mechanisms for establishing the legitimacy of personal data process-
ing lie at the core of any privacy theory and data privacy framework. The 
core mechanism for establishing this legitimacy in the commercial sphere 
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has been the mechanism of informed consent.55 In the sphere of public 
administration, informed consent plays a diminished or differently con-
structed role. There, the legitimacy requirement is anchored in democratic 
legitimacy of legislation underlying personal data- processing operations 
by public administrations, including the observance of the principles of 
necessity and proportionality of the related interference in view of relevant 
constitutional and fundamental rights safeguards.
If we restrict ourselves for a moment to the commercial sphere, we are 
confronted with a paradoxical situation. Even though the conditions for 
realizing meaningful informed consent to work in practice seem weaker 
than ever,56 current privacy regulations, such as the GDPR, place more focus 
than ever on informed consent and the control over personal data as the 
primary standard for legitimacy.57 In the following, I will discuss some of 
the core challenges for informed consent to work and what lessons have 
been and could be drawn from that.
At the practical level, informed consent has been demonstrated to be 
difficult to realize. Even if privacy policies and related service architectures 
would provide the levels of transparency that would allow people to inform 
themselves about privacy- relevant practices, people would lack the time, 
let alone stamina, to inform themselves properly before making informed 
decisions (McDonald and Cranor 2008). The data- driven nature of the pro-
duction of digital functionality and the increasingly dynamic nature of 
all the features that are offered make things significantly harder (Gürses 
and Van Hoboken 2018). If meaningful consent with respect to a certain 
data- processing operation has been established, when and how should and 
can consent be renegotiated? Once we add the integration of third- party 
services, as discussed previously, to the mix, the situation becomes even 
more challenging.
Take the situation of the smartphone ecosystems as an example. Smart-
phones are an ideal site for the offering of individualized data- driven ser-
vices. They tend to be personal and contain and provide access to a host of 
sensors and personal data, such as photos, messages, contacts, rich behav-
ioral patterns, and location (de Montjoye et al. 2013). Enforcement initia-
tives and research in academia and civil society continue to show a lack of 
respect for basic data privacy guarantees that would be necessary for the 
establishment of informed consent in this context.58 For instance, many 
apps do not even have a privacy policy, the most basic means through 
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which transparency is offered to users.59 While the relevant operating sys-
tems have implemented increased controls (and policies) for accessing per-
sonal data such as location, the permission architectures do not provide 
the granularity that would be needed to address integration of a growing 
number of third- party trackers.60 Considering the high levels of standard-
ization that are possible through the policies and designs of dominant 
smartphone ecosystem providers (Android and Google Play, Apple Store 
and iOS), smartphones would be one of the best places to hope for data 
privacy to work in practice.
In addition to the practical problems with respect to the establishment 
of informed consent, there are fundamental theoretical objections with 
informed consent as the primary mechanism for establishing legitimacy. 
And in fact, in the European context, informed consent is just one of the 
possible grounds for establishing the lawfulness for the processing of per-
sonal data.61 There are two main other grounds available in the commercial 
realm. The first one requires that the processing of personal data is neces-
sary for the delivery of a service, or more specifically “the processing is nec-
essary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party 
or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering 
into a contract” (Article 6(1)(b), GDPR). The second is that the processing 
“is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the 
controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by 
the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which 
require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is 
a child” (Article 6(1)(f), GDPR). Notably, these two standards are objective 
and subjective elements meant to play a role in individual cases only.62 But 
the most striking aspect of the role of informed consent in the European 
legal framework is that regardless of consent being required or not, entities 
processing personal data always need to do so fairly, transparently, for spe-
cific, legitimate purposes, in observance of data subject rights, and subject 
to independent oversight by privacy regulators.63
There are further objections to data privacy frameworks relying on 
informed consent. First, the requirement of informed consent and the 
underlying conception of privacy as the control over one’s personal data, as 
most famously articulated by Westin (1967), may get the value of privacy 
wrong. This argument has been made most eloquently and convincingly by 
Nissenbaum (2009) in her theory of privacy as contextual integrity. It may 
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be so that in a certain context, respect for privacy implies the respect for a 
norm regarding the flow of personal data that involves the negotiation of 
consent, but such a context- specific norm does not generalize to a theory of 
privacy (ibid.). Respect for privacy, Nissenbaum argues, involves the respect 
for contextual norms with respect to the flow of personal information. This 
more objective contextual definition of privacy places the respect for pri-
vacy firmly outside of the realm of individualized negotiations around the 
processing of “one’s personal data.”
In addition, the fact that informed consent aims to protect privacy by 
giving individuals (a certain amount of) control over the collection and use 
of their personal information runs into deeper trouble every year (see also 
Mai’s chapter in this volume). First of all, the practical boundaries of what 
has to be negotiated are unclear as the boundaries of the concept of personal 
information (personal data under the European data protection framework) 
are contested and legally uncertain. In the United States, consumer pri-
vacy protections tend to focus on providing control mechanisms related to 
the personal information of individuals that is collected in the interaction 
of a particular service with that specific individual.64 This implies that the 
collection and use of personally identifiable information gathered through 
other means, or the information related to others collected through those 
individuals, simply falls through the cracks.65 If one follows the guidance 
of the European Union’s Article 29 Working Party on the concept of per-
sonal data, one could wonder what would still escape this broad definition 
in the context of data flows in digitally mediated contexts.66 In practice, 
many entities processing information falling under the definition of per-
sonal data do not easily acknowledge this (Christl and Spiekermann 2016). 
The removal of identifiers and the application of similar privacy engineer-
ing practices, however, do not easily lead to the legal conclusion that such 
information is no longer personal data. A similar problem with respect to 
the legal definition of personal data exists for the designated special cate-
gories of sensitive data, such as information revealing someone’s ethnicity, 
race, sexual orientation, or medical data. The boundaries of this concept are 
legally consequential as EU law imposes some significant roadblocks for the 
processing of these data.67
Finally, the structures of relevant sets of personal data reflect the social 
and interconnected contexts in which data is collected and processed. 
It is difficult to meaningfully separate someone’s personal data from the 
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personal data of others. As a result, the individualized negotiations around 
privacy in terms of informed consent are simply too narrow, while func-
tional mechanisms for negotiating the pervasive collection of the personal 
information of nonusers are lacking.68 But perhaps more fundamentally, 
because of predictive analytics and machine learning, the personal data “of 
others” may be as significant, from the perspective of privacy and related 
concerns about the data- driven exercise of power, as one’s own data (Baro-
cas and Nissenbaum 2014). In sum, it seems unwise to continue to frame 
data privacy issues in terms of a subjective concern over the relative con-
trol over one’s “own” personal data, that is, the subset of information that 
relates to you.
International Data Flows and the US– EU Divide in Data  
Privacy Governance
Some of the differences between the US and EU approaches to data pri-
vacy have already been discussed in passing. These differences are many 
and exist at the level of legal culture, regulatory design, constitutional safe-
guards, and enforcement mechanisms.69 While a deeper understanding of 
the differences is of theoretical as well as practical value, this is not the 
place to discuss these differences in depth. It seems entirely unsurprising 
that different approaches to data privacy exist in the world and would con-
tinue to exist in the future.
In fact, the diversity of approaches to data privacy in the European 
context is often overlooked. In Scandinavian countries, mandatory trans-
parency requirements with respect to taxation data exist that would be 
unthinkable elsewhere in Europe. The right to be forgotten ruling came 
out of a minority position of the Spanish Data Protection Authority with 
respect to the application of data protection obligations on search engines.70 
It is quite unthinkable that a similar case would have emerged in the Neth-
erlands, and a number of right to be forgotten rulings in the Netherlands 
have demonstrated the relative unease with the conclusions of the CJEU at 
the EU level.71
The European approach to privacy is the result of a combination of the 
concern for the protection of personal data, already codified into national 
data protection laws since the 1970s, with the project of European integra-
tion (Fuster 2014; Gutwirth 2002; Lynskey 2015; Schwartz 2013). The latter 
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project necessarily continues to involve harmonization efforts to allow for 
the free flow of personal data in the European context. To allow for such 
free flow of personal data, the Data Protection Directive established a Euro-
pean Union– wide framework for respect for privacy in the context of the 
processing of personal data.72 To address legal fragmentation as a result of 
different implementation and enforcement practices of the directive, the 
new framework established by the GDPR provides for further harmoniza-
tion in view of digital single- market aims.
The real complexity and trouble emerge, in the relationship with Europe, 
in the context of increasingly pervasive international data flows and the 
relative lack of legal and political integration outside the boundaries of the 
European integration project. The Organisation for Economic Co- operation 
and Development (OECD) principles and the increased interest in data 
privacy in the human rights context provide some legal baseline.73 Fur-
thermore, a variety of more specific intergovernmental and international 
regulatory initiatives have been undertaken. In addition, more pragmatic 
efforts exist, including through corporate privacy governance frameworks, 
as well as standardization and engineering practices. These can all serve to 
increase interoperability in view of differences in data privacy protections 
and the economic and political interests connected to international data 
flows. Even so, the divide between Europe and the United States on privacy 
has lately looked as wide and challenging as it ever may have been, and the 
stakes have grown considerably.
It is only since relatively recently that the EU has had its own binding 
fundamental rights instrument, including the newly established fundamen-
tal right to the protection of personal data. Until well into the 1990s the sta-
tus of fundamental rights in the EU context was weak and heavily debated.74 
The European institutions, except perhaps for the Council of the European 
Union, have enthusiastically received the new charter right to the protec-
tion of personal data with far- reaching regulatory efforts and judgments. 
Such European harmonization in the area of personal data protection some-
times overlooks the lack of enforcement of relevant norms in the European 
Union and the member states itself, in favor of establishing a common 
ground. Also, often overlooked is the reality that national security and for-
eign intelligence surveillance practices, an area in which data privacy viola-
tions tend to be most severe, are not harmonized at the EU level in the first 
place. Clearly, Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights and 
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related Council of Europe instruments, including Convention 108, provide 
a fundamental baseline of protection. Still, it is sometimes hard to escape 
the impression that the increased attachment to the protection of funda-
mental rights at the EU level, which were predominantly informed by the 
European integration project, is causing international tensions about inter-
national flows of personal data partly for the sake of Europe’s self- image.
Looking at the United States, the main challenges for data privacy in 
the international context exist at two levels. The first level is the relative 
inability and unwillingness of the US political system to adopt meaningful 
legislative reforms in the area of data privacy, including in relation to offer-
ing meaningful protection of the privacy- related rights and freedoms of 
non- US persons. Recent efforts to adopt a commercial privacy bill of rights 
have stalled, and internationally controversial United States surveillance 
laws remain in place without fundamental reforms, in the view of many 
observers. It seems entirely possible that such lack of reforms and the appar-
ent lack of support of the current US administration to rigorously imple-
ment the recently adopted Privacy Shield will lead to another trans- Atlantic 
privacy breakdown now that the CJEU has been asked to look at it again.75
Second, the international dominance of US- based technology firms com-
plicates dynamics in relation to the protection of privacy in commercial 
settings as well as in relation to the issue of government surveillance.76 In a 
purely national setting the interaction between commercial data collection 
practices and lawful access regimes is already a complicated matter. Respect 
for privacy and the legitimacy of pervasive personal data processing involves 
consideration of the standards under which data held in private hands can 
become accessible to government agencies. This ideally requires the cali-
bration of privacy standards for commercial and government surveillance 
at the national level. When lawful access is not meaningfully restrained, 
domestically or abroad, people are right to worry about entrusting their 
data to internationally operating private entities. Internationally operat-
ing cloud companies and the resulting transnational relationships between 
service providers and users in multiple jurisdictions across the world take 
place under the shadow of a multiplicity of lawful access regimes. The legal 
complexity is staggering, goes well beyond the EU– US relationship, and is 
likely to keep privacy researchers and practitioners busy for decades.
All of these transnational data privacy tension points put significant 
pressure on the existing international framework for data privacy at the 
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international level, and the human rights framework in particular. The 
extent to which the right to privacy as enshrined in human rights treaties 
will be able to trickle down and play a constructive role in addressing some 
of the challenges discussed in this chapter remains to be seen. There are 
positive signs in the establishment of a UN Special Rapporteur on the Right 
to Privacy and the increased attention to data privacy in the human rights 
area more generally, including in relation to the practices of online service 
providers. However, these are minor steps in comparison to what may be 
needed in terms of institutional and legal reform at the international level 
to ensure respect for data privacy in a globalized world in the long run.
Conclusion
This chapter has created a bleak picture in sketching some of the current 
challenges to data privacy. Specifically, I have argued that current privacy 
laws and policies fall short in providing for the legitimacy of current- day 
pervasive personal data- processing practices. This falling short, which I 
have summarized as the Privacy Disconnect, exists at the socio- technical, 
the regulatory, and the political levels. The Privacy Disconnect may not be 
new, but I find it safe to argue that the intensity of some of the challenges 
for the establishment of legitimacy has increased. The complexity of the 
socio- technical environment has increased, existing legal mechanisms 
and institutional arrangements are wearing out, and solutions are hard to 
come by.
When one takes a step back and looks at all the efforts that go into the 
protection of privacy, should not one conclude that the glass is at least half 
full? Undoubtedly so. Still, the reality is also that privacy laws, policies, 
and engineering practices respond to a multiplicity of concerns and values. 
This can easily lead to a situation in which significant resources are spent 
on protecting certain aspects of data privacy while other aspects remain 
unaddressed. Moving forward, it seems particularly important that privacy 
law and policy discussions become more firmly connected to the underly-
ing power dynamics they aim to resolve. Although this is certainly ambi-
tious, we should aim to ensure that data privacy law and policy respond 
more directly to the social, economic, and political needs of people con-
fronted with a world in which power is increasingly mediated through 
data- driven practices.
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Notes
1. I would like to thank the editor, Rikke Frank Jørgensen, the anonymous review-
ers, and the participants in the Author Workshop for their valuable comments and 
suggestions with respect to this chapter.
2. Data privacy as a conceptual term referring to the subset of privacy issues 
that stem from the collection and use of (personal) information, including data 
protection.
3. Regulation 2016/679 of April 27, 2016, on the protection of natural persons with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, 
and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation).
4. The European Commission also published a new proposal for a Regulation on the 
processing of personal data by EU institutions, a Communication on International 
Data Protection and a Regulation on the free flow of nonpersonal data.
5. In early 2018, the US Congress passed the Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data 
Act (as a last- minute addition to a trillion- dollar spending bill), and the European 
Commission has put forward proposals in the area of law enforcement on electronic 
evidence gathering through Internet- based services. Internationally, the United 
Kingdom and the United States appear closest to reaching an agreement on cross- 
border access in the law- enforcement area.
6. In the last two years, the Article 29 Working Party has issued new guidelines on 
data portability, data protection officers, the lead supervisory authority, the data 
protection impact assessment, transparency, the rules on profiling and automated 
decision- making, and the setting of administrative fines.
7. See, for example, the proceedings of the European Court of Human Rights in 
the Big Brother Watch application relating to government surveillance, https://t.co/ 
PyAhfgq5cc. See also CJEU (2014a, 2015). See Europe v. Facebook for more background 
on litigation of privacy advocate Max Schrems, mostly in relation to Facebook. 
Available at http://europe-v-facebook.org/EN/en.html. Schrems recently launched a 
new data privacy enforcement nongovernmental organization, called noyb (“none 
of your business”).
8. Several (increasingly interdisciplinary) conferences have successfully established 
themselves in the area, including Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
Symposium on Security and Privacy, the Computers, Privacy and Data Protection 
conference, the Privacy Law Scholars Conference, the Amsterdam Privacy Confer-
ence, and the Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium.
9. IAPP recently reported it now has 40,000 members worldwide; see Ashford (2018).
10. For a discussion of the proposals, see Zuiderveen Borgesius et al. (2017).
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11. For a discussion, see Van Hoboken (2016). See also Nissenbaum (2017).
12. For a discussion, see Nissenbaum (2017).
13. See Brian Fung (2017), Todd Shields and Eric Newcomer (2018), and Carole Cad-
walladr and Emma Graham- Harrison (2018).
14. Article 8, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The charter 
was solemnly proclaimed at the Nice European Council in 2000 and became bind-
ing with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on December 1, 2009.
15. See Paul De Hert et al. (2017).
16. For a discussion, see, for example, Graef, Husovec, and Purtova (2017).
17. See recently, for example, Paul M. Schwartz and Karl- Nikolaus Peifer (2017).
18. See, for example, Nicole Bullock (2017). The most highly valued tech company 
in Europe is SAP, which is the world’s sixtieth most valued company.
19. Basic information about these acquisitions can be found on Wikipedia.
20. For a discussion, see, for example, European Data Protection Supervisor Opin-
ion, March 2014.
21. For a discussion, including of the potential rise of Amazon in ad sales, see Sorrell 
(2018).
22. See Miller (2017).
23. See, for example, Esteve (2017).
24. Note that the case of the right to be forgotten is different in character, as it does 
not relate to the processing of user data, but to the public accessibility of personal 
data through search engines.
25. See, for example, Dutch Data Protection Authority reports for 2014.
26. Supra note 7. See also Van Alsenoy et al. (2015), Samuel Gibbs (2018), European 
Commission (2017b), and Federal Trade Commission (2018).
27. See Bodoni (2017).
28. See http://www.housingmaps.com.
29. Consider the wide range of companies and organizations that are offering (infor-
mation) goods and services, connecting to users through digital channels, including 
retailers, publishers, political parties, educational institutions, health services, gov-
ernment agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and so forth.
30. This is a nonexhaustive list meant to illustrate the argument. The question of 
what the current array of service components in different online service sectors 
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looks like is the kind of future research that we think needs to happen and is likely 
to provide further insights into how privacy governance may be organized.
31. Statcounter (https://statcounter.com) or market leader Google Analytics (https://
analytics.google.com/analytics/web/provision).
32. RevenueHits (http://www.revenuehits.com) or market leader Google AdSense 
(https://www.google.com/adsense).
33. See, for example, SwiftID by CapitalOne (two- factor authentication; https://
developer.capitalone.com/products/swiftid/homepage), OpenID (http://openid.net), 
or Facebook Login (https://developers.facebook.com/docs/facebook-login).
34. See, for example market leader Google reCaptcha (https://www.google.com/
recaptcha/intro/index.html).
35. See, for example, Cloudflare (https://www.cloudflare.com); Symantec’s Web 
Security Service, (https://www.symantec.com/products/web-security-services); or the 
free and open https as a service, Let’s Encrypt (https://letsencrypt.org).
36. OpenStreetMap (https://www.openstreetmap.org) or market leader Google 
(https://developers.google.com/maps).
37. See, for example, Google Custom Search (https://cse.google.com/cse).
38. See one of the earliest movers to the cloud, Salesforce (http://www.salesforce 
.com).
39. See, for example, Oracle Data Cloud (https://www.oracle.com/applications/
customer-experience/data-cloud/index.html) or Acxiom’s LiveRamp Connect (https:// 
liveramp.com/blog/customer-data-liveramp-connect).
40. See, for example, PayPal’s Braintree v.zero SDK (https://developer.paypal.com).
41. See Eventbrite (https://developer.eventbrite.com) or Ticketmaster (http://developer 
.ticketmaster.com).
42. See, for example, Fulfillment by Amazon (https://services.amazon.com/fulfill 
ment-by-amazon/benefits.htm).
43. See, for example, Amazon’s Delivery Service Partner program (for delivery sup-
pliers; https://logistics.amazon.com) and UPS Shipping API (for delivery demand) 
(https://www.ups.com/us/en/services/technology-integration/online-tools-shipping 
.page).
44. See, for example, Feefo (https://www.feefo.com/web/en/us).
45. See, for example, AddThis (http://www.addthis.com) and Facebook Sharing 
(https://developers.facebook.com/docs/plugins).
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46. See, for example, Facebook Comments (https://developers.facebook.com/docs/
plugins/comments) or Disqus (https://disqus.com).
47. See, for example, Google’s YouTube (https://www.youtube.com/yt/dev/api 
-resources.html) and SoundCloud (https://developers.soundcloud.com/docs/api/
sdks).
48. See CJEU (2017a). See also CJEU (2017b).
49. A discussion of whether cookie walls are permissible in Europe is ongoing. See, 
for example, Zuiderveen Borgesius et al. (2018).
50. See, for example, Koops (2014).
51. For an in- depth discussion, see Van Hoboken (2016).
52. See, for example, Mundie (2014), United States President’s Council of Advisors 
on Science and Technology (2014), Cate et al. (2014), and Weitzner et al. (2008).
53. See Cate et al. (2014) for the application of this argument to the revision of 
international data privacy guidelines.
54. See Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
55. In the United States, informed consent tends to be phrased as the requirement 
of “notice and choice.”
56. For a discussion of core issues with consent, see Solove (2013), Reidenberg et al. 
(2015), Koops (2014), and Nissenbaum (2009).
57. See, for example, European Commission (2012, 2018).
58. Federal Trade Commission Protecting America’s Consumers (2013); European 
Commission, Article 29 Working Party (2013); European Union Agency for Network 
and Information Security (2017); and Future of Privacy Forum (2016).
59. App distribution platforms (Google Play for Android and the Apple Store for 
iOS) require apps that process personal information to have a privacy policy and 
have started to enforce this requirement more strictly in the last year.
60. See, for example, European Union Agency for Network and Information Secu-
rity (2017).
61. See Article 6 of the GDPR and Article 7 of the Data Protection Directive. See also 
Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
62. See, for example, European Commission, Article 29 Working Party (2014) Opin-
ion on the notion of legitimate interests of the data controller.
63. This stands in contrast to the market- oriented approach to data privacy in the 
United States.
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64. See, for example, the California Online Privacy Act, which defines “personally 
identifiable information” as “individually identifiable information about an individ-
ual consumer collected online by the operator from that individual and maintained 
by the operator in an accessible form.”
65. For a discussion of the definition of the US concept of personally identifiable 
information, see Schwartz and Solove (2011).
66. European Commission, Article 29 Working Party, Opinion on the Concept of 
Personal Data (2007). See also Purtova (2018). Specifically, the definition of personal 
data includes information relating to an identified or identifiable individual. This, 
in the view of the Article 29 Working Party, encompasses information that is about 
an individual, information that has the purpose to be used in relation to an individ-
ual, or information that is likely to have an impact on a particular individual.
67. The CJEU is expected to rule on this definition in an upcoming ruling on the 
obligations of search engines with respect to sensitive personal data in their index.
68. Think of the implications to others of providing access to one’s messages, 
e-mails, pictures, and contacts in the smartphone context.
69. See, for example, Bennett and Raab (2006) and Bygrave (2014).
70. The Spanish Data Protection Authority Agencia Española de Protección de Datos 
took a different position from the Article 29 Working Party in 2009, by arguing that 
a right to request delisting from search engines followed from the data protection 
directive. The Article 29 Working Party itself took a more careful approach in its 
Opinion 1/2008 on data protection issues related to search engines.
71. For a discussion of Dutch right to be forgotten cases, see Kulk and Zuiderveen 
Borgesius (2018).
72. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 Octo-
ber 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal 
data and on the free movement of such data (European Parliament and the Council 
1995).
73. See OECD (2013). In the human rights context, see, for example, United Nations 
(2014).
74. On the relation of the EU to fundamental rights, see Alston and Weiler (1999), 
Leben (1999), Williams (2004), and Coppell and O’Neill (1992).
75. The Irish High Court has recently referred questions to the CJEU, in a new case 
of Schrems, involving standard contractual clauses and the privacy shield. See the 
Irish High Court (2016).
76. For a US perspective, see, for example, Clarke et al. (2013). See also Van Hobo-
ken and Rubinstein (2013).
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11 Regulating Private Harms Online: Content Regulation 
under Human Rights Law
Molly K. Land1
Introduction
Online expression today is largely governed by private companies exer-
cising authority outside the purview of public control. Companies such 
as Google, Facebook, and Twitter moderate our conversations, deliver our 
news, and keep us connected with acquaintances, friends, and family. Busi-
ness entities now manage our communication and social relationships in 
ways that can affect everything from our emotions to our dignity, our live-
lihoods, and even our elections.
In the context of human rights law, however, private regulation— however 
pervasive— presents a dilemma. Both state and private actors can cause 
human rights harms, but international human rights law traditionally 
has only regulated the former. Human rights law requires governments to 
protect individuals from violations of their rights by non-state actors but 
generally stops short of imposing legal obligations on private actors them-
selves. Non-state actors typically have only a moral responsibility, not a 
legal obligation, to respect rights and remedy their violation.
Although nonbinding, the responsibility of companies to respect rights 
has gradually evolved into a framework of “corporate social responsibility” 
(CSR) that is now being applied across a range of industries, including in 
the context of Internet content moderation. The UN Special Rapporteur on 
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, for example, has called on Internet 
companies to follow the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights (Kaye 2018, para. 11). Yet the application of the UN Guiding Princi-
ples to Internet intermediaries2 raises a host of questions for human rights 
law and institutions. Do content “intermediaries” such as Facebook and 
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Google truly not have any obligations under international human rights 
law when they determine what content we see in our news feed or search 
results? If they do, what are these obligations and where do they come 
from? And how should these companies resolve disagreements about what 
content is indexed or displayed?
This chapter responds to these questions by developing a human 
rights– based approach to understanding the legal obligations of Internet 
intermediaries that engage in content moderation activities. The chap-
ter makes two contributions to the literature on Internet governance and 
human rights. First, it develops a definition of state action online that takes 
account of the myriad ways in which states are currently pressuring Internet 
content providers to implement state policies. Much of what is currently 
characterized as “private” action should instead be seen as action by the 
state, since in many cases the state has expressly or implicitly imposed an 
obligation on these private companies to regulate speech on its behalf. In 
order to understand the scope of state responsibility for the actions of pri-
vate intermediaries, the chapter develops a new typology for describing the 
activities of states seeking to influence, control, or appropriate these private 
entities: control, command, delegation, notice and takedown, co- optation, and 
informal pressure. The chapter applies this framework to delineate between 
action that can and should be governed directly by human rights law as 
state action and “private” action that requires a modified approach to 
account for its non-state character.
Second, this chapter provides such a modified approach for understand-
ing the “private” actions of non-state content intermediaries. It argues that 
Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
imposes some duties directly on online intermediaries. These duties do not 
mirror those of the state, but they do require intermediaries to respect basic 
principles of due process and remedy. Direct obligations may be strongest 
for Internet companies that are Internet gatekeepers— a position defined 
by an intermediary’s dominance, the nature of the intermediary’s service, 
and the availability of market alternatives. These intermediaries in particu-
lar must be transparent about their terms of service and provide grievance 
mechanisms for users wishing to contest their decisions about content.
Harms that are neither “state action” nor a violation of a direct obliga-
tion on an Internet company can be addressed through the exercise of pos-
itive state obligations. States have positive obligations to create an enabling 
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environment in which the right to freedom of expression is not threatened 
by terms of service enforcement. In meeting this obligation, states should 
not only regulate to enforce the direct obligations of due process and rem-
edy but should also take steps to ensure competition in the Internet eco-
system and to consider the rights of speakers in addition to the companies’ 
business objectives and the desires of users when they make decisions about 
content moderation and curation.
The chapter begins by briefly describing ways in which Internet inter-
mediaries can affect freedom of expression online. It then discusses cur-
rent CSR responses to these harms as well as the gaps and limitations of 
these approaches: the conflation of private and public action, the difficulty 
of identifying a “violation” of expressive rights, and the challenge of rec-
onciling the interests of speakers with business objectives and user prefer-
ences. The final section identifies concrete recommendations that can be 
adopted by human rights institutions, such as the United Nations bodies 
that monitor state compliance with human rights treaties, in responding to 
the human rights impact of such intermediaries.
Internet Intermediaries under Human Rights Law
For human rights law and institutions, harms caused by private actors can 
present a challenge. Both states and non-state entities can cause human 
rights harms, but international human rights law generally only regulates 
the former. This section first discusses the way in which current approaches 
to protecting rights online have tended to neglect the harms of private reg-
ulation. It then provides a roadmap of the kinds of harms associated with 
private regulation of online speech and identifies several conceptual chal-
lenges in fitting these harms within a traditional human rights framework.
Current Approaches to Business and Human Rights Online
Human rights law typically responds to the impact of business on human 
rights through a combination of national regulation and nonbinding frame-
works. States are obligated to regulate non-state actors to protect human 
rights, and many do so in a variety of ways. This duty to protect is a central 
pillar of human rights law and was recently reaffirmed in the reports of 
John Ruggie, who served as the UN Secretary- General’s Special Representa-
tive for Business and Human Rights from 2005 to 2011. The approach that 
288 Molly K. Land
Ruggie advocated, which was eventually affirmed by the UN Human Rights 
Council in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, puts 
primary emphasis on the state’s obligation to regulate business to protect 
rights (Jørgensen 2018; Ruggie 2011).
Efforts to promote greater respect for human rights by business enter-
prises have been largely voluntary, relying on aspirational statements and 
self- regulation to push forward the CSR agenda (De La Vega 2017, 446).3 
Ruggie’s framework, which provides the foundation for the Guiding Princi-
ples, reflects an attempt to give CSR more teeth by introducing the idea of 
a business “responsibility”— a moral (but not a legal) obligation to respect 
rights and to remedy their violation. The moral responsibilities of busi-
ness under the Guiding Principles include the duty to “[a]void causing or 
contributing to adverse human rights impacts through their activities” and 
to “[s]eek to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are 
directly linked to their operations” (Ruggie 2011, 14).
Efforts to apply this framework to Internet companies have tended 
to focus on two kinds of problems. First, significant efforts have been 
made— including by the companies themselves in many cases— to develop 
a way to respond to state requests to censor content online (Jørgensen 
2018, 263). Second, activists have also emphasized transparency and pro-
cess, including the need for more disclosure about the nature of company 
activities regulating online content and the importance of creating proce-
dures for receiving and responding to complaints (Laidlaw 2015, 112).
The first issue— how companies respond to state requests to censor 
online content— came to prominence in the mid- 2000s with revelations 
about the complicity of Yahoo! and other companies in human rights vio-
lations in China. These revelations led to Congressional hearings at which 
representatives of the major Internet companies had to respond to ques-
tions about their role in state human rights abuses. These events prompted 
the formation in 2008 of a multistakeholder organization, the Global Net-
work Initiative (GNI),4 composed of company, investor, academic, and 
nongovernmental organization representatives (Maclay 2010). GNI helps 
companies navigate “pressure by governments to act in ways that may 
impact the fundamental human rights of privacy and freedom of expres-
sion” by providing a framework of human rights standards, a process for 
holding companies accountable to these standards, as well as opportunities 
for policy engagement and learning (GNI 2017).
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Advocates and experts have also identified Internet companies’ lack 
of transparency about their policies and procedures as an issue of human 
rights concern. As Sullivan notes, “the lack of transparency and account-
ability for how those policies [the terms of service of Internet providers] 
are enforced can lead to human rights risks” (Sullivan 2016, 16). The issue 
of transparency about companies’ policies and how they are enforced has 
also been raised by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and 
Expression (Kaye 2016, para. 65). Ranking Digital Rights, a nonprofit advo-
cacy group, assesses Internet companies’ compliance with human rights 
principles, including by reference to whether the company communicates 
about changes in their terms of service and is transparent about enforce-
ment (Ranking Digital Rights 2018).
Human Rights Impacts of Content Regulation
Clearly, the question of how companies can and should respond to state 
requests plays a central role in promoting respect for human rights on the 
Internet. Yet the decisions that these companies make about their own 
policies and procedures can also have significant consequences for rights. 
Although UN experts have identified private harms as an important human 
rights issue (Kaye 2016, 2018), companies themselves have been “reluctant 
to view content moderation undertaken to enforce their terms of service 
(TOS) as a human rights issue” (Sullivan 2016). Jørgensen’s chapter in this 
volume, for example, explores how this focus on state overreach is reflected 
in the narratives of company employees and executives. Nonetheless, the 
thousands of decisions each day that these “new speech governors” (Klon-
ick 2018) make about the content on their platforms have significant effects 
on our ability to generate and share information and expression.
This section will discuss three primary ways in which private terms of 
service can affect freedom of expression online: content moderation, con-
tent curation, and account suspension or termination (Bradley and Wing-
field 2018, 12).
Content Moderation. Internet platforms can affect expression and par-
ticipation online by moderating (removing, de- indexing, or deprioritizing) 
particular user content. As the chapter in this volume by Jillian York and 
Ethan Zuckerman makes clear, content moderation policies and practices 
routinely go beyond what is required by either domestic or international 
law. Terms of service enforcement often removes content that platforms 
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believe might be unpleasant or harmful to users— including content that 
is violent, explicit, or abusive or which models harmful behaviors (such as 
pro- anorexia content). Content that might violate a platform’s terms of ser-
vice is often first identified by other users or through the use of algorithms 
(Cook 2016). After potentially harmful content is identified, it is reviewed 
by paid moderators and potentially escalated for further review within the 
company (Hopkins 2017).
Content Curation. Private companies are also increasingly taking on the 
role of curating the information world in which we live. Internet platforms 
and services do not just show us information randomly— they organize, 
curate, and manage information for us. Often, these processes of curation 
are algorithmic. Platforms use proprietary formulas to decide what content 
to provide to users: what search results to display, what content to show, 
and what related content to offer (Pasquale 2015, 59– 100). Because these 
formulas are proprietary and central to their business models, platforms 
do not share many details about how they make these decisions; some do, 
however, offer users the ability to provide input into the choices that are 
made about the content they experience.
In some instances, platforms may also intentionally display particular 
content to users. Examples include not only the infamous Facebook feed 
incident (Goel 2014) but also recent reports that YouTube redirects users 
who search for extremist content to antiterrorism videos (Brogan 2017). 
Facebook has partnered with Homeland Security and an analytics firm 
to support campaigns aimed at creating counterspeech against hate and 
extremism, although it has denied using its algorithm to direct people to 
such material (Solon 2017).
Account Suspension and Termination. Platforms also affect freedom 
of expression online when they suspend or terminate user accounts for 
repeated terms of service violations. Users whose accounts have been ter-
minated often have relatively few options for contesting those decisions 
(Angwin and Grassegger 2017).
Two Conceptual Challenges
There are several different types of human rights problems raised by the 
processes of content moderation, curation, and account suspension/
termination. Nonetheless, the extent to which human rights law governs 
these activities is unclear. This section discusses the human rights impact 
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of these activities in light of the two central challenges to applying human 
rights law to content moderation policies.
Challenge 1: Identifying the Violation The first challenge in applying 
human rights law to these activities has to do with identifying when, if 
ever, content moderation by Internet companies constitutes a violation of 
international human rights. When does a company’s decision to remove 
content or terminate a user account trigger a human rights obligation? As 
David Kaye, the current UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and 
Expression, noted in his 2016 report to the Human Rights Council, Internet 
companies can affect rights when they engage in “overzealous censorship of 
a wide range of legitimate but (perhaps to some audiences) ‘uncomfortable’ 
expressions” (Kaye 2016, para. 52).5 Clearly, restricting access to informa-
tion via moderation or curation limits the rights of both speakers and lis-
teners under Article 19 of the ICCPR, which includes the “freedom to seek, 
receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of fron-
tiers.” But does that transform every content decision by an intermediary—
not only large social media companies but also individual website operators 
and online newspapers with comments sections— into an action that must 
be justified pursuant to Article 19?
From the perspective of users, the fact that expression is silenced by 
a private rather than a public actor may not matter. Apple’s decision to 
remove from the iTunes App Store an application that distributed publicly 
available data about drone strikes (Biddle 2015) or Facebook’s deletion of 
a Syrian artist’s photos of refugees who had drowned off the coast of Libya 
(Mirzeoff 2015)— look and feel like censorship. For individuals affected by 
such decisions, it may be of little comfort that their content was blocked or 
removed by a private rather than a public actor.
Human rights institutions, to the extent they have addressed this gap, 
have simply tended to equate public and private censorship and have con-
demned both as inconsistent with freedom of expression. A joint decla-
ration by UN and regional freedom of expression experts, for example, 
contends, “Content filtering systems which are imposed by a government 
or commercial service provider and which are not end- user controlled are a 
form of prior censorship and are not justifiable as a restriction on freedom 
of expression” (Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and the Inter-
net 2011, para. 3(b)). Nonprofits as well have advocated that companies 
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adopt the standards of Article 19 in their content moderation policies 
(Bradley and Wingfield 2018, 15– 18). And David Kaye’s 2018 report recom-
mends that companies “recognize that the authoritative global standard for 
ensuring freedom of expression on their platforms is human rights law, not 
the varying laws of States or their own private interests, and they should 
re- evaluate their content standards accordingly” (Kaye 2018, para. 70).
Yet it cannot be the case that every content moderation decision made 
by every digital platform should be subject to human rights scrutiny. And if 
not, how and where do we draw the line in terms of when freedom of expres-
sion (or any other human right) is implicated? Is the decisive factor the 
platform’s size and impact, the presence of alternative avenues for expres-
sion, the type of content— or a combination of all of the above? Although 
any interference with free expression, if done by a state actor, would trig-
ger human rights scrutiny, it is not clear under which circumstances private 
content moderation or curation interferes with a protected right.
Challenge 2: Human Rights Norms on Commercial Platforms The second 
challenge is understanding how human rights norms might apply to con-
tent moderation and curation activities. Typically, when free expression 
norms are applied to states, the state is not in the business of moderating 
or curating content; indeed, it would be highly suspect for a government to 
take on the role of making content- based decisions about speech in order to 
curate the information space. Companies, in contrast, are not only engaged 
in curating content as a central element of their business model but users 
seek these platforms precisely because of the choices the companies make 
about the information they deliver.
The explicit role that information management plays in the business of 
Internet content providers complicates the human rights analysis. When a 
company chooses to prioritize some content over other, what values should 
guide its decision? Imagine, for example, the off- line equivalent— that Face-
book were put in charge of determining who should speak at a public rally 
in order to curate an information experience for listeners, who then paid it 
for this service. If we truly believe that the Internet is the new public forum, 
what criteria should Facebook use to determine who is heard in that forum? 
And is it legitimate for those criteria to be driven by business incentives 
designed to make our speech a desirable commodity for other users— for 
Facebook, a commodity that generated over $40 billion in revenue in 2017 
(Roettgers 2018)?
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At its core, the conflation of public and private raises questions about 
values. These platforms generally purport to be showing us information 
that we want to see based on a complex formula that takes into account 
our past information consumption habits combined with the habits and 
preferences of others. But is “what we want” the right metric for making 
those decisions? Shouldn’t they also consider what information we “need” 
to have? Are they obligated to show us what we do not want to see, and if 
so, under what circumstances? Curation algorithms that display content 
based on past user behavior, for example, will bias content in favor of mate-
rial for which the user has already expressed a preference and thus limit the 
extent to which the user encounters content with which he or she disagrees 
(Bakshy, Messing, and Adamic 2015; Tufekci 2015).
Some have advocated a principle of neutrality in content moderation, 
arguing that neutrality should be the governing principle not only for 
online transmission of data (i.e., “net neutrality”) but also for the “over the 
top” content delivery services. Such services, in this view, should act in a 
“neutral way” with respect to the content they deliver (Observacom 2017, 
11). It is not clear, however, what “neutrality” means, since even a principle 
of “most recent” reflects value choices. Further, given the amount of con-
tent on the largest platforms, some moderation is inevitable.
The question of public speech on private platforms also raises the ques-
tion of how “freedom of expression concerns raised by design and engi-
neering choices should be reconciled with the freedom of private entities 
to design and customize their platforms as they choose” (Kaye 2016, para. 
55). Content moderation is deeply intertwined with companies’ business 
models as well as being part and parcel of the products that they offer to 
consumers (Jørgensen 2018, 251). Internet platforms make decisions about 
content because of their brand or image and what they think consumers 
want from their product or service. Shocking or unpleasant material, even 
if it constitutes core political speech, could still be “bad for business” (Ben-
edek and Kettemann 2014, 105). How should the values of “free speech” be 
reconciled with business values, individual choice, and consumer rights? 
How should claims for transparency be reconciled with the need of compa-
nies to protect proprietary information about their algorithms?
Internet intermediaries view content moderation and filtering as essen-
tial to the nature of the services they provide and thus the value they offer 
to consumers. Moreover, these pressures cause companies to be highly risk 
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averse. In navigating the demands of consumers, business models, and 
governments, “[t]oo often, companies err on the side of caution and for-
bid much more speech than states would have to prohibit because of their 
human rights obligations” (Benedek and Kettemann 2014, 104).
A Proposed Human Rights Framework for Protecting Rights Online
This section proposes a framework for resolving these challenges. First, it 
argues that much of what might seem to be “private” speech is actually 
undertaken pursuant to state authority and thus should be treated as gov-
ernment action under human rights law. Second, it argues that platforms 
are subject to some limited but direct responsibilities under human rights 
law. With respect to private conduct of intermediaries that is not governed 
by human rights law, the section then argues that states have a positive 
obligation to create a rights- enabling environment to protect against and 
remedy harms to freedom of expression.
Identifying State Action
At the outset, human rights institutions and experts must first recognize 
that a good deal of “private” censorship is being done pursuant to state 
authority. From China to the European Union, private companies are being 
asked to “voluntarily” regulate speech on their platforms under the threat of 
regulation and liability (Bradley and Wingfield 2018; Xu and Albert 2017). 
Governments have strong interests in controlling the communications sec-
tor, and they are using a variety of sophisticated techniques to leverage the 
power of intermediaries in order to achieve their objectives. Jørgensen and 
Pedersen acknowledge this problem, asking “at what stage may freedom 
of expression limitations be attributed to the state, when caused by ‘vol-
untary’ measures taken by intermediaries following state encouragement 
to do so?” (Jørgensen and Pedersen 2017, 187). This section argues that 
the extent of government interference should determine whether a particular 
action— removal of content, for example— should be viewed as the action 
of a private entity or a state (ibid., 183).
Under international human rights law, there are two ways in which a 
state can incur responsibility for the act of a private entity. First, the private 
action may be attributable to the state under principles of state responsi-
bility. The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility, 
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which the UN General Assembly commended to the attention of states in 
2001, provides a framework for understanding the conditions under which 
action by an entity other than the state is attributable to the state for pur-
poses of state responsibility. Second, states have special obligations under 
human rights law to ensure and protect rights, which includes the obli-
gation to protect individuals from violations of their rights by non-state 
actors. This means that private harms can give rise to state responsibility if 
the state fails to respond adequately to these harms (Velásquez Rodríguez 
1988, para. 182). This second form of liability is not derivative liability for 
the acts of a private actor but rather a new and independent wrongful act 
by the state— namely, the systematic failure to prevent, prosecute, and pun-
ish harms to rights perpetrated by non-state actors (Hessbruegge 2004, 269; 
Bodansky and Crook 2002, 783).
This section addresses the first type of state responsibility— direct or 
vicarious responsibility. (State responsibility derived from the failure to pro-
tect and punish violations will be considered later in the chapter.) Broadly, 
there are three provisions of the Articles on State Responsibility relevant to 
understanding when the actions of an Internet intermediary are the acts of 
a state governed by human rights law:
• Article 4 (State Organ): Under Article 4 of the Articles on State Responsi-
bility, “[t]he conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that 
State under international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, 
executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever position it holds in 
the organization of the State, and whatever its character as an organ of 
the central Government or of a territorial unit of the State.”
• Article 8 (Instruction, Direction, or Control): States are responsible for 
wrongful private acts done pursuant to their instruction, direction, or 
control. Article 8 of the Articles on State Responsibility provides, “The 
conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of 
a State under international law if the person or group of persons is in 
fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, 
that State in carrying out the conduct.” The three terms in Article 8 are 
disjunctive, and thus any one of the elements— “instructions,” “direc-
tion,” or “control”— will satisfy the test (Commentary, 47). The ILC 
Commentary notes that Article 8 largely encompasses two situations: 
“The first involves private persons acting on the instructions of the State 
296 Molly K. Land
in carrying out the wrongful conduct. The second deals with a more 
general situation where private persons act under the State’s direction or 
control” (ibid.).
Instruction: State responsibility for acts carried out pursuant to state 
instruction is clearly established by international law. When the state 
instructs a private party to carry out a wrongful act, the act will be 
attributable to the state (ibid.). Key to establishing attribution under 
this provision is a specific charge. A broad rallying cry by the state, or 
statements that seek to instigate or encourage action, even in the con-
text of a shared goal with private actors, will not constitute instruc-
tion (Mačák 2016, 415- 416).
Direction or Control: The second situation, involving direction and con-
trol, is more complicated. Much of the law in this area has involved 
direction and control by a state over military operations, so the extent 
to which this law may be extrapolated to other contexts is unclear. 
Nonetheless, the Commentary emphasizes that private conduct can 
be attributed to the state only if the state “[1] directed or controlled 
the specific operation and [2] the conduct complained of was an inte-
gral part of that operation. The principle does not extend to conduct 
which was only incidentally or peripherally associated with an opera-
tion and which escaped from the State’s direction or control” (ibid.). 
Discussing the drafting history of this article, Mačák notes that the 
ILC’s Special Rapporteur, Professor Crawford, intended this second sit-
uation to provide for attribution in the absence of a “specific charge” 
since “the existence of an express instruction will be very difficult to 
demonstrate” (Mačák 2016, 413).
• Article 5 (Empowered by Law): Article 5 provides that states also incur 
responsibility for the wrongful acts of entities, which, although not offi-
cially organs of the state, are “empowered by the law of that State to 
exercise elements of governmental authority.” Article 5 includes entities 
that exercise state authority on behalf of state agencies as well as “former 
State corporations [that] have been privatized but retain certain public or 
regulatory functions” (Commentary, 42). What is key is that the entity 
“is empowered by the law of the State to exercise functions of a pub-
lic character normally reserved by State organs” (ibid., 43). This might 
include a private airline delegated authority over immigration issues or 
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a private company running a prison and exercising the governmental 
power of detention. (Ibid.)
To understand the application of these principles to government control of 
intermediaries, this section develops a typology of state activities seeking 
to control, influence, or appropriate the regulatory power of Internet inter-
mediaries. To date, there has been no systematic attempt to identify and 
describe the increasingly sophisticated ways in which states are bringing 
their power to bear on intermediaries.6 This typology is urgently needed 
to ensure that states do not evade responsibility for their wrongful acts 
by cloaking them in the garb of private power. Jørgensen and Pedersen 
(2017, 180), for example, note concern “that the intermediaries are being 
used to implement public policy with limited oversight and accountabil-
ity with severe implications on human rights.” Among other things, this 
could allow states to “de facto neglect their human rights obligations and 
escape the strict requirements, which would have been otherwise incum-
bent upon them had they applied the restrictions themselves” (ibid.; Jør-
gensen 2013, 98– 100).
Broadly, there are five different ways in which governments use Internet 
companies to control speech online: control, command, delegation, notice and 
takedown, co- optation, and informal pressure. These are ideal types, however, 
and any given government action may exhibit characteristics of more than 
one of these categories. Nonetheless, categorizing government action in 
this way provides a foundation for understanding how principles of state 
responsibility might apply to the various ways in which states interact with 
Internet intermediaries engaged in content regulation.
Control. A state might be responsible for the acts of an intermediary if it 
either controls the intermediary itself or controls the activities of the interme-
diary (Hathaway et al. 2017, 547).7 This might occur if the intermediary is 
an organ of the state under Article 4 of the Articles on State Responsibility. 
State ownership is most common with telecommunications companies and 
mobile operators, and the actions of those state- owned companies with 
respect to access and content are attributable to the state. State organs may 
also be directly involved in managing online content. A recent paper by 
King, Pan, and Roberts (2017), for example, describes the way in which the 
Chinese government engages in reverse censorship by hiring individuals 
to post social media comments. Analyzing documents from the Internet 
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Propaganda Office of Zhanggong in Jiangxi Province, King and his col-
leagues find that these posts are not aimed at countering but rather dis-
tracting readers from antigovernment speech. Individuals hired by a state 
to influence the information space are acting on behalf of a state organ and 
their activities are attributable to the government.
States might also be responsible for the acts of intermediaries under 
Article 8 if the intermediary is acting under the state’s direction or con-
trol. Mačák (2016) notes that although “direction” and “control” are often 
addressed as one element (411– 412), the explicit change from “and” to “or” 
indicates that the ILC intended these to operate separately (414). Thus, 
“direction” could encompass situations in which a state has an ongoing 
relationship with a private actor, such that a suggestion or innuendo by 
the state would be understood as a command (418). The control test, in 
contrast, has been interpreted fairly narrowly (Hathaway et al. 2017, 552), 
and would likely require either “effective” or at least “overall” control (Wit-
tich 2002, 894). Mačák (2016) argues however that international law may 
be moving toward a more permissive interpretation of “control,” either in 
general or on a case by case basis (423– 425).
In some instances, the requisite level of state direction or control over a 
private platform might be demonstrated. Certainly, there are several situa-
tions in which states have relationships with private actors that would lead 
the private actor to view the state’s “suggestion” as a command. For exam-
ple, although the precise contours of China’s relationships with its three 
largest Internet intermediaries— Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent— is unclear, 
it seems that these relationships would meet the definition of direction or 
even control, including under some of the more restrictive interpretations 
of the control test. The Chinese government has discussed taking a direct 
stake in these companies (Borak 2017), for example, and reports note these 
intermediaries are “careful to demonstrate loyalty to the party” and that 
they have significant power because “the government trusts them to heed 
[its] call to do whatever the regulatory bodies want” (Feng 2017). To the 
extent that the government directs and controls the content moderation 
activities of Internet companies, these decisions should be governed by the 
requirements of human rights law.
Command. Under Article 8 of the Articles on State Responsibility, states 
may also be responsible for the actions of intermediaries that, while not 
state organs, are acting under the instructions of a state. Thus, a legal 
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command directing an intermediary to take a particular action with respect 
to content on its platform should be considered state action. This might 
include, for example, court injunctions to block illegal file sharing sites 
(Laidlaw 2015, 170), or orders from the government directing platforms 
to remove particular apps (Manjoo 2017). Commands might also include 
enforcement actions seeking to apply existing laws to the Internet. Paki-
stan, for example, has used blasphemy laws to restrict access to Facebook, 
while in Lebanon, authorities used defamation law to justify the arrest of 
three Facebook users who had posted criticism of the Lebanese president 
(Deibert and Rohozinski 2012, 25– 26). When the government directs the 
intermediary’s actions with respect to content removal or account termi-
nation, the resulting conduct should be considered state action subject to 
human rights principles.
Delegation occurs when a state places legal responsibility on the interme-
diary to regulate content, thereby thrusting the intermediary into the role 
of state censor. Article 5 of the Articles on State Responsibility provides that 
states incur responsibility for the wrongful acts of entities that, although 
not officially organs of the state, are “empowered by the law of that State 
to exercise elements of governmental authority.” The Commentary to the 
Articles on State Responsibility notes that what is essential to this category 
is that the private entity is “empowered by the law of the State to exercise 
functions of a public character normally reserved by State organs” (Com-
mentary, 43). In the examples provided in the Commentary— including 
private airlines exercising immigration authority or private prisons exercis-
ing detention authority— the private actors are carrying out essential gov-
ernment functions and are therefore deemed to be state actors.
When governments create liability regimes that require Internet compa-
nies to censor the speech of their users, they risk delegating essential gov-
ernmental authority to the intermediaries and the resulting actions of the 
intermediaries could be considered state action subject to the requirements 
of human rights law. For example, in many jurisdictions Internet interme-
diaries are strictly liable for the speech on their platforms and thus must 
proactively police speech. The Chinese Cybersecurity Law of 2016 prohibits 
dissemination of “false” information as well as information that disrupts 
national unity or national security and “requires companies to monitor 
their networks and report violations to the authorities,” and failure to com-
ply with the law can lead to heavy fines (Kaye 2018, para. 15). Thailand’s 
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Computer Crimes Act also imposes strict liability on intermediaries for con-
tent prohibited by the government (Bradley and Wingfield 2018, 31). Ken-
yan law requires companies to “‘pull down accounts used in disseminating 
undesirable political contents on their platforms’ within 24 hours” (Kaye 
2018, para. 16).
The essential government function delegated to intermediaries in this 
context is the authority to regulate the rights and remedies of others. This 
“delegated censorship” (Deibert and Rohozinski 2012, 26; DeNardis 2014, 
158) is problematic because it calls for a private company to make decisions 
about the meaning, applicability, and enforcement of law. The making and 
enforcement of law is an essential government function and should not be 
delegated to a private entity without any framework of accountability.
Notice and Takedown. Governments also seek to influence the conduct 
of intermediaries through conditional liability. In these frameworks, inter-
mediaries are liable for offending content only if they fail to remove that 
content after being notified of its presence on their systems. For example, 
the new German network enforcement law (NetzDG) requires social media 
companies to remove unlawful content after being notified of its presence 
on their networks or risk up to fifty million euros in fines (Kaye 2018, para. 
16; McGoogan 2017). The European Union is pushing for similar legislation 
to make companies responsible for hate speech online (Fioretti 2017). In 
the United States, intermediaries are protected from liability for copyright 
violations only if they fail to remove offending content after being pro-
vided with notice (17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C)). Like direct delegation, notice 
and takedown or other forms of conditional liability have the potential to 
delegate essential governmental authority to intermediaries to make deci-
sions about whether the content of users on their networks is unlawful, and 
therefore could be considered state action if the delegated authority is not 
properly circumscribed.
There are two other types of state influence of Internet intermediaries 
that would not appear to rise to the level of state action.
Co- optation. States increasingly co- opt the enforcement systems devel-
oped by Internet intermediaries to achieve their own ends. The Counter- 
Terrorism Internet Referral Unit in the United Kingdom, for example, uses 
providers’ terms of service to initiate removal of content the government 
wishes to suppress. This Counter- Terrorism Internet Referral Unit employs 
state agents to review content online and upon finding “extremist” 
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content, notifies the platform on which it was found and suggests that 
this content should be removed as a terms of service violation (Kaye 2018, 
para. 19; Llanso and Cant n.d.). More informally, governments also “refer” 
matters to Internet companies for their review. In the wake of controversy 
following the publication of the video “The Innocence of Muslims,” for 
example, the US government asked Google to consider whether the video 
violated its Community Guidelines (DeNardis 2014, 158). David Kaye 
notes that “[i]n South- East Asia, parties allied with Governments report-
edly attempt to use terms of service requests to restrict political criticism” 
(Kaye 2018, para. 19).
Although state co- optation of private enforcement systems is troubling, 
it does not seem to rise to the level of state action. Under principles of state 
responsibility, the fact that a government has referred a matter to an inter-
mediary for evaluation under the intermediary’s terms of service does not 
make a subsequent takedown an act of the state. Absent facts that would 
indicate a close relationship between the intermediary and the state (which 
would imbue the “referral” with greater authority), there has been no exer-
cise of governmental authority by the intermediary, nor is the intermedi-
ary acting “on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of” 
the state. Nonetheless, while the activity of the private company is not 
state action, the referral or request is the activity of a state and thus can 
be judged on its own merits (Commentary, 47). Thus, the work of the UK 
Referral Unit, which co- opts providers’ terms of service to achieve its ends, 
should be judged in light of the UK’s human rights obligations— but the 
action of the intermediary itself remains a private, not a state, action.
Informal Pressure. Governments also regularly exert informal pressure on 
Internet intermediaries to take actions entirely outside of public law mech-
anisms.8 Governments pressure companies in a variety of ways, including 
through public condemnation and telephone calls. Following the WikiLeaks 
revelations, for example, the US government exerted pressure on PayPal, 
Amazon, and others to cease doing business with WikiLeaks (Balkin 2014, 
2328; DeNardis 2014, 162). As David Kaye notes in his most recent report 
to the Human Rights Council, governments “also place pressure on com-
panies to accelerate content removals through nonbinding efforts, most of 
which have limited transparency. A three- year ban on YouTube in Pakistan 
compelled Google to establish a local version susceptible to government 
demands for removals of ‘offensive’ content” (Kaye 2018, para. 20).
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Informal pressure alone, absent other facts that could give this pres-
sure greater coercive force, would not seem to meet the definition of state 
action— it is neither delegated governmental authority nor action taken 
under the instruction, direction, or control of the state. That said, there 
are instances in which informal pressure appears to border on delegation 
or instruction. For example, some instances of what appears nominally 
to be self- regulation are actually a form of delegation achieved through 
the threat of regulation. The 2016 European Union Code of Conduct 
addressing hate speech online, for example, is an “agreement” between 
the European Union and Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter, and YouTube that 
the companies will, among other things, review notifications and remove 
unlawful hate speech within 24 hours of notice (Aswad 2016, 3- 4; Kaye 
2018, para. 21). The European Union has also made demands that illegal 
content be removed within two hours, invoking the threat of legislation 
if platforms did not “voluntarily” comply with this demand (Bradley and 
Wingfield 2018, 10).
Under principles of state responsibility, the first four categories of state 
influence— control, command, delegation, and notice and takedown— 
transform the resulting private activity into state action that should be 
evaluated pursuant to human rights norms. While this conclusion is likely 
unproblematic with respect to the first two categories, it may be somewhat 
more controversial to view actions taken pursuant to delegation and notice 
and takedown as state action. That said, this conclusion is supported not 
only by law but also policy. The risks of overcensorship are extremely high 
in cases of delegated government authority.
Delegation is a problem for human rights law because it makes private 
actors responsible for governing the conduct of others. Clearly, a state can 
impose liability on private actors. Doing so is an important way for govern-
ments to force individuals and corporations to internalize the costs of their 
behavior and thereby to enforce the law. What is unique about delegated 
authority to remove harmful speech is that it is responsibility to govern 
the speech of others— what Jack Balkin (2014, 2298) calls “collateral cen-
sorship.” There is an important difference between holding a newspaper 
responsible for the defamatory material it publishes and holding a platform 
responsible for defamatory material that third parties publish on its site.9
It is appropriate to view this as a delegation of essential government 
authority because private entities do not have the proper incentives to 
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regulate the content of others. Internet companies do have an interest in 
protecting freedom of expression on their platforms as a general matter, 
since the content that users generate is an essential component of the prod-
uct that they are providing. However, while they may have an interest in 
protecting freedom of expression generally, they do not have a strong inter-
est in protecting any particular individual instance of speech. When faced 
with a choice of taking down a post that might be problematic and fighting 
to keep it up in the face of potential liability, the incentives weigh in favor 
of removal. Delegation thus leads inevitably to overbroad limits on speech 
(Balkin 2014, 2309– 2310). As a result of these concerns, both the current 
and former UN Special Rapporteurs have expressed significant concerns 
with the impact of intermediary liability on expressive rights (Kaye 2016, 
para. 40– 44; La Rue 2011, para. 38– 48). The Office of the Special Rapporteur 
for Freedom of Expression of the Inter- American Commission on Human 
Rights has similarly argued that strict liability and notice and takedown are 
both inconsistent with the American Convention on Human Rights (Spe-
cial Rapporteur for the Inter- American Commission 2013, para. 98, 105).
The primary consequence of viewing content moderation undertaken 
pursuant to delegated authority or notice and takedown as state action is 
that the resulting moderation should be evaluated under human rights 
norms. This means that content removals, for example, must pursue a legit-
imate purpose, follow lawful procedure, and be proportional to the ends to 
be achieved (La Rue 2011, para. 24). This ensures that states cannot delegate 
public authority to private entities and thereby evade lawful human rights, 
constitutional, and rule- of- law checks. In delegating responsibility to Inter-
net platforms, states must take care to ensure that the regulation occurs in 
ways that comport with its human rights obligations.
Limited but Direct Obligations
Under human rights law, the activities of non-state actors are generally not 
governed by international law, except in limited instances (Knox 2008; 
Land 2013; Weissbrodt and Kruger 2005). I argue that with respect to the 
regulation of speech, international law imposes a limited set of obligations 
directly on intermediaries in some circumstances.
The text and negotiating history of Article 19 of the ICCPR, which pro-
tects freedom of expression and opinion, indicates that it applies, at least 
in part, to private actors. As I have written elsewhere and Agnes Callamard 
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addresses in this volume, the drafters of Article 19 recognized that private 
actors can have significant effects on freedom of expression and therefore 
settled on a text that protected not only against governmental interfer-
ence but also interference from private actors (Land 2013, 445). This is rein-
forced by the term “media” in Article 19(2), which protects the channel of 
communication, as well as the term “duty” in Article 19(3), which makes 
clear that “opinion makers” are obligated “not to abuse their power at the 
expense of others” (Nowak 1993, 351).
If they do have direct obligations under human rights law, however, 
these obligations would only be triggered when there has been an “interfer-
ence” with a protected right. But under what circumstances would an Inter-
net company’s decision to remove my comment from its site be a violation 
of my freedom of expression? Because users often have a variety of options 
for expression online, an interference is likely to occur primarily when an 
Internet intermediary has assumed such a dominant position in the market 
that the user is not able to easily find another venue for his or her expres-
sion. This understanding of an “interference” with freedom of expression 
draws on the work of scholars who have written about dominant interme-
diaries as the “gatekeepers” of expression. Reliance on gatekeeper theory is 
particularly appropriate given that the rationale behind including private 
actors within the scope of Article 19 was the drafters’ concern with media 
concentration and monopolies in the communications arena.
Gatekeeper theory argues that some intermediaries may have spe-
cial responsibilities by virtue of their dominance, status, or influence on 
democracy. Emily Laidlaw (2015), for example, argues that companies with 
greater impacts on democracy should have greater obligations to ensure 
that discourse can take place. According to Laidlaw, the human rights 
responsibilities of these entities “increase or decrease based on the extent 
that its activities facilitate or hinder democratic culture” (Laidlaw 2015, 
48). Jørgensen similarly asks whether Google should merely be treated as a 
private company or whether the importance of its services mean it has “an 
extra obligation to respect human rights standards” (Jørgensen 2013, 95).
Gatekeepers may be defined both by reference to market dominance as 
well as the extent to which there are reasonably adequate alternatives. As 
danah boyd argues, Facebook is structured in a way that does not reason-
ably enable exit. Even if one disagrees with Facebook’s policies, it is difficult 
to leave the platform, which has become such a central nexus not only for 
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social connection but also for professional advancement (boyd 2010). This 
is complicated by network effects. A user might reasonably choose to use a 
different blog hosting service, but it is more difficult to recreate a social net-
work that includes one’s friends or followers (York 2010). Impact might also 
be measured by the extent to which a platform is used for political speech, 
which generally enjoys higher protections (Laidlaw 2015, 50). Platforms 
that host high levels of political speech, such as Twitter, may need to be 
more attentive to human rights concerns than those that are aimed solely 
at social connection.
Thus, intermediaries will have differential duties based on the extent 
to which their activities affect freedom of expression. All intermediaries 
would be subject to a limited set of duties, including obligations of process, 
transparency, and remedy— the obligation to provide grievance processes 
for individuals who alleged they have been harmed by the company’s deci-
sion; the obligation to provide information about the company’s policies, 
practices, and impacts; and the obligation to remedy harms to expression 
with which they are linked (see Kaye 2018, para. 58– 59, 71– 72, recom-
mending conformity with the Guiding Principles in these respects; see also 
Aswad 2018). Because their market dominance means they are able to inter-
fere with freedom of expression, gatekeeper intermediaries should also be 
required to evaluate their content moderation policies under the legality, 
necessity, and legitimacy requirements of Article 19(3) of the ICCPR.
At the same time, it is not clear that even dominant intermediaries should 
be treated like states for all purposes. State and private action can have 
different impacts on communication, and private entities cannot be held 
responsible for the full range of obligations that states have with respect to 
freedom of expression. Internet companies are private entities, and even 
the most dominant of them should be able, at least to some extent, to take 
into account their own business needs and the preferences of the users of 
their platforms, including in eliminating offensive content. Internet inter-
mediaries may also have their own expressive rights under domestic law to 
consider (cf. Hein 2014, 326). Nonetheless, these differential interests can 
be addressed within the framework provided by Article 19(3), as legitimate 
goals of content moderation. Article 19(3) allows limitations on speech 
that are necessary “[f]or respect of the rights or reputations of others.” This 
includes not only the expressive and association rights of others but also 
the domestic property rights and commercial rights of the company, since 
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the terms of Article 19(3) are not limited to “fundamental rights or Cove-
nant rights” (Nowak 1993, 463).
There may be a second type of situation in which direct duties are 
triggered— namely, situations in which the challenged action has a signif-
icant impact on a protected right. For example, interrupting access to the 
Internet can affect the ability of users not only to express themselves and 
associate with others but also to fulfill a range of basic needs, including 
applications for employment or social support. Thus, the decision of an 
intermediary to suspend or terminate the account of a user would be more 
likely to trigger human rights duties than decisions about content mod-
eration, regardless of the dominance of the platform. Similarly, violations 
of the right to be free from discrimination, or to give meaningful consent 
prior to being involved in an experiment, should be judged directly under 
human rights law. Thus, an intermediary of any size that suspends or termi-
nates an account, or engages in discriminatory content moderation, could 
be bound by human rights law on the same terms as a state.
Positive Obligation to Regulate Private Harms
Much of the activity of Internet intermediaries that affects freedom of 
expression can be addressed either as state action or by virtue of direct 
obligations on intermediaries to guard against interferences or particularly 
serious violations of rights. There will, however, be some amount of pri-
vate regulation of content beyond these measures of accountability. With 
respect to this private activity, companies can and should follow the UN 
Guiding Principles (Kaye 2018; see also Aswad 2018). In addition, however, 
it also falls to the state to create an enabling regulatory environment to 
ensure that the right to freedom of expression is protected.
States have positive obligations to create a regulatory environment in 
which all users’ rights can be respected, online as off- line (Del Campo 2017, 
5– 6). Human rights institutions and advocates have largely neglected the 
positive obligations of the state to regulate intermediaries to protect rights 
online by focusing on harmful regulation by states or the harms of content 
itself. Nonetheless, it is a fundamental principle of human rights law that 
states are required to protect individuals from human rights harms and to 
provide remedies when rights have been violated (Ruggie 2011, 3). Failure 
to do so can give rise to state responsibility. As the Inter- American Court 
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of Human Rights noted in the case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras: “An 
illegal act which violates human rights and which is initially not directly 
imputable to a State (for example, because it is the act of a private person or 
because the person responsible has not been identified) can lead to interna-
tional responsibility of the State, not because of the act itself, but because 
of the lack of due diligence to prevent the violation or to respond to it as 
required by the Convention” (para. 172). The Court has explained further 
in Ximenes- Lopes that these positive duties are particularly urgent when the 
state has outsourced the exercise of essential governmental authority:
Rendering public services implies the protection of public interests, which is one 
of the objectives of the State. Though the States may delegate the rendering of 
such services, through the so- called outsourcing, they continue being respon-
sible for providing such public services and for protecting the public interest 
concerned. Delegating the performance of such services to private institutions 
requires as an essential element the responsibility of the States to supervise their 
performance in order to guarantee the effective protection of the human rights of 
the individuals under the jurisdiction thereof and the rendering of such services 
to the population on the basis of non- discrimination and as effectively as possible.
(Ximenes- Lopes 2006, para. 96).
There are several components to a rights- respecting information ecosystem. 
States must enable access to the Internet (La Rue 2011, para. 61), and they 
must regulate to ensure the Internet is free and open (Kaye 2016, para. 30). 
States must take positive steps to protect individuals from harmful speech 
posted by others online, while avoiding the imposition of intermediary lia-
bility that can negatively affect freedom of expression (Arun 2015, 9– 10). 
States must also take positive steps to protect users from harms that might 
result from terms of service enforcement— content removal, content cura-
tion, or account suspension or termination— undertaken by the platform 
itself. In addition to being more transparent about their own requests of 
intermediaries, states should require transparency, process, and remedies of 
these content regulators. They might also impose fiduciary duties on Inter-
net companies to ensure they fully consider the rights of users.
One way in which public regulation could provide greater protection 
for users is to obligate intermediaries to be transparent about the decisions 
they make regarding content regulation and account suspension or termi-
nation and to provide for grievance procedures if individuals are harmed 
in the process. Transparency about platform terms of service and their 
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enforcement is needed both to ensure that individuals know what content 
is allowed and what is prohibited and to enable them to hold the platform 
accountable for violations. This might be complemented by regulations 
requiring a remedy or grievance procedure for responding to alleged harms. 
Robust remedies designed to respond to harms of online content might in 
many cases be preferable to prior restraints that seek to avoid the harm; 
this approach could minimize both limits on content as well as regulatory 
burdens on intermediaries.
States can also take steps to promote competition and reduce market 
concentration— for example, through competition law. Media consolida-
tion can have a significant impact on diversity and pluralism (Jørgensen 
2013, 94). States might use antitrust law to ensure there are enough avenues 
for expression and that markets do not become unduly concentrated, thus 
limiting choices available to users of these platforms (Kaye 2018, para. 6). 
Competition would be promoted by protecting user rights, such as rights 
to data ownership and portability (Thierer 2013, 283– 284). Tim Wu (2011, 
304) argues in favor of a separations principle, or “the idea of maintaining 
a salutary distance between differing functions in the information econ-
omy.” Comparing it to the governmental separation- of- powers principle, 
Wu argues that this principle could both protect young industries from 
incumbents as well as prevent against the consolidation of too much power 
in any one industry player (ibid.).
In some cases, states might also consider regulating intermediaries as 
public utilities to ensure basic minimum quality and access requirements 
(boyd 2010; Thompson 2010). Regulation of this sort is not without cost, 
of course, including costs to innovation and competition (Heins 2014, 
326– 327; Lao 2013, 314–317; Thierer 2013, 270– 278). Nonetheless, think-
ing about a public utility framework offers “a way to diagnose problem-
atic concentrations of power” and “suggest[s] a concrete way forward for 
today’s reformers seeking to secure access to basic necessities and impose 
checks and balances on providers” (Rahman 2018).
States might also impose substantive obligations in some instances. For 
example, a state could prevent particularly dominant intermediaries or 
intermediaries that hold themselves out as public forums from discrimi-
nating based on the content on their platforms. Twitter, for example, as a 
forum that is aimed at generating public speech, might reasonably be sub-
ject to greater regulation than Facebook, which positions itself as promoting 
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private speech. Although the public forum doctrine has not been applied to 
the Internet under US law (Gey 1998; Nunziato 2005), positive substantive 
obligations may be more consistent with European law (Laidlaw 2015, 157).
Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter has been to outline two central challenges that 
arise in applying human rights law online and providing starting points for 
human rights institutions and experts seeking accountability for private 
harms online. Clearly, much more work needs to be done to identify the 
normative commitments that should drive answers to these questions— to 
address what Gillespie calls the “basic paradox” of social media platforms: 
that “these are private companies policing public speech, and are often 
intervening according to a culturally specific or financially conservative 
morality” (Gillespie 2015). Nonetheless, the growing impact that Internet 
intermediaries have on freedom of expression compels the task.
Many of the challenges in this process stem from the fact that Inter-
net intermediaries often do not fit traditional roles. They are generally not 
speakers themselves; in general they do not solicit and curate content like 
a newspaper; nor are they in most cases mere conduits, such as a telephone 
company. Increasingly, albeit to varying degrees depending on the business 
at issue, these companies are the guardians and curators of speech of others. 
Failing to recognize this new and unique role has obscured the importance 
of an enabling regulatory environment in addressing harms associated with 
these activities.
Understanding better the responsibilities of non-state actors with respect 
to their private activity in defining the boundaries for public debate is par-
ticularly important given the poor track records most governments have in 
protecting rights online. The usual human rights response, which is to rely 
on states to regulate non-state actors to protect rights, may be ineffective 
given the incentives that states also have to exert their control over the 
communication space. Articulating independent responsibilities for private 
actors— and being clear about the limits of those responsibilities— will have 
beneficial effects for human rights in this sector because they can supple-
ment state responsibilities when the latter fall short.
Finally, addressing these challenges will also be important for efforts to 
promote business and human rights more generally. Understanding the 
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complicated relationship between business responsibility and protecting 
freedom of expression in this area could prove crucial for eventual efforts 
in obtaining a treaty on the human rights obligations of private compa-
nies. Further study is warranted, particularly with respect to how any treaty 
obligations would apply across various sectors, before moving forward, and 
understanding the obligations of Internet intermediaries would be a step 
forward in that process.
Notes
1. The author is grateful to Evelyn Aswad, Bethany Berger, Larry Helfer, Rachel 
Lopez, Federica Nieri, and Richard Wilson, as well as the faculty at Drexel Law 
School and the participants in the Business and Human Rights Scholars Association 
4th Annual Conference, for their helpful feedback and comments, and to Zeynep 
Aydogan and Camden Weber for excellent research assistance.
2.  “Internet intermediaries are third- party platforms that mediate between digital 
content and the humans who contribute and access this content” (DeNardis 2014, 
154).
3. The exception was the Draft Norms on the Responsibility of Transnational Cor-
porations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, which was 
not adopted by the UN General Assembly (De La Vega 2017, 443– 446). Although 
efforts to develop a new treaty on business and human rights are ongoing at the 
United Nations, the future of these efforts is uncertain given uneven state support 
and the opposition of many within the business community (ibid., 433; Response of 
International Business Community 2017).
4. The author participates in GNI’s academic constituency and is an alternate on 
its board on behalf of the Human Rights Institute at the University of Connecticut, 
which became a member of GNI in 2015. All views expressed here are the author’s 
own.
5. To the extent that curation results in content not being seen, it can be analyzed 
like moderation. There is generally little difference to the end user whether content 
is removed or simply made invisible.
6. Deibert and Rohozinski (2012) come the closest in their discussion of next- 
generation controls employed by government to control content online. Their 
framework, however, focuses broadly on all controls— legal and technical, public 
and private— while this typology seeks to understand and categorize the various 
forms of influence that governments can exert on intermediaries to control content.
7. Hathaway et al. (2017, 547) explain: “Under Article 4, the question is the level 
of control the state exercises over the actor that undertakes the act, whereas under 
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Article 8, it is the level of control the state exercises over the operation during which 
the act occurs.”
8. Deibert and Rohozinski (2012, 26) call this category “informal requests” but 
include in this category slowdowns by state- owned Internet service providers and 
pressure from government officials to remove requests.
9. This does not mean that all forms of secondary liability or even privatization of 
services transform private action into state action. It is the particular way in which 
incentives align in this instance to incentivize overcensorship that make delegated 
censorship especially pernicious.
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